Towards a theory of geographically uneven privatisation : The case of New Zealand public hospital ancillary services by Stubbs, John Graham
Towards a Theory of Geographically Uneven Privatisation: 
The Case of New Zealand Public Hospital Ancillary Services 
A thesis 
submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirement for the Degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the 
University of Canterbury 
by 
John Graham Stubbs 
Department of Geography 
University of Canterbury 
May 1990 
I rl. rn~ rnCJo r y CJo ±-
Willi~rn BCJo~~rs St~bbs 
1920 1990 
Towards a Theory of Geographically Uneven Privatisation: 
The Case of New Zealand Public Hospital Ancillary Services 
CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
LIST of FIGURES 
LI ST OF TABLES 
ABSTRACT Page 
INTRODUCTION 1 
The Social, Spatial and Political Extent of Privatisation 1 
The Geography of Privatisation 4 
The Inadequacies of the Privatisation Literature and the 
Contribution of the Thesis to Geographical Research 6 
The Structure of the Thesis 7 
CHAPTER 1 
Privatisation and the Public Interest 10 
1. 1 Pri vatisation: Towards a Concept ual Clarificat ion 11 
1.1.1 Public and Private in Economic Activity 11 
1. L 2 Privatisation and Voluntarisation 15 
1.2 Public and Private Spheres of Human Activity in Classical 
Political Economy 17 
1.2.1 Self Interest and the Public Interest 17 
1.2.2 The State and the Economy 19 
1.3 Liberal Political Economy and the Development of the 
Public Sector Economy 21 
1. 3. 1 The Public Interest Redefined 21 
1.3.2 The State in Liberal Political Economy 23 
1.4 The State and the Market in Marxian Political Economy 26 
1.4.1 The Market and Private Property in Marxian Political 
Economy 26 
1.4.2 The State in Marxian Political Economy 28 
Summary and Conclusion 30 
CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical Perspectives on the Development of Privatisation 1: 
Public Choice and Managerialism 33 
2. 1 Pri vat isat ion and Geographical Scale 33 
2.2 Public Choice Theory and Privatisation 35 
2.2.1 Economic Efficiency, Property Rights and Privatisation 35 
2.2.2 The Public Economy and Public Choice Theory 38 
2.2.3 Political Pluralism and Public Choice Theory 40 
2.2.4 The Spatiality of Privatisation and Public Choice 
Theory 42 
2.3 Managerialism and Privatisation 44 
2,3. 1 The Weberian Origins of Managerialism 44 
2.3.2 Geographical Applications of Managerialism 46 
2.3.3 Managerialism and Corporatism 49 
Summary and Conclusion 52 
CHAPTER 3 
Theoretical Perspectives on the Development of Privatisation 2: 
Marxian Theory 54 
3.1 The Provision of Public Infrastructure for Private 
Production 55 
3.2 State Fiscal Crisis and Privatisation: The Contribution of 
O'Connor 56 
3.3 Class Conflict, the State Sector and Privatisation 60 
3.4 Beyond the Marxist D~bate: Towards a Reassessment of 
Theory 64 
3.4. 1 Back to Managerialism and Public Choice Theory? 64 
3.4.2 Locality Studies and Regionally Uneven Development: A 
Return to Empiricism or an Advancement of Theory? 67 
Summary and Conclusion 69 
CHAPTER 4 
The Processes of Privatisationj 72 
4.1 The Implementation of Privatisation Policies: Descriptive 
Accounts 72 
4.2 An Analytical Framework for Identifying Forms of 
Privatisation 73 
4.3 Analysis of Forms of Privatisation 75 
4.3. 1 The Selling of State Assets and Enterprises 75 
4.3.2 The Commercialisation and Corporatisation of the 
4.3.3 
4.3.4 
State Sector 77 
Privatisation by Contracting Out 
Privatisation of the State and Deregulation of the 
Market 
79 
79 
4.3.5 Privatisation and Public Service Retrenchment 81 
Summary 83 
4.4 Contracting Out and Privatisation; Some Further Conceptual 
Clarification: 84 
4.4.1 Contracting Out, Private Contracting and 
Privatisation -84 
4.4.2 Contracting Out and Competitive Tendering 85 
4.4.3 Competitive Tendering and Privatisation 87 
Summary 90 
4.5 Privatisation by Contracting Out: The Contribution of 
Ascher (1987) 92 
Conclusion 97 
CHAPTER 5 
The New Zealand Public Hospital System and the 
Provision of Ancillary Services 99 
5.1 Privatisation and the Provision of Public Hospital Services 101 
5.1.1 The Growth of Private Hospital Care 101 
5.1.2 The Commercialisation of State Sector Hospi tal Care 103 
5.1.3 Theoretical Explanations for Public Hospital 
Privatisation 104 
5.2 The Public Hospital System under Stress; The Case of 
New Zealand 105 
5.3 The Administration of the New Zealand Public Hospital 
System 107 
5.3.1 The Provision of Services 107 
5.3.2 Direct or Contract Provision for Services 
5.4 Public Hospital Ancillary Services 
111 
112 
112 
115 
5.4.1 The Classification of Ancillary Services 
5.4.2 The Provision of Hospital Ancillary Services 
5. 5 The Provision of Ancillary Services in Canterbury and 
Ashburton Hospital Boards 119 
119 
122 
125 
5.5.1 The Canterbury Hospital Board 
5.5.2 The Ashburton Hospital Board 
Conclusion 
CHAPTER 6 
The Geographical Basis of Contract Service Provision 
for Public Hospital Ancillary Services 127 
6. 1 An Overview of the Growth of Contract Service Provision 127 
6. 1. 1 The Historical Origins of Cont ract ing Out 127 
6.1.2 Hospital Boards' Contracting Out Policies since 1970 132 
6.2 Competitive Tendering and Changed Forms of Contracting Out 
in the 1980s 137 
6. 3 Summary 140 
6.4 The Market for Contract Service Provision 140 
6.5 The Changing Geography of Contracting Out since 1970 145 
6.6 Organisational Characteristics of Public Hospital 
Ancillary Services 147 
6.6.1 Levels of Technology and Labour Intensity 147 
6.6.2 Professionalism and the Administration of Ancillary 
Services 148 
6.7 Review of Theoretical Considerations 151 
6.8 Institutional Size and Contracting Out 153 
6.8.1 Hospital Board Size and Contracting Out Policies 153 
6.8.2 Economies of Scale and Contracting Out 158 
6.9 Contracting Out and Geographical Location 160 
Summary and Conclusion 162 
CHAPTER 7 
The Early Development of Contracting Out Public Hospital 
Ancillary Services 164 
7. 1 Sources of Reference 164 
7.2 The Historical Origins of Contracting Out Hospital 
Services in New Zealand 165 
7.3 The Consolidation of Contracting Out Policies 170 
7.4 The Uneven Spatiality of Contracting Out prior to 1970; 
8. 1 
8.2 
8.3 
Towards a Theoretical Perspective 173 
7.4.1 Socio-economic factors 174 
7.4.2 Institutional Factors 183 
7.4.3 Political Factors 185 
Conclusion 187 
CHAPTER 8 
Contemporary Developments in the Contracting Out of Public 
Hospital Ancillary Services 190 
New Zealand's Economic Development since the late 1960s 
The Financing of the New Zealand Public Hospital System 
Changes to Hospital Board's Contracting Out Policies: 
Theoretical Considerations 
191 
195 
197 
8.4 Comparative Cost Reductions to Hospital Services 197 
201 
201 
8.5 Contracting Out and Financial Restrictions 
8.5. 1 Contracting out and Cost Saving: The Evidence 
8.5.2 Fiscal Stress, Labour Productivity and 
Contracting Out 205 
8.6 Political Power and the Contracting Out of Ancillary 
Services 213 
217 
220 
8.7 Managerial Considerations 
Conclusion 
CHAPTER 9 
Contracting Out and Class Conflict 222 
9.1 The Rationale for Labour Force Opposition to Private 
Contracting of Hospital Services 222 
9.1.1 Public Accountability and Private Contacting 
of Hospital Services 224 
9.1.2 Employment Conditions of Public Hospital Ancillary 
Workers 225 
9.1.3 Ancillary Sector Workforce Reductions 227 
9.2 Trade Union Policy and Contracting Out Ancillary 
Services 233 
9.2. 1 An Index· of Class Conflict 235 
9.2.2 The Growth of Industrial Militancy in the Ancillary 
Sector Workforce 240 
9.3 The Geography of Contracting Out and Class Conflict: 
10. 1 
10.2 
10.3 
10.4 
10.5 
10.6 
Case Studies 245 
9.3. 1 Stat ist ical Comparison of Northland with 
Southland and Auckland with Otago Hospital Boards 246 
9.3.2 Labour Force Militancy in Auckland and 
Northland: the Implications for Contracting Out 247 
9.3.3 The Management of Ancillary Services in the 
Auckland Hospital Board 252 
9.3.4 Political Factors in the Termination of Contract 
Services in the Auckland Hospital Board 254 
Conclusion 257 
CHAPTER 10 
The Geography of Privatisation and the Provision of Public Hospital 
Services in the 1990s: A Reconsideration of Theory 259 
Empirical Factors Mediating the Development of Privatised 
Service Provision 
The Contracting Out of Hospital Services within a 
Theoretical Perspective 
The Limitations of the Explanations of the Uneven Growth 
of Privatisation 
Recent Developments in the Privatisation of Public 
Hospital Care and the Provision of Ancillary Services 
Geographically Uneven Privatisation Beyond the Public 
Hospital Sector 
Future Directions in Geography: Some Concluding Comments 
APPENDIX 
259 
263 
267 
271 
276 
278 
282 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in Relation to Hospital Board Size 
(by Bed Numbers) and Number of Ancillary Services Contracted Out 
APPENDIX 2 
Calculation of Index of Privatisation for Ancillary Services in 
New Zealand Hospital Boards 
APPENDIX 3 
Adjustments to Hospital Board District Populations for Cross 
Boundary Flows of Travellers (after Barnett et a1 1980) 
APPENDIX 4 
Methodological Considerations in the Gathering of Data and 
Information on the Contracting Out of Public Hospital Ancillary 
Services 
REFERENCES 
283 
284 
285 
288 
LIST OF FIGURES 
1. 1 A selection of Definition of Privatisation 12 
1.2 Production and Exchange Characteristics of Private and Public 
Sector Economies 14 
1. 3 The Public Interest in Classical and Liberal Political Economy 23 
1.4 Socio-Economic Concepts and Political Economy 30 
3.1 Theoretical Frameworks for Explaining the Privatisation of 
the State 70 
4.1 Forms of Privatisation 73 
4.2 The Conceptual Differences between Collective and Commodity 
Provision 74 
4.3 Analytical Distinction between Three Different Forms of 
Privatisation 80 
4.4 Interrelationship between Privatisation and DeregUlation 83 
4.5 Venn Diagram Showing the Relation between Contracting Out 
and Privatisation 86 
4.6 Venn Diagram Showing the Relation between Contracting Out 
and Tendering Out 88 
4.7 Venn Diagram Showing the Relation between Privatisation 
and Tendering Out 89 
4.8 Venn Diagram Showing the Relation between Contracting Out, 
Competitive Tendering and Privatisation 91 
5.1 New Zealand Hospital and Area Health Board Districts 
1950 - 1990 -110 
5.2 The Financing and Administration of New Zealand Public 
Hospital by either Private (Contract) or Public (Board) 
Provision. 113 
5.3 The Social and Spatial Structure of New Zealand Public 
Hospital Provision 117 
5.4 The Administration of Public Hospital Ancillary Services in 
New Zealand Hospital Boards: Lines of Communication. 118 
5.5 The Location of Public Hospitals in the Canterbury and 
Ashburton Boards 
5,6 Comparison of Contracting Out Ancillary Services in 
Canterbury and Ashburton Hospital Boards 
5.7 Administration of Canterbury and Ashburton Hospital Boards' 
Ancillary Services and Private/Public Sector Interaction 
6. 1 New Zealand Public Hospitals Contracting Out Domestic Services 
Services 1948 
120 
121 
123 
128 
6.2 Ancillary Services Contracted Out in New Zealand Hospital 
and Area Health Boards, 1950-1970. 129 
6.3 Ancillary Services Contracted Out in New Zealand Hospital 
and Area Health Boards, 1975-1990 134 
6.4 Classification of New Zealand Hospital Boards' Contracting Out 
Policies for Cleaning, Orderly and Dietary Services since 1980 136 
6.5 Services Provided by ADT (New Zealand) 143 
6.6 The Relation between Hospital Board Size and Privatisation 
of Ancillary Services 157 
7.1 Industrial Disputes between 1948 and 1970 176 
7.2 Comparison of Hospital Board and Employment District Boundaries 
for 1950 182 
8. 1 Working Days Lost Through Industrial Stoppages and Total 
Registered Unemployed Persons 1961-1988 193 
8.2 Costs of Public Hospital Services in New Zealand, 1975-1988 200 
8.3 Elected Members of Hospital Boards by Socio-Economic Group 215 
9.1 Trade Union Policy on Contracting Out Public Servivces 223 
9.2 Regional Variations in Number of Work Stoppages in New Zealand 
Hospital Boards since 1970 239 
9.3 Trade Union Activity in the Work Place 251 
9.4 Trade Union Campaign for Election to the Auckland Hospital Board 255 
i Survey of Industrial Action taken in New Zealand Public 
Hospitals by Members of the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union 290 
LIST OP TABLES 
6.1 Time Periods in which Hospital Boards Commenced Contracting Out 131 
6.2 The Size of New Zealand Hospital Boards 1976-1986 146 
6.3 Example of Domestic Cleaning Contract Submitted to a Hospital 
Board in 1988 149 
6.4 Contracting Out of Hospital Services and Hospital Board Size 154 
6.5 Indices of Privatisation of New Zealand Public Hospital 
Ancillary Services 
6.6 Correlation Coefficients Gained From Correlating Institutional 
156 
Size and Levels of Contracting Out 161 
7. 1 Comparison of Contract and In-House Cost of Service Provision 
for a New Zealand Public Hospital in 1952 172 
7.2 Employment in New Zealand Manufacturing Industry - 1946-1970 174 
7.3 Notified Vacancies in In~ustrial Sectors, 30th November 1948 177 
7.4 Notified Vacancies in the Tertiary Sector of New Zealand 
Industry - November 1948 178 
7.5 Labour Short by Employment Districts 179 
7.6 Coincidence between Hospital Board Districts, Labour 
Shortage and Contracting Out for 1955 and 1956 181 
8. 1 Costs of Public Hospital Services in New Zealand 1975-1988 199 
8.2 Financial Constraints on Hospital Board and Cost Effectiveness 
of Ancillary Services for 1981 and 1986 207 
8.3 Summary of Data and t-Test for Contracting and Non-Contracting 
Hospital Boards for 1981 and 1986 209 
8.4 Correlation Coefficients for Privatisation, Financial 
Constraint and Cost Effectiveness of Hospital Boards' 
Housekeeping and Dietary Services 210 
8.5 Percentage Changes to Financial Constraints and Cost 
Effectiveness of Ancillary Services from 1981-1986 and Indi~es 
of Privatisation for 1988 212 
8.6 Correlation Coefficients between Percentage Changes in 
Financial Constraint and Cost Effectiveness 1981-1986 and 
Indices of Privatisation for 1988 213 
9. 1 Staff Reductions in HOUSEKEEPING Services 1980-1988 229 
9.2 Staff Reductions in DIETARY Services 1980-1988 230 
9.3 Percentage Changes in Hospital Board Operating Grants (per 
Capita) 1981-1986 and Ancillary Staff 1980-1988 232 
9.4 Indices of Privatisation and Class Conflict 238 
9.5 Principal Work Stoppages in New Zealand Public Hospitals 
Members of the Hotel and Hospital Workers Union 
9.6 Public Hospital Ancillary Workers Weekly Wages 1981-1989 
9. 7 Comparative Data. on Four Hospital Boards with Diverging 
Contract ing Out Policies in 1988 
9.8 Comparison of Cost Effectiveness in Contract Service 
Provision between Auckland and Otago and Northland and 
Southland Hospital Boards 
i The Availability of Informtion in New Zealand Hospital 
Boards on the Contracting Out of Ancillary Services 
by 
;';·H 
243 
246 
24.8 
289 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The opportunity for undertaking this thesis was made possible by the 
financial assistance received from the University Grants Committee which is 
gratefully acknowledged. Throughout the entire project an incalculable 
amount of encouragement and critical comment was given by my supervisor Dr 
Ross Barnett, Department of Geography, University of Canterbury. The 
format! ve st ages of the thesis also benefit ted from discussions with Dr 
Chris Connelly, Department of History, University of Canterbury and 
Professor Richard Bedford, Department of Geography, University of Waikato. 
Indebtedness is also expressed to Dr Pip Forer, Department of Geography, 
University of Canterbury, for reading and commenting on the final draft and 
to Mr Alastair Dyer for drawing the diagrams and doing the cartography. 
During the research for this thesis much help was given by Area Health 
Board personnel, members and officials of the Hotel and Hospital Workers 
Union, and managers and employees of private contracting firms. Particular 
thanks is extended to: 
Ms Yvonne Claperton, Secretary Whangarei Branch, Northern Hotel and 
Hospital Workers Union, 
Mr David Dawe, Executive Manager Support Services, Canterbury Area Health 
Board, 
Mr Paul Harris,Reserch Officer, Service Workers Federation of Aoteoroa (New 
Zealand) , 
Mr Chris Higgins, Director Information and Services Unit, Northland Area 
Heal t h Board. 
Mr Robert Hutcheon, Union Organiser, Canterbury Hotel and Hospital Workers 
Union, 
Mr John Ryall, Union Organiser, Wellington Hotel and Hospital Workers 
Union, 
Mr Peter Schultz, Executive Officer, Provisions and Services, Auckland Area 
Heal t h Board, 
Mr Robin Startup, Manager Planning and Administration, Wairarapa District, 
Wellington Area Health Board, 
Ms Susan Stewart, Union Organiser, Canterbury Hotel and Hospital Workers 
Union', 
A special word of thanks is due to all those area health boards and 
Hotel and Hospital Workers· Union branches who gave me access to their 
records and written documentation pertaining to private contracting. Much 
assistance was also given by various hospital ancillary workers who, still 
being employed by either area health boards or private contractors, should 
remain anonymous. 
Finally, but by no means least, much appreciat ion is extended to Mary 
Anne Ryan without whose unceasing support and forbearance this thesis could 
not have been written. 
Towards a Theory of Geographically Uneven Privatisation: 
The Case of New Zealand Public Hospital Ancillary Services 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to formulate a theory 
geographically uneven development of privatisation. 
hospital ancillary services are taken as a 
that explains the 
The New Zealand public 
case study of uneven 
privatisation, and the process of privatisation is analysed within terms 
of the three major theoretical frameworks used in social geography; public 
choice theory, Weberian managerialism and Marxian class conflict. 
Empirically it is found that geographically uneven pd vat isat ion occurs 
within three dimensions; the spatial, the temporal and the sectoral. This 
raises the questions, why pd vat isat ion in region A but not B, why at 
certain times and why in certain industries or sectors of industry but not 
in others? The answers to these questions are sought in the context of 
the three theoretical frameworks used in the thesis, as applied to hospital 
ancillary services. 
The empirical research reveals that the implementation of 
privatisation policies is mediated by several regionally variable factors, 
such as the size of institutions, hospital authority management 
structures, location to major urban settlements, levels of financial 
restraint on hospitals, and the labour militancy of the work force. The 
explanatory significance of these factors varies substantially according to 
the time and place at which pri vat isat ion occurs and the particular 
sector of the public hospital system being considered. Many of the 
explanatory factors contradict each other, insofar as some may predispose 
public authorities to privatise whereas others may inhibit the process. 
The complexity of the uneven development of privatisation renders 
inadequate any single theoretical explanation of the process. Nevertheless 
the research presents an understanding of how privatisation develops 
across space and time and an insight is also gained into the likely 
future uneven development of public service provision. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Social. Spatial and Political Extent of Privatisation: 
Few issues during the 1980s have aroused more controversy than 
privatisation, and debates on the subject have extended far across both the 
political spectrum and national boundaries. While the privatisation 
policies introduced in Britain during the 1980s have received most 
publicity they have spread much further afield, as many governments across 
the world appear to have embraced the idea with considerable enthusiasm. 
One ardent advocate of privatisation has remarked that Britain has been 
very much" the trail blazer' and that. "despite its novel ty [privatisationJ 
rapidly became one of the most important factors of the 1980s spreading 
outward from Britain to affect more than 100 countries throughout the 
world' <Pirie 1985, 3). 
Privatisation has come to be seen as almost any process involving the 
transference of goods and service provision from the state to the private 
. sector. One aspect of this process that has received much publicity is the 
selling of state assets. For example, a headline in the The Observer 
(1987) newspaper of London pronounced that, "All the World's a Stage for 
Sell Offs" while only two years earlier an article in The Economist <1985, 
71> of London entitled. Privatisation; Everybody's Doing it Differently, 
illustrated the geographical ubiquity of privatisation. The claim was made 
that, liThe selling of state assets from airlines to jute mills is 
capti vating po1i ticiBns everywhere even in socialist Spain and communist 
China" (The Economist 1985, 72). 
If the current impetus for privatisation has emanated from Britain,it 
is perhaps not surprising that much of the literature on the subject has 
focused on the UK experience. Particularly detailed accounts have been 
provided by Kay et a1 (1986), Veljanovski (1987) and Vickers and Yarrow 
(1988). Other works have sought to include a broader geographical scope in 
their discussion. The contributions to' MacAvoy et a1 (1988) cover the 
development of privatisation in the USA and Canada as weli as the UK, while 
Fraser and Wilson (1988), although still focusing largely on the UK, also 
examine the international extent of the process by conSidering, Western 
Europe, Japan, Australasia, North America and the Third World. Some works 
on privatisation have been devoted specifically to regions outside the UK. 
Vickers and Wright (1988) focus on Western Europe while the contributions 
to Hanke (1987) centre predominantly on the USA. Roth (1988) devotes 
his entire work to the private provision of public services in developing 
countries and, specifically within the New Zealand context, McKinlay 
(1987) has examined privatisation and the closely associated process of 
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corporat isat ion. 
Not only has privatisation been implemented on a very wide 
geographical basis but the range of industries involved has been equally 
extensive. Virtually no sector of the economy seems to have been exempt 
from some attempt to privatise it although much variation remains between 
sectors in the extent to which the policy has been pursued. In broad 
terms, accounts of privatisation have tended to concentrate their 
attention on one of the two major areas of the economYi the industrial 
(product ive) sector or the weI fare (consumptive) sector. The reasons for 
this divided attention may possibly be attributed to the different forms 
of privatisation that have been adopted in each one. 
The focus for writers examining industrial privatisation has 
primarily been the selling of state assets and enterprises to the 
private sector (eg Veljanovski 1987, Vickers and Yarrow 1988). Some 
writers, such as McKinlay (1987), have written on 'corporatisation, whereby 
state owned industries are restructured in order to operate in accordance 
wi th private sector principles while st ill being state owned. In respect 
of the welfare sector, studies of privatisation, such as Ascher (1987) and 
RIPA (1984), have analysed the contracting out of public service provision 
to the private sector. The essays in LeGrand and Robinson (1984) and 
Papadakis and Taylor Gooby (1987) have looked at the imposing of service 
user charges, the complete closure of public institutions, the withdrawl 
of public services or of government grants and subsidies, and the growth of 
private and voluntary welfare agencies to replace former public ones. The 
contributions examine both the potentialities and the realities for 
implementing these privatisation processes in the field of housing, health, 
education and public transport. 
Another process closely associated with privatisation, 
sometimes regarded as a distinct form of privatisation itself, 
and indeed 
is that of 
market deregulat ion. The existence of a deregulated market in which the 
state does not restrict the number of private sector operators is seen by 
most advocates of privatisation to be crucial for the efficient working of 
the. economy in both the industrial and welfare sectors whether publicly or 
privately owned. Many accounts of privatisation have therefore given much 
attention to the attendent process of deregulation (eg Kay et al 1986). 
The most cursory examination of the literature on privatisation 
reveals that the proc§ss has taken place in different geographical regions 
and amongst different industries and services. Another clearly defined 
feature in this literatUre is the different political perspectives upon 
which much of it is based. Drawing theoretical inspIration from public 
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choice theory, with its basis in neo-c1assica1 economics, a great deal of 
the literature produced has been unambiguously in favour of 
privatisation. Most of the contributions to Hanke (1987) are decidedly 
within this category. By far the most voe! ferous proponents have been 
writers such as Pirie (1985) and Savas (1987) who belong to right wing 
research organisations, commonly called 'think tanks'. The UK based Adam 
Smith Institute and The Heritage Foundation in the USA are two notable 
examples. 
Taking an opposing view to privatisation, and coming from a generally 
left wing political persuasion have been the pUblicat ions produced by 
trade unions whose members have been adversely affected by the process. 
Public Service Action which carries the subtitle The Anti-Privatisation 
Magazine of the Labour Movement is widely distributed in the UK, in trade 
union circles at least, and published monthly. In New Zealand the Public 
Service Associat ion has produced publications expressing a similar poblt 
of view (eg NZPSA 1989). 
More on the consumer (rather than producer) side, service user 
groups like London Health Emergency and Transport 2000 have produced, 
respecti vely, material such as PrJ. vat ising Heal th Care (Newbigging ar.d 
Lister 1988) and Rails for Sale? (Transport 2000 1989) both of which ta;'.e 
a distinctive anti-privatisation stance. Hastings and Levie (1983) 
provide one of the few book-length works that is openly opposed to 
pri vatisat ion. Other predominant 1y ant i-pri vat isation works have appeared 
as contributions to book-length publications, most of which contain 
accounts written from more conservative perspectives (see Thomas in Steel 
and Heald (1984) and Starr in Hanke (1987). 
In spite of, or may be because of, the distinct polarisation in 
political stances on privatisation, some writers like Ascher (1987) and 
RIPA (1984) have claimed to take a non-partisan or 'dispassionate' view of 
the subject with 'objectivity' being the goal rather than the advocation of 
ideologically biased policy prescriptions. To take just one example, 
Bailey <1987, 151) writes that: 
For the public manager [privatisation] should not be a matter of 
ideology, however, but of informed judgement based on experience 
in public management and on policy analysis ~re exacting than is 
currently presented by advocates of privatisation. 
Missing however from these supposedly non-partisan accounts, and n(')t 
surprisingly in view of their claimed objectivity, is any discussion of the 
political underpinnings of their own analysis. Implicit within such works, 
although seldom made explicit, is the contention that only whee 
privatisation can be shown to exhibit a definite public benefit can it De 
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justified. Questions concerning which individuals, groups or social 
classes may have access to such public benefits are seldom addressed less 
still answered. The implication is that there is, or at least can be, 
some common universal consensus regarding the public interest and 
privatisation. Almost a quarter of a century ago, Pahl <1967, 219) wrote 
of, and demonstrated, 'the myth of a value free geography'. Arguably then, 
a I value free privatisation' is equally mythical. It appears that few, if 
any, of the works produced on privatisation are cognisant of this, 
although some are much more honest about their political biases than 
others. 
This brief review of the privatisation literature has by no means been 
exhaustive and it has been confined mainly to book length publications and 
special issue editions of certain periodicals. The references cited 
illustrate the social, spatial and political dimensions that privatisation 
encompasses rather than covering the complete' Ii t erat ure. One point; 
however that should be clear from this review is that privatisation has not 
occurred in a spaceless environment but has instead had a distinct 
geographical basis. This raises the immediate question of the contribution· 
of the geographical literature to the privatisation debate. 
The Geography of Privatisation: 
Many publications have titles or chapter headings that refer directly 
to either The Economics of Privatisation <Hanke 1987) or The Politics of 
Privatisation <Ascher 1987) or The Political Economy of Privatisation 
(Walker 1984) but works detl'iiling The Geovaphv of Privatisation are very 
thin on the ground, which is as surprising as it is disappointing. 
Although much of the li terat ure reviewed above admits of a geographical 
dimension there has been little systematic analysis of this aspect of 
privatisation. Indeed, rather than analysing the geography of 
privatisation, geographers themselves appear to have been much more 
preoccupied with broader analyses of • industrial restructuring' as 
evidenced by the work of Massey and Meagan (1982), Massey (1984), Peet 
(1987), Martin and Rowthorn (1986) and Hudson and Williams (1986), 
Except for the last publication listed, which contains various refences to 
privatisation, the process barely receives a mention in the others. Even 
wi th Hudson and Williams there is no detailed analysis of the process, 
which is no small deficiency in a work on the contemporary industrial and 
social geography of Britain. 
The work geographers have produced on privatisation has been almost 
entirely devoted to the welfare sector of the state. The privatisation of 
housing in Britain, in the form of local authority (council) house sales, 
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has been described in detail in a series of four papers in Environment and 
Planning by Crook (1986). Tosics (1987) has examined the differences 
between western countries and Hungary in the privatisation of housing 
particularly as it affects inequalities in consumption between social 
groups. In the case of (surface) public transport provision, the possible 
social and economic consequences of its privatisation and deregulation 
upon service users in Britain has been studied by Farrington (1985) while 
Rimmer (1988) has examined the origins and uneven expansion of these 
processes in the South East Asian context. 
Within the field of privatising health care there has recently 
appeared an edited collection of works by geographers (Scarpaci 1989a). and 
as far as is known this is the only book length work specifically by 
geographers on the subject of privatisation. The contributors base their 
studies on either a particular area of health care or on certain 
geographical regions or nation-states. From detailing the growth of 
private hospitals in Ne.w Zealand (Barnett and Barnett 1989) and the USA 
(Bohland and Knox 1989), the material extends to considering the role of 
multinational pharmaceutical firms in the Third World (Gesler 1989) and to 
the dismantling of public health services in Chile (Scarpaci 1989b). Some 
of these writers in Scarpaci (1989a) have also published separate material 
on health service privatisation. Mohan (1988) has written about moves to 
privatise and restructure the British NHS while Laws (1988) has looked at 
the privatisation of a variety of welfare services in one specific region -
Ontario, Canada. 
If the existence of a geographical basis to privatisation is 
overwhelmingly apparent from the literature, a feature that is almost 
equally clear is the manifestly uneven spatial development of the process. 
In both industrial and welfare sectors of the state, privatisation £has 
occurred in different ways and to various extents. There remains however a 
distinct gap in the literature reviewed here. Little attempt seems to 
have been made to explain, within a theoret ical framework, . why 
privatisation should develop so unevenly across space. A possible 
exception is Eyles (989) who examines the uneven development of weH are 
'" state privatisation between western European countries. Drawing on the 
work of Esping-Andersen (1985). countries are classified as belonging to 
three broad' regimes of [welfare] distribution', and different levels of 
privatisation are identified for each one. Left unexplained by the account 
though is any variation of privatisation between the countries falling 
within these three 'regimes'. It is towards addressing this question of 
explaining theoretically the uneven development of privatisation that this 
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thesis is devoted. 
The Inadequacies of the Privatisation Literature and the Contribution of 
the Thesis to Geographical Research: 
One possible reason for the above mentioned gap in the literature, 
although by no means an excuse for it, is that so much of the work on 
privatisation has been produced in edited volumes containing contributions 
from different writers. Each contributor has focused on their own 
particular point of interest on privatisation, whether sectorally or 
regionally based, with little or no attempt being made to synthesise the 
contributions into a coherent analytical framework. In effect a series 
of rather disparate case studies has been presented reflecting writers' 
individual interests rather than the need to address unresolved theoretical 
issues. 
With reference to Scarpaci (1989a) again, there is undoubtably a clear 
recogition of an uneven spatiality in the privatis,ation of health care but 
attempts to provide any coherence to the various empirical contributions 
are confined to the final three pages of the 274 page text. Even then the 
presentation is more of a general description of trends rather than a 
theoretically informed analysis. 
272) observes that: 
By way of illustrat ion Scarpaci <1989a, 
In national politics in New Zealand, for example, the rise in 
private hospital and geriatric care has evolved gradually since 
the Second World War, but community opposition to hospital 
closures in New York City has arisen over a shorter period of 
time and within a smaller geographic area. Within the United 
States, the growth of proprietary hospitals has depended on a 
particular type of investment capital and has needed particular 
locational criteria for hospital markets. 
While certainly highlighting the geographical variations inherent in 
the development of privatisation it does little to advance apy theoretical 
understanding of why the process develops unevenly across space. To what 
extent one may ask is community opposition to hospital closures a factor in 
determining the spatiality of hospital closures, not only in New York but 
across a much wider geographical region? Similarly to what extent has 
location to markets and sources of investment capital been a factor in the 
spatial growth of private hospitals when considered across a variety of 
regions or nation states? A critical question then is whether the 
empirically observed factors are merely idiosyncratic to the particular 
aspect or region of privatisation under consideration, or are they 
applicable to a general theory of spatially uneven privatisation? 
Questions such as these are left unanswered by the geographers 
contributing to Scarpaci (1989a). Neither for that matter have any other 
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writers, geographers or otherwise, sought to address this issue 
other area of industrial or welfare activity. 
in any 
It is towards addressing this major theoretical gap in the literature 
that this thesis is devoted. The central question posed is simply why 
does privatisation develop unevenly across geographic space? Such a 
question is far from being of mere academic interest but is rather one of 
critical importance to communities, service user groups and workers having 
to confront the effect s of spatially fragmented pri vat isat ion init iat i VI~S. 
The extent to which uneven development of privatisation can be explairJed 
marks the prime contribution of this thesis to geographical research. 
Indeed it may be added that after almost a decade of privatisation, 
geographers have been distinctly remiss in their failure to undertake such 
research. 
As already indicated, privatisation has occurred on a very broad 
social and spat ial dimension. In view of the 11 mit at ions of time Clnd 
resources, the research conducted here has had to confine itself to 
explaining spatial unevenness of the process in just one industry in one 
country. By examining. within a theoretical framework, the contracting out 
to the private sector of public hospital ancillary services in New Zealand 
it is intended in this study to be able to formulate some explanations for 
the uneven development of privatisation policies in general. 
The Structure of the Thesis: 
The thesis is presented in ten chapters, the first four of which f:lre 
concerned with conceptual and theoretical issues. In the subsequent five 
chapters an empirical case study is presented which is followed by a 
concluding chapter where there is a return to theoretical considerations. 
The first chapter is mainly devoted to conceptual matters and primadly 
addresses itself to the question, what is privatisation? Concepts sl.lch 
as, private. public. market and all of which are fundamental to 
understanding the privatisation process, are analysed from three different 
political perspectives on political economy classical, liberal and 
Marxian. These same three perspectives are used to analyse the ideological 
basis underlying the use of the term, 'the public interest' in relation to 
implementing privatisation policies. 
Chapters two and three build on the conceptual foundation laid down in 
chapter one and detail the theoretical frameworks that purport to explain 
the implementation of privatisation policies. Here the basic question is, 
why privatisation? In chapter two attention centres both on public choice 
theories with their origins in classical political economy and on 
Weberian managerialisffi, founded more on the liberal social democratic 
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tradition. The intention is to assess their explanatory power in relation I 
to the spatial unevenness of privatisation. A similar methodological I: 
approach is adopted in chapter three which discusses the application of : \1 
Marxian political economy to privatisation. The theoretical shortcomingsl' i 
of all three frameworks is highlighted and the need established to cond.lct 
empirical research in order to acquire a more refined theory of uneven 
pri vat isat ion. 
The fourth chapter returns to conceptual issues again and seeks to 
identify the qualitative differences between various forms of privatisation 
that may be resorted to. In this chapter the main question posed is 
simply, how privatisation? A detailed examination is undertaken of the 
different processes by which contracting out for goods and service 
provision may occur, and a cri tical review is made of one of the maj or 
contributions to this form of privatisation. 
In the fifth chapter, which marks the start of the empirical section 
of the theSis,. an overview is given of the privatisation of health 
services in general wi th part icular reference to hospi tal care. 1;1i6 
provides background material for discussing the changing structure of the 
New Zealand public hospital system in respect of the administ rat ionmd 
provision of services. At tent ion is also given to the social, economic 
and political pressures that have led to major changes in the hospital 
system in the late 1980s. A largely contextual treatment· is presented 
which gives a framework for the empirical analysis conducted in the 
subsequent chapters. 
Chapter six commences with an account of the growth of contract 
service provision for public hospital ancillary services, and attempts to 
analyse the spatial patterns of privatisation that are observed. The 
discussion looks at the explanatory significance of variations in hospital 
board size, management structures and the geographical location of the 
boards in relation to the main urban settlements. The weakness of any 
statistical correlation between these variables and the occurance of 
privatisation leads to the conclusion that attention must be given to 
socio-economic and political factors within both the institutions concerned 
and society as a whole. These issues are taken up in chapter seven. 
This chapter looks at the historical origins of contracting out 
hospital services from around the time of World War Two to the end of the 
sixties. The process of contracting out is analysed in relation to 
developments in the New Zealand economy as a whole. Regional variations in 
the conditions of the labour market during the 1950s are identified in 
order to determine to what extent they mediated the spatially uneven growth 
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of contracting out during earlier times. 
Chapter eight discusses the developments in contracting out that have 
occurred from the early 1970s to the contemporary period. Attempts to 
explain the changing spatiality of the process focuses largely on the 
increasing, but regionally variable, financial constraints imposed on 
hospital boards in the 1980s. Also considered for their possible 
significance for uneven privatisation are changes in political climate, at 
both national and local level, and alterations to management prerogatives 
within the hospital boards. 
In chapter nine the attention focuses exclusively on the issue of 
labour militancy in response to contracting out. Here the proble~ is 
to determine the extent to which variations in workforce opposition to 
contracting out, across both time and space, have mediated the uneven 
development of the process. In other words, what' effect has the campaign 
of opposition had on the geography of privatisatlon? The final chapter of 
. the thesis is largely devoted to summarising all the empirical factors 
identified as being relevant to the geography of privatisation. An attempt 
is made to relate them to the theoretical frameworks of the thesis. Both 
the contributions and limitations of the thesis are assessed on the basis 
of the empirical work in the preceeding chapters and some comments are made 
on future geographical research on spatially uneven privatisation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Privatisation and the Public Interest 
Privatisation, like the more general term' restructuring' has come to 
have, "l1 high level of use and low level of meaning in recent years" <Pinch 
1989, 905) and there has therefore been a great deal of confusion and 
ambiguity surrounding the use of the term. This first chapter then 
addresses the question, what is privatisation? In order to detail the 
range of controversy that abounds over the issue, the meaning of the term 
privatisation is analysed from three different theoretical perspectives on 
political economy; classical, liberal and Marxian. Although the precise 
contents of the subject matter of political economy may also be open to 
debate it is understood in this work to refer to the study of the 
relationship between the exercising of political power and the production 
of economic <material) wealth. 
Central to much of the debate over privatisatlon has been the concept 
of the! public interest' sinc.e the implementation of the former has often 
been justified in terms of serving the latter. In contrast much of the 
opposit ion to pri vat isaUon has been presented in terms of it being 
contrary to the public interest. Unless there is some understanding of 
what constitutes 
relates to it, 
the public interest, 
there is bound to 
confusion in the debate. 
and how the privaUsation process 
remain a great deal of conceptual 
This chapter seeks to clarify these issues and is presented in four 
parts. In the first part the theoretical inadequacy of commonly used 
definitions of privatisation is pointed out and a discussion is presented 
on the qualitative differences between concepts frequently referred to in 
these definitions. Principally this requires distinguishing market 
provision and private ownership from state provision and public ownership. 
Recognition of the oversimplification of a two sector model of the economy 
as a representation of reality leads to a discussion of the structure of 
the voluntary sector in relation to the state and the market. 
In the subsequent three sections of the chapter, transfers of property 
ownership and service provision between the state and the market, or the 
public and the private, are discussed in terms of classical, liberal and 
Marxian political economy. The intention is to show how any 
understanding of privatisation and the public interest will vary 
significantly according to which form of political economy is applied to 
the debate. While the association with any overtly spatial issues may seem 
tenuous, the presentation of the discussion is justified in order to 
establish a firm conceptual foundation for developing theoretical 
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explanations of geographically uneven privatisation in subsequent chapters. 
1. 1 Privatisation: Towards a Conceptual Clarification: 
Privatisation is not an end in itself but it is a means to a 
better way of working and to higher standards of living. It is a 
means of reestablishing capitalism - people's capitalism <Lord 
King, chairperson of British Airways, quoted in The Times <of 
London), 19 June 1987, page 16, [emphasis in original] cited in 
Dear 1987, 363). 
As a statement which clearly expresses the desirability of 
privatisation this passage would be difficult to surpass - 'better way of 
working' 'higher standards of living' and, in emphasis, 'people's 
capitalism' ! 
least three 
statement. 
It is almost hard to see where the controversy lies. At 
important questions present themselves from the above 
The first is whether privatisation does in fact achieve the 
ends claimed by Lord King. Does Pri vatisati on Work? is the challenging 
title of a recent publicat ion (Bishop and Kay 1988:. The second question 
is what are the means lito a better way of working . .. " that Lord King 
refers to. Thirdly, the question still remains, what is privatisation7 
Donnison (1984, 45) has pointed out that the term privatisation has 
been largely invented by politicians and widely used by political 
journalists. Perhaps not surprisingly therefore a multitude of definitions 
of the process exist, a selection of which is shown in figure 1. 1. All 
primarily amount to saying, that privatisation represents simply a 
transference from state to market provision or public to private ownership. 
Such statements however merely beg the further quest ion as to what is 
meant by the terms state, market, public and private as they affect the 
ownership of property and the provision of· services. 
addressed in the following section. 
This issue is 
1. 1. 1 Public and Private in Economic Activity: 
Many commonly used definitions of public and private in economic life 
have tended to lack any firm conceptual basis. In the Penguin Dictionary 
of Economics (Bannock et a1 1978, 358), for example, the private sector is 
defined as, "that part of the economy under government control" (my 
emphasis) . Likewise, Lane <1985, 7) argues that public ownership <of the 
means of production) is distinguished from private ownership simply on the 
basis of the former being government ownership from which one can 
reasonably, if not trivially, conclude that private ownership is non-
government ownership. The geographical literature is by no means immune 
from this tendency to 'define by exclusion' . In a paper on the 
geographical basis of privatisation, Laws <1988, 434), refers to the 
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FIGURE 1. 1 A Selection of Definitions of Privatisation 
Ascher K. 1987, 7: The Politics OT Privatisation: 
An umbrella term that has come to describe a multitude of 
government initiat i ves designed to increase the role of the private 
sector. In its most literal sense, as it is used by the Thatcher 
Government, it refers to transfer of state ownership in nationalised 
industries to the private sector. 
2 Beesley M. and Littlechild S. 
Regulation: the UK Experience: 
1986, 35 in Privatisation and 
The formation of a Companies Act company and the subsequent sale 
of at least 50 percent of the shares to private shareholders. However 
the underlying idea is to improve industry performance in increasing 
the role of market forces. 
3 Blundell J. 1986, 5, I Privatisation; by Political Process or Consumer 
Preference' in Economic ATTair~ 7: 
The process by which goods and services currently financed and 
. provided by the state sector shift, either how they are paid for or 
how they are provided or both, to the private sector with or without 
concomitant changes in the regulatory climate. 
4 Heald D. 1984, 21 in Privatising Public Enterprises. 
An umbrella term for a diverse set of policies, albeit linked 
through an underlying judgement in favour of strengthening the 
'market' at the expense of the 'state', 
5 McKinlay P. 1987, 3: Corporatisationi The Solution for State Owned 
Enterprise?: 
In its narrow meaning [privatisation] describes the process 
whereby governments, such as that of Mrs Thatcher, have converted 
their trading enterprises into limited liability companies and then 
sold off the shares to the public. 
6 The Economist 21st December 1985, 72: 'Privatisation; Everybody's 
Doing it Differently': 
The best and British - stab at a definition of privatisation is 
that it is a process which transfers ownership and control of a state 
asset to the private sector. 
7 Walker 1984, 25 in The Privatisation of the Welfare State by Legrand 
J. and Robinson R. (eds): 
[Privatisation is] when the responsibility for a service, or a 
particular aspect of service delivery, passes wholly or in part, to 
the private sector and when market criteria such as profit or ability 
to pay is used to ration or distribute benefits and services. 
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process as one which "invol ves the transference of responsibili ty for 
service provision from the public sector to private Ue non-state) 
interests' (emphasis mine). On these grounds the distinction between 
public and private can only be quantitive and therefore no conceptual 
distinction is possible. 
A more analytically illuminating distinction between private and 
public sectors is made by Konukiewtz 0985, 181) who identifies: 
- a private sector in which goods and services are provided by 
private suppliers on the basis of value exchange in response to 
effective demand and, 
- a public sector in which goods and services are provided 'free' 
ie with a tax price on the basis of user fees or some other 
principle which is not related to the supply and demand mechanism 
of the market place. 
Although there is still the element of 'definition by exclusion' in the 
latter part of the statement (ie .... some other principle which is not 
related .... ) this formulation does at least provide the basis for an 
analytical distinction between the public and private sector. The 
existence of value exchans;e. becomes the basic criteria for defining the 
private sector of the economy. 
Value exchange occurs when products of production are exchanged at a 
rate that reflects either their embodied labour content, as in Marxian 
theory or their • utility' as in neoclassical economic theory. Under the 
conditions of value exchange, the products of production are referred to as 
commodities and are distinguishable from goods and services consumed either 
by producers themselves (eg 'do-it-yourself' work) or by holders of 
political power (eg rent, tribute or tax). For exchange to take place at 
value there are two necessary conditions to be satisfied. The first is 
that there is competItion between the owners of property or, more 
specifically, the means of production and second is that the production 
of commodities is profitable to the owners of property. In short no 
profit, no production. The delineat ing characterist ics of the private 
sector can be characterised by the production of commodities for profit 
wi th market exchange taking place according to the value of the 
commodi ties. 
By contrast, the public sector operates on the basis of production for 
a socially or collectively perceived need rather than for profit. The 
exchange of the products of production is rationalised according to a 
deliberately conceived plan by the holders of political power rather than 
by market mediated value. For example, prices (ie exchange relat ions) in 
the private sector are generally set by the conditions required for 
profitability in market exchange, whereas 
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in the public sector prices 
are more likely to reflect a plan by government to hold prices to a level 
consistent with some political or social objective such as with 'free at 
the point of use' hospital care and subsidised public transport. In the 
latter case, production for a social need defines the sphere of collective 
production. The private sector, however, is founded on production for 
profit rather than need and defines the sphere of commodity production. 
The latter is seen as the quintissential economic structure of capitalism 
and the former of socialism. The fundamental differences between the two 
sectors in terms of production and exchange are ed in figure 1.2. 
FIGURE 1.2: Production and Exchange Characteristics of Private and Public 
Sector Economies 
PRIVATE PUBLIC 
PRODUCTION I PROFIT NEED 
__________ 1 ___________________ __ 
EXCHANGE I VALUE PLAN 
Whatever the strength of these analytical distinctions, the empirical 
reality is that virtually· all modern societies, whether claiming to be 
capitalist or socialist, contain arbitrary degrees of commodity and 
collective production. It should also be added that commodity production 
through value exchange is occurring to an increasing degree in (former?) 
socialist countries following the recognition of the seemingly 
insurmountable practical difficulties of economic organisation entirely by 
plan and according to need. The ext ent to which compet it ion and market 
exchange is compatible with concepts of socialism has been the subject of 
much recent debate on the political Left, stimulated largely by Nove (1983, 
1987) and the ensuing debate in New Left Review particularly Mandel (1988) 
and Elson (1988). As a detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the 
scope of this work, suffice to say that privatisation can most 
appropriately be seen as a means by which production, from being mediated 
by state plan, increasingly takes the commodity form mediated by 
competition and value (market) exchange. 
Even if an empirically existing mix between public and private sectors 
is admitted, this two sector conception of economic organisation greatly 
oversimplifies social reality. There is a requirement to add a third one 
which is usually called the voluntary sector. This needs to be made 
conceptually distinct from the other two sectors. Even the most ardent 
advocates of privatisation and its associated free market economy, would 
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admit that I market failure' can arise in which private production is not 
profitable through lack of effective demand (ie demand backed by ability to 
pay). Where social need for a commodity exists and the state does not 
undertake production itself, then the task falls to organisations outside 
of both the private (market) and public (state) sector. 
1. 1. 2 Privatisation and Voluntarisation 
In respect of the privatisation debate, the voluntary sector has often 
been taken as a part of the private sector, primarily on the grounds that 
it is organised outside of the state sector (Sugden 1984, 70), The 
theoret ical shortcomings of defining by exclusion have already been made 
clear but the matter cannot rest here. In order to provide a distinction 
with (or rather within) the private sector and production for profit, the 
voluntary sector is usually identified (eg Weisbrod 1977) as being the 
'not for profit' private sector, This however amounts to a virtual 
contradiction in terms where the private sector ·itself is defined upon 
the basis of commodity production for profit. 
As the voluntary sector exists primarily to provide a social need 
rather than to make profit it cannot, on this basis, be distinguished 
from the state sector. The question to be addressed then is, what is the 
voluntary sector if it is constituted as being both non-state and non-
profit? Citing Laws <1988, 435) again one is advised that, "another 
call for I privatisation' is the call for co-operative housing ventures. 
This form of housing offers an alternative to both commercial and public 
institutional forms of housing ... ", Since she neglects to say how this 
alternative is structured in contrast to commercial and public institutions 
this statement is not very helpful for gaining conceptual clarifications, 
Perhaps the first and most obvious point to note is that a whole 
multitude of institutions exist within the so-called voluntary sector 
ranging from churches and charities to trade unions and household domestic 
activities. Sugden (1984, 73) points out that many commonly termed 'non-
profit' organisations, .. derive almost all their income from the sale of 
goods and services and compete on essentially equal terms with profit 
making firms', They are virtually indistinguishable from private sector 
organisations with typical examples including 'voluntary', yet fee charging 
schools and hospitals. On the other hand there are institutions, II that 
are so dependent on public money that their private status is purely 
formal" (Sugden 1984, 72) with some universities being cited by him as a 
prime example of this. 
<1984, 72), is that 
.. share of the cost 
The important conceptual point, according to Sugden 
in all such organisations there is a substantial, 
of supplying services that is paid by voluntary 
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contribution [donation] whether of money or labourll. 
It is the existence of voluntary contribution that provides the main 
conceptual distinction from the private and public sector. Each sector 
has its own specific form of funding. In the public sector the costs of 
supply are met by state levies and taxat ion from the public at large 
(collective production) while in the private sector they are met by private 
investment in the market place (commodity production). No voluntary 
donation is required in either of these two cases. Funding for the 
voluntary sector is, most fundamentally, reliant upon donations of 
either time or money from various sectors of the public or what is 
sometimes termed the community. By contrast with the respective commodity 
and collective production of the private and public sectors, the existence 
of the voluntary sector is based instead upon community production. 
Viewed in an historical context much of the state sector has arisen 
out of 'voluntary inadequacy' as much as 'market failure', The voluntary 
or charitable institutions were simply inadequate to ensure the requisite 
levels of health, housing and education for an industrial society. One of 
the intellectual founders of the welfare state, William Beveridge, is 
reported by Kramer <1985, 132) to have described the historical source of 
the welfare state as, .. voluntary action crystallised and made universal". 
Another writer on the growth of the modern (capitalist) state de Jasay 
(1985) has commented that, "the great practical utilitarian" Edwin Chadwick 
clearly recognised that, "if the state is effectively to promote .3 good 
cause it must not rely on the good will of independent intermediaries [ie 
voluntary agencies] whom it does not control" (de Jasay 1985, 78). 
Insofar as much contemporary state sector activity did at one time 
operate in either the private or voluntary sectors, privatisation can 
therefore be represented as part of a cyclical process over time. In the 
early days of industrial capitalism, the voluntary sector had to provide 
the consumption requirements for those sectors of society who could not 
obtain them through the market. There was in effect a process of 
• voluntarisation
' 
in operation even though it appears not to have been 
adopted as conscious policy decision by holders of political power. 
In historical terms the growth of active state involvement in 
production and consumption has seen an extensive 'socialisation' or 
collectivisation of a least some of these two economic activities. The 
contemporary era of state activity may be characterised by a return to 
varying degrees to the greater private and voluntary provision of earlier 
times. The use of the term reprivatisation might then be more 
historically sensitive to describe the contempory scene. 
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Even when some concept ual dist inct ions have been ident i fied between 
public, private and voluntary sectors, the question remains as to why the 
transference in goods and service provision between the sectors is so 
controversial? Returning to Lord King's view of privatisation the 
, reestablishment of capital ism' is presented as being decidedly in the 
public int erest. The issue then becomes, what is the public int erest, and 
how does it relate to the concepts just discussed? These issues are 
discussed in the next part of the chapter in which the classical, liberal 
and Marxian perspectives on political economy are applied to the 
conceptions of public or private ownership and state or market provision. 
1.2 Public and Private Spheres of Human Activity in Classical Political 
Economyl 
1. 2. 1 Self Interest and the Public Interest 
The public/private distinction may be said to provide the bedrock of 
the work of the classical political economists:2. The basic unit of 
analysis in their work is the individual upon whom the concept of private 
interests are built. These interests equate to the maximisation of 
satisfaction from goods and service consumption and it is claimed that, by 
pursuing private, or more specifically, individual interests, the public 
good (interest) may best be served. The public, in this view, is seen 
primarily as being 
Say (1964, 228) , 
(cited in Gaus 1983, 
an aggregate of private individuals and, according to 
II a nation is but an aggregation of lllany indi vi duals' 
184) . 
Within this perspective the public good, or the public interest, is 
held to lie in the maximization of total (public) wealth or income. The 
creation of this wealth should be the prime object of economic policy, 
hence the title of Adam Smith's major work The Wealth of Nations (1776), As 
0' Brien (1975, 30) states, for the classical political economists, nthe 
pursuit of [private] self interest (subject to an appropriate framework) 
ensures optilllal resource allocation [public good] to. In simple terms, 
private interest equals public good with the former understood as 
individual self interest and the latter the good of everyone. 
The mechanism through which private individuals achieve the public 
interest is through a system of competition with each other. This system 
is known generally as 'the market' in which voluntary exchange relations 
occur. Providing these exchange relations between individuals remain 
voluntary, in as much as there are no demands made by political 
aut hori ties, 
ensure, by 
the theory maintains that they are self regulating and can 
means of Smith's 'invisible hand', that social harmony 
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prevails. The voluntary exchange of the market is seen as coinciding with 
a certain conception of human liberty and freedom and is contrasted with 
the coercive element involved in state directed production. While 
recognising that the market is a human, and not a natural, construction 
classical political economy maintains that it is particularly appropriate 
to human nature. The order of the market exemplifies 'the natural order'. 
By individuals engaging in competitive market exchange, there is an 
inherent tendency for them to employ their labour and capital where it 
will produce the greatest wealth for themselves. Competition, it must be 
stressed, is seen as a critical factor in promoting the public interest. 
Through competitive exchange the aggregate wealth of society is maximised 
and economic growth occurs. Security of private property and, in order 
for exchange to remain voluntary, individual liberty, are viewed as 
being essential to the policy of income maximisation. 
It would however be an oversimplification to argue that classical 
.political economy, with its ~mphasis on wealth creation, had no regard for 
the well- being of the working class. On the contrary, Mal thus maintained 
that, .. it is most desirable that the labouring classes should be well paid, 
for a much more important reason than any that can relate to wealth, namely 
the happiness of the great mass of society' <cited in Gaus 1983, 185). 
This is not to say that the classical economists .favour the suppression of 
the interests of other' classes to further those of workers. On the 
contrary they resisted calls for legislation aimed to redistribute wealth 
such as progressive taxation or minimum wage levels. The raison d'etre of 
classical political economy was to provide a justification for policies 
that would benefit everyone - everyone as consumers - or in other words, 
the public. Concern with inequality was to the extent that policies aimed 
towards creating equality, whether social or spatial, must be such that the 
poor are made richer without making the rich poorer. In the subsequent 
development of neo-classical economics this policy became consistent with 
the concept of Pareto-optimalit y3. 
Although a certain amount of poor relief from public institutions was 
acceptable, issues of poverty were thought to be most appropriately dealt 
with by voluntary and religious organisations. Reliance on such bodies did 
not involve the levying of taxes to pay for public welfare which would have 
amounted to a coercive intrusion into the operation of the market. By 
funding poor relief through voluntary donation, the individual freedom and 
self-regulation of the market would be retained resulting in the securing 
of the public interest. 
Another source of opposit ion from classical political economist s to 
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wealth redistribution was the concern with the demographic trends of the 
time. Population growth rates in the 18th and first half of the 19th 
century in Europe were believed to be responsible for problems of scarcity 
of subsistence goods and overall resource depletion. The economist and 
demographer Thomas Malthus was influential in this respect. An important 
policy prescription arising from his general theory of population growth 
was that any redistribution of public wealth provided for the poor would 
ultimately be to the detriment of the poor, and so contrary to the public 
interest. The basis of this contention was that there would not be the 
same restraint on population growth as when individuals had to rely 
entirely on their own private resources to maintain their livelihoods. The 
reluctance of classical economists to countenance any public redistribution 
is echoed in some contemporary social theory as for example in the, Tragedy 
of the Commons by Hardin (1968) and in his subsequent work, Life Boat 
Ethics, The Case Against Helping the Poor (Hardin 1977). 
Within classical political economy there is then an identity between 
the interests of the working class and the public interest where the 
latter is understood in terms of wealth creation, the existence of 
private property and market exchange. Within the context of the 1980s, it 
is possible therefore to see the basis of Lord King's claim that through 
privatisation, and the reestablishment of capitalism which it engenders, 
higher standards of living may be achieved. To this claim one may 
immediately add the qualification, higher standards of living for some. 
With the emphasis being placed on the operation of market exchange 
processes in ordering social life, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
role of the state in society was highly problematic within the classical 
tradition. This issue is addressed in the following section. 
1.2.2 The State and the Economy: 
A central argument of the classical school was that market exchange 
was a self regulating/equilibriating process and so any intervention by 
the state should be minimal as it would be detrimental to the process. 
Although the classical school presents the state, like the public, as 
being an aggregation of individuals (Cullis and Jones 1987, 42) there is a 
very important difference from the way in which the public is conceived. 
Rather than being the embodiment of all consumers or simply 'everyone' and 
thereby serving the public interest, the classical economists saw the state 
as being a political institution serving the interests of certain 
individuals only. 
At the time the classical economists wrote, these certain individuals 
were typically merchants and manufacturers who had acquired political 
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power by which they could distort, to their own advantage, the operation of 
value exchange. In this case the pursuit of self interest was not seen as 
congruent with the concept of the public interest employed by the classical 
economists. The mercantilist state for most writers of this persuasion, 
but particularly Smith, was an institution that infringed upon 
individual liberty and served the private interests of those in power 
(political ends) rather than the public interest (economic ends). 
The politically biased nature of the state was not the only concern of 
classical political economists. Albeit to varying degrees, they all 
maintained that holders of public office were not sufficiently 
knowledgeable of the public (consumer) demand to be able to decide what 
should most appropriately be produced. A further concern was that by 
virtue of their position in the state apparatus they would not have such 
a direct interest in the financial outcomes of their investment decisions. 
According to Torrens (1965) I II when works are ctlrr1.ed on at the public 
expense, they are never perfo~med so economically and well, as when carried 
on at the risk of private individuals, watching over the expenditure of 
their individual fortuned' (Torrens 1965, 226 cited in Gaus 1983, 194), 
Nevertheless the classical economists, particularly Thomas Ma1thus and 
J. S. Mill, recognised that private production and market exchange failed 
to provide certain goods and services that were in the public interest. 
In the light of this, Smith gives three duties of the state; defence, 
justice, and public works and institutions. The role of state activity is 
severly circumscribed as his focus of concern, along with other classical 
economists, was the mercantilist state and hence intervention by such a 
state could only be justified on the grounds of strict necessity or utility 
(0' Brien 1975, 273). The state might therefore supply certain goods and 
services but there is no conception of any public sector economy and 
therefore by extension no private sector economy. 
On the whole classical political economists endorsed, a1 beit with 
limitations, the state development of major infrastructural projects like 
roads and canals in order to promote economic growth. A further 
recognition of the necessity of state regulation of the market was their 
belief that individuals pursuing their own private interests sometimes 
needed to be rest rained in order to achieve the public interest. The 
"appropriate frameworh..tl which 0' Brien <1975, 30) referred to above for 
ensuring optimal resource allocation involved not just the legal 
protection of private property but rather involved the implementation of 
health, safety, and fire regulations together with monetary, financial and 
banking regulations. Any advocation of a 'night watchman state' 
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restricted only to legislative and policing functions or of a rigid 
defence of a laissez faire economy can be said to have 
classical political economy (O'Brien 1975, 272). 
no place in 
To summarise the argument so far, the critical issue in the classical 
perspective of private and public is that the two are conceptualised at the 
level of the individual. State intervention in the economy should be 
minimal and restricted only to cases of market failure. Classical 
poli tical economy did not admit of any public or private sector economy. 
Rather society consisted of the state and the market, the latter being 
synonomous with' the economy' the former with I the political'. Private, 
individual interests pursued in the market place promote the public 
interest in the form of the greatest good, if not for all, then for the 
greatest number. On the other hand for those in power, that is in the 
state apparatus, the pursuit of individual interests then equates with 
private interests. There is, therefore, a divergence of interests in 
classical political economy between the public, conceptualised as 'everyone 
as consumers', and the state as a repository of private vested interests 
which comprise the sphere of politics. In broad terms, the state and the 
market and the political and the economic are antithetical to each other. 
Towards the end of the 19th century however, there developed a growing 
realisation that the pursuit of self interest through unfettered market 
exchange was neither economically desirable nor politically sustainable. A 
different approach to economic organisation was required in order to 
promote the public good and social harmony. 
1.3 Liberal Political Economy and the Development of the Public Sector 
Economy4 
1. 3. 1 The Public Interest Redefined 
The theoretical development of I positive liberalism' <Fainstein and 
Fainstein 1980, 280) arose in the late 19th century and included, in the 
USA, New Deal and War on Poverty programmes with the intention being that, 
"the harshness of the capitalist market system can be tempered through 
humane public action" <Fainstein and Fainstein 1980, 280). In Britain the 
ideas of Fabian socialism started to became influential around this time 
and contributed to the formation of the Labour Party in 1901. The 
essential features of liberal political economy are twofold. First is 
that, as foreshadowed by some of the classical economists, particularly 
Malthus and Mill, market exchange· between private individuals is not self 
equilibriating and therefore minimal state intervention does not promote 
the public interest. Second, the aggregative conception of the public is 
tempered, if not entirely replaced by, the introduction of a rather more 
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vague conception of the two which considers 
whole. 
Nevertheless the liberal political economists 
societ y to be a unitary 
still retain a faith 
in the public interest being served by resource allocation through market 
exchange. There is also a similar, and even reinforced, concern for the 
well being of the working class and the differences between the two 
versions of political economy are more in degree than substance. Liberal 
theory tends to be much more qualified in the advocation of market forces 
than does classical theory while the former sees a much greater need for 
public concern over the well being of the working classes than does the 
lat ter. 
Although classical economists recognised the massive inequalities 
generated by a market based economy with minimal state intervention, they 
deemed them to be a necessary cost of economic growth. Indeed only with 
economic growth could there be improvement in the conditions of the working 
.class. Liberals on the other hand argued that such obsessions with wealth 
creation could compromise the development and weI fare of all (Gaus 1983, 
197) and not just the working class. As Beveridge. wrote, II misery 
generates hate" (Beveridge 1944. 15 cited in Gaus 1983. 196) and so could 
seriously threaten the established order. Moreover the classical 
economists' argument that the market alone could create economic growth is 
open to question. 
In the liberal vie~ the public interest is founded much more on the 
redistribution of wealth rather than solely on its production by the 
pursuit of (private) self interests. Instead of resource allocation 
through competitive market exchange. liberals advocate a certain degree of 
distribution through plan or organisation. It is generally maintained 
ihat rather than decreasing labour productivity, redistribution could, on 
the contrary, increase it. Whatever the effect on productivity, the 
liberal perspective would also cite the social need for planned 
redistribution as being the stimulus for 20th century growth of Weberian 
style bureaucracies with their particularly hierarchical means of 
achieving resource redistribution. 
The changing demographic patterns in the 20th century meant that 
liberals were not so concerned with population growth pressing on resources 
if wealth redistribution took place between classes. According to Donnison 
0984, 46), II The arguments advanced by William Beveridge and others of his 
generation for national insurance and a national health service were as 
much concerned with the inefficiency of friendly societies, private 
insurance, and private and voluntary hospitals as with their inequity". 
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In these cases private provision was inefficient, in as much as it was 
expensive compared to what the state could provide, and besides it was an 
inadequate service in terms of social need (Donnison 1984, 47). 
For liberal political economists, the public interest is defined more 
in terms of pursuing policies designed to achieve social justice than 
aggregate wealth accumulat ion and they maintain that t he market system 
alone is neither efficient in terms of labour productivity nor in terms of 
social justice. The natural justice of the market is therefore replaced by 
the social justice of redistribution and the public interest is at least 
supplemented, although not supplanted, by state weI fare. Indeed some 
would argue that the latter should be achieved even if it conflicts with 
the former. There can therefore develop a necessary trade off between 
social equity and market efficiency. The different perspectives on the 
public interest which the two theories exhibit are presented in figure 1.3 
FIGURE 1. 3: The Public Interest in Classical and Liberal Polit ical Economy 
1. 3. 2 
Classical Political Economy 
Self Interest 
Nat ional Wealth 
Market Efficiency 
Liberal Political Economy 
Redistributive Justice 
State Welfare 
Social Equity 
The State in Liberal Political Economy 
One of the driving forces behind the development of a liberal 
political economy perspective according to Gaus (1983, 200) was the 
conviction that the classical world of individual capitalist entrepreneurs 
had given way to II a system of powerful bureaucratic organisations able to 
defy the discipline of the market and whose individual decisions greatly 
affected the public welfare". So the conception of a private sector as 
being based on individuals operating in an unregulated market changes to 
one of institutions acting in a distorted or 'rigged' market. But the 
critique of a market based economy is only a limited one. The policy 
prescription is simply to regulate the market and supplement it by public 
provision from the state rather than replace it altogether by another 
economic order. 
Invoking the role of the state in the economy entailed a change in the 
conception of the state itself. A crucial factor in this change was the 
advent of universal adult male sufferage since then the state could be seen 
as a primarily democratic institution and which could consequently serve 
public (social) rather than private (individual) interests. The extent to 
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which the state is viewed as democratic has depended largely upon whether a 
pluralist or managerialist perspective is applied. In the former the state 
is assumed to be controlled by a plurality of different elected 
representatives, whereas in the latter case it is controlled by appointed 
managers (Johnston 1982, 22), The foundation of the pluralist perspective 
is that 'participation determines power' whereas in the managerialist case, 
I power determines participation'. In both cases the liberal version of 
political economy open to attack from the classical view that the state 
remains the tool of private vested interests. In the pluralist variant 
"the state is up for grabs' <Saunders 1980, 32, cited in Johnston 1982, 22) 
by pressure groups or, in the managerialist case, is captured by managers 
and professionals who are seen to be immune from public recall or 
account abil it y. 
The implication of these issues in respect of pri vat isat ion 
initiatives will be considered further in the 'next chapter. For the 
present, it is simply noted that neither perspective is very consistent 
with the liberal conception of the state as, "the institutionalisation of 
the sodal whole and the guardian of the public interest" <Caus 1983, 205), 
There is however a third approach to analysing the state which is somewhat 
more consistent with the public interest as understood in liberal 
political economy. 
In what has been termed the corporatist conception of the state, the 
disparate interests extant in both the state and the market place are seen 
to coalesce into a ruling triumvirate between the representatives of 
workers, employers and government. Collaboration between interests, 
whether public or private, replaces the bargaining, compromising and 
conspiracy of the pluralist and managerialist theses. In the pluralist 
perspective, policy is made by democratically elected representatives of 
the public while for managerialism it is made by appointed government 
officials. The corporatist framework on the other hand maintains that 
both representatives and officials from labour, business and government 
participate together in formulating public policy. 
cor:poratism is: 
For Jessop (1978), 
a system of representation in which capital (employers] and wage-
labour [employees] are entitled to participate in the formulation 
and implementation of state intervention in the economy and in 
other matters relevant to capital accumulation [economic growth] 
(Jessop 1978, 41 cited in Johnston 1982, 122), 
Wi thin the corporat ist framework, major decisions are made by 
government institutions outside of the elected parliament. But as Johnston 
(1982, 122) points out, an elected government is still needed to regulate 
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the action of, and sometimes to curb the excesses of, the corporate actors 
- whether of business, trade unions, or government bureaucracy. In this 
way the legitimacy of the economic system is preserved and the public 
interest is served accordingly. The corporatist view maintains that the 
state is an essential adjunct to the (capitalist) economy. The myriad of 
institutions through which the state regulates, plans and adjudicates, 
ensures that, in advanced capitalism, it plays a vi tal role in regulat ing 
and often organising production <industry) and consumption (welfare). The 
existence of • enterprise zones' would be an important example of state 
support for industry while the enactment of protective labour 
legislation, such as minimum wage laws, is a prime example of the state 
playing a welfare role. Rather than the state being, an institution 
acting in a manner antithetical to the smooth operation of an otherwise 
free market economy as in classical political economy, it is instead an 
integral part of the economy itself. 
For liberal political economy the dichotomy hypothesised in classical 
theory between the state and the economy or the political and the economic 
can still be maintained in analytical terms. At the empirical level 
however the liberal view gives recognition to a cont inuum between public 
and private sector institutions. Private individuals are still seen as 
operating in the market place but their significance is greatly 
overshadowed by large institutions both of the private and public sectors. 
Wi thin the corporatist perspective, the state is assumed to have taken on 
many of the redistributional functions that for the classical economists 
would have been left to either market forces or, failing this, the 
voluntary sector. 
The private sector of 
institutionally conceptualised, 
the economy, whether individually or 
is based in the market place while the 
public sector is regarded as coinciding with the activities of the state. 
In this way the state sector and the private sector together ensure that 
the public interest is served. By contrast with classical political 
economy, the state and market, as embodied respectively in the public and 
private sectors, are complementary to each other rather than antithetical. 
To summarise, it may be said that in the liberal view of society, the 
private world of self interest, national wealth and market efficiency is 
amalgamated with the public world of redistributive justice, state welfare 
and social equity. Economic growth through market compet it ion is st ill 
seen as being in the public interest but not to the exclusion of other 
social and political factors. Without the justice, welfare and equity that 
only a public sector economy can provide, the capitalist economy would be 
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inherently unstable. The liberal view on the significance of the public 
sector for securing the public interest is epitomised in the following 
quotation from the economist Frank Hahn cited in The Economist: 
It is likely that the vastly exaggerated claims for the invisible 
hand will lead to a react ion in which the hand, to our great 
loss, will be amputated forever (The Economist [London], May 6th 
1989, page 63). 
Nevertheless, as this quote makes clear, and to repeat if only for 
emphasis, the critique of classical political economy by the liberal 
version is only partial. The need for an invisible hand through market 
exchange and private ownership of property is still retained. For a more 
fundamental critique it is necessary to turn to the methods of Marxian 
political economy in which the concepts discussed thus far take on a very 
different complexion. 
1.4 The State and the Market in Marxian Political Economy 
The central focus of Marxian political economy is the role of social 
forces in the development of capitalist society. For Marxian 
enquiry the classical concern with self interest and economic growth, and 
the liberal concern with social welfare and state redistribution, is 
replaced by an emphasis on class relat ions and capital accumulat ion. A 
further contrast, with the previous two theories lies in the conception of 
the public interest. 
The term Ithe publici has been conceived of as being either an 
aggregate of individuals or a unified social whole. There is therefore 
an implicit blurring of the class divisions embodied in capitalist society. 
So instead of asking whether the public interest is served by the enactment 
of social processes, such as privatisation, the question posed in Marxian 
analysis is, whose class interests are served? A start may be made in 
answering this question by examining the social significance of the market 
and private property in the context of a specifically capitalist economy. 
This requires that the concepts discussed in previous sections are 
analysed within an historical context of societal development. 
1. 4. 1 The Market and Private Property in Marxian Political Economy: 
Long before the advent of capitalism, markets were established and 
competition between owners of capital, such as merchants and money lenders, 
set commodity prices and interest rates (Burkett 1986, 194). With 
the development of capitalism the vast majority of people became 
propertylessB , to the extent that they no longer had possession of 
sufficient means of production to support themselves without recourse to 
wage-labour. At this stage a market developed specifically for buying and 
selling labour power Eo in which the workers' capacity to labour had to be 
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exchanged for a monetary wage. Without this market in labour power 
capitalist commodity production and market exchange could not exist. 
The particular significance of the labour market for Marxian political 
economy is that, through the exchange process it engenders, workers produce 
more value than they collectively require to live on. The surplus value 
produced is appropriated by the property (ie means of production) owning 
capitalist class. By capitalists reinvesting this surplus value in 
further rounds of production, capital accumulation occurs, understood in 
classical and liberal political economy as economic growth. So rather than 
being simply a medium of free and fair value exchange, the capitalist 
labour market is also the site of exploitation between two classes; those 
who are propertyless (workers) and those who privately own property in the 
form of the means of production. 
The existence of the market place in capitalism is inseparable from 
the development of private ownership of the means of production such as 
land, minerals, machinery and factories. With certain individuals 
acquiring these assets (fe property) and thereby making most people 
propertyless. the need arose for people to sell their labour power to the 
owners of property in order to survive. Without private property 
ownership there would be no labour market although this would by no means 
rule out the existence of other markets. Private ownership of property 
then is not 
commodi ties. 
merely a device that ensures the value exchange of all 
In the Marxian perspect i ve it is more fundamentally the 
embodiment of a social relation between the owners and non-owners of 
property. These two classes meet in the market place by exchanging labour 
power for wages in order that production may occur and capital be 
accumulated. 
Once the private ownership and value exchange of property became 
established the owners of property had neither to exert any political 
coercion over the workforce to ensure that they sold their labour power, 
nor did they have to perform any redistributive welfare function. This 
provided a distinct contrast to pre-capitalist societies where holders of 
economic power also held political power. Under capitalism however all 
production became effectively privatised while all redistribution and 
coercion assumed a distinctly public or social dimension. In other words, 
the private or economic sphere of product ion became divorced from the 
public or political sphere of redistribution and the public aspect of 
social life became the sole prerogative of the state apparatus (Wood 1981). 
To the extent that the process of value exchange fails to secure the on 
going reproduction of both labour and capital, there is a requirement for a 
- 27-
degree of public redistribution of surplus value and this requires the 
existence of certain state (public) institutions. 
1.4.2 The State in Marxian Political Economy 
It has been seen that both classical and liberal pol it ical economy 
conceptualise the state in terms of it having certain functional 
characteristics according to the way in which it is deemed to serve the 
public interest. By contrast, Marxian theory is concerned with deriving 
the particular form and function of the state from the operation of 
capi t alist social relat ions. The task is by no means st raight f.orward and 
indeed the Marxian literature on the state is about as vast as it is 
contentious. Within contemporary accounts of the capitalist state 
possibly the most widely accepted are those presented in Offe (1984). 
The work of Offe has arisen largely from a critique of earlier Marxist 
'instrumental' theories, in which the state is conceived of as being an 
instrument for promoting the common interests of the capitalist class (Offe 
1984, 119). The instrumentalist theories, exemplified in the writings of 
Miliband (1969),. did themelves arise as a critique of the pluralist 
perspective in which the state acts for the common good of all through 
the operation of democratic structures (eg voting procedures). Offe 
maintains instead that the state, II seeks to implement and guarantee the 
collective interests of all members of a class society dominated by 
capi tal" (Offe 1984, 120 emphasis in original). 
For the state to guarantee those collective interests or more 
generally to carry out political functions, it depends critically upon the 
tax revenue generated by the volume of private capital accumulation. At 
the same time however the state cannot organise and control the 
accumulation process without viol at ing the modus operandi of capitalism 
with is foundations in private ownership. State (ie political) power 
therefore depends on a process of accumulation which is beyond its power to 
organise. A consequence of this, Offe <1984, 120) maintains, is that 
"every occupant of state power is basically interested in promoting those 
poli tical condi tions most conduci ve to pri vate accumulation". 
So while the capitalist class is not able to subjugate the state 
apparatus entirely to suit its requirements, as in the crude 
instrumentalist theory, Offe argues that II state actors must be interested 
- for the sake of their own power - in guaranteeing and safeguarding a 
'healthy' accumulation process' (Offe 1984, 120) which in turn requires the 
maintenance of the class relations underpinning capitalism. Failure to 
do so inevitably results 'in the replacement of that regime by one more 
conducive to capital accumulation. Upon this basis privatisation may be 
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seen as a means to achieving a II heal thy accumulation" process and to 
reinforcing capitalist class relations. 
The capitalist state therefore has a contradictory social function. 
It depends for its exist ence upon a process over which it has no cont rol 
and which runs counter to the exercising of state power (Giddens 1984, 
315). But as already seen commodity production by private interests does 
itself demand a degree of collective production by public (state) 
institutions, typically in the form of major infrastructure investment and 
basic welfare provision. At the same time however the collective provision 
serves to destroy the commodity form upon which capital accumulat ion, and 
ultimately the state itself, is dependent upon. Based on Offe (1984), 
Giddens <1984, 315), argues that, "the contradictory nature of the 
capitalist state is e,ypressed in the push and pull between commodification, 
decommodification and recommodification". 
This is illustrated by Giddens with the examples of public health care 
and transport provision. By socialising these services they no longer take 
the commodity form and are provided according to a perceived overall need 
of capitalist production rather than the ability to generate private 
profit for any individual capitalist. Those with the highest income tend 
to have the least need for public provision of these services as they can 
opt for privately provided ones. Because of graduated taxation scales, 
such people have often had to contribute a disproportionate amount towards 
the maintenance of public provision. This situation though has been 
altered considerably in some Western countries during the 1980s with the 
coming to power of more politically conservative governments. The point 
remains, however, that higher t ax paying people are likely to apply 
pressure to have public services recommodified or, in other words, 
(re)privatised. Giddens <1984, 316) concludes that as those who are on 
lower incomes are likely to have opposing views, government policy may 
'lad llate between socialisat ion and pri vatisat ion according to the class 
interests of the political party in government. 
The important point from a Marxian perspective on privatisation is 
that the process represents a drive to reassert capitalist class relations 
and thereby intensify the exploitation of labour power. The state 
provision of decommodified public services is seen as part of the social 
wage paid from taxation on both workers wages and capitalists' profits. 
Any reduction of the social wage through privatising the state represents a 
greater exploitat ion of labour. Instead of attempting to reinforce the 
commodity form. 
liberal theory, 
as in classical theory, or merely to reform it, as in 
the prescriptive basis of Marxian theory is ultimately to 
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eliminate the commodity form. This requires the ending of private 
ownership of the means of product ion and therefore of capi talist class 
relations and their replacement by a completely different socio-economic 
order of comprehensive collective production. 
Summary and Conclusion: 
The discussion in this chapter has attempted to show that, regardless 
of how privat isation is defined, any analysis of the process itself will 
vary enormously according to the theory of poli tical economy that is 
applied to the fundamental concepts involved, The critical differences are 
summarised in tabulated form (figure 1.4), Any explanatory frameworks 
developed to show why the process of privatisation may be implemented will 
clearly depend critically upon whether the concepts involved are analysed 
from the standpoint of individual actors, institutional organisations or 
class conflicts in material production. 
FIGURE 1. 4: Socio-Economic Concepts and Poli tical Economy 
Political Pri vate Market Public State 
Economy Sector Exchange Sector Functions 
Classical Individuals The economy Aggregation Private 
I everyone' Interests 
Liberal Institutions Sector of Society Public 
the economy Interest 
Marxist Social Site of Class Contradictory 
Relations Exploitation Structure 
Between the classical and liberal approaches to privatisation there 
are distinct differences in the structures that are established. A 
market economy founded on individual actions is counterposed to one in 
which institutions are the prime actors. Similarly an autocratic state 
apparatus is contrasted to an essentially democratic one. Within the terms 
of classical political economy, privatisation would be conceived of as 
being a transference from provision and control by a state apparatus 
serving private interests alone to one of individuals operating freely in a 
market economy. The assumed freedom of individualism is counterposed to 
the assumed coercion of collectivism. Privatisation is therefore seen as a 
policy that serves the public good (interest). By contrast liberal 
poli tical economy sees pri vat isat ion as a transference from a 
democratically founded state which serves the public good to private 
institutions that, for liberals, are often seen to be beyond public recall. 
In this way there is a failure to achieve the public good primarily because 
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the concept is understood differently from that of classical political 
economy. Rather than being in the public interest, privatisation is then 
viewed as serving private interests. 
In the Marxian view the focus is on social processes rather than 
st ruct ures. Changing class relations are the critical explanatory 
variables. Whether serving public or private interests, privatisation is a 
process for reinforcing capitalist class relations. The Marxian 
perspective on privatisation, and its contrast with the other two 
formulations, may be presented by paraphrasing Roemer (1986, 152) thus: 
When (neo) classical economists argue for privatisation to 
increase economic growth, the liberal economist can only reply 
that pri vat isation does not achieve this end. Marxists on the 
other hand might admit that privatisation will increase economic 
growth, understood in the form of capital accumulat ion, but take 
this not as a mandate to privatise but rather as an indictment of 
the system of property relations in which such forms of 
productivity stimulus are needed. 
As capitalist production requires both private accumulation and social 
redistribution, the process of privatisation is at the same time a 
contradictory one which is beset by class conflict. To return to Lord King 
and his view of pri vat isation, the liberal opponent would st rongly deny 
that privatisation leads to 'better ways of working and higher living 
standards' and may even be detrimental to economic growth. Marxists, 
however, might see Lord King as being right in as much as privatisation 
involves the I reestablishment of capitalism'. But the I bet ter ways of 
working' are based on a greater degrees of labour (class) exploitation 
while the higher standards of living that acrue to some sectors of society 
may mask ever greater socio-inequalities. 
From the three frameworks of polit ical economy presented here, the 
process of privatisation can have very different conceptual foundations. 
It is from these very foundations however that explanations for why the 
process has occurred may be offered and, more particularly from a 
geographical standpoint, why privatisation has developed unevenly across 
both space and time. This subject forms the basis of the next chapter. 
Footnotes: 
1 The discussion in this and the subsequent section owes much to Gaus 
(1983), 
2 Most noteable amongst the classical political economists were, Adam 
Smith (1723-90), David Ricardo (1772-1823), Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), 
John Stuart Mill (1806-73), and Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832). 
3 Pareto, Vilfredo Federico Damaso (1848-1923), Italian economist. 
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4 Amongst the founding members of the liberal tradition are, Sidney Webb 
<1859-1947), Beatrice Webb <1858-1943) I William Beveridge <1879-1963) and 
Herbert Morrison (1888-1965). 
5 The term I propertyless' refers specifically to the lack of ownership 
of productive assets or means of production. It is fully recognised that 
private ownership of the means of consumption (eg home ownership) is 
widespread in many capitalist <and socialist) economies. 
6 The term labour power is used to indicate that under capitalism 
workers only sell their capacity or potential to work rather than their 
complete personna as in slave and feudal societies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical Perspectives on the Development of Privatisation 1: 
Public Choice and Managerialism 
The previous chapter analysed the different approaches to political 
economy that underlie concepts commonly used in definitions of 
privatisation. From the discussion it was seen that any understanding of 
privatisation would depend critically upon the way in which the terms 
private and public, market and state were understood. These concepts were 
examined in relation to the different analytical frameworks of political 
economy that have already been established - classical, liberal and 
Marxian. This chapter builds upon these analytical foundations in order 
to develop possible theoretical explanations for the implementation of 
privatisation policies within a geographical context. 
A cursory observation of privatisation policies, both within and 
between nation states, would reveal that they ,may be implemented at 
local, regional and national levels. Explanatory frameworks are needed 
therefore to account for any spatial and temporal unevenness in the 
development of privatisation at any of these scales. 
presented in three parts. The first part briefly 
The chapter is 
discusses the 
relationship between the productive and redistributive areas 
sector activity in relation to the geographical scale 
of 
at 
state 
which 
privatisation may occur. 
This is followed by two sect ions which examine, in t urn, two of the 
three main theoretical perspectives used within geography and which could 
be used to explain the development of privatisation: public choice theory 
of neo-classical economics; and Weberian organisational theory upon which 
the liberalist urban managerialist approach is founded. Discussion of 
the Marxian perspective is delayed to the following chapter. The 
shortcomings of the first two theories are presented and a need is 
demonstrated for a more comprehensive theoretical framework to advance 
understanding of the uneven spatiality of privatisation. 
2. 1 Privatisation and Geoglrphical Scale: 
In a comprehensive review of the varying extent of privatisation in 
Europe, Vickers and Wright (1988) argue that it is not easy to explain why 
policies to encourage privatisation are implemented for at least five 
reasons. First, there has been no systematic expose of the reasons for 
privatisation; second, motives vary widely across European countries; 
third, emphasis is given to different objectives at different timesj 
fourth, reasons for privatisation have often followed rather than preceeded 
its implementation; and finally, unspoken motives may not always be 
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distinguishable from the declared reasons or the consequences from the 
wishes (Vickers and Wright 1988, 5). Although their work is targeted at 
what they call industrial privatisation, which refers to the productive 
side of the economy, the reasons they cite could be just as applicable to 
the privatisation of the redistributive side of the economy which exists 
in the specific form of the welfare state. 
Within a geographical context there are, in effect, two questions to 
address. First is why has the state sector been privatised and second, 
why has privatisation occurred so unevenly across space? Geographically 
uneven privatisation may occur at two principal spatial scales: the 
national and the local or regional. At the former level are state owned 
industries in the productive or trading sector of economies: industries 
such as steel production, mineral extraction, railways, posts and 
telecommunications. Some of these first became established as private 
ventures in the 19th century before their gradual ~ssimilation into public 
ownership in the 20th century. In the 1980s however some of these 
industries have been returned to private ownership in certain countries. 
The geographical variations in the extent to which this has occurred allows 
for comparisons on an international scale as attempted in a descriptive 
manner by Vickers and Wright (1988) within Western Europe. 
At a regional or local level the state provides services aimed 
primarily, but not entirely, at redistribution rather than production. 
Typical examples are urban passenger transport, public utilities, 
schools, hospitals and social welfare payment offices. Although almost 
always provided under conditions laid down by the central state their 
administrat ion is generally conducted at various sub-nat ional levels. In 
these cases there is scope for the privatisation of these services to 
develop unevenly within a specific national context. The spatiality of 
their privatisation can then be examined within both a national and 
international context. 
A further important distinction can be made between privatisation at 
the nat ional and subnat ional levels. In the former case, pri vatisat ion 
policies have generally been applied to complete industries. For example, 
where electricity generation, airlines and telecommunications have been 
privatised, the whole industry has usually been transferred to the private 
sector by means of a change in ownership rights. It should be emphasised 
that this is by no means always the case as will be seen in a later 
chapter. By contrast, however, at the subnational level privatisation has 
seldom involved changes to the ownership rights of entire organisations. 
Instead there has been a change to the form of service provision as certain 
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services start to be provided by the private sector. In the case of public 
hospitals, for example, state ownership of the institution is retained, 
while individual services can be privatised through having their provision 
undertaken by pri vat e sector operators. Subnat ional pri vat isat ion then 
usually only involves certain services within organisations being privately 
provided rather than the entire organisation itself being transferred to 
the private sector as often occurs at the national level. 
The distribution of resources, whether publicly or privately owned, 
has long been a preoccupat ion of geographers. To dat e however little 
attention seems to have been given to variations in the extent to which 
transfers from public to private provision have occurred regardless of the 
geographical scale involved. In attempting to provide an explanatory basis 
for spatially uneven privatisation, the three main theoretical 
perspect i ves used in geography to explain resource dist ri bution may be 
appliedj public choice, managerialist, and Marxist. The remainder of 
this chapter critically evaluates these theories with this end in mind. 
2.2 Public Choice Theory and Privatisation: 
According to this theory, the public or state sector of the economy· 
should, wherever possible, replicate the operat ions of the market as in 
the private sector, where, it is claimed, individuals are able to exercise 
freedom of choice. The state apparatus at both local and national level 
has both a bureaucratic ar~ comprising appointed managers or 
bureaucrats, and a democratic arm of elected presentatives of the 
communi t y or the nation. In public choice theory, state sector industries 
and inst it utions <bureaucracies) are seen as monopolist ic and therefore 
denying the consumers of their goods and services the choice that would be 
offered them in a competitive market environment. Public prOVision of 
goods and services becomes inherently problematic as it conflicts with the 
public interest secured through market exchange. Within public choice 
theory there is therefore an extensive critique of state sector activity 
which is elaborated upon in the following section. 
2.2.1 Economic Efficiency. Property Rishts and Privatisation: 
Where collective provision obtains, as in the state sector, public 
choice theory argues that managers pursue their own private interests 
rather than the public interest. They can do this because, as the previous 
chapter showed, the state sector economy does not operate according to 
value exchange cri teria. For this reason it is deemed to be permanently 
prone to economic inefficiency and therefore operates contrary to the 
public interest. The pursuit of economic efficiency lies at the very 
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heart of arguments for privatisation and it has two principal aspects to 
it: 
Productive efficiency is realised when goods and services are produced 
with minimal cost in resource utilisation. In quantitative terms 
productive efficiency is simply the ratio of output to input costs. The 
ratio is maximised when input costs are minimised for a given unit of 
output. Even where production conditions enable this ratio to be maximised 
there can still be an inefficient allocation of goods and services if more, 
or less, is produced than is required by society. 
does not necessarily imply allocative efficiency. 
Productive efficiency 
2 Allocative efficiency is realised when the allocation of resources in 
society is such that the maximum possible social wealth is realised. In 
other words, an optimal allocative efficiency results when no one can be 
made bet ter off without making anyone worse off - the so-called Pareto 
criteria. Where there is allocative inefficiency there are still 
opportunities to increase social wealth by reallocating resources without 
making anyone else worse off. 
The conditions for satisfying allocative effiCiency are automatically 
fulfilled when individuals pursue their own self interest in a perfectly 
competitive market by maximising profits, in the case of firms, and 
utility, in the case of consumers (Stephens and Nolan 1988, 59). 
Leibenstein (1966) has termed as X inefficiency, the difference between the 
maximum possible economic efficiency attainable for a given input and the 
actually existing level of efficiency in an institution. Most public 
choice theorists argue that, largely due to the lack of market competition, 
state sector institutions, 
private sector ones. 
have a greater level of X inefficiency than 
If the existence of value exchange is a prerequisite for attaining 
maximum economic efficiency, there must also be a clear establishment of 
individual rights to private ownership of property in order to realise 
value exchange. Within the ambit of public choice theory has arisen, since 
the late 1960s, a fairly extensive literature in the so called • Property 
Rights School' with major contributions coming from Demsetz (1967) and the 
writings in Furubotn and Pejovich (1974). The main argument, as Hodgson 
(1988, 152) explains, is that: 
by providing individual incentives and disincentives in the form 
of property rights in areas hitherto uncovered it is imagined 
that the scope for government intervention would be reduced and 
individuals would be more free to assess benefits and disbenefits 
on their own and act accordingly. 
Rather than have problems such as air pollution or workplace safety 
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controlled by government intervention, it is maintained instead that the 
solution lies in developing and enforcing a system of clearly defined 
property rights, so that aggrieved parties could sue those responsible for 
their disadvantageous situation. The policy implications of this school of 
thought is that if property rights are not unambiguously defined 
resources will not be correctly valued (ie priced). Where property rights 
are held collectively, resource allocation is thought to be inefficient 
since each individual can gain full use of the resource without paying for 
the full cost of it. Alternatively stated there is no incentive for 
individuals to achieve economic efficiency. Hence there is potential for 
waste with the ever present possibility for a I Tragedy of the Commons' 
type situation referred to in the previous chapter. 
Essential to the establishment of property rights is the requirement 
that they are embedded in a competitive market. This enables them to be 
transferred and traded between individuals or groups according to their 
most profitable outcome. The central argument for privatisation in terms 
of public choice theory is that prl vate sector ent erprlses with clearly 
defined rights to profit will perform better <ie be more efficient) than 
those in the state sector where rights are diffused and uncertain (Dunsire 
et al 1988, 365). 
One of the claims of some public choice theorists such as Parkinson 
(1958) and Downs (1967) is that state institutions have an in-built 
tendency towards continual expansion (Jonsson 1985). This contention was 
extended by Niskanen (1971) who claimed that state sector managers 
(bureaucrats) necessarily strive to maximise their budgets and oversupply 
their services or outputs. Because of ill-defined property rights, public 
bureaucracies are forever prone to oversupply outputs - that is to supply 
to a level beyond which is socially optimal as judged by a perfectly 
competitive market. The implication is that the state sector will always 
be allocatively inefficient regardless of how internally or productively 
efficient it may be. 
The growth of state sector expenditure is, in public choice theory, 
primarily a consequence of this maximisation hypothesis. Through not being 
exposed to the discipline of market forces and the need for commercial 
profitability, managers can push for ever greater budgets to increase their 
numbers, improve promotion prospects and all round job security. A 
monopolisation of knowledge and lack of public recall or accountability 
accompanies this process. The immediate policy prescription is 
privatisation of the institution (bureaucracy) either through its sale or 
contracting out to the private sector. 
- 37-
While this maximisation thesis 
is by no means uncritically accepted even amongst public choice theorists 
themselves (see Lane 1987, chI,) its significance lies in the unequivocal 
rationale it provides for privatisation. 
Whether the maximisation thesis is accepted or otherwise, most public 
choice theorists argue that state sector bureaucracies have expanded to the 
extent that private profitability and public choice has been severely 
compromised. As the state sector bureaucracies expand their act i vit ies 
through, say, taking over the ownership of bankrupt private companies and 
extending social welfare provision, there is a 'crowding out' of the 
(productive) private sector (Bacon and Eltis 1978). The tax base is 
consequently eroded which gives a reduced supply of resources for the 
state to redistribute, while at the same there is an increased demand for 
state provided goods and services. The obvious remedy of raising tax 
rates, while perhaps providing t~mporary amelioration of the situation, 
only places a still greater tax burden on the e:lf:isting private sector. 
Ultimately then the need for privatisation in public choice theory rests on 
the operation of supply and demand factors. 
Within the field of public choice theory two distinct approaches to 
the provision of state sector goods and services can be identified. The 
public economy variant attempts to construct a II representative theory of 
democracy based primarily upon [value] exchange relationships in society' 
(Clark and Dear 1984, 47). The other approach - the pluralist variant - is 
founded on the contention that the public interest is served by, 
"poli ticians reflecting the preferences of voters through their responses 
to the demands made by pressure and interest groups in a pluralist society 
composed of many complex groups' (Pinch 1985, 34), In the next two 
sections these two variant forms, starting with the public economy one, are 
discussed in respect of their ability to explain the implementation of 
privatisation policies, while a third section focuses on their distinct 
geographical context. 
2.2.2 The Public Economy and Public Choice Theory: 
The origins of the public economy approach to the state sector extends 
back to the classical economist J. S. Mill in his Principles of Political 
Economy. It was not unt 11 the 1950s that it became widely used to 
analyse the provision of local government services. The most important 
theoretical contributions have been due to Tiebout (1956) and Downs (1957), 
and much subsequent geographical work in this field is considerably 
indebted to these two writers (eg Bish 1971 and Bish and Ostrom 1976). In 
simplest terms, the intention of the public economy approach is to apply 
micro-economic analysis to the supply of publicly provided goods and 
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services. The solution to the I problem' of state sector oversupply 
propounded by Tiebout is to establish numerous small local authorit ies 
supplying a varying number of public services in direct proportion to the 
level of local tax. 
Residents could choose which particular mixture of services and taxes 
they desired by opting to migrate to the authority most suited to their 
preferences. In this way any oversupply of services would be met by higher 
than needed taxes which would result in out-migration and hence an erosion 
of the tax base. Public service cutbacks to a more socially optimum level 
should then follow. The state supply authorities would thereby receive 
price signals just as if they were operating in the market place. 
Consumers become the equivalent of voters <ie consumer voters), but voting 
with their feet rather than through the ballot box. Using the terminology 
of Hirschman (1970) this is the equivalent of the I exi t I option that is 
open to people when faced with a problem. The des'ired policy outcome is a 
series of local authorities co~peting with each other to gain residents and 
capital investment, just as private businesses compete with each other in 
the market place for customers. 
The Tieboutian model, since it is an ideal model, has a number of 
restrictive assumptions, such as all individuals having perfect mobility 
and sufficient resources to undertake the necessary migration. This aside 
there is some empirical evidence from both the USA and the UI{ to support 
the hypothesis of voting with ones feet in response to high taxation and 
diminishing levels of service provision. In an empirical test of 
Tiebout I s hypothesis, Aronson (1974.) has applied mathematical modelling to 
populat ion movements in selected met ropoli tan areas. Taking Harrisburg 
(USA) and Leeds and Manchester (UK) as case studies, the conclusion was 
that fiscal factors appear to have affected the distribution of population 
in all three areas although the trend was more pronounced in the US example 
than in the UK (Aronson 1974., 338). A few years earlier Oates (1969) in 
study of tax rates and public service provision in the New York 
metropolitan region found empirical support for Tiebout's model while more 
recently Davies (1982) came to similar conclusions in a study of 'fiscal 
migration' between the boroughs of metropolitan London. 
These cases notwithstanding such analyses have been subjected to much 
crit iei sm. A comprehensive cri t ique of the t heoret ical approach has come 
from Clark (1981) who, writ ing from a broadly Marxian perspect i ve, 
maintains that, "those elements central to any critical analysis of 
capitalist democrac~ class conflict, the mode of production, ideology, and 
the state are missing from Downs and Tiebout" (Clark 1981, 120). It is 
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not necessary however to appeal to Marxian methodology to criticise Tiebout 
and Downs. 
There is no denying that people's choice of destination may be 
influenced, in part at least, by tax and service levels. Nevertheless 
much of the literature on residential relocation cites changes in life 
cycle and socio-economic status as being more important factors in 
determining peoples migratory tendencies than the balance between property 
tax and service provision (Pinch 1985, 34). Another limit at ion of the 
Tieboutian model is that it ignores both certain groups income constraints 
and the impossiblity of achieving many scale economies of service delivery 
in a spatially fragmented administrative system. In view of the 
restrictions that apply to the public economy approach, Pinch (1985, 34) 
argues that it has been less influential than the pluralist approach. 
2.2.3 Political Pluralism and Public Choice Theory: 
The original works in this approach can be a"ttibuted to Dahl (1956) 
and Polsby (1963) while Shelley (1984) has reviewed much of the 
contemporary writing. A fundamental premise of the pluralist approach is 
that consumer preference or public choice is revealed through democratic 
voting procedures. In this case voting is through the ballot box rather 
than with the feet. As stated briefly above, under pluralist democracies, 
policy makers have to respond to various interest and pressure groups. In 
order to stay in political office they would most likely respond to the 
group which takes the most political action to have its concerns aired. 
For indi vdual and group interests, the pluralist principle is basically 
that, I the door that squeaks gets the grease'. 
The extent to which political action occurs is expected to reflect 
the strength of the group preference and therefore the public interest. If 
people should fail to be represented in such a democratic arrangement the 
system gives them a clear signal to improve their ability to be heard in 
the polit ical arena. Moreover should there be any abuse of power by an 
elected representative s/he can always be recalled from office through 
periodic elections. Appealing again to the terminology of Hirschman 
(1970), the pluralist approach is predicated upon people taking the I voice' 
rather than the' exit' option. An important part to the pluralist model 
is that the state apparatus itself is perceived to be a neutral arbitrator 
between competing groups and therefore not beholden to any sectional or 
class interests. 
strong pressure 
political power 
compromised. 
Any discriminatory act ions on the part of excessively 
groups would not be countenanced by the holders of 
and so the overall public interest would not be 
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With reference to the privatisation of either nationalised industries 
or urban services, pluralist public choice theory sees the policy as 
reflecting consumer preferences revealed in the outcome of electoral 
processes. Sears and Citron (1982, 1) give several examples to reveal the 
explanatory power of pluralist public choice theory. They cite the 
electoral successes of Right wing part since the late 1970s, in the 
Scandinavian countries, Britain, and the USA all of which were pledged to 
curb the economic activities of the state sector while promoting the growth 
of private enterprise. 
At a more analytical level, studies by Johnston (1979 chS) and Shelley 
and Goodchild (1983) have examined the levels of public provision in 
relation to partisan elections in a similar manner to those undertaken in 
modelling Tiebout's hypotheis. Possibly the most celebrated example of 
political 'voice' and tax/service levels has been the passing of 
Proposit ion 13 in California in 1978, as a consequence of a mass tax 
revol t by propert y owners. The effect of this was to reduce sharply 
property based taxes and to restrict their future growth (Sears and Citron 
1982, 2). 
The 'voice' option can also operate in the other direction insofar as 
it may be effective in preserving, rather than reducing, state services. 
The long running and ult imately successful public campaign to keep open 
the Settle Carlisle railway in Britain is an interesting example of this. 
Another example, which comes close to the ridiculous, concerns what The 
Economist of London has refered to as, "the controversial Right-wing leader 
of Westminster Council". According to the The Economist <1989, 54-): 
[the leader's] obsession with privatisation has got her into deep 
trouble. Eager to get rid of a loss-maker, in 1987 she pushed 
through the sale of three council-owned cemeteries to a property 
company for 15 pence. 
A public outcry has forced the council to agree to buy them back, 
though the asking price is now closer to f10M. The fiasco has 
fuelled Tory worries that her public image might be a liability. 
The important point about both the public economy and the pluralist 
variant of public choice theory is that they each assume an equal ability 
of individuals to influence policy outcomes. Peoples' ability to 
participate in electoral campaigning or house moving can be severely 
constrained by their lack of finance and material resources. 
Notwithstanding these limitations it is the public economy approach, based 
on the Tieboutian hypothesis, which seems to have most prescriptive 
potential in respect of privatisation. 
The democratic pluralist model of state provision is open to the 
public choice objection of the ever present possibility of corruption and 
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'pork barrelling' in which case consumer preferences are not realist ically 
represented. Market oriented structures, such as Tiebout's are preferred, 
on the grounds that, as Friedman and Friedman (1960) first argued, a vote 
'through the pocket' or 'by the feet' is a more reliable indicator of 
preferences than a vote through the ballot box. Through the de facto, if 
not de jure, establishment of propert y rights in state service provision, 
local authorities have to compete with each other for consumers' tax 
revenues. For privatisation at the national level, public choice theory 
would advocate the spatial fragmentation of enterprises so as to promote 
competition between them and hence promote consumer (public) choice. 
The establishment of a market exchange process for goods and service 
provision should mean that state sector ma.nagers will no longer have a 
vested interest in maximising their budgets, and oversupplying services 
beyond the level of consumer preferences. In achieving this end contr~lct, 
rather than direct, employment is generally preferred together with 
multiple-provider structures over single provider structures (Hood 1987, 
149). Under these circumstances not only would service provision be 
spat ially fragmented but condit ions of employment become 'individualised' 
with the implementation of contracts. In this way employment conditions 
more accurately reflect market conditions and so they are in effect, 
I privatised', just as is the service provision itself. A crucial aspect of 
privatisation policies is the necessity to fragment production into several 
competing enterprises and thereby ensure public choice. 
In order to present such policies in an historical context it is 
worth noting that in 19th century USA, urban public transport was 
predominantly privately owned and highly fragmented into a multitude of 
enterprises competing over different routes. One of the reasons for the 
increasing degree of state provision of urban transport in the 20th century 
was to introduce some rationalisation to the route structure (Stopher 1988, 
22), Also, according to Stopher <1988, 22), n cut throat competition among 
operating companies was increasingly responsible for degradation of 
servic~' from which he concludes that those advocating privatisation 
policies that spatially fragment production would rather repeat history 
than learn from it. 
2.2.4 The Spatiality of Privatisation and Public Choice Theory 
f 
Although many geographical applications of public choice theory exist 
there has not hitherto been much attention given to spatial unevenness in 
the privatisation of public services. Reynolds (1976) has analysed the 
variat ion wi thin, and between, three metropolitan areas of the USA (Los 
Angeles, St Louis, and Detroit) in ~:r~ forms of public service provision. 
Considerable attention was given by Reynolds to the extent of inter-
government contracting for services, especially in Los Angeles, but he had 
little to say on the level of private sector involvement in the process in , 
any of these conurbations. 
Dunleavy <1986a) has shown that one major problem for advocates of 
privatisation based on public choice theory is that government bureaucrats, 
on the basis of their budget maximising tendencies, would be most reluctant 
to privatise the services they have control over. This would entail a 
reduction in their budgets, demain of control, and possibly job security. 
It is difficult to see how any impetus for privatisation would arise from 
within the bureaucracy itself. External pressure would need to be applied 
which, within the pluralist model of public choice theory, would come from 
the elected politicians, Within elected governments politicians may gain 
popular support for privatisation policies through presenting a tax-
service provision trade off as in the case of California's Propostion 13 
cited above. 
Viewed in a spatial context it might be expected that privatisation 
could develop unevenly according to two principal factors. First, is the 
regionally varying electoral support for such a policy while second, would 
be the varying strengths of resistance from within the bureaucracies 
themselves. A fUrther factor that should have a critical bearing on policy 
outcomes is the spatial variations in the level of pressure group 
interests for the maintenance of publicly provided services faced with the 
threat of privatisation. 
Both versions of public choice theory could also be applied to the 
workforce employed by the state sector in the provision of goods and 
services. Faced with the prospect of privatisation and the likely 
reduct ion in employment condit ions, workers have two options. Either the 
opt ion of leaving (the Tiebout ian sol ut ion - exit) may be adopted or of 
making representations to the public administration concerned that 
privatisation is not in the public interest (the pluralist solution -
voice). To this end regional variations in the strength of workers 
convictions on privatisation and the conditions of the local labour market 
for alternative employment opportunities, could have a significant 
influence on the uneven development of the policy. 
Regardless of whatever empirical validity could be found to support a 
public choice explanation of privatisation this would indeed only be a 
partial explanation. The public choice model almost totally ignores the 
role of private (institutional) investors, their preferences and their 
impact upon any privatisation initiatives. The theoretical framework seeks 
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to present a situation moving to a static equilibrium between supply and 
demand for goods and services. Little is said in relation to any of the 
broader socio-economic forces that might lead to a change in consumer 
preferences towards (or even against) pri vat isat ion or which place the 
state under severe constraints in the field of service provision, Taking 
this into account, along with Dunleavy's <1986a) criticism of public 
choice theory cited above, it becomes clear that other theoretical 
frameworks must also be considered in order to obtain a broader explanation 
of privatisation, 
2,3 Managerialism and Privatisation: 
The managerialist framework for explaining the distributional aspects 
of public goods and service provision, whether publicly or privately 
provided, was born largely of a dissatisfaction with the public choice 
theory of seeking optimal social allocation of resources based on market 
criteria. By contrast with public choice theories of (state) bureaucracy 
which tend to be, according to Lane <1987, 2), II indi vidualist, atomistic 
and economic in their assumptionll, the organisational theory upon which 
the managerialist framework is founded, displays a prefsrence for 
"structure, holism and power' (Lane 1987, 2). In the latter, society is 
ruled by appointed managers (bureaucrats) 
elected politicians. 
rather than by democratically 
In this respect managerialism is not at variance with the public 
economy (Tieboutian) version of public choice theory, but the prescriptive 
implications for privatisation are quite different as will be seen 
presently. The intellectual origins of managerialism can be traced back to 
Max Weber rather than Adam Smi th or J. S. Mill. In terms of political 
economy the analytical approach adopted by the managerialist framework is 
much more liberal than classical. The public interest and the perspective 
on privatisation are therefore seen very differently in the two cases, 
2.3, 1 The Weberian Origins of Managerialism 
For Weber the development of bureaucracy has been a necessary 
accompaniment to advanced capitalism by imparting to it a level of 
organisation and stability thought to be lacking in the market place. He 
maintained that political domination in modern capitalist society 
necessarily and increasingly becomes bureaucratic. Instead of belng 
inherently inefficient, bureaucracies, whether private or public, are 
instead seen as being, potentially at least, highly efficient. The 
discreprancy between the two theories lies largely in the different 
conceptions of efficiency employed. Weber (1978, 223) argued that: 
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[Blureaucracy is, from a purely technical point of vie~ capable 
of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this 
sense formally the most rational known means of exercising 
authority over human beings <cited in Lane 1987, 3). 
The important point is that Weber contrasted modern bureaucracy under 
capitalism with traditional pre-capitalist feudal and oriental forms of 
bureaucracy. He found in favour of the efficiency of the former but this 
finding was set in terms of organisational form rather than economic 
efficiency. By organisational form Weber meant the rigid rules and 
codified conduct of modern bureaucracies. These characteristics served 
to minimise the nepot ism and political patronage so endemic to earlier 
forms of bureaucracy. More particularly, Weber saw bureaucracy as being 
efficient insofar as it was a rational means-of organising production. 
The concept of rationality in organisational theory has been 
identified as, lithe capacity of organisations to order and to make sense of 
complicated environments' <Meyer 1987, 215). Studies of bureaucracy 
subsequent to Weber have produced the concept of 'bounded' <ie limited) 
human rationality which, "compels construction of organisation to 
accomplish complex tasks" <Meyer 1987, 221) . Bureaucracies in 
organisational theory may, or may not be economically efficient, but they 
are inherently rational. They bring order and reason where otherwise choas 
and systemic breakdown would occur. Public sector policies may therefl)re 
be analysed from the perspective of economic efficiency or bureaucratic 
rationalisation', 
A further issue of dispute between public choice and organisational 
theory is the motivational factor of individuals. As already seen the 
former theory focuses on maximisation borne of self interest; state sector 
managers maximise their budgets, and individuals in the market place 
maximise their profit. The latter theory however argues that bureaucrats, 
whether in public institutions or private enterprises, do not 'maximise' 
but 'satisfice' because there are cognitive limits to human choice 
(Stephens and Nolan 1988, 61). Particularly in the case of senior public 
sector managers, Stephens and Nolan (1988, 61) maintain that the desire for 
job satisfaction and serving the community is more readily identified as 
the motivational factor rather than maximisation. 
Within the managerialist framework, managers can be seen as being 
able to serve the public interest, at least insofar as the concept is 
understood in liberal political economy. The pursuit of both efficiency 
and equity are much more compatible than in public choice theory. But 
organisational theorists going back to Weber himself have had many 
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misgivings over the enormous political power of bureaucracies and the 
managers who staffed them. An important feature of Weber's model of 
bureaucracy was that the exercise of power, authority and domination lelas 
based on knowledge. In short, knowledge is power. Upon this basis exists 
an extensive role for a professional salariat within the bureaucracy, who 
wi t hout owning any product i ve asset s unlike the capit alist class, have 
class interests quite distinct from wage earners in the work force. 
The class power of the 'professional, technical and managerial strata' 
(PTMS) , which may exist in both the pri vat e and public sector, arises 
through an ability to restrict entry to their positions on account of their 
knowledge and the necessity of formal qualifications. They can therefore 
obtain political power quite independently of any economic power through 
ownership or control of productive assets and, moreover, their political 
power is removed from any democratic control. According to Leonard <1982, 
192), II The increasing rationalisation of administration, thus reduces the 
possiblity of effecti ve political control over the state bureaucracy for 
such control is only possible in a very limited degree to persons who are 
not technical specialists'. 
While Weber saw a rationality for the existence of bureaucracy and its 
positive role in serving the public interest, he was nonetheless very 
ambivalent over its effects on both the individuals within it and society 
at large. He fully recognised the existence of many features of 
bureaucracy that public choice theorists have seized upon such as excessive 
secrecy, monopolisation of knowledge and lack of accountability. It is 
somewhat paradoxical therefore that while public choice theory is based 
largely on a critique of Weber's concept of bureaucracy (see Lane 1:'187, 
Hood 1987), managerialis~ with its Weberian origins, arose as a critique 
of public choice theory. 
2.3.2 Geographical Applications of Managerialism: 
The first introduction of Weberian ideas into geography came with Rex 
and Moore (1967) in their study of housing allocation in Britain. Like 
public choice theorists, they also saw the spatial structure of urban 
environments as reflecting a migratory process from (city) centre to 
(suburban) periphery. The crucial difference is that Rex and Moore did 
not analyse this as a market driven process, as in the Tiebout ian model, 
but rather as a class mediated process. Class status in the market place 
(ie wealth) considerably enhances a person's opportunity to move to 
different parts of the metropolis in accordance with their perceptions of 
service quality. To the extent that spacious housing in the suburbs was 
desired by all, it is a scarce resource which is unequally distributed 
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amongst classes hence there is potential for political conflict that market 
forces cannot transcend. 
Two important factors which mediate the operation of the market were 
ident Hied by Rex and Moore. First, was the securit y and size of the 
income of residents as this determined how banks and building societies 
would allocate credit. Second the access to publicly provided housing 
depended upon criteria laid down by local authorities such as I need' and 
time of residence in the district. The access to desirable housing was 
controlled not so much by market forces acting through people voting with 
their feet or through electoral procedures, but by appointed officials 
(professionals and managers) in the private financial institutions and the 
public administration. Spatial residential patterns came to be seen as 
reflecting the social processes embedded in administration. 
The work of Rex and Moore (1967) has been built upon by Pahl (1970) 
whose writings have close parallels with the 'community power thesis 
developed in the USA by Lineberry (1977) and Mladenka and Hill (1978). 
Rather than any external political considerations it is the internal 
operations of bureaucracies, whether iri the state or private sector, that 
became the centre of attention in the early managerialist writings. Pahl 
(1970) contended that professionals with specialised knowledge control 
access to resources. They act as 'social gatekeepers' and through their 
knowledge they can manipulate their elected representatives to the extent 
that the political composition of a government, particularly at subnational 
level, makes little difference to the policies pursued (Leonard 1982, 192). 
These writers see elected authorities and community pressure groups acting 
in the pluralist tradition as not possessing the necessary knowledge and 
expertise to provide effective opposition to managers' policy goals. 
As pointed out earlier, such an argument varies little from what 
public choice theorists claim about the role of managers in bureacracies. 
The critical difference between them and the managerialist thesis is that 
privatisation may be actively pursued by managers rather than opposed by 
them as recognised by Lineberry (1977) and Dunleavy (1986a), According 
to Lineberry 0977, 171), following Hirschman (1970), dissatisfied 
consumers need not I exit' wholesale from a publicly provided service but 
may choose to opt for provision from a private sector operator. Rather 
than opposing such an 'exit' public sector managers may even welcome the 
unloading of potentially troublesome customers. 
60), Lineberry <1977, 171) claims that: 
Quoting Hirschman (1970, 
Those who hold power in the lazy monopoly may actually have an 
interest in creating some limited opportunities for exit on the 
part of those whose voice might be uncomfortable ..... instead of 
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revivifying monopoly [bureaucratic rationalisation in Weberian 
terms] competition [privatisation] may permit it to r'emain flabby 
and complacent. 
Invoking the Weberian notion of class, Dunleavy (1986a) argues that by 
privatising many state services, managers exercise their class power borne 
of their professional status over a large unskilled or semiskilled working 
class. Privatisation, according to Dunleavy (1986a, 31): 
advances the (class) interests of central and policy-level 
officials at the expense of job losses and worsened conditions 
for rank and file state workers. It also produces a qualitative 
and quant itat i ve reduct ion of services to recipients, especially 
the poor and the working class. 
It is largely upon this basis that much of the opposition to privatisation 
has arisen. In respect of the public interest it may neither increase 
economic efficiency, as Lineberry (1977) argues, nor be consistent with 
social justice in terms of maintaining employment condit ions and service 
quali ty in Dunleavy's thesis. For managerialism, with its founding in 
organisational theory, privatisation is by no means always indicated as a 
means to improve efficiency since this is not the prime intention of the 
policy. Yet the process may well have a degree of bureaucratic 
rationality since by privatising a concern the administrative procedul'es 
within the bureaucracy tend to be simplified and difficult problems 
displaced onto someone else's shoulders. 
Within the managerialist framework then, the impetus for privatisation 
would stem from within the bureaucracy itself rather than the democratic 
structure. From a geographical standpoint the spatiality of the process 
might be expected to reflect variations in the organisational structul'es 
and goals of different bureaucracies and their appointed managements. The 
possibli t y of a I di ffusion of innovations' process taking place across 
regions could be an important factor in the geographical development of 
privat isaHon. As the init ial success of the policy, whether viewed in 
terms of efficiency or rationality, is communicated throughout the region, 
nation state, or indeed across international boundaries, so it could be 
, 
expected that there would be a spatial unevenness in the implementation of' 
the policy. 
To place the diffusion process within any of the two theoretical 
frameworks considered so far is difficult. Communicat ing the idea of 
privat isat ion across space could be done either by elected polit icians 
responding to political pressures (public choice theory) or by appointed 
managers trying to rationalise their operations (managerialism). The 
process of diffusion can therefore be reconciled with either framework. To 
the extent that diffusion mayor may not occur, the more important 
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t heoret ical quest ion for both (pluralist) public choice and managerialist 
frameworks is where the origins of the process lie - with polit icians or 
managers; the democracy or the bureaucracy. 
Also of theoretical interest within a managerialist perspective would 
be the particular nature of services or industries that are privatised and 
how they compare to those that remain publicly provided. There could be 
distinct differences in the management structure between services that 
might well give rise to a sectorally uneven privatisation. The relative 
degree of professional dominance between services might also be a powerful 
factor mediating privatisation. So certain services or sectors of industry 
may be privatised far earlier, and at far greater spatial extent, than 
others. In this way it may be seen that the geography of privatisation is 
as much a reflection on spatial variations in what services/industries are 
privatised as well as where they are privatised. 
While presenting a somewhat different theoretical approach to the 
privatisation debate from that of public choice theory, this exposition 
managerialism as an explanatory framework still remains inadequate in many 
respects. The focus is exclusively on managers at the local (city) state 
level and there is a distinct neglect of any external constraints on them 
from either alliances with private sector interests or the central state, 
although this issue has been addressed in later versions of 
managerialism as will be seen presently. In as much as a diffusion 
process may occur, the managerialist (and public choice) framework is 
silent on addressing the question of what drives the process beyond the 
whim of individual managers (or politicians). 
Whatever the empirical evidence for the autonomy of 'the bureaucracy' 
from 'the democracy'! much criticism has been levelled against early 
managerialist work through its failure to address the sources of 
bureaucratic power. According to Saunders (1980, 92), "it lacked a theory 
of power and in practice consisted of little more than descriptive data 
gathering on those who were assumed to occupy important positions". 
Paraphasing Basset and Short (1980, 52) writing in respect of the 
allocation of public housing, "while managers may implement privatisation 
policies they certainly do not create the socio-economic conditions under 
whi ch pri vatisation is indicated'. 
2.3.3 Managerialism and Corporatism 
In later wri t ings wi thin the managerialist framework - what may be 
termed the corporatist approach - there has been a move to identify the 
constraints, other than purely spatial ones, operating on the policy making 
decisions of local state managers. In a later work of Pahl (1979), 
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managers came to be seen as being constrained by a 
availability of resources such as land and finance and 
lack of the 
by limitations 
imposed upon their decision making capacity by organisations outside of the 
bureaucracy. Two other key actors come into the decision making processes 
involved in resource distribution; the private sector (the capitalist 
economy) and the central state apparatus. The latter might severely 
constrain the operating budgets of local authorities or the capital 
borrowing requirements of publicly owned (ie nationalised) industries. In 
respect of private sector influences on public service provision, Piven 
and Friedland 0984, 278) cite studies than have pointed to the role of 
local banks dominating finance boards, developers influencing zoning 
boards, city centre corportions the urban renewal agencies, and doctors 
influencing the local health system. 
A major concern of writers within the corporatist framework has been 
the growing size of private sector capitals and the' necessity for the state 
to provide the propitious conditions to attract or maintain their 
investment in ei ther the nafional or local economy. Simultaneously the 
central government has to negot iat e with organised labour for any notion 
of a corporatist alliance between, state, capital and labour to be 
sustained. Private corporations may seek state financial aid for such 
necessities as infrastructural development and industrial site 
preparation while the social costs of private investment like air 
pollution, public safety and unemployment levels, all have to be 
underwritten by the state. 
In this perspective state fiscal stress arises from the manipulation 
of state budgets by the actions of private capital. But just as 
importantly for Pahl (1979), writing before the advent of the current 
Conservative administration in Britain, is that, lithe state is playing an 
increasing role in allocating resources. Housing, education, health the 
social services and so on consume enormous [public] resources' (Pahl 1979, 
38). At the same time however the state has assumed a greater financially 
supporting role in relation to the private sector with the establishment of 
'enterprise zones' and 'development corporations' being major examples. 
The intense interaction between the state and private capital has led 
to the conception of a corporatist society in which a form of economy 
intermediate between capitalism and socialism is hypothesised; that of 
private ownership of the means of production (capitalism) but state contol 
over the operat ions of the economy (socialism). While not referring to 
corporat ism as such, Gurr and King (1985) detail the increasing role of 
the state at both local and national level in affecting the economic and 
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demographic viability of cities. Within this corporatist framework, the 
state can then be seen as operating in the public interest insofar as this 
requires a modification of the activity of the operations of market forces. 
The centralised state is viewed as imparting efficiency criteria in its 
administration of both the public and private economy. 
The important point about this corporatist perspective of state sector 
activity is that managers, as decision makers, are no longer seen as 
omnipotent but simply as mediators between the contradictory pressures. On 
the one hand there are the often opposing forces of central government 
regulation and the need for service provision while on the other hand there 
is the need for maintaining private sector profitablity while still 
fulfilling social needs. In short the managers are neither autonomous nor 
irrelevant but constrained by a combinat ion of geographical, economic and 
poB tical factors <Saunders 1981, 195). The original Weberian framework 
of the early managerialist writing is still maintained insofar as the key 
actors in resource allocation are individuals rather than social classes 
and the role of appointed officials still prevails over that of elected 
representati ves. 
In respect of implementing privatisation policies, the locus of power 
would still be sought in the role of state sector managers but 
consideration also has to be given to the structural constraints under 
which they operate. Trapped between the lack of available government 
finance and their requirement to maintain services, privatisation may be 
readily resorted to where it is thought to be a cheaper, if not necessarily 
more efficient, alternative to public provision. Geographical variations 
in the development of the process must then be located in spatial 
differences between the interaction of the state, private capital, the 
workforce and the community. While this undoubtedly presents a more 
sophisticated account of resource allocation than the earlier managerialist 
writings, it still leaves certain issues unresolved. 
There is in particular a failure to explain theoretically the social 
origins of the constraints identified on the policies of state sector 
managers, No account is taken of changes in macro-economic forces, 
stemming from the capital/labour conflict, that have provided or restricted 
the role of state sector institutions. Neither have regional variations in 
the level of local I on-si te' class conflict been considered as possible 
mediating factors in the uneven development of the privatisation of public 
service provision. These criticisms have led researchers into the field of 
Marxian theory in an attempt to provide a broader understanding of the 
dynamics of state sector activity. From an essentially institutional or 
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state centred explanation of privatisation, the debate moves to one 
centred on class conflict. 
Summary and Conclusion: 
The above discussion has shown that neither the public choice nor the 
Weberian frameworks provides a comprehensive explanation of social 
processes such as privatisation although each may have a certain 
contribution to make. The essence of the public choice explanation for 
privatisation is that public sector bureaucracies grow inexorably because 
of ill defined or non-existent property rights. This enables managers to 
pursue a maximisation strategy to the detriment of both the productive 
private sector and, by extension, the public interest. In order to 
revitalise economic growth it is necessary to reduce the role of the state 
by privatisation, and reorganise the residual elements of the state 
apparatus so that they replicate the operations of the market economy. 
The Weberian approach to the state sector see~ its existence as being 
a rational, and possibly even efficient, complement to the market economy. 
Privatisation is not so much seen in terms of increasing economic 
efficiency but as being a rational means of dealing with complex 
organisational problems. Notwithstanding the enormous political power that 
managers have through their access to information, they do nonetheless have 
the potential, even if not always realised, to pursue the public interest 
by implementing policies aimed at social equity rather than just market 
efficiency. In this view privatisation is by no means always in the public 
interest whether the latter is understood in terms of social equity or 
economic efficiency. 
Both theoretical frameworks however tend to ignore the broader socio- , 
economic forces at work which may severely constrain the activities of the 
state sector. The question that remains is what is the social driving 
force lying behind the actions of state sector managers or elected 
representatives of the community. There is also a need to explain how any 
external forces acting on bureaucracies enable privatisation policies to 
develop in a geographically uneven context. It is towards addressing these 
issues from within a Marxian framework that the next chapter is devoted. 
Footnote: 
1 An example of the difference between bureaucratic rationality and 
economic efficiency arises in the case of promoting workforce personnel. 
Where seniority applies, as is usually the case in the state sector, the 
process is rational insofar as it is simple, unambiguous, non-
discriminatory and prevents patronage, nepotism, and corruption. It might 
however be to the detriment of an institution's efficiency as a totally 
unsuitable person may be promoted. Where suitablity rather than seniority 
applies, as in the private sector, greater efficiency may be realised but 
the procedure could be less rational where opportunity opens up for all 
the above mentioned shortcomings. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Theoretical Perspectives on the Development of Privatisation 2: 
Marxian Theory 
In contrast to Weberian and public choice perspectives, Marxian 
theory sees the roles of managers and elected government representatives in 
policy making decisions as being subordinate to the overriding requirements 
of capital accumulation and the class conflicts engendered in the 
accumulation process. Explanations for policy outcomes in respect of 
social processes like privatisation are sought in terms of the balance of 
class forces in existence at anyone time and place. This chapter 
addresses itself to analysing the role of class conflict in mediating the 
development of privatisation policies and examines some of the recent and 
continuing research in this field in the context of locality and regional 
studies. 
The chapter commences with a brief account of .the rationale for state 
involvement in the market economy as a means of securing capitalist 
product ion. The contradict ions inherent in capitalist production and the 
attempts by the state to resolve them lead to an assessment of the 
frequently cited Fiscal Crisis of the State by 0' Connor (1973). Being 
perhaps the first specifically Marxist account of state expenditure under 
advanced capitalism, it has been extensively reviewed over the years since 
its first pUblication. A further look at the work however is justified in 
order to examine its potential to explain the development of privatisation 
policies. The theoretical shortcomings of the work in explaining state 
activity in general, and privatisation in particular, are detailed and this 
leads to a third section which presents a Marxian account with a far 
greater emphasis on class conflict, rather than simply the requirements of 
capital. 
The issue of geographical variations in the levels of class struggle 
is given prominance in this section in order to determine their affect on 
the uneven development of privatisation. The likelihood of class 
reductionism in this approach, together with the functionalism of 
0' Connor (1973), has largely been responsible for a thorough ressessment 
of the relevance of Marxian theory for explaining social phenomena. Recent 
contributions in Antipode and Society and Space (1987) are testimony to the 
extent of this reassessment, and the significance of these writings to the 
privatisation debate is discussed in the final pads of the chapter. 
Attention is given to the attempts being made to move beyond the 
limitations of the Marxist framework by placing a far greater emphasis on 
empirical work set within local and regional contexts. The relevance of 
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this work for explaining privatisation at different spatial scales is' 
assessed and a case established for doing further theoretically informed( 
empirical research on the geography of privatisation. 
3.1 The Provision of Public Infrastructure for Private Production: 
From the earliest days of capitalism, the state has been involved in 
the provision of major infrast ruct ure in the field of communicat ions (eg 
posts and telegraph), transport (eg roads and canals) and national defence. 
Even the classical economists presented in chapter one saw a positive role 
for the state to play in this arena. State intervention in the market 
economy first arose in order to secure what Marx (1973) in Grundrisse 
called the general conditions of production. These served to speed up the 
circulation of commodities and comprise? many of the items necessary 
for commodity production that are either used collectively by capitalists 
or else are not directly included in the production process itself. The 
rationale for the state to embark on providing the general conditions of 
production has rested primarily on the inability of private capital to do 
so. 
Drawing on the account of Dunford <1988, 54), for private capital to 
supply these major means of production there must be: 
1 Very large amounts of money capital available as the investments 
required are usually large and costly. 
2 Investors prepared to commit money to projects where capital turnover 
is very slow and there is a high element of financial risk. 
3 Ample opportunity to sell the products of production at prices which 
give an adequate rate of return on investment. 
For this third condition to hold, property rights must be clearly 
established so that goods and services are exchanged at value and so-called 
I free riders' excluded. Dunford (1988, 55) concludes that where investm,~nt 
in the general conditions of production are not capable of yielding an 
average rate of return on capital invested, then adequate provision is 
likely to depend upon state action, On this basis it would be worthwhile 
to reflect upon h~w much public infrastructure would ever have been built 
had, say, a 10 percent real rate of return on investment been required. 
The process of state intervention to enable the private production of 
commodities has not however been a contradiction-free process as was seen 
in the first chapter's discussion of Offe (1984). The specific ways in 
which the state attempts Simultaneously both to maintain and negate the 
commodity form of production have been identified in the work of O'Connor 
(1973). The basic argument presented is that the state has to bolster 
capital accumulation (the commodity form) while at the same time 
establishing social legitimacy which requires decommodifying production. 
The end result is a 'fiscal crisis' of the state. 
It is worth emphasising that many other works have analysed the 
theoretical underpinnings of state fiscal crisis. Some have been 
essentially Marxist (eg Ph'en and Friedland 1984), others decidely non-
Marxist (eg Wildavsky 1985), while at a more empirical level the public 
policy implications of fiscal crisis are thoroughly examined in the 
contributions to Hubbell (1979) and Levine and Rubin (1980), In this 
account, however, it is specifically the work of 0' Connor that is examined 
in view of the originality of his theoretical approach to Marxian inquiry 
and its relevance in explaining the current growth of privatisation. 
Although presenting a rather underconsumptionist account of capitalist 
production and a functionalist explanation of state expenditure (see 
Schwartz 1983), 0' Connor's work has nonetheless provided a benchmark for 
Marxian analyses of changing public sector economie~, 
3,2 State Fiscal Crisis and Privatisation: The Contribution of O'Connor: 
According to 0' Connor (1973) the growth of monopoly capitalism in 
the 20th century has required the state to underwrite many of the costs of 
private production for the reasons outlined above by Dunford (1988). To 
this end there has been a dual function for the state. On the one hand 
has been the requirement to provide social capital. This amounts to 
supplying the necessary conditions for capital accumulation such as major 
infrastructure, and an educated, healthy workforce. On the other hand this 
accumulation has had to be timated to the population by the provision 
of ext ensi ve weI f are services - social expenses - none of which however 
makes any contribution to accumulation. Included in the category of 
social capital is investment and social consumption. The former 
amounts to expenditure on capital works such as roads and railways and the 
latter is expenditure on labour power in the form of education. health, 
and urban passenger transport. The state intervenes to take up the burden 
of what would otherwise be costs to private capital. 
At the same time however capitalists privately appropriate the returns 
on publicly subsidized investment. and consequently state bureaucracies no 
longer have adequate funds to perform their legitimation function 
(Fainstein and Fainstein 1980). For example, capitalists reap the benefit, 
in the form of private profit, of employing a predominantly publicly (ie 
tax payer) educated and trained workforce. The state has therefore 
socialised many of the costs of private production but not socialised the 
profits. There arises therefore a large gulf between state revenues (from 
taxes on wages and profits) and expenditure on non-productive welfare. In 
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this context the privatisation of much state sector activity could be seen 
as addressing this expenditure gap. 
An alternative to privatisation might suggest itself in the form of 
increasing the taxation on capitalists' profits. The main difficulty 
with this is that it simply reduces the level of profit and encourages 
private industry to relocate to more favourable financial regimes, in which 
case the state's tax base is eroded. This means that fewer resources 
(surplus value) are available for further investment. Taxation on 
workers' wages amounts to an indirect reduction of surplus value as, were 
it not for the taxes, workers could be paid that amount less by capitalists 
without any reduction in real wages or living standards. There would then 
be more surplus value to reinvest in further rounds of production. 
Taxation reduces both workers wages and capitalist profits, thereby 
giving scope for intense political pressure to reduce the role of the state 
in order that the tax burden may be reduced. As was seen in the previous 
chapter, there have been o\.!tright tax revolts particularly by property 
owners in the USA, which in certain cases have seen a substant ial 
reduction in state supplied goods and services in some cities. The term 
'minimal city' has been applied by Millar (1981) to the situation in which, 
to minimise property taxes, 
of their major services 
municipal bureaucracies. 
the city authorities have contracted out most 
to county governments rather than establish 
O' Connor focused his study on the USA, where so much public 
expenditure is by the local state at the city level and is financed out of 
local property taxes. In more centrally governed countries, like the UK, 
the fiscal situation at the city level has been rather less severe 
although still troublesome. Here most public expenditure is centrally 
financed while services are still administered through local bodies. 
Elliot and McCrone (1984) prefer the term financial strain rather that 
fiscal crises for the UK situation and they cite inflation as being a major 
stress factor rather than a dwindling tax base. Nevertheless an important 
underlying feature to the cutbacks to public service provision was that 
the, UK economy was neither sufficiently productive, nor internationally 
competitive, to fund both its welfare provision and the heavy military 
spending first embarked on in the fifties and sixties (Gamble 1987, 191), 
Faced with local rate-payer revolts and reductions in the level of central 
government financing, public services have come under increasing threat 
from the seventies onwards. 
Rather than being able to finance the provision of existing services, 
through further taxation on capital, governments in many countries, both 
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local and national, have often had to reduce, or eliminate, the taxation on 
company profits. Only in this way could private investment be attracted. 
So called 'enterprise zones' are an important example. As most of the 
working class do not have sufficient incomes to enable the imposition of 
significantly higher tax levels, the main burden of taxation in late 20th 
century capitalism has increasingly fallen on the professional salariat, or 
what Wright (1976) has termed the new petite bourgeoisie l • 
It was pointed out in the first chapter, that this class, with its 
high salary, has least need of state provided and tax payer subsidised 
services. Arising largely from this quarter, much anti-state sentiment 
has arisen with calls for implementing a less progressive tax structure in 
which there is less redistribution of wealth from the poor to the well 
off. This has occurred under the 'monetarist';;Z policies of some 
governments during the 1980s. The important theoret ical point from a 
Marxian perspective is that the underlying basis for this regressive pOlicy 
lies in the requirement of capitalism itself rather than in political 
campaigning against perceived government inefficiencies. 
Friedland <1984, 399) point out: 
As Piven and 
Consequently the tax revolts of homeowners represent a popular 
response to the inability of the public sector to finance the 
public expenditures required by advanced capitalism without also 
cutting deeply into popular incomes. 
The capitalist class, for obvious reasons, also opposes the imposition 
of heavy tax burdens. Unlike the professional salariat however their taxes 
can often be minimised. A major example of this is the 'transfer pricing' 
policies of multinational companies in which their profits are only 
declared in countries with the lowest tax rates. For the capitalist class 
it has been the comprehensive state welfare provision that has been 
particularly contentious since it increases the bargaining power of labour 
(Piven and Cloward 1982). With the welfare state, workers become less 
compliant with workplace discipline and there is a decreased dependence of 
the propertyless upon the labour market for their subsistence (Therborn and 
Roebuck 1986). 
The analysis can be extended beyond just state welfare institutions 
towards explaining the privatisation of the state's industrial sector. 
Frequently state owned industries have provided what amounts to a de facto 
welfare or legitimation function. Typically this has occurred through 
providing employment to people displaced from the private sector where the 
competitive 
technological 
dri ve for 
innovat ion. 
profit 
This 
has 
has 
resulted in 
often resulted 
labour-displacing 
in a state sector 
economy which is seemingly chronically overstaffed and hence inefficient. 
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In the words of Schwartz (1983), paraphrasing O·Connor (1973): 
monopoly"" sector growth, for the most part owing to increased 
capitalization ..... involves a concomitant decrease in the 
monopoly [ie private] sector labour force. Workers displaced by 
this process are either hired by more labour-intensive 
competitive sector industries at lower paying positions, become 
state sector employees, or find themselves dependent on the 
state's welfare provisions (Schwartz 1983, 45). 
The public sector therefore socialises the costs of the private 
sector's labour shedding drive for profit by creating, if possible, 
employment opportunities and, if not possible, by providing welfare 
(unemployment) benefits. Following the conservative motto, 'more business 
in government and less government in business', policies have been 
implemented in the 1980s to privatise various state sector industries by 
separating commercial from social objectives and establishing them as 
self-financing businesses, just as a pri vate concern would be. A prime 
example of this was the establishment in New Zealand in 1987 of state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) which were required to yield a profit. The 
restructuring and privatising of the state industrial sector generally 
entails substantial labour shedding 8S happened in the formation of New 
Zealand's SOEs. A consequence of this is that workers· bargaining power 
tends to be weakened. This may lead to depressed employment conditions and 
a consequent transfer of wealth from labour to capital. 
The inability of the capitalist state to resolve the contradiction 
between capital accumulation and social legitimation has lain at the heart 
of what many writers have referred to as a collapse of 'consensus 
politics' . Under this arrangement all main stream political parties 
maintained a commitment, to varying degrees, to uphold a public sector 
economy. But through governments underwriting the social costs of private 
profitability there has been a crisis in (private) production itself. This 
in turn has threatened the existence of the public sector economy and 
reduced the pre-exist ing pol! tical commitment to maint ain it. Upon this 
basis a polarisation of polit ical views has developed, largely between 
those on the Right who would roll back the frontiers of the state to 
rest ore pri vat e prof! tabU it y, and those on the Left committed to the 
maintenance, if not expansion, of public services and the public economy as 
a whole. In this way privatisation becomes a highly political policy and 
seen as one in which capital attempts to reassert its domination over 
labour. 
The main theoretical conclusion from O' Connor's thesis is that the 
political pressures for privatisation arise directly from the state 
underscoring the drive for private capital accumulation. This approach 
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arguably sets the privatisation debate into a broader social framework than 
the public choice and Weberian ones considered previously, but it still 
cannot be accepted without criticism. Even though state expenditure 
is seen to have a contradictory effect, it occurs entirely at the behest of 
the internal workings of capitalism itself and presents a functionalist 
analysis. There is moreover the important empirical observation that 
states under similar fiscal constraints/crisis may pursue very different 
policies on privatisation. O'Connor (1973. ch5) details, and quite 
extensively, the geographically variable effect of state 
between ci ty and suburb. The major shortcoming, however, 
fiscal crisis 
is that his 
thesis does not address itself to explaining variations in socio-economic 
conditions between both different suburbs and different cities. 
In many respects this mode of analysis is not a great deal different 
from a public choice framework as pointed out by Peters (1980) and Gans 
(1984) even if the political conclusions drawn are very different. For 
public choice theorists state· fiscal stress is primarily an issue of demand 
for services outstripping the supply of resources, whereas in the Marxian 
perspective accumulation of capital is no longer sufficient to fund the 
necessary social legitimation measures. While the former sees the 
reinforcement of capitalism. through privatisation. as the resolution of 
the problem. the latter sees capitalism itself as the problem. 
Perhaps however the main difficulty with O'Connor's thesis is that it 
only considers state actions in respect of the needs of capital. But while 
capital has I needs', labour has' demands' and the state has had to act in 
the context of these st ruggles (Burden and Campbell 1985, 17). Al though 
0' Connor (1973) states that, "i f those who are dependent on the state do 
not engage in political struggle to advance or protect their wellbeingl the 
fiscal crisis will remain relatively dormant" (0' Connor 1973, 206 cited in 
Schwartz 1983, 47), it is crucial to show explicitly, which 0' Connor fails 
to, "how the actions of the relevant actors and institutions temper the 
dynamics of the fiscal crisi~' (Schwartz 1983, 47). The following section 
shows how Marxist accounts subsequent to O' Connor have attempted to move 
into the realm of class conflict, By referring to certain empirical 
studies it is intended in this section to show how heightened class 
conflict can inhibit the implementation of government policies such as 
privatisation. 
3.3 Class Conflict. the State Sector and Privatisation: 
In order to transcend the functionalism inherent in O'Connor's 
underconsumptionist account of state expenditure there has been an attempt 
to invoke the role of social class conflict. Rather than being functional 
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(or dysfunctional) for capitalism the growth of public expenditure is, in 
part at least, the result of class conflict through struggles to secure the 
social wage. Within a geographical context it might then be expected 
that privatisation policies would be mediated across both space and time 
by different levels of class conflict that prevail. This is not to dismiss 
the importance of spatial variations in political systems in the formation 
of public policy. Instead it is to argue that, in the Marxian context, the 
underlying basis for any political power largely arises out of class 
struggles. 
In the writ of Gough <1975, 1979) it is maintained that much of 
the difference in public sector activity between nations can be attributed 
to the relative strengths of their respective labour movements. 
Consequently the lower level of public welfare and state owned industry in 
the USA compared with most of Western Europe is due to the absence of a 
unified labour force with political representation via a parliamentary 
social democratic, if not socialist, party. According to Gough <1975, 65) 
mass based class action can threaten the security of the capitalist class 
to the extent that the latter will pressurise the state apparatus to defuse 
the conflict by introducing ameliorating interventionist policies - 'social 
welfare as the antidote to social(ist) revolution'. All governments, Gough 
argues, "whatever their poli tical complexion depend for their survi val 
under bourgeois democracy on their abili ty to offer reforms and 
concessions to the struggles of the dominated classes" (Gough 1975, 66 
emphasis in original). In this way state intervent ion need not be 
explained simply in terms of pre-existing requirements of capital. 
The advantage of this approach is that any crises of capitalist 
production can be viewed in terms of the inability of capitalists to 
maintain their dominance over labour instead of this just arising from the 
internal workings of capitalism itself. Further attempts to incorporate 
class struggle, and therefore human agency, into the debate, have led some 
writers following a Marxian framework (eg Susman 1981, Ross 1983, Trachte 
and Ross 1985) to locate the changing role of the contemporary capitalist 
state into the dynamics of global capitalism. Susman 0981, 15) claims 
that the current period of advanced capitalism is quaH tatively different 
from earlier periods in three important respects. First is the far greater 
than hithert 0 concent rat ion and centralisat ion of capit aI, making entry 
into various industries almost impossible for small enterprises. The 
second is the lack of state controls over the investment and disinvestment 
policies of multinational companies, while third is the expansion of 
corporate manufacturing production in socialist and Third World countries 
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(Susman 1981, 15). 
These developments in capitalist production have had far reaching 
effects upon the workforces involved. To attract investment from 
increasingly internationally mobile capital. state policies have to ensure 
appropriate condit ions for profit able investment. Goodman (1979). 
referring to the state as The Last Entrepreneur, provides a vivid account 
of this and a wealth of support i ve examples. For the working class and 
many public officials, the era of global capitalism pits them against a 
Leviathan. According to Ross (1983, 249), II each local advance or reform 
may be subverted by the investors ability to evade it by moving away'. But 
the process is not by any means an automatic one and is rather the outcome 
of a balance of class forces and state policies. While recognising that, 
"the state may be dominat by the interests of capital, or at least 
constrained by the structure of capitalist relations as a whole", Ross 
(1983, 251) argues that there are spatial variations which exist in the 
success workers achieve. in obtaining policies in their interest. 
In the case of Italy. Dunford <1988, 24) details how between 1966 and 
1974 a series of frequent and forceful revolts against the conditions of 
work in modern industrial plants occurred, often under the leadership of 
unskilled, immigrant, young and women workers. Using graphs to illustrate 
how indices of strike act ion <in hours lost per employee per year) and 
union membership (as percentage of active population) increased 
substantially between the mid sixties and seventies, <Dunford 1988, 131) 
shows how, "employers were largely prevented by union strength from raising 
producti vi ty and restoring profitability by reorganising work or laying 
off workers" <Dunford 1988, 135). The immediate implication is that 
working class militancy can readily thwart the viability of capitalist 
product ion. 
The historical course of class confict is not however a unidirectional 
one and capitalists continually search for ways to circumvent the advances 
gained by workers. Geographical mobility in production has been one such 
way frequently resorted to over the last two decades. From a study of 
industrial relocation in the USA, Peet (1983) has developed an index of 
class struggle based on factors such as levels of unionisation, wage rates, 
work stoppages and 'business climate'. He uses this to show how industrial 
relocation from the North East to the southern States reflects the lower 
levels of class struggle in the latter. 
With specific reference to the privatisation of state sector activity, 
the industries concerned are more spatially fixed in terms of international 
mobility than those considered by Peet (1983) and Dunford (1988)i 
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railways, telecommunications, schools and hospitals are typical examples. 
In these cases privatisation, as a response to working class strength, may 
involve the spatial fragmentation of industries or institutions on a 
regional basis. For example in the 1970s and 1980s freight distribution 
has been substantially transferred from rail (public) to road (private) 
transport while more recently health care facilities have started to be 
transferred from large public institutions to smaller (private or 
voluntary) ones, In each case working class organisation becomes much more 
difficult. 
A specific case study of working class resistance to privatisation is 
provided by Elliot and McCrone (1984). They detail the opposition mounted 
in two districts of Scotland to central Government's requirement for local 
authorities to sell <ie privatise) their stock of council <ie public) 
housing. In one of them: 
. 
Between February and September 1981, there were strikes and 
rallies, petitions were signed and MPs lobbied. Many hundreds of 
trade unionists, local 'authority workers, council tenants and 
others participated in what the Lothian Region Joint Trade Union 
Committee dubbed, 'the battle for Lothian' (Elliot and McCrone 
1984, 204). 
In the other district, public housing existed on a very large scale and was 
very much part of the social wage for the working class. Resistance to the 
privatisation was led by the largest trade union in the district and, 
Elliot and McCrone (1984, 206) report that, throughout the 'no sales' 
campaign in 1980-81, "[ the Union] did more than any other agency to 
mobilize support and shape oppositional strategies", It was able to link 
workplace and community struggles over the maintenance of the social wage. 
The important theoretical point made clear by this example is that 
unified class action can do much to thwart the implementation of 
privatisation polices. The geographical development of privatisation 
therefore may be expected to be strongly mediated by regional variations in 
levels of class conflict. 
In some respects Elliot and McCrone's analysis is more in the 
Weberian than the Marxian tradition with its focus on the actions of trade 
union and local council bureaucracies rather than strike action at the 
poi nt of product ion. Nevertheless they do indicate the effectiveness of 
working class mobilization to counter privatisation. It may be argued that 
much more empirical research could still be done to detail how geographical 
variations in levels of class conflict have mediated the development of 
privatisation policies 
Such an approach may 
and other forms of state sector reorganisation. 
overcome some of the objections of the earlier 
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attempts at Marxist analysis but there still remains room for 
dissatisfaction with it as being a comprehensive explanatory framework. 
Insofar as class struggle is cited as the critical variable there is a 
tendency to class reductionism by ignoring the possibility of non-class 
factors having an important or even decisive role. A theory more sensitive 
to the diversity of human action is required. 
3. 4 Beyond the Marxist debatej Towards a Reassesment of Theory: 
Possibly the main limitation of such Marxian inspired analyses using 
class conflict as the major explanatory variable for actions by the state 
is that, as Pinch <1985, 157) notes, .. broad categories of labour and 
capital are inadequate to explain the large diversity of interests and 
pressure groups invol vecf'. The usual stance of Marxist writers has been 
that, sectional or urban struggles in the world of consumption are seen as 
outgrowths of class struggles in the world of production (Castells 1975 and 
Harvey 1978), As the above study of Elliot and McCrone (984) has shown, 
state supplied consumption g09ds and services are part of the social wage 
paid by capital to labour and struggles over their retention are just as 
much class struggles as those over employment conditions and job retention 
in the world of production. 
For many writers however the emphasis on the role of class forces is 
too simplistic as the actions of decision makers in state institutions and 
of community group resistance may not all be reducible to class conflict. 
For Gans (1984, 284) writing specifically about the USA: 
Struggles that have nothing to do with the economy over issues of 
race, religion, ethnicity, power and culture take place in 
American communit ies in which class, in the Marxist, Weberian or 
Warnerian sense is sometimes only a side issue, 
Laws (1988) has also observed that pressures to privatise are not just top 
down state induced policies but come from a wide cross section of the 
communi t y, including service users and providers themsel ves, In some 
recent writings on the welfare state (eg Barnett and Barnett 1989) there 
has been a move to attribute the cut backs it is enduring largely to 
overtly political factors rather than the requirements for capital 
accumulation or the balance of class forces. 
3.4.1 Back to Managerialism and Public Choice Theory? 
Mohan (1988), following a critique of Gough (1979) by Hindess (1987), 
maintains that: 
It is functionalist to argue that because welfare cuts may be 
against the short 01- long term interests of capital, 'we would 
expect to find not so much cuts or dismantling of the welfare 
state as its restructurintt [Gough 1979, 138] without specifying 
the precise links between the interests of capital, government 
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political strategy, and restructuring (Mohan 1988, 451) 
While these points are well made, it can be countered that it is equally 
important not to present explanat ions of pri vat isat ion and other state 
sector activities as lying entirely within the realm of politics. Thus the 
above passage taken from his discussion of the privatisation of health 
care in England, is followed immediately by the claim that Conservative 
party policy is the primary explanatory variable through its: 
critique of bureaucracy and a belief in the inefficiency of the public 
sector, an attack on trade union power, and an emphasis on value for 
money and the need for determined management (Mohan 1988, 451), 
This however takes the debate almost back to the Weberian perspective 
in which the focus of attention is on a descriptive analysis of the 
activities of the state bureaucracy itself in implementing policies. 
Virtually no discussion is presented of how changes in the structures of UK 
and int ernat ional capitalism have provided the c;ontext for Conservat i ve 
political policies towards privatisation. Perhaps even more importantly in 
view of the examples cited ih the above section, little or no account is 
ven of work force resistance invol ved in the opposition to such 
policies. This is in no way to deny the importance of the political sphere 
or to elevate the process of capital accumulation and class conflict to a 
det ermining role. Instead it may be argued that the implementation of 
government policies needs to be set within an analysis of changes in the 
socio-economic forces of which capitalist state are integrally linked to. 
It should not be forgotten that significant amounts of state sector 
I rationalisation', if not strictly privatisation, of the UK economy 
occurred prior to 1979 under a Labour administration. 
A similar critique of Marxist inspired accounts of state sector 
cut backs and pri vat isat ion has come from Dunleavy (1986b) who, like Mohan 
(1988) argues that: 
they do not provide any detailed account of the causal mechanisms 
by which changes in the economic or ideological priorities of 
corporations and capital owners can translate effectively into 
alterations in state policy <Dunleavy 1986b, 130). 
The question of interest to Dunleavy is: 
How is it that the electorates, political parties, 
leaders, policy advisors and the mass media in 
industrial states recognise and respond to the 
priori ties of capital? <Dunleavy 198Gb, 131). 
polit ical 
advanced 
changing 
By way of explanation he develops the thesis that the growth of the welfare 
state in a capitalist society is a politically self-stabilizing process. 
This is explained on the basis that: 
As the historic rationale for [state] intervention recedes to the 
status of a folk memory, and the deficiencies or inconsistencies 
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of current policy replace them at the forefront of at tent ion, so 
we might expect public support for continued intervention to 
decay (Dunleavy 1986b, 135) . 
Be this as it may, the question begged is if the welfare state is 
politically self st abi lising, at what level will it stabilize and why? Is 
there indeed an equilibrium point for welfare state provision? A similar 
theme is expressed by 
that, notwithstanding 
Therborn and Roebuck (1986, 332) who have argued 
much recent privatisation and cutting back of 
services, the welfare state is: 
irreversible by democratic means [because] the size of the 
population benefitting from the we If are state ensures that as 
long as democracy accompanies advanced capitalism, the core of 
the welfare state is safe. 
There is a certain degree of empirical support for this contention 
from the pronouncements of some political leaders that certain parts of the 
welfare state are' safe in our hands'. While it ~ay be argued that there 
is a certain irreducible minimum for the welfare state in advanced 
capitalism, the important theoretical question is to ascertain what social 
forces will determine the I minimum' or the 'equilibrium'. The welfare 
just like the capitalist production process itself from which it 
has assumed its raison d
' 
etre, is in no way polit ically or economically 
self stabilizing unless one disregards the destabilizing and contradictory 
effects that class conflict under capitalism engenders. Account s such as 
Dunleavy (1986b) and Therborn and Roebuck (1986) tend to ignore the 
variety of oppositional strength that has, albeit spatially unevenly, been 
generated against state sector cut backs and privatisation. Although 
trying to distance himself from the conclusion, Dunleavy (1986b, 135) comes 
close to admitting the similarity between the process of self stabilization 
he is presenting as an explanatory fact or and a pluralist public choice 
I issue attention cycle' first proposed by Downs (972). 
It can be seen then that the debate on explaining pri vat isat ion has 
come full circle back to the original public choice framework. Largely on 
account of this there has recently opened up a schism in radical geography 
on the relevance of Marxian class conflict to explain social reality. The 
necessity to consider the explanatory potential of political factors which 
cannot all be simply reduced to the demands of labour or needs of capital 
has required some recent rethinking of the relevance of Marxian theory as 
an analytical tool. In view of the enormous geographical variations in 
capitalist societies that have occurred across time and space in social 
processses like welfare state cut backs and industrial restructuring, 
Marxian methodology is thought by some to be too much of a 'totalising 
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discourse' . It is insufficiently sensitive to the details of human 
existence. As Duncan 0989, 128) remarks: 
understanding how capitalist society works at a general level 
seemed to have little connection with how people acted; ignoring 
the abstract expose they voted in large numbers for right wing 
governments both in Europe and North America, governments which 
then set about reinforcing the very injustices which research had 
indicated and explained. 
Although this is hardly a new observation, what is new is the 
concerted attempt to try and bridge the gulf between social structure and 
human agency. By undertaking, detailed theoretically-informed, empirical 
studies in localised geographical contexts, the intention has been to gain 
greater understanding of the way in which people create their own lives or 
histories. With reference to privat isat ion the quest ion is to determine 
why the policy may have become so much more entrenched in some regions 
rather than others even where similar overall spcio-economic conditions 
prevail. 
3.4.2 Locality Studies and Regionally Uneven Development: A Return to 
Empiricism or an Advancement of Theory? 
The regionally uneven development of capitalism has been of much 
concern to Marxist geographers. The existence of unevenness in development, 
whether of industry, public services or gener<al human well being, has been 
recognised since the days of Marx himself and over 100 years later the 
issue is still far from resolved. A question of much theoretical 
significance is why the unevenness not only persists but has become even 
more accentuated at all geographical scales? 
To this end, public choice theories are not particularly illuminating 
since, according to Tieboutian logic, regional inequalities would be 
expected to even out with the operation of market forces. 
dispari ties in development are not problemat ic in this scenario 
Regional 
<unless 
they threaten systemic stability) as their existence is seen as merely an 
unwillingness of people to move in response to the alleged self 
equilibrium of market forces. The theoretical import ance of regional 
dispari ties from a Marxian viewpoint is that the unevenness provides a 
distinct social and spatial fragmentation in the class opposition to 
capitalism. Not surprisingly then class forces, not market forces, come to 
be the subject of analysis. But as just seen, regional uneven development 
cannot readily be explained in terms of class forces alone. 
Many Marxist-inspired geographers have recently come to devote more 
attention to changes in social phenomena such as labour markets, divisions 
of labour and public service provision within a specific regional setting. 
Efforts have been made towards trying to explain why such geographical 
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variations occur in these processes within the totality of capitalist 
social relations. Stimulated largely by the seminal work of Massey (1984) 
a plethora of I locality' and 'regional' studies have emerged since the mid 
1980s. A major example is the CURS4 initiative (Cooke 1986) which has 
invest igated the causes of deindust rialisation in the UK and focused its 
empirical research on seven urban set t lements as being represent at i ve of 
localities. 
Much research within the 'locality studies' arena has been grounded 
in the theory of structuration due to Giddens (1984), which specifically 
attempts to bridge the ever-problematic theoretical gulf between 
individual actions and social structure in both time and space. 
Structuration theory has sought an understanding of social reality 
through emphasising both . the opportunity and constraints for human 
activity. In this vein the emphasis in locality studies is placed on the 
intentional nature of human action in the development of regions and 
Communi ties. 
The interaction of many factors not easily reducible to the effects of 
capitalist social relations provides each locality studied with a distinct 
uniqueness. Broader non-local structures, whether of the central state or 
global capitalism, are seen strictly in a limiting rather than a 
determining role. Methodologically the approach is very much I bottom up' 
rather than 'top down' and general theories of capitalist development which 
are not place specific have been eschewed. But to accord with 
structuration theory, localities are not analysed as if they were solely 
the products of conscious human decisions. Rather they also reflect the 
unintended consequences of human activity and these consequences then 
become constraints, or structures, upon further conscious actions. 
An example of the way in which structuration theory may be applied 
would be to consider a workplace strike for achieving advanced working 
conditions. This may have the unintended effect of seeing the workplace 
close down altogether and move out of the region. So rather than 
improving working conditions, there may be no work at all. This ability of 
capital to be geographically mobile then becomes a constraining factor on 
further conscious decision to secure working conditions. The social 
struct ures which exist within capitalism, as expressed at the local level, 
are therefore both enabling and constraining. In the 'new geography' there 
is a recognition of the' boundedness' of human activity within capitalist 
society but hitherto it seems the debate over the precise theoretical 
status of locality research in relation to capitalist development and 
Marxian political economy is far from resolved. 
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The issue has received a thorough airing in Society and Space (1987) 
and recent editions of Antipode. Cochrane (1987) has succint ly summarised 
the respective positions in the localities debate. For committed 
manageria1ists, their position is exemplified in the tirade against 
Marxism by Saunders and Williams (1986) in which, according to Cochrane 
<1987, 355), the claim is that the' new geography' is little more than a 
"cover for structural Marxism wi th a human face". On the other hand for 
those such as Harvey (1987) and Smith (1987) who maintain that Marxism has 
overriding explanatory significance, recent moves in an empirical direction 
are but covers for, "a return to empiricism with a theoretically 
sophisticated face' (Cochrane 1987, 355), 
Warf <1988, 182) has possibly cleared the air somewhat by arguing 
that, at the dissagregated level of the locality, the ability of humans to 
exert a considerable, even if limited, influence over their environment is 
manifest. At successively larger spatial scales 'however the explanatory 
utility of theories centred around conscious action declines. Warf (1988, 
183) supports this contention by asking. "does structuration theory reveal 
much about the deindustrialisation of the Rustbelt, the behaviour of 
multinational firm~ or famine in Africa?'. To this list may be added, the 
privatisation of the state? 
Summary and Conclusion: 
This chapter has outlined the two major variants to the Marxian 
perspective on state expenditure under advanced capitalism. These may be 
termed the underconsumptionist version due to O'Connor (1973) and the class 
conflict version of Gough (1975). The characteristic features of each in 
regard to explaining the development of privatisation initiatives are 
presented in tabulated form in figure 3.1, where they are compared with 
those of the public choice and Weberian perspect i ves. As this, and the 
previous chapter has shown, none is without serious theoretical 
shortcomings, and yet each may have a certain degree of empirical validity. 
In the final part of the chapter a summary was given of some recent 
empirical work conducted at a local and regional scale. The research has 
been aimed towards gaining a greater theoretical understanding of social, 
reality than is provided by the three frameworks previously detailed. To! 
the degree that there is still a distinct dearth of understanding of the! 
uneven development of social processes, a greater need for emPirica1/ 
research is indicated in order to advance the theoretical explanations od 
\ 
offer. 
By taking an empirical example of spatially uneven privatisation as ~ 
" 
specific case study, it is intended in this thesis to examine critica11y\ 
\ 
FIGURE 3. 1: Theoretical Frameworks for Explaining the Privatisation of the 
State 
Public Choice 
<Democratic) 
Pluralist 
Consummer preference 
for private provision 
'voiced' through 
democratic procedures 
Public Economy 
Consummer preference 
expressed through 
'exiting' to private 
sector 
Weberian 
(Bureaucratic) 
Managerialist 
Privatisation from auto-
nomous state officials 
following 'bureaucratic 
rationalisation' plans 
Corporatist 
State officials under 
conflicting pressures 
and privatistion is 
outcome of the relative 
strength between them 
Marxian 
(Class Relations) 
Underconsumptionist 
Privatisation since 
insufficient surplus 
value production for 
private profit 
Class Conflict 
The implementation 
of privatisation 
contingent upon 
balance of class 
forces 
each of the three theoretical perspectives. The aim in the subsequent 
chapters is to ascertain the extent to which each theory may provide at 
least a partial explanatory base for the uneven development of the process. 
Explanat ions of the localised development of pri v.t isation are sought but 
with emphasis on the pivotal relationship with broader socio-economic 
forces. Rather than rejecting anyone theory a priori and recognising that 
monocausality of social phenomena is seldom valid, it may be possible 
through empirical research to establish a 'hierarchy' of explanations of 
With this end in mind it is suggested geographically uneven privatisation. 
that the explanatory power of different social forces <elected. 
representatives of the community, private capital, the central state, the 
labour movement, or the changing role of the economy under global 
capitalism) may have varying relevance at certain times and places. 
Before proceeding in this direction attention in the next chaper turns 
to examining some of the different processes through which pri vat isat ion r
l
! 
may occur. Thus far in the discussion privatisation has been analysed as a·;· 
unitary process. It will be seen how different forms of privatisation may i 
n be applied to particular areas of state activity. ~ 
Footnotes: 
1 Wright (1976) distinguishes the new, from the old or traditional, 
petite bourgeoisie on the grounds that the latter comprise shopkeepers, 
artisans, trades people and those who are generally self employed. They 
neither employ (exploit) wage labour nor do they produce surplus value for 
capitalists. According to Wright the numbers of the traditional petite 
bourgeoisie have dwindled in the 20th century while the new class of 
professionals and managers - the new pet i te bourgeoisie has increased 
subst ant ially .. 
2 Monetarism is the term that has come to be applied to much Right wing 
economic theory. Basically it maint ains that inflat ion is the root cause 
of all economic difficulties and can only be controlled by limiting the 
money supply. The way this is achieved is by reducing public (state) 
expenditure to a minimum in favour of free market forces. The main 
contemporary advocate of this policy has been Milton Friedman of the 
Chicago School of economics. 
3 O' Connor ident i fles two subgroups wi thin the private sector: 
competitive industries organised by small business and monopolistic 
industries organised by large scale capital (0' Connor 1973, 13). It is 
the latter, rather than the former type of industry that has imposed the 
heaviest demands on state expenditure. 
4 CURS: Changing Urban and Regional Systems 
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CHAPTER 4-
The Processes of Privatisation 
One of the major difficulties in giving conceptual clarity to the term 
privatisation has been the number of different forms or processes through 
which the policy may be implemented. The identification of the possible 
forms that privatisation policies may take is addressed in this chapter 
and illustrative empirical examples are provided from different parts of 
the world, but particularly Britain and New Zealand. In this way a 
framework is established for providing a detailed case study of the 
geographically uneven development of one particular form of privatisation. 
The chapter opens with a section devoted to the forms of privatisation 
identified in some of the literature, and outlines the critical social 
variables involved in any transference from public to private provision. 
This is followed by a section that discusses the major conceptual 
distinctions between each form. In the third section a more detailed 
study is made of one specific .form of privatisation and how it interrelates 
with the closely associated process of market deregulation. The final 
substantive section undertakes a critical review of one major contribution 
to the literature on privatisation in which a specific form of the process 
is subjected to detailed study. 
4-.1 The Implementation of Privatisation Policies: Descriptive Accounts: 
One advocate of privatisation writing for the Adam Smith Institute has 
identified no less than 21 different methods of privatisation (Pirie 1985 
cited in 
point 
Ascher 1987, 6 see figure 4-. 1). Wri t ing from an adversary 
of view, on behalf of the trade union movement, Hastings and Levie 
<1983, 12) describe privatisation as covering a "multitude of sins" from 
which they list eight forms and indicate that they by no means exhaust all 
the options available. Following Bailey (1987) and Starr (1987), Boston 
(1988) has described privatisation as comprising a 
ini tiati ves" such as: 
"mul ti tude of policy 
1) the termination of public programmes and the disengagement of the 
state from particular activities or responsibility load 
shedding; 
2) the privatisation of funding through user-charges while retaining 
public provision; 
3) market deregulation or liberalisationj 
4) the sale of publicly-owned assets such as state-owned 
enterprises, land or capital items; 
5) the contracting out of services once performed by public agencies 
to private firms (Boston 1988, 1). 
Regardless of the number of 'forms of privatisation' there may be, 
enumerating them is of little assistance to analytical debate as 
presented. The crit icalquest ign, which immediately arises, is whether 
72-
there are any qualitative 
represent different stages 
dist 1nct ions between them, or do they just! 
on a continuum from a public to a private 
sector economy? In the subsequent section an attempt is made to isolate 
the main con:eptual<differences between various fOflllS' oLprivatisation. 
In so doing it lays the groundwork for a more detailed look at one 
particular form of privatisation in a subsequent section of the chapter. 
FIGURE 4.1: Forms of Privatisation 
Method Example 
selling the whole 
selling complete parts of the whole 
selling a proportion of the whole 
selling to the workforce 
'giving' to the public 
'giving' to the workforce 
charging for the service 
contracting out 
diluting the public sector 
buying out existing interest groups 
deregulation by voluntary associations 
encouraging alternative institutions 
making small scale trials 
repealing monopolies 
encouraging exit from state provision 
vouchers 
curbing state power 
divestment 
applying liquidation 
withdrawal 
right to private substitution 
Amersham International 
English Channel Ferry Services 
British Petroleum 
National Freight Corporation 
British Telecom discounts 
Hoverspeed 
NHS prescription charges 
local authority and NHS services 
road funding 
council house sales 
aviation (CAM 
University of Buckingham 
freeports 
bus and coach services 
social security <private pensions) 
transport tokens 
private searches 
Bri tish Gas 
hospitals 
quango activity 
the 'right to repair' 
Source: M. Pirie, 1985: Privatisation, Adam Smith Institute, London, taken 
from Ascher K. 1987: The Politics of Privatisation, Macmillan, London. 
4.2 An Analytical Framework for Identifying Forms of Privatisation: 
It was established in the first chapter that, in its simplest form the 
difference between the public and private sector economies rests on the 
respective distinction between collective <social) and commodi fied 
prOVision of goods and services. For any economy, capitalist or otherwise, 
to reproduce itself over time three processes must occur; production, 
exchange and distribution. Goods and services <understood as products of 
human labour in all economies where there is at least a rudimentary 
division of labour, or as commodities in capitalist ones) must be produced, 
exchanged, and distributed for sustained societial reproduction. In the 
case of production, the critical factor 1s the ownership of the means of 
production - whether it is predominantly private as under capitalism or 
public (ie social) as under socialism. 
Once produced goods and services must be exchanged in order to be 
consumed. This process can take place either through a market mechanism or 
by some collective body which in a capitalist economy would take the form 
of the state sector bureaucracy. Where a market is operat ive, the funding 
or financing of goods and service provision is through the value exchange 
process. On the other hand, with a bureaucracy provision has to be 
funded from taxation or fees, levied on a collective basis. 
Finally distribution or allocation can be through market based 
competition on an individualised basis, or by regulation <legal 
requirements and conditions) imposed by the collective apparatus of the 
state. 
controL 
The difference between these two conditions is essentially one of 
In individualised commodity provision the only control is that 
of supply and demand in the market - the I invi ble hand' - whereas in 
collect i 'Ie pr.ovision the control is distinctly visible in the form of 
statutory legal requirements or political coercion. 
It is suggested here that the three variables - ownership, funding and 
control, which corresponding respectively to the production, exchange and 
are fundamental to identifying different forms of distri but ion, 
pri vat isat ion. These variables may therefore be regarded as forming the 
basis of the critical differences between the public, state, regulatory 
sphere and the private, market, competitive sphere. The conceptual 
distinctions between the sphere of collective provision and the sphere of 
commodi ty provision may be represented schematically as in figure 4.2. It 
may therefore be reasonable to conclude that all pri vat isation processes 
must involve changes to one or more, if not all, of the three variables 
ident Hied. 
FIGURE 4.2: The Conceptual Differences between Collective and Commodity 
Provision 
Pri vat isat ion 
Variables 
OwnerShip 
Funding 
Control 
Sphere of Collective 
Provision 
Public 
State 
Regulation 
Sphere of Commodity 
Provision 
Private 
Market 
Competition 
In the following analysis the prime intent is to identify possible 
ways by which collective provision can be transformed into individual 
provision. Without losing any conceptual rigour the terms, public, state, 
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and regulation are used interchangeably and likewise for private, market, 
and competition. Hence a publicly owned enterprise is taken as identical 
to a state owned enterprise and regulatory control to state control. The 
term government is reserved for the administrative arm of the state and 
includes the democratic elected parliament and the appointed administration 
(bureaucracy). The problem, to be pursued is to determine, and 
distinguish between, the various ways in which public sector institutions 
can be privatised using these variables. 
4.3 The Analysis of Forms of Privatisation: 
Possibly the most obvious, and indeed the most publicised, way of 
privatising state assets is to sell them in the market place in which case 
they then become privately owned and market funded through the I user pays' 
principle. Examples range from state owned property such as housing to an 
entire national railway system. By undertaking the state 
relinquishes its role as both owner and funder of the goods and services 
provided. 
4.3. 1 The Selling of State Assets and Enterprises: 
This process may take place in a variety of ways. First, the sale may 
be made to an existing private sector enterprise, usually which ever one 
offers the highest market price. The st at e owned ent erprise may either be 
sold as one single operating unit, or else in various parts, to a series of 
different buyers. A second and perhaps better known, if not more 
controversial, way for the state to sell its assets is by creating a new 
enterprise through the establishment of a public limited company. This 
may be achieved either through a management/worker I buyout' of the 
enterprise or through a public share subscription. In the latter case the 
assets being offered for sale are 
occupying a monopoly position in 
often those of state owned industries 
the market place for their products. 
Sometimes these industries are termed 'natural' monopolies because 
economies of scale indicate optimum efficiency from a single provider 
st ruct ure 1. 
The privatisation of natural monopolies has generally been a problem 
for .advocates of privatisation. As there is the ever present likelihood of 
just creating a private monopoly out of a public one this is seen to negate 
the desirability of privatisation since there is no competitive market in 
existence for attaining economic efficiency. In the absense of market 
competition various regulatory bodies have had to be established to monitor 
perf ormance. Perhaps t he most prominent examples are the format ion of 
OFTEL and OFGAS in the UK to regulate, repectively, the operations of 
privatised British Telecom and British Gas. 
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Various methods have been advanced by which the monopoly status of 
certain state owned enterprises may be ended upon privatisation. At risk 
of loss of scale economies, the ent erprise might be regionally fragmented 
so that the entire service provision for the nation state is based upon a 
smaller number of privat ised units. Competition would then be stimulated 
from comparison of costs and levels of service provision across regional 
boundari es. Another method is to retain the single nationwide service 
provision, but to fragment the enterprise along infrastructural lines. 
This particularly applies in the case of industries based on networks such 
as railways (tracks) , electricity transmission (grids) and 
telecommunications (networks). The enterprise would be split to form one 
authority, possibly still state owned, which would own the network, and 
would then sell the rights to any private sector operator who wished to 
provide a service. 
Another means of privatising state owned enterprises is to fragment 
the services provided between different private sector operators. 
Railways, for example, might be privatised through the formation of 
separate private companies for, say, inter city passenger· traffic, urban 
commuter services, provincial services, and railfreight. As an alternative 
to selling an enterprise as a single operation, anyone, or mixture of, the 
above means of regional, infrastructural and service fragmentation may be 
implemented. For example, the pri vat isat ion of Japanese Nat ional 
Railways (JNR) has mainly involved a regionally and service based 
separat ion of the system. Sakita 0989, 29) reports that JNR, the only 
nationally owned rail corporation in Japan was broken into 12 private 
corporations on April 1st 1987: 
The 12 private corporations, collectively called. the Japan 
Railway (JR) Group, consist of six regional passenger railways, 
one freight railway corporation, one Shinkansen <bullet train) 
corporation, one account settlement corporation, one research 
institute, one computer and one telecommunication corporation 
(Sakit a 1989, 29), 
In the UK there is still much debate on the most appropriate one of the 
above methods by which the privatisation of British Rail may be achieved 
(see Modern Railways 1988, 658, 1989, 225), 
The divestment of state ownership and funding need not always come by 
the state selling assets. Instead a leasing or franchising arrangement 
may be entered into with the private sector. The ownership rights would 
not then be transferred in perpetuity and the state would be in receipt of 
rental income instead of proceeds from asset sales. To take the example of 
state owned commercial forests, the cutting rights to the timber rna;, be 
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sold or leased competitvely to the highest bidder, while the land itself 
remains in state ownership, a policy that is being seriously considered in 
New Zealand at the time of writing, Similarly public hospitals, either in 
their entirety or just some of the beds within them (' pay beds' in the 
UK), may be leased, rather than sold, to private and voluntary sector 
operators, State owned transport services might lease out the provision 
of catering services to private sector operators as British Rail has 
already done in certain instances, Again with public hospit any 
surplus capacity in catering and laundry facilities may be leased for 
private sector operation. 
The changing of the ownership and funding arrangements of state 
enterprises by their sale, or lease, to the private sector can clearly 
result in major changes to the socio-spatiality of service provision, In 
each case however where provision by private enterprise is involved, there 
. 
is bility of bankruptcy and/or corporate merger. These processes are 
said to be instrumental in ,ensuring the alleged superior efficency of 
private over state sector enterprises. The result of mergers and 
bankrupties might be that goods and service provision is compromised and 
consequently the privatisation of the state may not always extend as far 
as selling the assets and enterprises, Alternatively the state owned 
enterprise might be in such a financially unattractive situation that no 
private business operation would be interested in its purchase, a not 
infrequent occurrence. Returning to the case of JNR, Sakita <1989, 29) 
states that the state owned enterprise had accumulated debt totalling 
US$285 billion prior to its privatisation, Clearly before any such 
enterprise can be sold it would require radical 'restructuring'! 
4.3.2 The Commercialisation and CorRoratisation of the State Sector: 
Where a government wishes to ensure cont inuit y of suppl y, but st i 11 
divest itself of financial costs, public ownership may be retained but 
market funding resorted to by the introduction, or enhancement, of user 
charges. The state remains owner but not funder. In practice few state 
owned industries or institutions are completely' free at the point of use' 
but .those that are are usually in the welfare or consumptive sector of the 
economy and comprise institutions like publicly provided schools and 
hospitals, Normally though, charges are imposed on the consumers of state 
publicly provided goods and services but at lower than market rates, such 
as with prescription charges for medicines, university fees or urban 
(commut er) t rain and bus f ares'z. 
The levying of these charges moves the source of funding from public 
(state) to private (individual) payment and the 'user pays' principle 
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starts to operate even though the charges levied may leave the major 
proportion of the funding to be derived from state sources. The move from 
public to private funding can be extended even further to the point at 
which the entire cost of the goods and services are met by the consumer 
through the state charging the full market (commercial) rate rather than 
providing them free or at a price below the full cost recovery level. 
Hence the funding may be entirely from private sources while the asset 
concerned is still owned, and hence the service provided, by the state. In 
addi t ion to a move to generate revenue from users, the process is nearly 
always accompanied by efforts to reduce expenditure, particularly labour 
costs through attrition and redundancy. 
The process described here, which does not necessari ly require any 
change to the ownership of the assets, may be referred to as the 
commercialisation of the state sector. From 1987 onwards much of the state 
sector in New Zealand underwent such a process the end point of which was 
termed I corporatisation'. This saw the transference of certain 
government departments, funded largely from state taxation revenue, to 
market funded but still publicly owned enterprises (corporations). 
According to Gregory <1987, 119), corporatisation is "a move to 
establish publicly owned enterprises which are expected to act as if they 
were private ones'. The essential rationale behind the policy was to 
separate commercial (profitable) from social (non-profitable) objectives as 
these had been formerly indistinguishable when the enterprises operated as 
full departments of state. On this basis the costs of providing services 
on the basis of social need would become 'transparent' and the government 
might then make what would amount to a political decision on whether to 
continue funding such a service. 
Some of these newly formed New Zealand corporations have subsequently 
been sold to the private sector and currently the sale of others is still 
pending. The critical difference however between corporatisation and the 
selling of assets to the private sector is that in the former case the 
enterprise itself cannot be bought and sold in the market. It is not 
therefore subjected to the competitive conditions existing in the market 
place. For this reason, according to Boston <1988, 7), advocates of free 
market policies regard corporatisation as being little better than an 
n unsatisfactory half way house" to privatisation. From this standpoint 
privatisation would mean nothing less than the sale of the enterprise to 
the private sector. Nevertheless corporatisation may still justifiably be 
called a form of privatisation as the funding is comprehensively privatised 
with the move towards market based sources of finance. 
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4.3.3 Privatisation by Contracting Out: 
Notwi thstanding the analyt ical di fferences between pri vat isat ion by 
asset sales or commercialisation, a basic similarity is that both forms of 
privatisation are intended to generate revenue simply by making the 
privatised form of delivery more profitable than hi therto. In the first 
case revenue comes from the proceeds of a 'one off' sale and in the second 
it comes from the receipt of a regular dividend on commercial operations. 
There are cases however where it may not be possible to generate revenue 
for the state if the users of the goods or services provided are not able 
to pay a market price for them. Should the government deem, for whatever 
reason, that it is either economically necessary or socially desirable to 
maintain provision then the privatisation alternative is to 'contract out' 
to the private sector, a process sometimes known as 'private contracting'. 
This may occur with areas of state activity like refuse collection and 
hospi tal services, where termination of the services would threaten the 
overall well being of the populace and possibly create political unrest. 
Wherever contracting out occurs private sector 
requi red goods or services while the state st ill 
oper a tors provi de the 
acts as funder. The 
assumed duty of the government is then merely to see that services are i 
I 
provided, rather than for the state to be the actual provider. Private\ 
contracting, in effect, amounts to a process in which the state remains \ 
funder but not provider of goods and service provision. 
The cleaning of schools, hospitals, government offices and many 
const ructional act i vities are often performed by the private sector under 
contract from the state. This is the well known' provider/funder' split. 
As a much fuller discussion of contracting out is presented in a later 
section, further analysis of this form of privatisation will not be pursued 
here. Suffice to say by way of summary that by altering the ownership and 
funding variables from public to private and from state to market 
respectively three different forms of privatisation can be identified. 
State asset sales or leasing involves changes to both ownership and 
funding, commercialisation/corporatisation changes the funding only while 
cont ract ing out only al ters the ownership or provision arrangement. Thl=se 
changes are presented in tabulated form in figure 4.3. 
4.3.4 Privatisation of the State and Deregulation of the Market: 
In each of these three processes of asset sales, commercialisation and 
contracting, the effect of privatisation depends critically upon the extent 
of market deregulation. The process of deregulation involves the 
government removing many, though hardly ever all, legal restrictions (ie 
FIGURE 4.3: Analytical Distinctions between Three Different Forms of 
Privatisation 
Private Public 
Ownership Ownership 
Market Sale of Commercialisation 
Funding Assets Corporatisation 
State Contracting Public/State 
Funding Out Provision 
controls) on private capital competing with publicly owned enterprises. 
There are two principal control mechanisms that the state can maintain 
over the operation of the market which may be termed, quantity and quality 
licensing. Deregulation through eliminating, or at least reducing quantity 
licensing, involves the ending of restrictions l,imiting t he number of 
entrants into a market. This does not usually extend to relaxing, still 
less ending, quality licensing which regulates the conditions under which 
entrants may operate in the market. While the transport industry may be 
deregulated to the extent that anyone can compete for a share of the 
business, regulation still governs the issuing of heavy vehicle driving 
licences, loading factors, and other issues deemed to be in the public 
interest. Much controversy however surrounds the question of whether the 
ending of quant it y licensing also compromises the effect i veness of the 
quality licensing, particularly as health and safety standards may be 
affected. 
The essential rationale behind deregulation is to introduce (more) 
competition into the market place and thereby break the hitherto restricted 
competition or monopoly that exists in either the state or private sector. 
In both Britain and New Zealand, the transport industry was one of the 
first to be deregulated through allowing greater freedom for private road 
hauliers, both passenger and freight, to compete with state owned railways 
systems. By allowing Mercury to compete for some of the business of 
British Telecom the UK government went someway towards deregulating the 
telecommunications industry. Airlines may be similarly deregulated under 
what has been termed the 'open skies' policy which has been vigorously 
pursued in the USA, and partially introduced into New Zealand in 1987 with 
the entry of the Australian domestic carrier Ansett to compete alongside 
Air New Zealand. 
Deregulation policies can also be applied to other than physically 
existing enterprises. Finance capital may be deregulated by such means as 
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the state relaxing, exchange controls, restrictions on the granting of 
banking licenses, and rules governing the investment of capital overseas. 
Similarly the labour market may be deregulated by the state abolishing, or 
at least weakening, legislation governing the payment of minimum wages, 
nationally based occupational or industrial wages agreements, holidays and 
long service leave entitlements etc.. The intention is to ensure that 
labour costs will more readily reflect the laws of supply and demand and 
growing competition will result between units of labour for a given number 
of jobs. 
By deregulating the market, potential is opened up for private 
enterprise to operate where only state owned enterprise existed before. 
This occurred with the establishment of the privately owned University of 
Buckingham in the UK and with the Anglo-French Channel Tunnel for which 
private capital was raised through forming the public limited company, 
Eurot unne!. Such enterprises have hitherto usually been considered the 
"sole preserve of the state,' which therefore has maintained a monopoly 
control over their establishment. In a similar vein, an increasingly 
common result of a deregulated market is the 'joint (public/private) 
venture'. Here an entirely new company is formed, based on capital from 
both the public and private sector. For example, the New Zealand Railways 
Corporation has recent ly joined the Freightways Group in a j oint vent ure 
dubbed Freightways Express (Stott 1988, 220). 
Markets can be deregulated without any changes to 
financial structures of state institutions themselves. 
ownership or 
Schools and 
hospitals, for instance, may still be publicly owned and provided' free at 
the point of use' even if the market for the private provision of these 
establishments is deregulated. By deregulating the market there is 
simply a relaxation of the controls over the entry of private capital into 
areas of formerly state monopoly. The principal effect, however, is an 
arbitrary increase in the proportion of private to public sector provision. 
This could take the specific form of an increase in the number of private 
hospitals, schools, or transport services compared to public ones. Usually 
however the operation of a competitive deregulated market necessitates 
changes to the structure of the state sector in order for it to be 
competitive with the private sector. Conversely the state sector may be 
privatised without necessarily deregulating the market for the products of 
the industry being privatised. 
4.3.5 Privatisation and Public Service Retrenchment: 
Apart from the process of 'load shedding' (Bailey 1987, 139), the 
situations just" discussed cover all the forms of 
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pri vat isat ion in the 
typology produced above by Boston <1988, D. Arguably load shedding has 
been involved in all the above processes since the state has effectively 
'load shedded' in respect of either its ownership, funding, or controlling 
functions. Yet in all instances there is the tacit assumption that the 
state 'load sheds' in favour of private ownership, market funding and 
compet it ion between enterprise owners (providers). This however may not 
necessarily be so as some goods and services may not be able to be produced 
profitably by the private sector, in which case the private sector does not 
produce them at all. 
Privatisation through selling, leasing, or commercialising a state 
owned enterprise, or part thereof, may not be possible if the enterprise 
does not have sufficient potential revenue generating capacity in the form 
of making a real return on investment. In other words if it is simply not 
profitable. Similarly privatisation by contracting out, while structurally 
possible, may not produce a sufficient expenditure reduction for a fiscally 
strained government. The only, and indeed ultimate, option is for the 
government to close down the institution concerned. Typically this 
affects the state's welfare sector and may take the form of the closure of 
pUblic hospitals, rural railway services, schools, or post office and 
retail banking facilities. Writing over a decade ago, Moseley (1979) has 
detailed the affects of such closures in rural areas in terms of residents' 
accessibility to alternative sources of provision. 
To take the example of rural railway services, these may be, in the 
first instance, replaced by private bus companies, a process that has 
become known as 'bust it ut ion' in Brit ain. The substituting bus companies 
might either operate the service on a self financing basis or on contract 
from the state. But if not profitable, or no government contract is 
forthcoming, then no substi tute service may be provided at all. Under 
these circumstances potential consumers have to find their own means of 
travel either individually (eg cycling) or collectively (eg car sharing). 
Where there is both market ' failure' and state 'abstention', 
production has to be undertaken by the domestic sector (the household) or 
by charities and religious institutions in the so-called voluntary sector. 
Residential child care is an example of a service being provided in each 
of the pUblic <local authority), voluntary, and private sectors. The 
termination of public transport services, whether privately or publicly 
provided, necessitates households having to find their own personnal forms 
of transport. While not strictly privatisation since there is no market 
invol vement, 
decade ago, 
there are nonetheless marked social consequences. Writing a 
largely before the current phase of privatisation, Hillman and 
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Whalley (1980) detail the adverse effects on people of rural railway 
closures in Britain. Communal or voluntary forms of organisation may also 
develop from public service retrenchment in the form of car pools, women's 
refuges and self-help housing groups (see Wekerle 1984). 
Summary 
In summary then it may be said that privatisation requires changes to 
ownership and funding arrangements while deregulation necessitates changes 
to the state controls operating on the market exchange process. For both 
privatisation and deregulation to occur then all three variables identified 
- ownership, funding and control need to be changed. Figure 4.4 shows 
in tabulated form the interelationship between privatisation and 
d eregul at ion. 
FIGURE 4.4: Interrelationship between Privatisation, and Deregulation 
Sale ofl Corporat isation! Contracting Deregulation 
Assets Commercialisation Out 
Ownership x x 
Funding x x 
Control x x x x 
x change from public to private 
To the extent that privatisation is, in part at least, a response to 
state fiscal stress, the different processes identified can be grouped 
according to either their state revenue generating or their state 
expenditure reduction capacity. Selling enterprises, leasing the rights 
of service provision, and commercialisat ion of inst it ut ions each generat e 
revenue for the government. Contracting out to the private sector and 
service retrenchment are means of expendi t ure reduct ion. To a certain 
degree there is~ temporal si3quence to these processes. St ate enterprises 
usually have to be commercialised or corporatised first so that they can be 
made attractive for sale or lease while contracting out can amount to being 
an intermediary stage towards complete service retrenchment. 
In the above discussion it has been assumed that each of the processes! 
identified as a form of privatisation necessarily results in privatisation./ 
This m~y not however always be the case. A state owned enterprise may be 
sold but to another state owned enterprise albeit in another nation state3 
rather than to the private sector. Hence not all state asset sales amount 
to privatisation. A similar situation holds in the case of contracting 
out. As this form of privatisation, and its geographically uneven 
development, is to be subjected to a detailed empirical case study, the 
remainder of this chapter is devoted to further analysis of contracting 
out. 
4.4 Contracting Out and Privatisationj Some Further Conceptual 
Clad ficat ion: 
Since the late 1960s, and even before in some cases, contracting out 
has been seen by many government authorities as being a means to trim the 
seemingly ever growing size of the state sector. Although contracting out 
exists extensively in the private as well as the public sector, the latter 
case is particularly noteworthy as there is a direct effect upon goods and 
services which the community as a whole depends upon, These range from law 
enforcement and health care to public transport and refuse collection. 
Rather than being specifically sold to the private sector, these services 
may be contracted out, in which case they are effectively privatised 
wi thout the risk being incurred of the services disappearing altogether 
through the likely lack of private profit. The main purpose of this 
section is to identify the conceptual differences between the process of 
contracting out and that of privatisation. This involves the need to 
make qualitative distinctions between three terms which tend to be used 
almost interchangeably in the privatisation literature; contracting out, 
private contracting and competitive tendering. 
4.4.1 Contracting Out, Private Contracting and Privatisation: 
Contracting out has been described by Ascher <1987, 7) as occurring, 
II where one organisation contracts wi th another for the provision of a 
particular good or service". While this may accurately describe the 
process involved, the main problem with this definition is that it does no 
more than just describe. No indication is given of the conceptual 
foundat ion which underlies the cont ract ing out process. Viewed more 
analytically it may be said, as an above section has indicated, that 
contracting out requires an institutional separation of the provision 
from the funding of goods and services. The institution or enterprise that 
continues to be the funder becomes the contractee and the institution or 
enterprise that takes up the role of provider becomes the contractor. 
Under such an arrangement either the provider or the funder, or indeed 
both, may be in the public or the private sector. For example, it was 
pointed out in the previous chapter that, in the USA, some city 
authorities have been contracting with other local body authorities (as 
well as private operators) to provide some of their municipal services; a 
case of one state institution, as funder, 
state institution to be provider (see Miller 
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contracting out to another 
1981) . In a simi lar way 
many private sector enterprises contract out to other private companies for 
goods and services they either cannot, or wish not, to provide themselves. 
A private bus company contracting out its vehicle maintenance requirements 
to a local private garage would be a typical example. 
Private contracting occurs when the contractee (funder) is in either 
the public or the private sector but the contractor (provider) is 
specifically in the private sector. If this latter condition does not hold 
the cont ract ing out is not private, as in the first of the two examples 
just given. But for private contracting to amount to privatisation an 
additional condition must hold. There must be a transfer from public 
(state) to private (market) provision. This requires a public institution 
to contract out to a private business (contractor). In this case the 
contractee must be in the public sector and the contractor in the private 
sector. Privatisation therefore is a special for~ of private contracting 
which is in turn a special form of contracting out. Conversely of course 
contracting out is itself· a certain form of privatisation to be 
distinguished, for example, from state asset sales and commercialisation. 
So just as contracting out does not necessarily imply privatisation, 
neither does the latter necessarily imply the former as illustrated in the 
Venn diagram below (Figure 4.5). 
4.4.2 Contracting Out and Competitive Tendering: 
Contracting out, whether it be private contracting or specifically 
privatisation, can be achieved in two principal ways. The first is by 
the contractee entering into a negotiated price contract with just one 
contractor in which case the contract price is then settled by mutual 
agreement between the two. This situation usually, but not always, occurs 
when one enterprise or institution has a monopoly in the market for certain 
goods and services. The second way is to tender out by inviting 
enterprises to compete with each other for the contracts, but this can only 
arise when there is more than one potential contractor in the market. 
With competitive tendering the contractee would normally opt for the most 
competitive bid rather than negotiating a contract price. This may not 
always be the lowest bid as the standard and reliability of the contractors 
can also be considered in awarding contracts. 
Tendering out then may involve the same structures as contracting out 
with regard to the relations between provision and funding, but unlike the 
latter it requires a competitive market to be effective. Hence contracting 
does not automatically involve tendering out. Again however the 
converse also applies; tendering out need not always result in contracting 
out. The management of the service to be tendered out may submit their OwTI 
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Figure 4.5 Venn Diagram Showing the Relation between 
Contracting Out and Privatisation 
P 
Privatisation 
with no 
contracting out 
ego Asset Sales 
Corporatisation 
Commercialisation 
Deregulation 
{P} = {all forms of privatisation} 
{C} = {all forms of contracting out} 
{P (') C} = {privatisation by contracting out} 
c 
Contracting Out 
with no 
privatisation 
{P - C} = {privatisation with no contracting out} 
{C - P} = {contracting out with no privatisation} 
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tender, alongside the others, to the institution which employs them. If 
this 'in-house' tender is competitive relative to the others then it may 
be awarded the contract in which case the contract price becomes the budget 
for the service to be provided. Public hospital ancillary services have 
often been provided under this arrangement in the UK and, to a much lesser 
extent, in New Zealand. 
In this situation there is tendering out but no contracting out as 
there is no funder/provider split. Under negotiated price contracting out 
this could not occur as no competitive bidding is involved in which the 
in-house labour force could be involved. In short then, contracting out 
need not imply tendering out while conversely, the latter need not require 
the former. Excepting the special case of contracts being secured in-
house, competitive tendering may be regarded as a restricted form of 
contracting out. Again the relationship bet weep the two may best be 
illustrated in another Venn diagram <Figure 4.6). 
4.4.3 Comyet it ive Tendering and Privatisation: 
Owing to the highly specialised division of labour throughout modern 
industry no public or private sector concerns can produce internally all 
their required goods and services. Scale economies may simply render 
impractical the acquisition of necessary labour skills and technology to 
provide these requirements and so both state and private organisations have 
to rely on contracting out to other organisations. For example public 
hospitals cannot usually satisfy much of their regular requirement for 
certain domestic supplies, medical and engineering equipment. Tendering, 
or contracting, out for this could not then be regarded as privatisation if 
only because no in-house work force was ever involved in the first place 
and so there was no transference from state to market provision. So, as 
has already been seen in another context, contracting out, whether or not 
by competitive tendering, does not necessarily amount to privatisation 
<Figure 4. 7). 
Nevertheless when these kind of services required by the state are put 
out to competitive tender, the potential opens up for I rationalising' the 
labour force employed by the contractors in order for them to be 
compet it i ve. In this case it is in 
force is 'rationalised' through the 
the private sector where the labour 
greater competition in the market 
arising from the state sector putting out its requirements to competitive 
tender. A somewhat different situation arises when a state institution 
provides its own goods and services and then decides, for whatever reason, 
to tender out their provision to some other public or private institution. 
Public hospital catering services, or local authority bus services and 
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Figure 4.6 Venn Diagram Showing Relation between Contracting 
Out and Tendering Out 
T 
Tendering Out 
In - house 
Contracts 
{T} = {all forms of tendering out} 
{C} = {all forms of contracting out} 
C 
Contracting Out 
Negotiated Price 
Contracts 
{T n C} = {contracting out by competitive tender} 
{T - C} = {in-house contracts} 
{C - T} = {negotiated price contracts} 
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Figure 4.7 Venn Diagram Showing Relation between 
Privatisation and Tendering Out 
T 
Tendering Out 
with no 
privatisation 
to Private 
Sector 
{T} = {all forms of tendering out} 
{P} = {all forms of privatisation} 
P 
Prlvatisation 
with no 
Tendering Out 
ego Negotiated Price 
Contracts 
Asset Sales 
Corporatisation 
{T n P} = {privatisation with competitive tendering} 
{T - P} :::: {tendering out with no privatisation} 
{P - T} = {privatisation with no tendering out} 
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refuse collection for example, may be put out to competitive tender in this 
way. 
This situation is particularly relevant to the process of 
privatisation as market forces are then being brought into the state 
inst it ut ion itself and therefore there is a direct impact on the labour 
force that was formerly employed by the state. Unless the contract is 
awarded in-house, there is always a change of employer and the possibility 
of redundancy and redeployment, all of which is especially pronounced in 
labour intensive industries. Even with the contract being awarded in-house 
these possibilities are only reduced and by no means eliminated (see for 
example Milne 1987). So where there is competitive tendering for 
services in which no in-house labour force has ever been employed, the 
effect of the process is to I rationalise' the work force already in the 
private sector by increasing competition there. 
In the second case, where there is an existing in-house labour force, 
competitive tendering brings the forces of market competition to bear on 
the state sector workforce. The result of the tendering process is that 
the workforce could end up being either transferred to the private sector 
or remaining in the state sector. As to which option eventuates depends 
upon which sector offers the most competitive contract price. A 
comprehensive illustration of the interrelationship between the concepts 
just discussed is presented by superimposing all the above Venn diagrams as 
in figure 4. 8. 
Summary 
Privatisation in respect of contracting out requires an act of 
transference from state (public) to private (market) provision of goods and 
services that are customarily provided by the state. Where the contracting 
out is by tendering out, then privatisation need not necessarily amount to 
a transference from state to private provision since the competition 
engendered is intended to bring market mechanisms into state institutions. 
Market provision may occur without the service concerned being technically 
<ie legally) private. Similarly if the private provider is a monopoly 
then, while technically private, there is not any meaningful market 
provision, The cd tical point in the privatisat ion and contract ing out 
debate is not so much whether the provision is by private or public 
institutions, but whether the forces of market competition operate. Only 
in this latter case will the labour force and the operation of the service 
itself be I rationalised' in the way that privatisation pOlicies hope to 
achieve. 
Having established some conceptual clarity upon which to examine the 
Figure 4.8 Venn Diagram Showing Relation between Contracting Out, 
Competitive Tendering and Privatisation 
{ fi?1 } 
{ © } 
{ 'if } 
{P}-{TuC} 
{T - C } 
{ P+C-T} 
{PnC}-{P+C-T} 
{T - P} 
{ C} - {Tv P} 
PnC-(P+C-T) 
= {all forms of privatisation} 
== {all forms of contracting out} 
= {all forms of tendering out} 
== {privatisation without contracting or tendering out} 
= {privatisation by tendering out but without contracting out; 
in-house contracts} 
== {privatisation by contracting out but with tendering out} 
= {privatisation by contracting out but without tendering out; 
standard or negotiated price contracts} 
== {contracting out with tendering out but without privatisation; 
goods and services which the state cannot provide itself} 
== {contracting out without tendering out or privatisation; 
negotiated price contracts with another ,state institution} 
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process of contracting out, attention can be turned towards applying this 
analysis to a particular empirical sit uat ion and within the theoretical 
frameworks stablished in the previous chapter. The particular case 
selected is the New Zealand public hospital system where the contracting 
out for certain ancillary services has become well establised, especially 
in the 1980s. Prior to this it is worthwhile to review some contributions 
to this debate. An especially signi ficant one is that of Ascher (1987). 
4.5 Privatisation by Contracting Out: The Contribution of Ascher 
(1987); 
The Politics of Privatisation: Contracting Out Public Services 
<Ascher 1987) presents a detailed analysis of developments in contracting 
out in UK local authorities and in the National Health Service <NHS). The 
significance of this work to the study of privatisation arises in at least 
four ways. 
The first is that, rather than presenting a general overview of t.he 
entire privatisation process, Ascher gives a detailed account of one 
specific form of privatisation; that of contracting out to the private 
sector. Secondly, she provides one of the few full-length accounts of 
privatisation that is not devoted primarily to the sale of state assets. 
The work therefore address a substantial gap in the privatisation 
literature. Thirdly, attention centres entirely on service provision at 
the scale of local government which includes the provision of public 
hospital ancillary services. This restriction in focus is advantageous 
insofar as it permits a much more detailed analysis of the privatisation 
process than would be possi ble in a more general work, The final point 
arises directly out of the previous one and is perhaps the most importunt 
for this thesis. By centering at tent ion on locally provided services, 
Ascher's work raises, but fails to address, the issue geographical 
variations in pd vat isat ion that may occur within a single nation-state. 
Through undertaking a critical review of this contribution, a context is 
provided for the empirical research in the following chapters. 
Much of the development of contracting out in the 1980s, as detailed 
by Ascher, is set within the context of rising militancy of public sector 
unions and industrial disruption in local authorities and public hospitals 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The election of a Conservative central 
government in 1979, and again in 1983, is presented as a crucial 
development in the contracting out of hospital services through the 
subsequent pressure that this Government placed on hospital 
administrations to implement the policy of contracting out. The major 
services involved, known collectively as ancillary services, included 
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domestic, catering and laundry services. With local authorities on the 
other hand the impetus for contracting out is presented as stemming mainly 
from the local level administration itself, consequent upon the election of 
Conservative controlled councils. 
Along with Dunleavy <1986a), Ascher <1987, 249) finds wanting the 
thesis of what she terms the' New Right'. Based on public choice theory, 
and detailed in chapter two above, the New Right argument is that 
government administrators are budget maximers and therefore reluctant to 
pri vat ise the services which they administer. This cont ent ion is disputed 
by Ascher on basis of the generally limited opposition she found to 
privatisation exhibited by these people in both the NHS and the local 
authori ties. However, what she calls the 'traditional left' or trade 
union contention that privatisation is an overt political attack on workers 
and their organisations is also not sustained. T~is finding is based on 
the grounds that the central government did not pursue privatisation with 
as much vigour as it might have done, as it only insisted on tendering out 
services rather than contracting them out. Ascher <1987, 259) concludes 
instead that contracting out must be seen as, "a natural adjustment to an 
over reliance on public sector provision, a reaction to two decades of poor 
management and overly powerful trade unions". 
Although a wealth of information on contracting out within an 
empirical situation is given by Ascher, at least four major criticisms can 
be levelled at her account. The first relates to the theoretical framework 
adopted. Despite Ascher's objections to the New Right's budget 
maximisation thesis, her own conclusion is still set very much within the 
terms of public choice theory, in which the public sector is seen as 
inherently problematic. In respect of her conclusion on the reason for 
contracting out, what one may ask is "natural" in the adjustment to private 
provision, in what way was there an "over reliance" on public provision and 
by what criteria were the trade unions "overly powerful"? Answers to 
these questions are not evident. 
Clearly within the terms of public choice theory and its focus on the 
dysrunctionality of public bureaucracies these points may be perfectly 
valid, but, again with reference to chapter two, this body of theory only 
presents a partial explanation of social phenomenon. Virtually no 
considerat 16IT---ts~givEm by Ascher to ei ther the macro-economic cont ext in 
wh i c i1---fne----c-onlr Be t i ng 0 u t -p ~;~~~~ 
recession and deindustrialisation> or 
occurred (eg 
to changes 
rising 
in the 
unemployment, 
role of the 
welfare state in Britain. Where these issues are neglected, only a 
part ial explanat ion of the pri vat isat ion process is possible as earlier 
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work in this thesis has demonstrated. 
A second level of criticism of Ascher arises form the conceptual 
understanding of privatisation. The inadequacy of her definition of 
contracting out has already been referred to earlier in this chapter. A 
further problem relates to her rather confusing use of the terms, 
contracting out and competitive tendering. Thus chapter sil< is entitled, 
I Competitive Tendering in the NHS' (my emphasis), and chapter seven, 
'Contracting Out in Local Authorities' (my emphasis). Why the difference? 
Both processes seem to have occurred in each organisation. 
It appears, without being madeel<plicit, that all health authorities 
were requi by central government, specifically to tender out services, 
but not necessarily to contract them out if the in-house tender was more 
competitive than outside private sector ones. However at the time that 
Ascher wrote, local authorities were at liberty to contract out their 
. 
services either by competitive tender or by negotiation with whom ever 
they pleased. Moreover in the case of local authorities there do not seem 
to have been any in-house tenders submi tted. Such matters are not made 
clear in the text and the two concepts appear to be used rather 
arbitrarily. A much more rigorous analytical approach is required to the 
differences between contracting and tendering together with a much greater 
of specifity in the subsequent use of the terms. 
The third level of criticism can be directed at the lack of attention 
given to the structures and constraints of hospital and local service 
provision. Throughout Ascher's account attention focuses almost solely 
on the role of interested parties almost as if they were autonomous actors 
on the scene. So rather than just citing "two decades of poor management" 
it would have been more illuminating if Ascher had detailed the 
structural conditions under which management decisions were made and 
highlighted what may have been contradictory pressures upon the managers 
concerned. 
Hardly any discussion is presented on the structure and funding of the 
NHS and its various services, such as the ancillary ones under discussion. 
Even just some simple flow diagrams or chart s detailing the chain of 
command would add greatly to the clarity of the work especially for anyone 
not familiar with the organisation of the NHS or UK local authorities. It 
is almost impossible from Ascher's account to ascertain who in the hospital 
or local civic administration makes the decisions with regard to 
contracting out services and who exercises the authority. 
The fourth main criticism and, from a geographical perspective, 
possibly one the most prominent is the almost total neglect of any 
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consideration of regional variations within the overall process. Nowhere 
is the reader told how many different health and local authorities were in 
existence or which ones contracted out their and if so which 
services? Neither is any information provided on variations between 
hospital aut horit ies in terms of populat ion characterist ics of catchment 
areas, or of the size and type of hospitals involved in contracting out. 
The only suggestion found of a regional basis to contracting out, and then 
only mentioned in passing, is in the passage, II Union officials publicly 
at tri buted this geographical shi ft [in the focus of industrial act ion] to 
the fact Northern authorities began to implement the Government's tendering 
policy rather late in the day" (Ascher 1987, 122). No explanation is 
offered in respect of this observation. 
It is also apparent from Ascher that in some of both the NHS and local 
authorities there was no tendering or contracting out at all. This is 
revealed, albeit indirect ly, when she states, II authori ti es which have never 
are parti cular1y keen to minimise the risks of future 
disruptions in key serviceGt' (Ascher 1987, 124 emphasis mine). But no 
indication is given of where these authorities are located or how many fall 
into this category. Moreover it is not clear from the text, both in this 
passage and elsewhere, whether the authorities that Ascher is referring to 
are NHS or local ones or both. Another interesting observation is that, 
"only about half of all NHS services had been put out to tender by the end 
of 1985 and local authority services are unlikely to go out in significant 
'V'olume until 1987 at the earliest" (Ascher 1987, 133). Similar ions 
arise in respect of the geo~raphical bqsis of the development of this form I: 
of pri vatisat ion. That there is not a e map offered anywhere in the I 
293 page text, not even one showing NHS/local authority boundaries, does I 
make it very difficult to ascertain the overall extent ~ of the contracting l \ 
out from both a spatial and sectoral perspective. \ 
Arguably Ascher's inattention to the uneven spatiality of the 
privatisation she describes has cramped the scope of the theoretical 
frameworks she offers to explain the process. She argues that "overly 
powerful" trade unions were one of the main causes of contracting out in 
the first place. However the work of Elliot and McCrone (1984), detailed 
in the previous chapter, has shown that high levels of class conflict can 
restrict employer initiatives to reduce working conditions through policies 
such as privatisation. Regional variations in the industrial militancy of 
the work force could then have had an important, if not decisive, affect 
on the contracting out process. As Ascher (1987, 188) comments, 
"pressure from the unions led at least two health authorities, Sunderland 
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and York, to temporarily suspend their tendering programmes". Al though it 
is not clear whether these author! ties did event ually tender out their 
services, the possibility should be considered that labour militancy might 
have inhibited privatisation initiatives as much as enhanced them. 
By taking a regionally sensitive approach, as for example adopted by 
Massey (1984), it would seem that spatial, and temporal, variations in 
levels of class struggle may have had a crucial mediating role in the 
uneven development of privatised service delivery. While it is 
indisputable from Ascher's account that there has been a major assault on 
workers' employment conditions in the services in tot~ the process appears 
to have been far from spatially uniform. Regrettably this matter is given 
virtually no attention. 
Before concluding 
consider, if only very 
this section 
briefly, a 
on 
few 
Ascher, it is worthwhile to 
other contributions on the 
contracting out of public services. All exist in the form of individual 
papers but are worth citing if. only for the added poignancy they give to 
the critique of Ascher. Milne (987), Sheaff (1988) and Cousins (1988) 
each present comparat i ve case st udi es of changed working condit ions for 
hospital ancillary workers resulting from contracting out, new management 
structures and poor industrial relations. The selectiveness of these 
studies however does not provide any basis for ascertaining the overall 
geographical extent of this form of privatisation in the British NHS. 
Within the geographical literature, contributions to the study of 
privatisation by contracting out have come from Pinch and Witt (1987) and 
Mohan (1988) both of whose work is set within the broader context of the 
general 'restructuring' of public hospital services in Britain. 
The former work focuses exclusively on one single region, but the 
latter considers privatisation in the broader context of England. 
Although Wales and Scotland are excluded for reasons not stated, the 
spatial unevenness of contracting out ancillary services is suggested by 
Mohan (1988) in citing the National Audit Office (1987) to the effect that: 
DHAs [District Health Authorities] in the South East [of England] 
have cant ract ed out more servi ces t han in t he Nod h and West 
while inner London DHAs were initially slower than their suburban 
counterparts to put services out to tender (Mohan 1988, 457). 
This observation however is not subject to any further discussion or 
explanation. 
On the basis of these reviews it is clear that many questions remain 
unanswered and much scope exists for geographical research into the socio-
spatiality of privatisation. The importance of these criticisms for this 
thesis lies in the direction they give to the empirical research undertaken 
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in the following chapters. The shortcomings in the work of Ascher and 
others provide a useful reference point from which to approach the 
analysis. It is with a view to progressing in this direction that the 
cont ract ing out of New Zealand public hospital ancillary services is 
offered as a case study. 
[
-I the aim is to present 
uneven privatisation. 
Concl usion: 
In the light of many of the issues just raised, 
further theoretical understanding of geographically 
In discussing the qualitative differences between forms of 
privatisation, this chapter has presented an analytical framework for 
identifying the various processes involved in transferring public goods and 
service provision to the private sector. It has also been seen that 
whether through the sale of state owned enterprises, the commercialisation 
of government departments or the contracting out of public services, 
dist inct regional and sectoral variat ions may develop in the way that 
services are provided. 
uni t ary process. 
Pri vat isat ion cannot therefore be analysed 
For state sector activity in the productive sector, spatial 
fragmentation can occur when enterprise operations are regionalised with a 
view to establishing market competition between them. It is acknowledged 
that regionalisation tends to occur whenever an industry has its operations 
decentralised and that privatisation may be non existent. Rather the point 
to emphasise is that where privatisation has been pursued, there is 
invariably a regional fragmentation of production. 
In the case of public services, the extent of their privatisation 
through contracting out can vary substantially between and within each 
local state authority. In addition to the 
institutions and enterprises there is also 
accompanying the process. Enormous potential 
spatial differentiation of 
the social fragmentatiorr'1 
opens up for significant 
spatial and sectoral changes in the working conditions of those employed in 
the privatised industry and the levels of service provision to community. 
While considerable attention has been given in the literature on 
privatisation to describing the various socio-economic effects of the 
process, there remains a distinct dearth of theoretically informed analyses 
of the spatially uneven nature of its implementation. 
Footnotes: 
1 This conception of natural monopoly is the one used in neo-classical 
economics. Within Marxian theory, monopolies are only 'nat ural' to the 
extent that they derive this status from the inherent tendency of 
capitalism towards expanded reproduction. The operation of scale economies 
is only made possible by the ever growing centralisation of capital. 
2 According to Rails <April 1988, 202), "The principality of 
Liechtenstein, worried about mounting pollution, has become the first 
country in Europe to offer free public transportation in a move to 
discourage private commuting'. In Fiji, South Pacific Sugar Mills Ltd., 
used to offer the only free passenger train service in the world, until 
completely abandoning the service in 1978. 
3 Although no empirical examples of this appear to exist, the 
potentiality for it was present with the possibility of the sale of the 
Shipping Corporation of New Zealand to the state owned Italian shipping 
line, Lloyd Triestino. The Corporation was finally sold to the <private) 
British based company, Blueport ACT. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The New Zealand Public Hospital System and the 
Provision of Ancillary Services 
This chapter provides an introduction to the empirical investigation 
of the contracting out of New Zealand public hospital ancillary services. 
The previous chapter attempted to show that different forms of I' 
privatisation can have different geographical impacts and it was noted that . 
very little academic attention had been given to analysing the spatially 
uneven development of any particular form of privatisation. Also apparent 
from the last chapter is that whatever form of privatisation one considers, 
it has occurred across a wide variety of different industries. The 
geographically uneven development of privatisation may therefore be 
analysed either in the context of a particular industry or a particular 
form of the process itself. 
. 
In chapters two and three the theoretical frameworks that purport to 
explain the implementation of privatisation policies were developed without 
reference to any particular industry, nation state, or form of 
privatisation. This chapter looks at one specific industry - that of 
public hospital provision and in particular the organisation of its 
ancillary services. Within the terms of the theoretical frameworks 
established previously any industry in which privatisation has occurred 
could be selected for detailed analysis, but there are at least three 
reasons for choosing public hospital provision. 
The first, which has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, 
refers to the political sensitivity of health care privatisation. In most 
western capitalist countries a publicly provided and funded hospital system 
has been seen by most sectors of society as being an integral part of the 
welfare state. The privatisation of the system has tended to generate much 
apprehension amongst the public, to the extent that some governments which 
have been enthusiastic implementers of privatisation policies in other 
areas of state activity have felt the need to claim that the system is 
I safe in our hands'. Be this as it may, a study of public hospitals in 
the ,New Zealand context reveals that privatisation through contracting out 
ancillary services had become entrenched in the system well before the mid 
1980s when the major initiatives to privat or at least to corporatise 
the state sector, came to the fore. Moreover, and somewhat paradoxically, 
the privatisation of these particular hospital services has caused very 
little political controversy. 
The second reason for studying the pUblic hospital sector is to 
address the question as to why certain services or sectors of industry may 
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be privatised much earlier than others. While this observation may also 
apply outside the hospital sector, the industry provides a striking 
example of sectorally uneven privatisation. The review of Ascher (1987) in 
the last chapter showed that the potential exists for the contracting out 
of public hospital services to the private sector to develop very unevenly 
across geographic space. Consideration though must also be given to the 
probability that certain services or sectors of industry, at anyone time, 
may be privatised to a far greater spatial extent than others. A study of 
public hospital privatisation can show the process to be both spatially and 
sectorally fragmented. 
The third reason for analysing the privatisation of public hospital 
ancillary services arises from the value such a study may have in 
explaining the geographically uneven privatisation of other local authority 
services. At the time of writing major reorganisa~ion is taking place in 
New Zealand's local government and urban public transport, all of which 
is expected t6 result in ext~nsive contracting out of services to private 
and voluntary organisations. This privatisation may be expected to be a 
very spatially uneven process across the country as a whole. A study of 
contracting out on a nation wide scale is therefore timely in the New 
Zealand context in view of likely forthcoming developments in public 
service provision and, as already noted, the existing history of hospital 
service privatisation. 
Although the case study selected is centred on the New Zealand 
hospital system, it is anticipated that whatever conclusions are ultimately 
drawn, they will have theoretical significance across a broad section of 
industries and need not be confined to anyone nation state. Limitations 
on time and resources have restricted the empirical work in this thesis 
to just one form of privatisation in one particular sector of an industry. 
Much of this chapter is devoted to showing the administrative 
structure of the New Zealand public hospital system in general and the 
ancillary services in particular. In order to provide a broader context 
for the discussion, the chapter starts by examining the ways in which 
different forms ofJ)rivatisation may be applied to public hospitals. A 
second section examines the rationale behind moves to privatise and 
generally 'restructure' public hospital provision in the context of the New 
Zealand em. In the third section attention is centred more 
specifically on the administrative structure of the New Zealand public 
hospital system and is followed by a section dealing exclusively with the 
ancillary services. The final part presents a short case st udy showing 
the different ways in which ancillary services can be provided within the 
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same public hospital system. Throughout the chapter emphasis is given to 
showing how the social (ie hierarchical) dimension of the hospital system 
interacts with the spatiality of service provision. 
5.1 Privatisation and the Provision of Public Hospital Services: 
In most western countries there exists a mixture, in varying 
proportions, of private and public sector involvement in hospital care as 
demonstrated by Navarro (1985). All the forms of privatisation identified 
to transitions from public to private in chapter four may apply 
provision. 
dismantled 
Nowhere, 
and, as 
however, has 
al ready seen, 
the public system been completely 
it is almost universally held by 
to be t he bedrock of the welf are governments, and the public at large, 
state. Nevertheless hospital care has not been immune from privatisation 
and may be increasingly subjected to the process during the 1990s. 
Attempts to privatise a public hospital syst.em can take one of two 
possible directions. The first is to increase the proportion of private 
to public sector involvement in hospital care, while the second seeks to 
reorganise the remaining public sector hospital system in such a way that 
it more closely resembles the operations of the (private) market sector. 
In practice these two policy goals may be pursued simultaneously. The 
expected result would be a reduction in the state's financial support for 
hospital care. In the following two sections each of these two policies is 
considered in turn. 
5. 1. 1 The Growth of Private Hospital Care: 
The growth of private over public hospital provision may occur simply 
through the state failing to provide sufficient resources to cater for the 
demand for services. There may therefore, using the terminology of 
Hirschman (1970), be an I exit' from the public hospital system by some 
service users who take their requirements to the private sector and thereby 
stimulate the growth of private hospitals and medical insurance companies. 
Writing over a decade ago on the New Zealand situation, Fougere (1978), in 
what he terms, Undoing the Wel fare state, has demonstrated this I exi t I 
effect and claimed that: 
... dissatisfaction [by the public] has given rise to massive exit 
and an undetermined degree of suffering in silence. Each year 
since its introduction, more and more people have taken out 
private medical insurance. At the same time, the number of 
people obtaining surgery in private hospitals appears to be 
steeply increasing, particularly in Auckland (Fougere 1978, 410). 
Writing more recently on New Zealand, Barnett and Barnett (1989) have 
detailed the growth of private hospitals since the 1950s. They emphasise 
the rapidity of this growth in recent years, especially for long term 
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geriatric care where, by 1986, companies or small entrepreneurs controlled 
43 percent of all beds (Barnett and Barnett 1989, 89). In the USA private 
hospital growth has been even more marked and since around 1970, Bohland 
and Knox <1989, 54) report on the growth of private 'multihospital 
organisational structures'. A distinctive feature of this trend, as 
observed by Salmon (1985), has been the increasing ownership of hospitals 
by large scale corporate capital as opposed to the former preponderance of 
smal1 scale individually or charitably owned institutions. According to 
Salmon <1985, 396), II the growth in numbers and beds since 1970 [in the for 
profit hospital systems] contrasts dramatically to the contraction of the 
, not for profi t I and government segment of the industry". 
Regarding the institutions in the latter two categories, Whiteis and 
Salmon (1987, 48) comment that recent US government policy has encouraged 
their closure through the reduction of federal refmbursement for treating 
the medical1y indigent. As a consequence a growing number of them have 
become either unable, or unwilling, to care for the kind of patients they 
previously took in <Whiteis and Salmon 1987, 48). Citing the work of 
McLafferty (1982), they report that since the mid 1970s, "data has shown a 
growing phenomenon of economic crisis and hospi tal closures among 
institutions serving the poor and minority populations of major US cities' 
(Whiteis and Salmon 1987, 53). 
In discussing privatisation of the British National Health Service 
(NHS) , Mohan <1989, 115) comments that, since the early 1970s, there has 
been a Igreciter market penetration by multinational hospital chains, 
including United States based corporations'. Rayner <1987, 210) attributes 
this growth to locally owned private and charitable hospitals retaining a 
low fee structure in line with the NHS 'pay beds' and having staff payment 
rates similar to NHS rates. The result of such policies was that these 
hospitals did not have sufficient financial resources to respond as 
quickly as the multinational hospital chains to the expanding market in the 
late 1970s <Rayner 1987, 210). A similar process has occurred in the New 
Zealand private hospital system where Barnett and Barnett (1989, 89) have 
identified a clearly discernable trend towards multinational, multihospital 
investment. 
Where there exist state restrictions or regulations on the extent of 
private hospital prOVision, the growth of the private sector can be 
considerably enhanced simply by the government deregulating the market for 
this service. Private sector hospital growth may be encouraged still 
further by the existence of government subsidy which has often taken the 
form of tax relief for private medical insurance contributions. 
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Mohan 
(1989, 114) notes that in the UK, as in New Zealand, controls on new 
private hospital developments have been relaxed in the 1980s although both 
Governments stopped short of tax concessions for insurance contributions. 
An even more direct way to increase the private to public ratio of 
provision is for public hospital authorities to sell off or lease hospitals 
to private, and voluntary sector operators. Alternatively, or 
additionally, public hospitals, in either whole or part, may simply be 
closed down. The private or voluntary sector is therefore required to meet 
the outstanding service demand. Not only does this increase the proportion 
of private to public hospital provision but additionally there may be an 
increase in the use of private resources as service users could have to 
travel much further than previously to the nearest remaining public 
hospital. Far from multinational capital being involved in this case, many 
small individually owned hospitals or even domes~ic households assume a 
share of what may have formerly been public provision as inst it utional 
(hospital) care is transferred' to community (private and voluntary) care. 
5.1.2 The Commercialisation of State Sector Hospital Care: 
Whatever the increase in private provision, and whatever the scale of 
capital involved, a residual public sector must always exist if a socially 
accept able level of provision is to be made for those without sufficient 
resources to avail themselves of private care. Growing costs of medical 
care together with increasing restraints on state expenditure has 
encouraged governments to restructure the state sector so that it 
operates according to market criteria. The aim therefore has been to 
introduce a more competitive environment for public hospitals to operate 
in. 
Certain options present themselves. Hospitals could be establised on 
a full cost recovery basis similar to state owned enterprises and forced to 
compete for business alongside private sector hospitals. Fees for service, 
financed either individually or through third party insurance, would be the 
means of funding. Through such a 'corporatised' form of provision the 
state can still be the provider of services but it no longer retains its 
funding role. The main problem with this arrangement is that it 
involves the public sector charging market prices for its services and so 
the difficulty of providing for the medically indigent still remains. As 
far as is known no country yet operates such a system. 
When the ensuring of a universal access to hospital care across all 
social classes is deemed necessary the public hospital system may be 
reorganised so that it still retains its role as funder of service 
provision. By contracting out services to the private sector, particularly 
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through a process of competitive tendering, the state ensures the provision 
of all services without itself being the provider. By placing all service 
provision and staff on a contractual basis the foundation can be 
established for providing an internal market for the public health system. 
Advocates of private sector provision maintain that such a system yields 
greater accountability, transparency and economic efficiency. To date 
however no such large scale contracting out of hospital functions seems to 
have occurred and the process has been largely restricted to certain 
activities like the ancillary services or to the provision of geriatric 
beds. Nevertheless, in countries like Britain and ,New Zealand, moves to 
contract out a greater range of services and personnel than hitherto are 
under serious consideration. 
5. 1. 3 Theoretical Explanat ions for Public Hospit al Pri vat isat ion: 
Two interrelated processes appear to be ing in hospital care 
pri vat i sat ion. One is the reduction in the level of public sector 
provision and the other is the move to provision by large scale 
multinational capital. Each is considered in turn. In the first case 
the explanation, according to Whiteis and Salmon <1987, 53) is that 
reduced public hospital provision is, 1\ part of a larger move toward 
removal of public goods and services from certain population segments; the 
unproduct i ve poor, working class, aged, and di sabl ed'. Without 
specifically referring to the Marxist thesis of 0 1 Connor (1973) discussed 
in chapter three, their explanatory analysis follows a similar theme. They 
argue that: 
this dismantling of health care institutions to exclude the 
, unproductive' population comes at a time when there is a 
rerouting throughout the international economic order of 
substantial amounts of formerly public monies into private 
accumulation, in an effort to shore up sagging profit levels 
(Whiteis and Salmon 1987, 53). 
An explanation more in line with Tieboutian public choice theory 
detailed in chapter two would contend that the increasing public demand for 
hospital care outstripped the financial ability of the state to supply it 
and thus stimulated a consumer led I exit' to the private sector <Califano 
1981 ). A Weberian managerialist perspective on the other hand would 
suggest that the cause of private sector growth lies in governments trying 
to rid themselves of public responsibility towards those least able to 
'exit' to the private sector <Fougere 1978). Whatever the relative merits 
of these explanatory frameworks, all three would probably be in agreement 
that there has been a significant growth in the size of private capital 
investment in hospital care. This brings the discussion to the second of 
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the two processes referred to above. 
The growth in capital investment may be attributed to the increasing 
technological complexity involved in the hospital service. The result has 
been that, on the one hand, greater levels of capitalisation are required 
for hospitals while, on the other hand, some small conununity hospitals 
lacking such investment potent ial have been squeezed out of exist ence as 
Whi teis and Salmon (1987) have shown. It is predominant ly in the low 
technology, geriatric, and terminal care provision that individual and 
voluntary/charitable hospital ownership has prevailed, and indeed 
proliferated in some countries such as New Zealand (Barnett and Barnett 
1989). Even in this low technology sector however large scale capital is 
becoming more involved as Harrington (1984) reports in the case of the USA. 
Public hospital systems may therefore be either sold, leased, 
corporatised and/or contracted out in efforts to privatise service 
provision. As mentioned earlier, the provision of hospital ancillary 
services has been one. of the first sectors of public hospitals to be 
privatised while the privatisation of other areas of the hospital system 
has been a much more recent development. In the case of New Zealand many 
of the forms of privatisation just discussed are still only at a 
feasibility stage. 
Throughout the 1980s, however, public hospital services in New Zealand 
and many other countries became increasingly difficult to provide. This 
has brought about much political and economic pressure for substantial 
changes in the form of service provision beyond just privatising ancillary 
services. In the next section these difficulties are discussed in the New 
Zealand context, although many of the problems identified are by no means 
confined to that country. 
5.2 The Public Hospital System under Stress: The Case of New Zealand: 
The concern of many governments over hospital care, or more generally 
heal th care, during the last two decades has rested primarily on its 
increasing cost. At least four reasons, applicable to a variety of 
countries, have been cited for this increase in health expenditure. In 
brief these are, first the growing public expectation of what health care 
can deliver, second the removal of financial barriers to access, third the 
increased complexity of medical technology and, finally the ageing of many 
countries l population which has led to greater demands for hospital 
treatment. New Zealand, as the government commissioned Report of the 
Health Benefits Review Conunittee (HBRC 1986) made clear, has by no means 
been exempt from these general trends. Public hospital expenditure in 
particular has come under considerable fire as, according to the HBRC 
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<1986, 87), it has been responsible for only 10-20 percent of patient care 
but takes up 60-80 percent of total health expenditure in many countries 
including New Zealand. 
From the mid 1970s most OECD countries faced slow economic growth 
together with growing fiscal deficits. Accompanying these adverse economic 
conditions and state fiscal stress was the realisation that increased 
health expenditure was not resulting in parallel improvements in mortality, 
life expectancy or any other measure of health status (HBRC 1986, 87). 
This has been particularly pronounced in New Zealand in the case of infant 
mortality where in the 1930s this rate was the lowest in the world but 
since then the country, II has been overtaken by most OEeD countries and now 
has a low ranking on this indicator' (HBRC 1986, 28). 
Only two years after this report another one appeared, again 
commissioned by the government, and produced by t.he Hospital and Related 
Services Taskforce (HRST 1988). This report, which has become more 
commonly knowoas, 'The bbs" Report', after the Taskforce's chairperson, 
has identified some rather more fundamental problems with hospital care. 
The principal one was that of access, or lack thereof, to the system due 
to the existence of unacceptably long waiting lists for treatment. 
According to this report: 
As far as the public is concerned the greatest failing of the 
present hospital system is access. Waiting lists for treatment 
are one of the public hospitals' most obvious problems. People 
must wait for admission for treatment unless they are victims of 
accidents or develop acute conditions such as appendicitis (HRST 
1988, 6). 
The report also identified a series of what it termed 'management 
defi ci enc es' (HRST 1988, ch 4). More specifically these related to a lack 
of productivity incentives for staff, a lack of management information and 
accountability due to almost non-existent management accounts and costing 
systems. Largely following from this, t here was seen t a be a decided 
1 ack of cost consc i ousness on t he part of st a ff (HRST 1988, 21) . In short 
the two reports maintained that health care outputs, in the form of 
treatment and health status, were not 
inputs, specifically in the form of costs. 
matching the (ever increasing) 
Both these reports, but particularly the second, advocated a much more 
competitive, market-oriented system of hospital provision while still 
keeping the major proportion of funding public. For the HBRC (1986, 116), 
the recommendation was to move either, II to a system with competitive HMOs 
[Health Maintenance Organisations'] or to one invol ving the state as 
principal [under contracting for at least some of the services it needs'. 
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With the HRST <1988, 26) the main proposal was to establish a structure 
that introduced a clear separation between the funder (the government) and 
the providers of health services. "This separation", claimed the HRST, 
"enables a market to be created in which prices are set by modified 
competition between hospitals" (HRST 1988, 26). Waiting lists might then 
be reduced through the hoped for productivity increases with privatisation. 
It is perhaps a measure of the political sensitivity of public 
hospital and health care provision that the New Zealand government did not, 
at least openly, accept the recommendations of these reports. Nevertheless 
continued constraints on hospital funding and increased costs of provision 
have resulted in some of the recommendations of these reports being 
adopted by the hospital authorities. This has led some communi t y and 
trade union groups to see the so-called Gibbs' report as having received 
at least a de facto acceptance by policy makers. Be this as it may, both 
this, and the previous section, clearly show that New Zealand has by no 
means been immune from the' general world wide tendency to privatise 
hospi tal services. It would though be erroneous to regard all current 
public hospital pdvatisation and more general restructuring as having only 
arisen in the light of the above two reports. 
One sector of the New Zealand public hospital system above all others 
the ancillary sector - has for long been the subject of pri vat isat ion, 
market competition and the separation of the funder from the provider by 
contracting out to the private sector. While the HRST could refer to a 
general lack of cost consciousness on the part of hospital staff, this 
shortcoming has certainly not been in evidence in the ancillary sector, at 
least since the mid 1970s. Before examining this sector in closer detail 
though it is first necessary to look at the overall structure of the 
public hospital system. This enables one to see how the system, since its 
inception, has provided hospital services. 
5.3 The Administration of the New Zealand Public Hospital System: 
5.3. 1 The Provision of Services: 
The administration of hospitals in New Zealand has, for over a 
century, been in the hands of regional authorities known as hospital 
boards. The severe economic and social problems associated with the 
Depression were responsible in large part for the election in 1935 of the 
first Labour Government <Fraser 1984, 60), which introduced a public 
'free at the point of use l hospital care syste~ In the Social Security 
Act of 1938 free inpatient treatment at public hospitals became a universal 
entitlement. One important consequence of this was the growth in demand 
for treatment which saw public hospital financial requirements become 
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stretched to the point at which former local authority and charitable 
funding was no longer adequate, even with state subsidy, to maintain a 
service (Ward and Asher 1984, 91). Following the passing of the Hospitals 
Act in 1957, the central government assumed the entire financial 
responsibility for the public hospital system from 1st April 1958, while 
still devolving the administration to the regional level. 
Largely as a direct consequence of hospital boards having to rely on 
central government for their funding, the latter has always had a 
significant degree of control over the operations of the former. In order 
for the elected government to ensure that a hospital system is maintained 
and controlled there exists a centrally organised structure, or 
bureaucracy, called the Department of Health. This administrative 
structure is comprised of appointed managers, rather than elected 
politicians and headed by a Director-General. The function of the 
Department has been to: 
advise the Minister [of Health] on, or determine in respect of 
boards, the extent and standard of hospital and allied services, 
the building requirements to provide these services, the numbers 
and levels of the main groups of professional staff to be 
employed, the appropriate financial grants, and measures of 
financial assistance to be given to private hospitals including 
loan finance (NZOYB 1985, 177). 
In keeping with this, the Department of Health has issued from time to time 
a variety of instructions to all hospital boards relating to service 
provision. 
The number of hospital boards in New Zealand has varied over the years 
as the changing distribution of population has brought about some 
amalgamations. From a peak of 47 hospital boards in 1909, there had been a 
reduction to 37 by 1950, 31 by 1970 and 29 by 1974. These boards initially 
comprised members and nominees of existing local authorities until the 
amendment of the Hospitals and Charitable Institutions Act of 1909, after 
which they were directly elected every three years at local council 
elections (Ward and Asher 1984, 91). They each comprised 8 to 14 members 
who between them represented different local council constituent districts 
within each hospital board district. The members of these boards conduct 
their business through being subdivided into various committees, typically 
comprising one for finance, one for works and buildings, and another for 
heal th services. These committees report monthly to the meet ings of the 
full board in order to make final policy decisions. 
The 29 hospital boards in existence in 1974 remained unt il mid 1988 
when some further amalgamations took place. The size of these boards 
varied enormously, both in spatial extent and population covered, from that 
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of the Auckland Board to the Maniototo Board (serving in 1988, 913,000 and 
2,290 people respectively). In 1983 the government passed the Area Health 
Board Act which provided for the gradual replacement of hospital boards by 
area health boards. Members were still to be el ect ed under t he same 
circumstances as previously but the new structure assumed responsiblity for 
primary health care, a funct ion that hitherto had been performed direct ly 
by central government acting through the Department of Health. The first 
area health board was formed in Northland in 1985 and by the end of 1989 
all pre-existing hospital boards had been transformed into 14 area health 
boards as shown in the maps in figure 5. 1. 
The main statutory requirements that central government impose on the 
elected members of hospital boards is that they, II provide, maintain and 
staff such institutions, hospital accommodation and medical, nurSing and 
other services as the Minister of Health considers necessary' (NZOYB 1985, 
178). With the recent formation of area health boards the government 
imposed a slightly broader function upon them that extends to all health 
services in the wider community. Under either system the provision of 
hospital services by a board, required the appointment of a specific 
management structure to execute board policy in a similar way to the 
Department of Health in respect of the central government. In the hospital 
board system this structure was divided into a managing triumvirate 
comprising a chief executive, a medical superintendent and a chief nurse 
although in some cases the third position was subordinated to the second. 
By the end of 1989 these three management areas had been condensed into one 
with the formation of area health boards in which the position of general 
manager became established to oversee the provision of all health services 
both primary and secondary. 
Within the original hospital board structure, the board members had a 
considerable management role, insofar as they could, ' hire, fire, and 
promote' all levels of staff and generally oversee the proviSion of all 
services. In practice however it was usually only the most sehior 
management staff that were specifically appointed by the board with the 
responsibility for the recruitment of lower levels being delegated to other 
management staff. Virtually all issues relating to management policy had 
to be placed before the elected board members for approval. Under the 
succeeding management structure this managerial role haS been all but 
eliminated. According to the Minister of Health in Health, A Prescription 
f or Change (nd, 17) : 
the role of the [area health] boards is to develop policy and 
specify services to be provided in their regions. The 
responsibility for implementing that policy falls on the board's 
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chief executive. The elected members of the boards have no 
management function (my emphasis). 
Much cont roversy remains t hough over whet her it is possi ble or even 
desirable to dichotomise between management and policy (Martin 1989, 7), 
and the precise role of the area health boards in this matter is still 
uncert ain. In respect of staff appointments, the board members may only be 
responsible for appointing the general manager who then takes on the 
responsiblity for all staffing positions. Provision also exists for the 
central government to appoint a, still to be decided, number of members to 
each area health board and so these bodies will no longer comprise solely 
elected members. Democratic representation by election from the 
community is therefore to be reduced in favour of bureaucratic management 
by ntment, a move that has mainly been justified on the grounds of 
incr complexity of hospital management and the need for specialised 
ise. 
This tendency may be count ered to some ext ent by members of area 
heal th boards receiving an enhanced payment under the new em in the 
hope that a broader cross section of the community will be encouraged to 
st and for office. In this case at least the quality, if not the quantity, 
of democratic representation will be increased. 
subsequent chapter, the tendency under the original 
As wi 11 be seen in a 
em was for members 
to belong to those social groupings which did not have to engage in full 
time wage labour, and therefore the boards had only limited community 
represent at ion. Regardless of the degree of democratisation, the 
ive roles of government, elected hospital/area health boards and the 
public has been summarised by Martin (1989, 8) as follows: 
5.3.2 
a board is the agent of its at"sa population; it has a 
mandate ~o do whatsoever it believes necssary to meet the health 
needs of its areaj and it is accountable to its area electorate. 
the Minister is the 'banker' and by statute the' regulator' of 
the Board's behaviour and is accountable to the New Zealand 
electorate for his exercise of both these roles. 
Direct or Contract Provision for Services: 
In neither the hospital nor area health board structure is t or 
was there, any requirement made by central government for boards 
to provide the services they required. The responsibility of 
boards has been to see that services are provided, whether directly by 
employing staff themselves or by engaging outside contractors. 
latter option is adopted the boards have to comply with 
If the 
certain 
regulations over the letting of contracts as laid down by the Department 
of Health. Perhaps the most significant of these is that contracts should 
not be entered into for more than three years. 
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A major difference 
between hospital and area health boards is that, with the former, the 
elected members had to give approval for contracting out services. Under 
the latter, superceding st ruct ure, boards have no management funct ion cmd 
decisions on contracting out rest solely with the general manager. 
When adopting the contract option boards cease to be the employers of 
the labour force and providers of the services although they still act as 
funders of the services. If, as is usually the case, the contracting out 
is specifically to the private sector (ie private contracting) then the 
provision of the service and the labour force employed is transferred from 
the public (state) to the private (market) sector. In privatisation by 
contracting out of hospital services there are then four parties involved; 
the central government, hospital/area health boards, the labour force and 
the cont ract ors. 
Summary 
In spite of the differences between hospital and area health boards 
the overall structure of public hospital service provision in New Zealand 
may be summarised as follows. Central government, through the Department 
of Health allocates, funds to the boards and discharges to them the 
responsibility for seeing that hospital services are provided. The board 
members appoint a management t earn, or just a general manager, who in turn 
must decide either directly to employ a labour force to provide hospital 
services to the public, or else to engage contractors to do so. The 
taxation paid by the public to the central government gives the necessary 
funding for the service provision and the election of the board members is 
intended to ensure the public's democratic representation (figure 5.2). 
As contracting out for service provision in public hospitals has been 
most ly for ancillary services, a closer study is merited on the ways in 
which these services are administered. 
5.4 Public Hospital Ancillary Services: 
5.4. 1 The Classification of Ancillary Services: 
There are few clearly defined divisions amongst hospital services in 
New Zealand and nowhere is the term 'ancillary' given precise definition in 
this context. The usual dictionary definition of the term is 'subordinate, 
subservient and auxiliary' and in terms of hospital services it usually 
refers to services that provide 'support' to the primary function of 
hospitals - that of treating patients. Sometimes called, A Forgotten 
Sector (Smith 1969), ancillary services have not historically attracted 
much media or academic attention except in more recent times in the 
context of industrial disputes. 
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Figure 5.2 The Financing and Administration of the New Zealand Public Hospitals 
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One of the major sources of statistical information on New Zealand 
public hospital is Hospital Management Data which was published annually by 
the Department of Health's, National Health Statistics Centre between 1975 
and 19882 • In this publication, hospital services were classified under 
six main headings; general treatment, diagnostic, hotel, engineering and 
maintenance, administration, and community. The first category comprises 
medical, nursing and para-medical physiotherapy, pharmacy, psychology) 
services while the second covers pathology and X-ray services. The term 
ancillary has generally been applied to what Hospital Management Data 
calls' hotel' services, although sometimes, engineering, maintenance and 
administration may also be included under the term. 
The word ancillary, support or hotel may then be taken as simply 
di fferent labels for the same group of services. There is however a 
further subdivision of this group in Hospital Management Data into that 
of housekeeping, laundry and diet ary services. Th~ latter two are capable 
of reasonably clear distinctiqn and are complete services in themselves. 
Housekeeping however has been presented as a generic term to cover a 
variety of unspecified services which do not fall within the scope of the 
other two. The task of identifying precisely the services that comprise 
housekeeping has been made difficult as the Department of Health has not 
provided any clear guidelines to boards on this matter. There has 
therefore been much scope for discretion on the part of individual boards 
in recording data on these services. The identification of these services 
remains a crucial issue here, for by far the majority of ancillary services 
that have been contracted out are included under this classification. 
Empirical research with hospit al boards has revealed that the maj or 
components of housekeeping, in terms of costs and personnel employed, are 
that of domestic cleaning and orderly or portering services. The term 
'domestic' has often been prefixed to 'cleaning' in boards' correspondence 
with contractors in order to distinguish it from other more minor or 
alised housekeeping services like window cleaning and vermin control. 
Somet imes boards just refer t a their domest ic services in which orderly 
serv:ices may, or may not, be included. Nevertheless, orderly services in 
terms of employment classification have always been quite distinct from 
that of domestic cleaning even if there has sometimes been an overlap of 
duties. For the purposes of this work, housekeeping services are taken to 
refer to both domestic and orderly services and, where laundry and dietary 
services are also being referred to the term ancillary is used. In short: 
ancillary/support/hotel = housekeeping + dietary + laundry 
= domestic + orderly + dietary + laundry 
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5.4.2 The Provision of Hospital Ancillary Services: 
The provision of most hospital services, including the ancillary ones, 
has usually taken place at two ial scales; the regional and the local. 
At the former scale is the central administrative apparatus for all 
hospitals (173 in 1988) and institutions within the 29 regions (districts) 
covered by each board. 
hospitals with their 
The local scale is founded on the individual 
on site institutional administration in which 
managerial authority is devolved down to the workforce at the point of 
service product ion. Within each board there has existed different levels 
of management with the number of levels depending very much upon the 
size of the board. In what follows a typical structure is detailed and it 
should be realised that no two boards have ever been identical in their 
management stuctures. 
With the hospital board structure, as it existed prior to 1989, 
. 
ancillary services, for the most part, were administered under the ultimate 
responsibility of a board's chief executive, This generally applied to 
domestic, orderly and laundry services. From what has generally been seen 
as their close connection with patient treatment, dietary departments 
have come under the medical superintendent of each board. Beneath both of 
these top positions came the respective deputies together with various 
other senior management staff such as the director of finance and the chief 
engineer. 
At the next level of administration were a number of executive 
officers who each had responsibility for service provision in their 
respective sectors for all hospitals and institutions within the board's 
district. For the ancillary services, overall management has usually been 
divided between the board's supplies officer who has covered domestic and 
orderly staff and the chief dietitian for the kitchen staff. In general 
then the central or regional administration has comprised three levels of 
managerial hierarchy: the chief executive, the deputy and the executive 
officers heading the various services. Similar levels of management 
existed on the medical side. 
, Below this level of administration, managerial authority has been 
spatially, as well as socially <ie hierarically), diffused to the various 
localised hospitals, where proviSion for housekeeping and dietary services 
became the responsibility of a hospital manager and head dietitian 
respectively. Intervening between these positions and the labour force 
have been various departmental heads and supervisors each having 
successively decreasing levels of authority. This basic form of 
managerial structure would have been replicated at all hospitals within 
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each board. 
Although the system just described is largely hypothetical it has 
nevertheless been more applicable to the larger boards, since in many of 
the smaller ones the management positions identified have often been 
combined. For example, the supplies officer's and hospital manager's 
responsibilities were in some cases assumed by the chief executive 
alone. In this case there would have been no cent ral or regional 
administration as such since the board may only have comprised one 
hospital and the entire management structure was located within it. 
Nevertheless the socio-spatial context of ancillary service provision in 
New Zealand public hospitals can be presented in terms of a general overall 
administrative structure. Starting from the central government's 
Department of Health in what may be termed' the core' (Wellington), there 
is a pyramid like diffusion of power and authority in two principal stages. 
The first is towards the regionally based hospital boards and the second is 
the continuation from there towards the locally based institutional 
administrations which govern the labour force in I the periphery' (figure 
5.3) . 
Where either housekeeping (domestic and orderly) or dietary services 
or both have been contracted out the management responsibilities from that 
of executive officers downwards were considerably reduced as some, and may 
be all, staff who would otherwise have been administered by them were 
instead employed by a contractor. If an entire service was contracted out 
there would then have been no departmental head or supervisors in the 
board's employment and the funct ions of the (local) hospital manager ·3.nd 
(regional) executive officer would also have been much reduced in this 
part icular area. In some cases a contract supervisor has been appointed 
by boards to oversee standards of service provision. This position nas 
usually been subordinate to the supplies manager and has replaced the 
administrative functions that lower levels of management had when services 
were provided by the boards. 
When contracting out has been resorted to, the main line of 
communication between board and contractor has normally been from the 
projects or supplies officer to the branch manager of the contracting firm 
concerned. As many supplies for hospitals, from food to fuel, have always 
had to be secured by contract from the private sector it has often been 
appropriate for ancillary services to be the responsibility of the same 
manager who deals with all other board contracts <figure 5.4). To 
illustrate the separate administrative structures between boards in 
respect of contracting out ancillary services it is instructive to take 
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Figure 5.3 The Social and Spatial Structure of 
New Zealand Public Hospital Service Provision 
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Figure 5.4 The Administration of Public Hospital Ancillary Services 
in New Zealand Hospital Boards: Lines of Communication 
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two specific examples: the Canterbury and the Ashburton Boards. Since 
these structures do not remain static over an extended period the year 1988 
has been selected for examination. 
5.5 The Provision of Ancillary Services in Canterbury and Ashburton 
Hos pi t al Boards: 
The Canterbury and Ashburton Hospital Boards, along with the South 
Canterbury Board were both amalgamated into the Canterbury Area Health 
Board in 1989. In the year before amalgamation each served populations of 
355,300 and 24,700 and had 3,021 and 220 beds respectively (Hospital 
Management Data 1988). Within Canterbury is the third largest urban area 
in New Zealand whose population in the 1986 census was 299,373 while, for 
the same census year, Ashburton township was only 15,229. In 1988 the 
Canterbury Board operated 19 hospi tals, nine of them wi thin the bounds of 
the Christchurch urban area, while the Ashburton Board had just two 
hospitals both located within the township itself -as shown on the maps in 
figure 5.5. 
Apart from di fferences in gross populat ion charaderist ics, the two 
spatially contiguous boards had quite different forms of ancillary service 
provision. Taking the Canterbury Board first, only domestic services were 
contracted out and then only at seven hospi t fi ve of which were in 
those of greater than 100 beds. All seven hospitals were in 
Christchurch and the other two hospitals in the urban area which had no 
contract provided services were both psychiatric insti tutions which have 
always provided their own services. 
In the Ashburton Board, although much smaller than Canterbury, 
contracting out has been much more extensive and has applied to all 
ancillary services except the laundry requirements. This latter service is 
provided directly by the boards themselves in both cases. Prior to 1989 
however the laundry service at Kaikoura Hospital, about 200km north of 
Christchurch in the Canterbury Board, was contracted out to a local firm. 
The major differences between the two board's hospitals in terms of size, 
functional classification and the extent of ancillary services 
contracted out are presented in figure 5.6. These differences in size and 
forms of service provision has meant that the bureaucratic structures for 
administration have varied consideI~ably in both cases, Each will be 
considered in turn taking Canterbury first. 
5.5. 1 
In Canterbury there has been a spli t bet ween cont ract and board 
provision for ancillary services with a different administration in each 
case. For all the board's hospitals and institutions the overall 
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Figure 5 The Location of Public Hospitals in the Canterbury 
and Ashburton Hospital Boards 
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Figure 5.6 Comparison of Contracting Out Ancillary Services in Canterbury and Ashburton Hospital Boards 
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responsi bili t Y for the service 
has rested with the projects officer. 
provision, under either arrangement, 
Beneath this position have been the 
individual hospital managers and a contract supervisor. The former has had 
responsibility for the orderly services in their respective hospitals while 
the one contract supervisor has covered all hospitals that engaged 
contractors and was required to ensure on-going quality control. 
In respect of contract provided services the administrative tasks 
related to negotiating contracts, assessing tenders and communicating with 
contractors themselves has been the responsibility of the projects officer. 
For a detailed knowledge of the day to day running of the contract, 
particularly in regard to standards of service provision, the project 
officer has drawn on advice from the contract supervisor. When any 
policy decision over contractual arrangements was required, such as a 
change of contractors or a continuation with the incumbent contractor after 
competitive tendering, the matter then had to be' referred to the deputy 
and then to the chief executive for approval before being presented to the 
elected members of the board's finance committee. This committee, 
which was one of five, would assess the proposal and, if approving of it, 
woul d forward itt 0 t he mont hl y meet ing of all board members for f ina 1 
ratification. Only after this procedure could the proposal be adopted as 
policy. The line of communication therefore went from the contract 
supervisor at the workface to the projects officer and then successively 
to the deputy chief, the chief executive, board finance committee, and 
finally the full board. 
Wi th board-provided ancillary services the administrative structure 
has varied somewhat with each individual service. In the case of 
orderlies the communication channel was from the work site supervisor to 
depart ment al head, to hospit al manager, proj ect s off i cer and then 
cont inued as wi th contract provided services. A similar gradation of 
managerial hierarchy occurred in the dietary section but under the ultimate 
direction of the medical superintendent. The administration of laundry 
services has been different if only because the service is centrally 
provided for all hospitals rather than individually (institutionally) 
provided for each one. A regional manager of linen services had the 
overall responsiblity in this area and the position was directly 
subordinated to the deputy chief executive. The hierarchical structure 
of all ancillary services' administration in Canterbury is illustrated in 
figure 5.7. 
5.5.2 Ashburton Hospital Board: 
In the case of Ashburton, there has been a far greater private sector 
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Figure 5.7 Administration of CANTERBURY and ASHBURTON Hospital Board's 
Ancillary Services and Private / Public Sector Interaction 
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presence in the provision of ancillal-y services. The task of contr-act 
supervisionl rather than being a specialised funct ion, has been part of 
the hospital manager's responsibility. The duties of this position have 
also included the overseeing of laundry services as well as other 
administrative tasks. There have been, in effect, two fewer tiers of 
administration than in Canterbury as there has been neither a projects 
officer or equivalent, nor a deputy chief executive. In Ashburton the line 
of administrative communication has been direct from the hospital manager, 
who covered both the board hospitals, to the chief executive. 
Both supervision of standards and negotiations 
in either housekeeping or dietary services, were 
with the contractors, 
conducted between the 
hospital manager and the contractor's on-site supervisor or, if necessary, 
the branch manager. Even though the dietary services were contracted 
out, the board sti1l employed a dietitian who had to ensure. from a 
clinical dietetic viewpoint, that the contractor provided a satisfactory 
service. A1l . other aspects of quality control were under the supervision 
of the hospital manager. In contrast to Canterbury. however not only was 
day to day authority devolved to a lower level (ie hospital manager rather 
than executive officer), the quality control system operated was passive 
rather than active. It relied on departmental heads reporting 
shortcomings in service provision to the hospital manager. The 
controlling function then was only exercised as and when required ins~ead 
of on a permanent basis as in Canterbury. 
In matters relating to policy changes rather than day 
supervision, such as renegotiating with or changing contractors, the 
to day 
chief 
executive assumed the responsibility. There was however reliance on the 
information and advice supplied by the hospital manager. As with 
Canterbury all proposed changes in contracting out policy had to be 
submitted to the elected part of the board. This comprised only two 
committees, one for finance, the other for buildings and works ,,.ith 
ancillary contracts being handled by the former. It was always the 
chief executive who made the final decision over which policy to recommend 
to the board's finance committee. So, for example, a proposal to change 
contractors would first have to be agreed upon by the chief executive 
following advice from the hospital manager. After this stage the chief 
executive then had to gain approval from the board in order to implement 
the proposal. In figure 5.7 above the comparative management structure 
with Canterbury is presented. 
This brief study of these two boards' administrative structures has 
attempted to show that the physical size of the hospital board as an 
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institution can be an important factor in influencing the spatiality of 
service provision. The smaller the board, the more integrated is the 
central and local administration and fewer levels (tiers) of management 
are involved. By contracting out services there is also a tendency to 
reduce levels of management which in turn alters a board's administrative 
structure. But while the basic socio-spatial structure of public hospital 
administration has remained fairly constant over the years, the 
geographical pattern of contracting out ancillary services has been 
anything but constant. It is toe detail the uneven development of 
contracting out these services across all New Zealand hospital boards that 
attention focuses upon in the next chapter. 
Conc 1 usi on: 
After establishing the rationale for undertaking an empirical study of 
publ ic hospital services, this chapter has shown tb-~tthe bureaucratic 
(appointee!) ami democratic <elected) structures for administering these 
< 
services have existed at three, principal spatial scales; the national, the 
and the local. The first is the central government's Department 
of Health, the second the 29 hospital boards and third the individual 
hospitals and institutions. The provision of ancillary services has been 
predominantly at the local institutional scale with the exception of 
laundry which is regionally provided. As the comparative case study has 
shown, contracting out can exhibit regional variations in both its spatial 
and sectoral extent. Certain ancillary services may be contracted out in 
one board and not in another, while the same service may be contracted out 
at a different number of institutions across any two boards. 
Yet notwithstanding this spatial dissimilarity in contracting out 
policy, all boards and their constitutive institutions operate within the 
same national framework governed by the same legislature. The 1956 
Hospitals Act and 1983 Area Health Boards Act, both of which have had major 
effects on hospital administ rat ion, have st ill engendered signi ficant 
differences between boards in respect of their provision of ancillary 
services. Although just two specific examples of boards have been 
presented here similar observations could equally have been extended 
to cover all the other 27 hospital boards that existed until 1989. To this 
end the following chapters examine contracting out in a broader context 
both spat ially and socially 
present ed here. 
Footnotes; 
than the necessarily rather static account 
1 HMOs (Health Maintenance Organisations) were established in the 1960s 
in the USA and encouraged by the federal government as a way of reducing 
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health care costs. They are private organisations which charge a set 
annual fee to all their patients regardless of treatment required. The 
treatment is provided through the HMO contracting with which ever hospital 
or medical practitioner can provide the most economical service, with the 
emphasis being on minimising the duration of hospitalisation. 
2 The publicat ion has been discont inued since 1988. At present the 
collation of all data relating to public hospital services is under review. 
No other publication has yet superceded Hospital Management Data. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Geographical Basis of Contract Service Provision 
for Public Hospital Ancillarv Services 
This chapter has two main ect i ves. The first i:3 to detail the 
overall historical devel of contracting out public hospital ancillary 
services, giving specific attention to the geographical basis of the 
process. The second objective is to start analysing the particular 
spat ial pat terns observed in the first, part with a view to ing 
explanations in terms of the theoretical frameworks established in 
chapters two and three. By developing further some of the material 
presented in the previous chapter, the analysis focuses on onal 
variations in the sational characteristics of the different hospital 
boards and their respective ancillary services. in the broader 
socio-economic and political environment in which hospital boards have had 
to operate and the e affect on contrac~ing out services are 
discussed in chapters. 
The first four sections this chapter outl in ial order, 
the development of cont ract ing out ancillary towards 
more competitive tendering for contracts, the different scales of private 
capi tal involved and alterations in the observed 
over t he last two decades. These four sections t 
cal pat terns 
her provide the 
foundat ion upon which to procede wi th an analysi::; of the process of 
A start in this direction is made in the three 
sect ions which examine the organisat ional,c1,iJL§rences bet ween t he services 
contracted out, the size of the institutions in which t are contracted 
out and finally some locational aspects of the institutions themselves. 
6. 1 An Overview of the Growth of Contract Service Provision 
6. 1. 1 
The historical origins of contracting out public hospital ancillary 
services in New Zealand extend back to the early 1940s when the process 
first developed in response to the critical labour shortage brought about 
by Wor ld War Two. The significance of national and regional labour 
shortages to the development of contracting out will be investigated 
thoroughly in the next chapter, but for the purposes it may simply 
be noted that reference material detailing the geographical growth of the 
contracting out process over' time is very sparse. Fort unat ely, field 
research has revealed a preserved copy of a let t er from the Commercial 
Cleaners Company to the Secretary of the Wairarapa Hospital Board in 
September 1948 which has listed the public tals at which the company 
had contracts at the time. The hospitals concerned and their respective 
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localities are listed in figure 6.1. Their cartographic representation 
for the year 1950 is shown in figure 6.2 when it seems that only Wairau 
Hospital <Blenheim) in the Marlborough Hospital Board had commenced with 
contracting out in addition to those listed in 1948. 
FIGURE 6.1: New Zealand Public Hospitals Contracting Out Domestic Services. 
Source: 
September 1948. 
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Board 
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Letter from the Commercial Cleaners Company Ltd to Waipawa 
Hospital Board, 14th September 1948. 
No record or indication was found of any other company holding 
contracts for domestic or orderly services in New Zealand public 
hospi tals 1 , This could most likely be explained on the grounds that as 
this company was, and still is, by far the lal'gest operator in the market 
for these services, no other would have had sufficient resources and 
expertise at its di to provide the services to the institutions 
concerned. It is believed therefore that this list gives a comprehensive 
statement of the extent of private contracting of these services in 1948. 
The next list of public hospitals served by private contractors does 
not appear until 1962 where it is contained in a letter to the Wairarapa 
Hospi tal Board as part of a proposal to take over their cleaning and 
orderly services. As in 1948 the same company, Commercial Cleaners Ltd., 
was involved but in 1960 its name changed to that of Crothalls Hospital 
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Source: compiled from information supplied by New Zealand Hospital Boards 
Sel-vices. By this stage it is possible that other contractors may have 
been involved at some hospitals but even from the incomplete records that 
exist on the subject all the available evidence indicates that those 
boards which had no Crothalls' contracts also had none with any othel' 
company. 
The geographical extent of private contracting in 1960 (figure 6.2) 
has been estimated from the 1962 list. Regrettably both board and company 
records are too incomplete to detail the spatial pattern of 
contracting out for any particular year in the 19508. Nevertheless the 
informat ion that was available showed no extension of cant ract ing out 
between 1960 and 1962 and therefore cartographic presentation can reliably 
be given for 1960. This provides a decade of comparison with 1950. One 
noteworthy feature from the maps is that as well as a spatial development 
in the process since 1950 there had also been a sectoral one, as by 1960 
orderly services were also contracted out in several hospital boards. 
After 1960, lists of contracts held by Crothalls Ltd. no longer 
present a comprehensive overview of the situation as other competing 
companies started to enter the market during the late 1960s, even if only 
briefly. The situation however can be clarified as there is a better 
supply of hospital board records than previously. These records 
cornprised mainly the minut es of board meet ings and correspondence between 
boards and cont ractors. The thi rd map in figure 6.2 is const ructed 
largely from these records and shows the contracting out situation in 
1970. The geographical growth of this form of privatisation over its first 
20 yeal'S is detailed in the three maps of figure 6.2 while table 6.1 
identifies the particular time periods during which various boards started 
to contract out. 
During the 19608 private sector contracts for dietary services were 
introduced, with the Vincent and Maniototo Boards being the first in New 
Zealand to adopt this form of provision. There was a slight expansion in 
contracting out activities into dietary services at the end of the 1 
although it has not been possible to determine precisely the in which 
this occurred. 
concerned, with 
Ashburton, Bay of Plenty and West Coast were the Boards 
the latter being formed from an amalgamation of four 
smaller Boards in 1970; Buller, Inangahua, Grey, and Westland. 
Cartographic comparison of levels of contracting out between boards is 
unfortunately complicated by there being variations in the process within 
the boards themselves as was shown with Cantet-bury and Ashbudon in the 
previous chapter. However the research undertaken points strongly to the 
largest genera1:;;:: hospital of each board being the first to contract out 
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TABLE 6. 1: Time Periods in which Hospital Boards commenced Contracting Out 
Hospital 
Boards 
Wellington 
North Canterbury 
Waikato 
Otago 
Southland 
Palmerston North 
Wanganui 
South Canterbury 
Taranaki 
Hawera 
Marlborough 
Northland 
Tauranga 
Bay of Plenty 
Ashburton 
Grey 
Taumarunui 
Dannevirke 
Buller 
Opotiki 
Patea 
Inangahua 
Wairarapa 
Waitaki 
Vincent 
Maniototo 
Location of 
Board Off ice 
Wellington 
Christchurch 
Hamilton 
Dunedin 
Invercargill 
Palmerston North 
Wanganui 
Timaru 
New Plymouth 
Hawera 
Blenheim 
Whangarei 
Tauranga 
Whakatane 
Ashburton 
Greymouth 
Taumarunui 
Dannevirke 
Westport 
Opotiki 
Patea 
Reefton 
Masterton 
Oamaru 
Clyde 
Ranfurly 
- 1950 
Mean 
Population 
31st March 1950 
220,330 
212,950 
156,470 
110,460 
78, 110 
72, 180 
55, 140 
46,870 
43,900 
20,440 
19, 180 
1950 - 1960 
31st March 1960 
88,690 
39,230 
28, 120 
23,070 
16, 910 
15,470 
13,970 
10, 220 
7,950 
7,090 
3, 330 
31st March 
45,480 
23,350 
8,680 
2,810 
1970 
Total Beds 
31st March 1950 
2,030 
1,001 
934 
598 
575 
528 
416 
378 
295 
126 
224 
31st March 1960 
623 
260 
137 
210 
177 
129 
148 
102 
75 
57 
59 
31st March 
350 
210 
86 
62 
1970 
Dat a Source: Department of Health Records and Hospital Board Records. 
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services, If this hospital did not contract out neither did any at her. 
as in f 6.2, the following For cartographic representation, 
dist inguishing criteria has been adopt ed f or a board to be shown a·s a 
cont ract ing board. As i! minimum, ei ther the cleaning services at the 
main hospital are contracted out or there is a continuous expansion 
over time in the contract service towards total coverage of the hospital, 
Following this second point it should be stressed that, in the 
larger hospitals at least, contracting out generally developed in a gradual 
manner rather than there being a sudden transference from board to private 
provision, Records indicate, but do not unequivocally confirm, that whi Ie 
contract cleaning first started in 1948 in the Southland, Wellington, and 
Otago tal it was not until the late 19605 that the main 
hospitals in these boards adopted full contracts. The case of the Auckland 
Hospital Board however is even more complex to determine . 
. 
Apart from the eal-ly brief period of contracting out referred to 
above, the Board seems to have maintained most of its domestic cleaning 
services in-house until 1981 when full contracts were let at Auckland 
Hospital. Exist records only extend back to 1972 and, according to the 
Auckland management, II Prior to August 1981, the housekeeping services at 
Auckland Hospital were shared between Board staff (85%) and a commercial 
cleaning contractor (15%)" (Management Report to Auckland Hospital Board, 
30th November 1987), Just when this 15% contract commenced has not been 
possible to trace although it was certainly before 1972. Because there 
was no continuous growth in contracting out over the years prior to 1981, 
this Board has not then been shown on any of the maps as having contracted 
out services prim- to 1981. Other boards seem to have had a less obscure 
history of contract out as the policy has progressed fairly uniformly 
over time to the state of having their full service contracted out. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, contracting out expanded fairly 
unif ormly. It init ially cent red on hospital boards covering maj or urban 
areas, with Auckland being the exception, and proceeded to develop in some 
of the more peripheral areas of New Zealand. Similarly, within many of the 
hospital boards, the contracting out process appears to have developed 
from the urban core out to the rural periphery as the general 
hospitals contracted out first, followed later by the smaller 
ones. Aftel- the mid 1970s a more complex geographical pattern started to 
emerge and this is discussed in the next section. 
6. 1. 2 Hospital Boards' Cont ract ing Out Policie~ since 1970: 
Changes by hospital boards to the contract ing out of anciL.ary 
services from the mid 1970s onwards are illustrated cartographically in 
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figure 6.3. The four maps are constructed in five year intervals from 
1975 to 1990 and much of the information upon which they are compiled has 
been collated from enquiries to each individual hospital board concerning 
services provided by contractors. As the time period under consideration 
here only extends from around 1970 many of the difficulties encountered 
for detailing the period 1950-1970 do not arise. The hospital boards and 
their respective district boundaries shown in the map for 1990 had ceased 
to exist by mid 1989 with the change to area health boards (see chapter 5, 
figure 5.1). . In spite of this there has still been a continuity in the 
spatial pattern of contracting out into 1990. So while administratively 
the final map is anachronistic it nonetheless gives an accurate 
presentation of the process. 
Remaining hospital records indicate that the last board to contract 
out its ancillary services prior to 1979 was Waitaki in 1965. Between 1965 
and 1979 the only further contracting out was a slight expansion in the 
existing activities of some hospital boards such as with the above detailed 
dietary sel'vices. At least two examples exist. In 1973 the Waikato 
Board, which had used contl~actors since the late 1940s at its majOl~ 
institution (Waikato Hospital, Hamilton), proceeded to contract out its 
domest ic services at Taupo, Morrinsville and Te Awamut u Hospitals. 
Similarly, in 1973 , the Wairarapa Board, extended the policy to cover the 
services at Pahiatua Hospital. Prior to this private contract provision 
had existed for domestic and orderly services since the early 1960s only at 
Masterton and Grey town tals. 
The following year (1974) saw the beginnings of the opposite process 
to contracting out in the New Zealand public hospitals. The Otago Board 
decided to revert to providing its own services while two years later in 
1976, the Waitaki Board took over the employment of its own domestic and 
orderly staff although it still retained the incumbent contractor to 
manage the services. From that time on a 'management only' contract 
existed as distinct from a 'full' contract~. 
Some ficant changes in contracting out policies took place 
between 1979 and 1983. In 1979 the Wanganui, Palmerston North and 
Wairarapa all spatially contiguous, ceased contracting out their 
services although the latter implemented a • management only' contract for 
its dietary services. During the same year the Thames Hospital Board 
started contracting out for its domestic and orderly services for the first 
time. A year later Hawkes Bay and Maniototo each changed their contracting 
out policies but in opposing directions. The latter terminated the process 
just as the former commenced it. Around the same time the West Coast Board 
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Source: compiled from information supplied by New Zealand Boards 
whi c h had been us i ng private contractors for its dietary services since 
the late 1960s reverted to in-house provision for this service. Going in 
the other direction, Auckland and Otago started contracting out their 
domestic services, or rather restarted in the latter case, in 1981 and 1982 
respect ively. Waitaki also restarted in 1982, after e~periencing a 
management only contract since 1976, while in the following year South 
Otago contracted out all its ancillary services for the first time. 
Further developments in the growth of contracting out since 1983 have 
been confined to boards which had already been contracting out at least 
some of their services. Dietary services were contracted out in Southland 
and Thames in that year, followed by Northland in 1985. During the time 
in which these developments occurred some other boards were reverting back 
to in-house provision. The West Coast Board progressively reduced the 
number of contracts at its various institutions throughout the 1980s until 
at the end of the decade there was contract provision only at the Board's 
one maj or hospit al in Greymout,h. In 1986 Dannevirke finished with all its 
contracts as did Auckland in 1988 and Northland also terminated its 
dietary contract in that same year. 
In view of the numerous changes that have occurr and the two 
opposing directions that they have taken, it has been exceedingly hard to 
present an analytical classification of contracting out policies between 
hospit al boards since 1970. An attempt at classification is made in 
figure 6.4 whel-e change:::> to contracting out are grouped into a sectoral 
and a dimension. In the former case, the process has been 
classified into four categories starting from there being no services at 
all under contract and extending progressively to all services. It is 
noteworthy that domestic cleaning invariably represents the first level 
of contracting out, followed by a combination of cl 
services and finally these two combined together with 
and orderly 
the dietary 
services. Interestingly no other variation on this arrangement has been 
found to exist. 
Laundry services have only been contracted out to the ivate sector 
in very isolated instances and are not detailed on the maps. In the 
Canterbury Board the laundry at Kaikoura Hospital, about 200km north of 
Christ church, was processed 
which time the Board itself 
of long standing personnel, 
laundry service for Buller 
by a local private firm until 
took over the service, Based 
it is believed that during 
Hospital (West may have 
out. No documented cor.firmation of this has been found and 
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on the memories 
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certainly by 
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Figure 6.4 Classification of New Zealand Hospital Boards' Contracting Out Policies 
for Cleaning, Orderly and Dietary Services since 1970 
(1) 
Continuous 
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Provision 
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Cleaning 
Services 
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(3) 
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j I 
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Auckland 1 (1981) 
Olago2 (1982) 
Hawkes Bay (1980) 
Wai taki3 (1982) 
Thames (1979) 
South Otago (1983) 
I 1 ======~========= ----------1 ------~---------T----------' I ' I r---------------~ I I 
Transferred from ! ! 
C ! ' ontract to j j
In - house ! I (with year of transfer) I 
Palmerston N. (1979)- - - - - -II l 
Wairarapa (1979) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
Wanganui (1979) - - - - - -1- - - - - - - - - -
Dannevirke (1986) -------'----------
Maniototo (1980) -- - - - -1- -- -- -- --- - - -- - - - - --I 
Iii
Continuous J I I Contract Provision I 
since 1970 I 
Canterbury - - - - - - --
Waikato - - - - - - - - ~ 
Wellington - - - - - - --
S. Canterbury - - - - - - - -
Taranaki --------
Taumarunul - - - - - - - - -------·1985 - date ----------
Marlborough - - - - - - - - -------·1985 - date ----------1 I 
Tauranga - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -I I 
West Coast - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------1969 - 1980 ---------
Southland - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------1983 - date ____ DO_DO. 
Northland - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------1985 -1988---------
~~hbo~~~nty = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =~~~ ~70 .::...date--.:-~-~-~ 
Vincent - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
1) Auckland had reverted to in house provision in all its institutions by June 1988. 
2) Apart from at one small hospital, Otago had no contract provision for cleaning services, 1974 and 1982. 
3) Waitaki had contract provision for cleaning and orderly services until 1976 and a 'management only" 
contract between then and 1982. 
Source: compiled from information supplied by New Zealand Hospital Boards 
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the mid 1970s, and ever since, the service has been provided by the Bosrd 
itself. Apart from this the Dannevirke, Marlborough, Maniototo, and 
Vincent Hospital Boards had their laundry processed by larger adjacent 
boards (Palmerston North, Nelson and Otago respectively) but there is no 
contracting out to the private sector. 
Within the context of contracting out policy, a fourfold 
classification can also be determined. This again starts with those boards 
that have never, hitherto at least, contracted out any of their ancillary 
services; Waiapu, Cook, Central Hawkes Bay and Nelson. The next two 
categories comprise the boards which have pursued opposing policies. Since 
1970 six different boards have either commenced or terminated the process 
with half of them having experimented with both contract <private) and 
board (public) provision during this time. The remaining 14 of the 29 
hospital boards have continued throughout the two decades to maintain a 
consistent contracting out policy and changes have come in the form of 
alterations to the existing contractual arrangements rather than a complete 
change of policy. 
The immediate task is to explain the uneven privatisation in terms of 
these sectoral and policy dimensions identified in figure 6.4. A temporal 
dimension must also be added to the debate by considering why these changes 
in contracting out policies took place during the time period under 
consideration, and why particularly so many between 1979 and 1983. Before 
proceeding further in this direction it is important to consider a further 
development in the process. During the 1970s, but particularly in the 
latter years of the decade, there was also a very important change in 
the method of contracting out. Where contracting out existed, or was 
resorted to, a process of competitive tendering often developed. 
6.2 Contracting Out in the 
Prior to the 1970s, 
renegotiated or "rolled 
generally Crothalls Ltd. 
contracts for ancillary services had usually been 
over" periodically with the same contractor, 
(Commercial Cleaners Company). During the 1950s 
and 1960s contracts were usually drawn up on a cost plus basis using, what 
was generally termed, a standard labour schedule. Each hospital had a 
schedule of work to be done at a given frequency and a set number of hours 
were allocated to each job. The total hours represented the standard 
labour hours for which the boards paid the contractors a contract price. 
This form of contract seemed to work satisfactorily for several years. 
According to one hospital secretary in a letter of reference in early 1961 
to a UK hospital authority on the issue of contracting out: 
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The contract which my Board operates is based on standard work 
schedules costed at standard values which become the ceiling 
price. Any saving [by the contractor] on standard costs is 
returned to the Board and there is a measure of profit sharing. 
This form of contract has evolved through experiment over the 
years and is proving eminent ly sat isfactory (Let ter from 
Canterbury Hospital Board to Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, 12th 
January 1961). 
Under this arrangement all the costs involved were passed on to the 
board and the contractor was allowed a defined profi t margin. There was 
not then any competitive pressure from the market for lower levels of 
profits and therefore reduced costs to the boards, Moreover, al though 
there was 'a measure of profit sharing', boards eventually found that in 
practice they shared in very little of the contractor's profit, 
to the Wairarapa Board: 
According 
Crothall Industries Ltd. can also make additional profi t out of 
employing less people than are shown on the ?chedule of duties. 
As there is no profit increase from increased production, the 
only way to increase the profi t mal~gin is to drop the staffing 
numbers while maintaining the same weekly charge to the Board 
(internal memorandum, 11th September 1978). 
Many boards came to realise that this method of contracting out was 
not a worthwhi Ie investment. The choice facing the boards was either to 
revert to labour directly employed in-house or to change the conditions 
under which the cont racts were let. Where the former opt i on was not 
resort ed to, there was instead a substantial change in contracting out 
policy to one of competitive tendering. 
When contracts were tendered out on a competitive basis, it was found 
that only the quantity and quality of services required needed to 
speci fied, The amount of capital, labour and profit margin 
be 
the 
contractor requires is then a matter of indifference to the hospital board 
and hence the cost plus element is eliminated. 
hospital authority: 
In t he words of 
With the competitive system, it should follow that all factors 
are considered [by the contractor] before a quote is made. 
Therefore, the method each firm uses to arrive at a figure is a 
matter for their concern and is of no relevance to the Board. 
Because of this, the only information needed relates to labour 
and materials' costs, plus the pricing structure, so that these 
can be used as a basis for comparison for tender evaluation and 
when request s for price increases are recei ved <Hospital Board 
internal communication; 1981). 
one 
The rationale behind this policy innovation was that contractors would be 
obliged to minimise all expenditure in order to remain competitive, and the 
economies gained thereby would be passed on to the hospital boards in terms 
of lower contract prices. 
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In the cases where contracting out ceased altogether, this invariably 
followed a process of tendering out for contracts, whereupon it was found 
that the hospital board itself could provide the service itself more 
economically than could any outside contractor. Under these circumstances, 
competitive tendering did not lead to, or sustain, contracting out. Only 
very rarely in New Zealand has the process of in-house tendering been 
attempted, whereby tenders are submitted from individual institutional 
managers to the hospit al board along with those of outside contractors. 
Instead the procedure seems to have been that on receiving outside tenders 
they have been assessed in comparison to what the board's management have 
estimated they could provide the service for themselves. Their 
recommendation as to the most sui table form of prOVision has then been 
placed before the elected board members for approval. 
The change from contracting out by negotiation to that of competitive 
tendering has still not been universal across all Doards. Some have been 
regularly tendering out their contracts for ancillary services since the 
19608 while others still find that the optimal arrangement is a negotiated 
contract using a standard labour schedule. As many, if not most, boards 
have periodically changed between having tendered and negotiated contracts, 
it has not been possible to make a definitive spatial or temporal 
distinction between the two categorises. 
Instead of, and sometimes as well as, these changes in the form of 
contracting out, most boards have been able to make financial savings by 
insisting on the contractors reducing their prices. This has been 
achieved primarily through stipulating reduced service requirements in the 
tender documents provided by boards to incumbent 
contractors. 
and prospect i ve 
As far back as the late 1960s the the Department of Health was urging 
boards to adopt a policy of competitive tendering by claiming that, " .... it 
has become apparent that with the number of firms now tendering for 
cleaning contracts, tender prices have become very competitive" <Health 
Department Circular, 7th November 1969), From the lat e 1970s onwards, 
the government made further efforts to persuade boards to adopt a 
competitive strategy in service provision. Circular letters from the 
Department of Health were issued to each hospital board chief executive 
advocating this policy. One such circular issued in 1981 stated that: 
It has come to the department's attention that not all boards for 
which cleaning is done under contract are calling competitive 
tenders for the work. The purpose of this circular letter, 
therefore, is to advise that no cleaning contract should be 
entered into without the prior calling and consideration of 
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competitive tenders (Health Department Circular, 6th April 1981). 
A further circular in 1983 was even more emphatic ng that, "Indeed 
regarding the use of taxpayers money, it would be invit cri ticism from 
suppliers and contractors if tenders were not called on the widest basis 
feasible" <Health Department Circular, 21st October 1983). 
During the 1970s, but particularly the 1980s, the proviSion of public 
tal ancillary services was not simply an issue of whether this was to 
be in-house or by private contract. Even more important has been how the 
latter form of provision was to be implemented; whether by negotiation with 
a single contractor or through a competitive tender. An important factor 
in predisposing a hospital board towards contracting out a service has been 
the supply of private contractors since this critically affects the 
viability of competitive tendering. It is to a discussion of the growth of 
contractors that attention turns in the next section. 
The development of cont ract ing out public 
can be grouped into four main time periods. 
al ancillary services 
Prior to around 1970 the 
process developed fairly progressively starting with the boards covering 
major urban centres. By comparison the 19706 marked a period of relative 
stagnation but at the end of the decade and until the mid 1980s, the 
process developed in three different directions. First, some boards 
terminated their contracts and reverted to providing their own services. 
Second, a few other boards, which had hitherto provided their own services, 
adopted the cont ract opt ion. Finally in many boards, where cont ract ing out 
either already existed or had just been adopt t he form of the process 
changed from being one of periodic negotiation with the incumbent 
contractor to that of competitive tendering. The fourth time period lasted 
from around the mid 1980s to date and has been marked again by st ion 
and even a slight decline in contract provision. 
Viewed sectorally the process first commenced with domestic cleaning 
services and then expanded progressively into the orderly and dietary 
sectors. Throughout the entire history of contracting out, cleaning has 
had. the widest geographical extent of privatisation followed by orderlies 
and then dietary services. With only a very few exceptions, laundry 
services have not been contracted out at all in New Zealand public 
hospi tals. 
6.4- The Market for Contract Service Provision: 
The operations of the contract cl industry in New Zealand have 
been detailed by Brosnan and Wilkinson (1989) and therefore only a brief 
account will be provided here with specific reference to the proviSion of 
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hospital ancillary services. The virtual monopoly position of Crothalls 
changed in the 1970s when a long established Wellington based firm 
called the Vacuum Cleaning Company acquired contracts for domestic services 
at the Waikato, Palmerston North, Wellington, West Coast, South Canterbury 
and Ot ago Boards. During the decade these two companies had a virt ual 
duopoly in the market. Although other companies existed, their market 
minimal. Even share for public hospital services appears to have been 
compared to Crothalls, which by the 1970s had become a multinational 
company, although still New Zealand based, Vacuum seems to have had only a 
very small share of the market at anyone time. 
To the extent that remaining records reveal, the only other companies 
to hold contracts in New Zealand public hospitals in the 1970s were two 
Auckland firms each of which had various branches throughout the countrYi 
Lloyds Cleaning Services and United Cleaning Services. The former held 
contracts with the Taranaki Board from 1975 to 1982, Palmerston North from 
1970 to 1974 and Bay of Plenty until 1976 although in this latter case it 
has not been possible to ascertain the year of commencement. United held 
the contract for the very small part of Auckland Hospital that was cleaned 
under contract upto 1978 although again time of commencement is unknown. 
Both Lloyd and Vacuum were taken over by Crothalls, in 1982 and 1984 
respectively, and while United still exists to date it has not provided any 
hospital services since 1978. The 1980s saw more companies gaining 
hospital contracts although Crothalls still dominated the market thl'ough 
its acquisition of competitors and expansion of activities beyond its 
original base in contract cleaning. In 1977 a holding company, Command 
Services Corporation Ltd., was formed (in New Zealand) to take all the 
Crothall companies under its umbrella, while Brosnan and Wilkinson (1989, 
84) observe that since then the company has expanded into such activities 
as: 
building maintenance (Crothall Property Services), private 
hospi tal management (Comprehensi ve Aust ralasian Ret irement 
Enterprises, Health Care Management Consultants), security 
(Securit as), alarm syst ems (Monit or Cont rols) communi cat ion 
services (Seekers), catering and vending (Huntsbury Food 
Sel'vices, Advanced Food Systems and Synergetic systems). 
The founding in 1979 of a subsidiary company, called Advanced Food 
Services, led to specialisation in the provision of food services for 
hospitals and other public and private institutions. 
During the same year however an Australian based firm called 
Ber'keley!: entered New Zealand and over the following years succes:;fully 
competed with Crothalls to gain contracts with the Northland, Taranaki, 
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West Coast, Canterbury, Waitaki and Southland Hospital Boards. Small scale 
(ie local) capital also existed. A Wellington based firm called Newco 
acquired the domestic and orderly contract at Grey Hospital in the West 
Coast Board from 1980 to 1983 at which time this company was also taken 
over by Crothalls. After the existence of another virtual duopoly, this 
time between Crothalls and Berkeleys lasting from around 1984 to 1989, the 
latter became merged with the former and a new company was formed as a 
result of some major corporate 'restructuring'. 
A holding company called Command Services was established in 1977 to 
take all the Crothalls companies under its control. In 1980 Command 
Services, was acquired by UK based Pritchard Service Company which it sel f 
merged with the Hawley Group in 1986. According to company literature, 
this made Command part of a company with a turnover in 1986 of 
approximately fl,OOOm sterling and over 100,000 staff working from 500 
service centres, princi ly in the UK, United States and Australasia 
(writ ten communicat ion to Minist er of Health, 11th November 1986), More 
recently still Hawleys acquired, and changed their name to an American 
company called ADT4, which also owned Berkeleys. The New Zealand branch of 
ADT, formerly Crothalls, became ADT Services (New Zealand) in 198.'3 and 
restructured into two companies, Crothall Property Maintenance and United 
Heal th Serv (Brosnan and Wilkinson 1989, 84). So all prexisting public 
hospital contracts under either Crothalls or Berkeleys became provided 
under the name of United Health Servo An idea of the activities of these 
two related companies can be gained by examining the extensive 1 ist of 
services they advertise in the telephone directory (f 6.5), 
During 1988 a Swedish based multinational called Electrolux finally 
gained contracts in the Taranaki and Canterbury Boards after several years 
of unsuccessful tendering for hospital services throughout New Zealand. 
Another competitor to emerge in this field in 1988 was a former Government 
Department known as the Internal Affairs Service Division which, for many 
years, had provided cleaning and maintenance services to government 
buildings such as Parliament House, Treasury and the Justice Department. 
Moves by the Government to corporatise and commercialise the state sector 
in 1987 resulted in the Service Division having to operate as a private 
company although, at the time of writing, the legal status of the 
enterprise is still uncertain. Nevertheless since April 1988 the company 
has been able to tender for contracts in both the public and private sector 
and in that same year it started to provide some of the domestic services 
for the Canterbury and Otago Boards. 
The contract provision of hospital services has always been di~ided 
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very unequally between a variet y of mult inat ional, nat ional and locally 
based companies. At present ADT (United Health Serv) and Electrolux are 
by far the largest companies although the former has the vast majority of 
public hospital contracts. At a national level, there is the Internal 
Affairs Hospital Service Division with numerous branches throughout New 
Zealand while there also exist three locally based, and individually or 
family owned, companies with public hospital contracts. Independent 
Cleaning Services of Dunedin, established in 1988 by two former Crothalls 
employees, took over all the domestic and orderly services from Crothalls 
in the Ashburton Board in that year. 
formed company called Avalon gained 
The previous year another recently 
all Crothalls contracts in the 
Wellington Board's hospitals while in the early 1980s a small, but long 
established, Christchurch firm called the Vacuum and Blue Ladder Company 
acquired a cleaning cont ract, again from Crothalls, with t he Cant erbury 
Board. 
In summary the developme~t of the maI'ket for hospital contracts has 
been one of domination by a steadily expanding company but with periodic 
entry by much smaller enterprises. Many of these new entrants have either 
lost their contracts or been taken over by the dominant company but, as 
just seen, in the last few years the wheel has been reinvented with new 
competitors coming into the market. 
(1989, 84): 
In the words of Brosnan and Wilkinson 
Despite its near monopolisation, the industry remains fiercely 
competitive. What is more, the low level of capital required for 
entry permits a substantial number of small, locally based firms 
on the periphery of the industry [which] can compete successfully 
with the major companies. 
This process of increasing size of enterprise might seem to parallel 
the growth of private hospital care as outlined in the previous chapter. 
There is, however, an important difference between the two. Whereas in 
the case of private hospitals the increasing size of capital investment 
could be largely attributed to the growing technological complexity of the 
industry, the same argument cannot hold for such a labour intensive 
industry as contract cleaning. In this latter case the expansion of the 
industry has come primarily through service diversification so that large 
contract cleaning enterprises achieve scale economies through being engaged 
in far more acivities than just cleaning as figure 6.5 demonstrates. At 
the other end of the size scale however are the very small enterprises 
whose field of operation is confined to cleaning only in a similar way that 
most small private hospitals are increasingly restricted to geriatric and 
hospice care. 
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6.5 The Changing Geography of Contr~ctinH Out since 1970: 
An examination of the maps in figure 6.3 readily reveals that 
although the spatial pattern of contracting out has been uneven across the 
years, the unevenness i tsel f has changed considerably especially since 
the early 1970s. In the southern part of the North Island, there are five 
spatially contiguous boards Wanganui, Palmerston North, Wairarapa, 
Dannevirke and Central Hawkes Bay - where there has been a progressi ve 
decrease in the extent of the process. By contrast, the far south of the 
South Island has seen the opposite occur with contracting out expanding 
its base in Otago, South Otago and Southland. 
At the other end of the country, in the Northland, Auckland and Thames 
Boards, the process grew until 1985 but has since reduced in scale. The 
central areas of both Island seem to have experienced a slightly more 
stable pattern of contracting out over the time period under consideration 
here. To provide a complete contrast with these changes there are two 
regions which have always remained free of contractors. These are the 
East Cape area of the North Island, which is covered by the Waiapu and Cook 
Hospital Boards, and the Nelson Board district. 
Possibly the most striking feature of the pattern of contracting out 
seen here is t hat within the boards covering New Zealand's maj or ur'Jan 
areas of Auckland, Hami lton (Waikat 0), Palmerston Nort h, Wellingt on, 
Christchurch (Canterbury) and Dunedin (Otago)G there has been little 
contract ing out 
the other hand, 
and in some of them, at certain times, none at all. .On 
in the boards covering the smaller towns in areas 
peripheral to the main centres contracting out appears to have taken place 
either very extensively, insofar as at least two ancillary services are 
involved, or else there is no contracting out at all. Significantly, the 
boards in the former case are much larger institutions than in the latter 
case. 
This apparent tendency to greater contracting out in smaller boards 
holds not only when size is measured in terms of board district and main 
city population for each of the census years 1976, 1981 and 1986 (table 
6.2) but, more directly. when measured by the total bed numbers each board 
provides. With the exception of Nelson prior to 1986, a figure of 1,000 
beds divides the hospital boards' contracting out policies into two. In 
all boards with more than 1,000 beds, contracting out has been, at most, 
confined to domestic services whereas below this any amount of ancillary 
services may be provided under contract. 
As already pointed out there has also been a distinct geographical 
uneveness to contracting out within many hospital boards. Where boards 
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TABLE 6.2: THE SIZE OF NEW ZEALAND HOSPITAL BOARDS 1976-1986 
1981 
BOARDS MAIN CITY/ BED BOARD l>lAIN BED BOARD MAIN BED BOARD MAIN CITY/ 
SETI'LEMENT NUMBERS POPUIA- CITY/ NUMBERS POPUL- CITY/ NUMBERS POPUIA- POPUIATION 
TION POPUL- ATION POPUIATION TION 
ATION 
Auckland Auckland 5309 796506 742786 4975 829465 769558 4475 889167 820754 
Wellington Wellington 3003 344338 327414 2644 338912 321004 2606 345620 325697 
Canterbury Christchurch 3131 344017 295296 3175 341518 289959 3130 353335 299373 
Otago Dunedin 2052 129187 113222 1752 122741 107445 1369 121843 106864 
Waikato Hamilton 2859 320411 94777 2817 326794 97907 2715 338524 101814 
Palmerston N. Palmerstcn N. 1674 125893 53873 1661 129384 66691 1475 133990 67405 
Tauranga Tauranga 411 66387 48153 417 75183 53097 414 85436 59435 
Hawkes Bay Hastings 859 121508 50814 782 125001 52563 789 127644 54909 Napier 50164 51330 52151 
Southland Invercargill 772 . 116568 53762 743 117099 53868 705 116449 52807 
Taranaki New Plym:.lUth 685 99312 43914 698 98500 44095 673 103107 47384 
.p. Nelson Nelson 1161 64352 42433 1108 66313 43121 984 69777 44593 m 
I Northland Whangarei 789 106743 39069 840 114349 40212 807 127616 44043 
Wanganui Wanganui 875 75714 39679 861 74295 39595 789 74232 40758 
Cook Gisborne 369 41136 31790 347 41428 32062 316 41325 32238 
S. Canterbury T:irraru 485 62027 29958 503 59907 29225 492 56494 28621 
Marlborough Blenhelin 290 31649 21481 303 34033 22104 234 34855 22681 
Wairarapa Masterton 337 46726 21001 329 45353 20422 304 44298 20145 
Bay of Plenty Whakatane 281 44467 14282 261 46547 15159 257 47616 15954 
Ashburton Ashburton 285 25316 15357 284 24925 15303 228 24855 15227 
Waitaki Oamaru 200 22576 15095 206 21782 14664 186 21514 14247 
West coast Greyrrouth 852 34818 11811 851 34202 11604 673 34983 11261 
Thames Thames 332 33619 6769 309 35513 6456 291 39741 6480 
Taumanmui Taurrarunui 151 12454 6479 156 12522 6541 123 12440 6387 
Dannevirke Dannevirke 153 12317 5638 149 12063 5694 137 13055 5873 
C. Hawkes Bay Waipukurau 197 13195 3632 195 12993 3648 174 13176 4322 
S. otago Balclutha 214 17159 4740 181 16641 4515 141 15613 4227 
Vincent Alexandra 79 9483 4137 79 11005 4348 79 13370 4842 Cromwell 1202 2364 3536 
Maniototo Ranfurly 33 2547 939 46 2582 994 46 2381 961 
Waiapu Te Puia 44 4606 312 44 4687 242 44 4628 225 
Data Source: Census 1976, 1981 and 1986 and Hospital Management Data, various years. 
have contracted out services, the larger urban based hospitals have, 
without exception, been the first to be affected. Some boards such as 
Northland, Ashburton and Vincent have contracted out services at all their 
hospitals whereas most others have retained in-house provision at the very 
small places many of which are rurally located. In only very few cases 
have hospitals with less than 50 beds had any of their ancillary services 
contracted out regardless of which board district they are located in. 
Institutional size appears therefore to have an important mediating role in 
determining the spatiality of privatisation both within as well as between 
hospi tal boards. 
Whether the geography of contracting out is analysed at either the 
local (hospital) level or the regional (administrative) level, a further 
factor to be considered is the sectoral variation in the process. 
Examination of the maps in figures 6.2 and 6.3 reveals that domestic 
cleaning has always had the greatest spatial extent of contracting out. 
This is followed sequent ially. by orderl ies, dietary and laundry services, 
the latter of which has not been contracted out anywhere except under the 
special circumstances already outlined. 
out could be expected to occur in 
Uneven development of contracting 
this context even if all the 
institutions concerned are of identical size and organisational structure. 
6.6 Organisational Characteristics of Public Hospital Ancillary Services; 
In the next two sections it is intended to see why there has been an 
empirically observable sectoral decrease in contracting out, The issue is 
examined in respect of relative levels of technology used in the different 
services and their different forms of administrative structure, 
6. 6. 1 Levels of Technology and Labour Intensity: 
On the basis of degrees of labour intensity and the capital equipment 
involved, a distinction can readily be drawn between domestic and orderly 
services on the one hand and dietary and laundry services on the other, 
The former two services, but particularly the latter of them, are 
characterised by the very low level of capital equipment required for their 
operat ion. An immediate consequence of this is that entry into the market 
is very easy for potential private sector contractors as Brosnan and 
Wilkinson 0989, 84) have noted. Compared to the other services considered 
here the market for contract cleaning in New Zealand has many operators and 
is highly competitive although meaningful comparative data is not 
available. Some contract cleaning companies have no office premises and 
are not even registered in the telephone directory, making quantification 
very difficult. 
Although some technological and labour saving advances have been made 
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since World War Two in cleaning materials and equipment available, domestic 
cleaning is still a heavily labour intensive activity. Taking the most 
recent cost schedules submitted by contractors to hospital boards as a 
de, at least 90 per cent of total contract costs are comprised of labour 
costs. Table 6.3 s an illustrative example of this and shows how 
contractors' costs are calculated. As no separate contracts exist for 
orderly services it is not possible to give a figure for this service but 
there is certainly even less capital equipment used in this activity. 
This provides a marked contrast to dietary and laundry services which 
both involve large investments in plant and equipment. But it is not only 
the size of the investment that is so important. These services have a 
vital strat c importance to the day to day functioning of a hospital. 
Most hospitals can function for some time without the labour of cleaners 
and, to a certain extent, without orderlies but in the case of dietary and 
laundry a continuous supply of these services must always be maintained for 
a hospital to function. 
Whenever dietary services have been contracted out, the form of 
contract 
only one, 
hospital 
adopted is a labour and management only, or sometimes, a labour 
but either way the capital equipment remains the property of the 
board. In no case, to dat e at least. has any hospi t al board 
contracted out its dietary service to the extent that its own kitchens and 
catering equipment have subsequently become defunct. It may be argued 
therefore that, as regards maintaining vital service provision, there is a 
greater risk factor involved in contracting out dietary and laundry 
services compared to the other two. 
In of laundry services, enquiries to individual boards have 
revealed that the principal reason for not contracting out is that no 
private sector operator is sufficiently resourced to process the 
quantities of laundry that hospitals generate. Whether this really is the 
case may be debateable but it still does not explain why a labour only 
contract could not be entered into with a contractor using the hospital 
board's existing plant and equipment as with dietary services. From 
di ons with the management of United Health Serv (formerly Crothalls) 
there seems to be a reluctance to enter into such an arrangement. A full 
contract is preferred in which the contractor would also own or lease the 
plant in addition to employing the labour. A lack of interest from private 
capital may be the best possible anation that can be offered for the 
absence of contract laundry provision. 
6.S.2 Professionalism and the Administration of Ancillary Services: 
Of the four services under consideration, dietary is the only one in 
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TABLE 6.3: Example of Domestic Cleaning Contract Submitted to a 
Hospital Board in 1988 1 
Wages 
Holiday Pay 11.7% 
ACC 2.25% 
Public Risk 0.225% 
TOTAL LABOUR COSTS 
Indirect Costs Mat erials 
Staff Travel 
Plant Depreciation 
R & W~ 
Vehicle Costs 
TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS 
TOTAL DIRECT & INDIRECT COSTS 
Overheads & Profits 
14,547.52 
16,249,58 
365.62 
36,56 
249.72 
26,84 
149.83 
83.24 
91. 56 
601. 19 
TOTAL COST 
TOTAL COST P.A 
+ GST 
TOTAL PRICE 
$16,651. 76 pw 
$17,252.95 pw 
993.42 
$18,246.37 pH 
$948,811. 24 
$1,043,692,36 pa 
All labour based on the N.Z. Hospital & Domestic Workers Award 6/1/88 
1 The names of both the contracting firm and the hospital board is this 
example have been withheld to preserve confidentiality. 
2 Repair and Maintenance 
lice: hospital board records 
-149-
which state regulated, professional qualifications are attainable and 
indeed necessary. The professionalism, and hence formally recognised 
expertise, of dietitians has provided them with a much more powerful 
position in the board management structure than that possessed by either 
the head of the domestic or the orderly services. As was seen in chapter 
five the head dietitian has direct access to senior board management in 
the form of the medical superintendent whereas the other two service heads 
have had to operate through the manager of the respective institution 
(hospital) concerned rather than directly to regional (central) board 
managemen t. 
Although not 
manager, like the 
management usually 
by necessity professionally 
chief dietitian, also has 
in the form of the board's 
quali Hed, the laundry 
direct access to senior 
deputy chief executive. 
Unlike either domestic or orderly services, both laundry and dietary have 
regionally, rather than locally, based administrations even though the 
dietary services are predominantly locally operated insofar as most 
institutions have their own catering unit. This factor enables the most 
senior officers in the dietary and laundry services to have a much 
stronger position in the board administration than domestics and orderlies 
for advocating the continuing provision of their respective services by 
the hospital board rather than by private contractors. 
On the above criteria, domest ic and orderly services have the same 
organisational characteristics but the former is contracted out more 
extensively than the latter. There are at least two important differences 
between them which might provide some of anation for this. 
Perhaps the most fundamental one lies in their respective work forces. 
Orderly work is predominantly and was exclusively, until a few years ago, 
a male occupat ion while domest ic services have been a 
Although no data is available to v:erify this contention, 
f emal e preserve. 
it s validit y is 
well founded from extensive empirical observation. However any appeal to 
gender related issues in explaining differential levels of contracting out 
between the ancillary services would be hard to sustain since dietary and 
laundry labour forces are also predominantly female and yet are contracted 
out less than orderly services. 
Of possibly more explanatory value is the contention that most 
domestic (and other) cleaning requirements can be more precisely specified 
with respect to timings and frequencies than orderly services. The latter 
can often be required at irregular intervals and at no one set time. Much 
of the work has to be done on an I as and when required basis'. An 
immediate consequence is that it is considerably more difficult to specify 
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in tender documents the detailed requirements for orderly services than for 
domestic services. 
Whatever the significance of the above factors in explaining the 
sectoral variation in contracting out, there is still the question of why 
the process has predominated in the smaller hospital boards. The next 
section starts to address this issue by first looking at the relevance of 
inst it ut ional size in terms of the t heoret ical frameworks laid down in 
chapters two and three. 
6.7 Review of Theoretical Considerations: 
Within public choice theory it has been seen that state sector 
managers pursue a policy of maximisation of both and bureau size. 
This leads to the growth of the bureaucracy itself with lowered levels of 
economic efficiency stemming from the reduced effect of market forces in 
planning procedures. On this basis it could be expected that the larger 
the bureaucracy (inst it ut ion) t he great er the oversupply of services in 
terms of what consumers would require. Therefore more consumer pressure 
could be levelled against larger institutions to privatise their services 
notwithstanding the possible loss of scale economies as was noted in the 
Tieboutian hypothesis in chapter two. 
Empirically this effect may be somewhat diluted in the New Zealand 
cant ext as hospital services, while provided by 
financed from the (central) government. 
authori ties, are 
Any direct association 
between levels of nationally raised taxes and locally provided services 
may not be so transparent when both the funding and provision is at the 
sub-national level which was an assumption of the Tiebout modeL 
Nevertheless an association, even if only a weak one, may still be 
ed between consumer preference for less costly service provision, and 
hence lower (national) taxes, and privatisation in large public 
bureaucracies. 
The relevance of scale economies to contracting out is apparent in 
the context of Weberian organisational theory in which privatisation is 
presented as a form of 'bureaucratic rationalisation'. By the term, scale 
economies, is meant economies resulting from the changes in the size of an 
operation or process. Where an organisation is so small that it is not 
economically worthwhile to provide a service on the grounds of its size, 
then contract provision is indicated. The process is applicable to the 
concept of 'bureaucratic rationalisation' in which management personnel 
adopt privatisation to divest themselves of problems associated with 
staff/labour force administration. In smaller institutions the operation 
of scale economies might not justify the employment of industrial relations 
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and personnel officers specifically for this purpose. 
An extension to this argument however is the possibility that larger 
institutions may have greater levels of labour militancy in the workforce. 
In this case privatisation could also be resorted to for relieving managers 
of particularly onerous administrative responsibility rather than 
realising scale economies. This predisposing factor to privatisation would 
t hen out weigh the administ rat i ve advant ages accruing to larger 
institutions from employing the industrial and personnel officers. 
Size might also be indicative of the level of privatisation when 
considered in a broadly Marxist framework. In general the larger the 
inst i t ut ion, the more communicat ion, cohesion and organisat ional st rengt h 
of the workforce and hence the association of large work places with a 
higher level of class conflict than comparatively smaller ones. This 
supposedly greater level of class conflict could possibly inhibit the 
implementation of privatisation policies in view of the likely depressed 
working conditions t hat would ensue. This argument therefore confl ict s 
with the above managerialist one. The spatiality of privatisation might be 
expected to reflect differences in the balance of class forces in each 
region or locality with the largest resistance to privatisation occurring 
in the regions with the largest institutions. 
Summarising t hen, all three frameworks indicat e that inst i t ut ional 
size may have an important bearing on the development of privatisation. 
Yet the theories are at a degree of variance over the direction in which 
any size factor might operate. For public choice theol-y a positive 
correlation might be expected between the level of privatisation and the 
size of institutions as public dissatisfaction grows with the size of the 
public bureaucracies. Wi thin managerialism however any possible 
correlation between size and privatisation cannot be so easily predicted. 
Managers may privatise at both ends of the size scale; for the achievement 
of scale economies at the lower end and for relieving industrial 
relations problems at the upper end. 
By contrast a Marxian framework would indicate a clear negative 
correlation between size and privatisation as heightened labour militancy 
in the larger institutions might inhibit the process there. It should also 
be realised that any substantial change over time in institutional size 
might change the predisposition towards privatisation and therefore alter 
both the strength and the sign of any correlations. Any likely 
correlation should therefore be examined across as wide a time span as 
available data permits. 
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6.8 Institutional Size and Contracting Out: 
The first part of this section attempts to explain the contracting out 
of services according to hospital board size while the second looks at the 
possibility of realising economies of scale by contracting out. 
6.8.1 Hospital Board Size and Contracting Out Policies: 
If hospi tal boards are grouped according to the number of services 
they contract out, as shown in table 6.4, a distinct size profile emerges. 
Total bed numbers of each board are taken as the surrogate for board size 
and the groupings are given for the same years as in table 6.3; 1976, 1981, 
1986 together with 1989 as this is the latest year for which such data is 
available. As popUlation figures are not being considered there is not the 
same need to adhere to census years but the same three years are still 
retained for analysis as they provide a comprehensive coverage of the years 
in which the major changes in contracting out occurred. 
Inspection of table 6.4 readily reveals that in each year considered 
t he largest group of boards, as measured by both mean and median val ues of 
bed numbers, 
Using the 
is that which contracts out domestic cleaning services alone. 
same size criteria, the next largest group is that which 
out nothing at all while the third and fourth ranked group contracts 
alters from year to year between the groups contracting out domestic and 
orderlies and the one contracting out all three services. Table 6.4 also 
reveals that there is a marked variation in board size within each group. 
Analysis of variance conducted for each year did however show that the 
mean size variation between the groups was greater than the variation 
within the groups although statistical significance was not found even at 
the five percent level for 1989 (see Appendix 1). Clearly although size 
is a factor in determining the number of services a board contracts out, it 
does not manifest itself in a simple linear progression of increasing <or 
decreasing) contracting out with changes in board size. 
Two factors may have distorted the above analysis. One is the 
crudeness of using measures of contracting out based simply on the number 
of services involved and the other is the neglect of intra-board variations 
in the process. The four category sectoral classification in figures 
6.2 and 6.3 and table 6.4, subsumes many boards with apparently equal 
levels of contracting 
disparities between them. 
out when in fact there may be considerable 
To investigate the matter further two approaches 
are adopted. The first involves developing an 'index of privatisation' in 
which each board is scaled according to both the number of services 
contracted out and the proportion of total bed space that is served by 
contractors. The computational details are presented in Appendix 2. In 
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TABLE 6.4: Contracting Out of Hospital Services and Hospital Board Size 
(--------------------------------------------------------------------------- Services Contracted Out ---------------------------------------------------------------------) 
None Domestic Domestic and Domestic, Orderlies I None Domestic Domestic and Domestic, Orderlies Orderlies and Dietary Orderlies and Dietary 
Hospital Beds Hospital Beds Hospital Beds Hospital Beds Hospital Beds Hospital Beds Hospital Beds Hos!,ital Beds 
Boards Boards Boards Boards Boards Boards Boards Boards 
1976 1981 
Waiapu 44 Waikato 2, 859 Tauranga 411 Bay of Plenty 281 Waiapu 44- Waikato 2,859 Tauranga 411 Bay of Plenty 281 
Cook 369 Taranaki 685 Taumarunui 151 Ashburton 285 Cook 347 Taranaki 698 Taumarunui 156 Ashburton 284-
C Hawkes Bay 197 Wellington 3,003 Marlborough 290 Vincent 86 C Hawkes Bay 195 Wellington 2,644- Marlborough 303 Vincent 79 
Nelson 1, 161 Canterbury 3, 131 Wanganui 875 West Coast 852 Nelson '1,108 Canterbury 3,175 Northland 840 
Auckland 5,309 5 Cant' bury 485 Dannevirke 153 Maniototo 33 Wanganui 861 S Cant'bury 503 Thames 309 
Hawkes Bay 859 Palm'st N 1,674- Wairarapa 337 Palm'st N 1,661 Auckland 4, 975 Dannevirke 149 
~ Otago 2,052 Northland 789 Ioiairarapa 329 Hawkes Bay 782 West Coast 851 
()1 Thames 332 Southland 772 WaHaki 206 Southland 743 t South Otago 214 Wait aki 200 Otago 1,752 
South Otago 181 
Maniototo 46 
MEAN I, 171 1,973 442 307 MEAN 612 2,228 471 208 
MEDli).N 369 2,267 337 281 MEDIAN 347 2,644- 363 261 
1986 1989 
Waiapu 44 Waikato 2, 715 Tauranga 414 Bay of Plenty 257 Waiapu 38 Waikato 2,457 Tauranga 386 Bay of Plenty 24.7 
Cook 316 Taranaki 673 Taumarunui 123 Ashburton 228 Cook 317 Taranaki 634 Taumarunui 105 Ashburton 234 
C Hawkes Bay 174 Wellingt on 2, 606 Marlborough 234 Vincent 79 C Hawkes Bay 195 Wellington 2,444 Marlborough 185 Vincent 67 
Nelson 984 Canterbury 3,130 Dannevirke 137 Northland 807 Nelson 958 Canterbury 2,970 Northland 780 Thames 234 
Wanganui 799 S Cant'bury 492 West Coast 673 Thames 291 Auckland 4,225 S Cant'bury 488 West Coast 625 South Otago 134-
Palm'st N 1,475 Auckland 4,475 Waitaki 186 South Otago 141 Wanganui 714 Ha",-kes Bay 716 Waitaki 185 Southland 731 
Wairarapa 304 Hawkes Bay 789 Southland 705 Palm'st N 1.315 Otago 1,300 
Maniototo 46 Otago 1,369 Dannevirke 114 
Wairarapa 275 
Maniototo 46 
MEAN 518 2,031 295 358 MEAN 823 1,573 378 275 
MEDIAN 310 1,988 210 257 MEDIAN 296 1,300 286 234 
Data source: Hospital Hanagt?ment Oata 1976} 19S1 and 1986 and Oepart~ent of Health records 
the second approach each individual hospital, is considered by correlating 
the size, as given by total bed numbers, with the number of services 
privatised. Starting with the first approach, the privatisation indices 
are presented for all the boards in table 6.5. 
From the row of totals at the bottom of table 6.5, 
the overall level of contracting out, as assessed by 
it is seen that, 
this index has 
remained virtually static over the years. This is not altogether 
surprising since cases of cont ract ing out in some boards have often been 
accompanied by reversions to in-house provision in others as described 
earlier. The lowered 1981 level is explained on the basis of the time lag 
between the termination and the adoption of contracting out between various 
boards. It should also be noted however that these privatisation indices 
do not account for the general tendency towards more competitive 
tendering instead of negotiated contracting. By performing regression 
analysis on the privatisation indices for each year, and the board size, 
as gi ven by tot al bed numbers, r val ues of -0. 44, -0. 30, -0. 31 and -0. 32 
were obtained for, 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1989 respectively. For the 29 
cases in the regression, statistical significance only existed for 1976. 
When individual hospitals' bed numbers are correlated against the 
numbers of services they contract out, the r values, presented in the same 
chronological order as before, are only 0.02, 0.02, 0.06 and 0.06. Even 
with 165 to 200 cases considered none is significant but this time however 
all r values are positive. Interestingly no evidence has been found to 
indicat e any cont ract ing out in psychiatric hospitals, which are some of 
the largest in New Zealand. Ostensibly this has been for security reasons 
and when these institutions are removed from the analysis the correlation 
between size and contracting out is slightly stronger. The r values 
however are st ill only O. 13, O. 11, O. 15 and O. 14 and again yield no 
statistical significance. 
At the board, or regional, level the correlations are consistently 
negative, as might be expected if contracting out was resorted to in 
pursuit of scale economies. The weakness of the correlations for 1981 and 
1986 is illustated graphically in figure 6.6 where a very large degree of 
scattering amongst the hospital boards can be observed. On the other 
hand, at the hospital or local level the correlations are positive 
indicating a greater tendency, even if only very slight, to contract out in 
larger hospitals which contradicts the scale economy argument. Clearly 
the operation of scale economies in the context of contracting out requires 
further consideration. 
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TABLE 6.5: Indic~s of Privatisation of New Zealand Public HosQital 
Ancillary Services 
Hospital Pri vat isat ion Indices 
Boards 1976 1981 1986 1989 
Auckland 6.2 8.9 
Canterbury 14.6 15.5 16. 1 16. 5 
otago 1.8 1.7 12.9 15. 1 
Waikato 11. 7 12.0 11.8 12.6 
Wellington 15.6 18. 4 18. 2 17. 9 
Cook 
Hawkes Bay 27.4 27.4 26.8 
Nelson 
Northland 66. 7 66. 7 100.0 66, 7 
Palmerston North 16.3 
South Canterbury 28.5 29.2 29. 6 29.6 
Southland 56.2 61. 6 93.2 93. 7 
Taranaki 26.2 27.0 27. 1 28.5 
Tauranga 62.5 62.2 62.5 62.3 
Wanganui 58.3 
West Coast 51. 2 33.8 34.5 19.0 
Ashbudon 100.0 100. 0 100.0 100.0 
Bay of Plenty 94. 3 95. 0 95. 3 97.6 
C. Hawkes Bay 
Dannevirke 66, 7 66. 7 
Maniototo 100.0 
Marlborough 61. 9 61. 1 61. 3 63.3 
South Otago 68. 1 64.2 
Taumarunui 66. 7 66. 7 66. 7 66. 7 
Thames 41. 8 64.6 73.0 
Vincent 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Waiapu 
Wairarapa 62. 7 
Waitaki 51. 3 50. 2 50. 5 
TOTAL 1,049.8 829. 6 1048. 4 1,004.5 
me: calculated from Hospital l'fanageAumt Oatd 1976, 19B1 and 19B6 and Department of Health records 1989 
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Figure 6.6 The Relation between Hospital Board Size 
and Privatisation of Ancillary Services 
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6.B.2 Economies of Scale and Contracting Out: 
It was seen in chapter five, that where domestic and orderly services 
were provided by a hospital board rather than by contractors, the services 
were administered by a (hospital) manager in each of the board's 
institutions. The smaller boards are structured such that regional (board) 
and local <institutional) management is combined and almost 
indistinguishable. These boards tend not to be of sufficient size to 
merit t he employment of a manager speci fically for these services. The 
task therefore has to be performed by administrative staff whose primary 
function lies in other areas. 
A further point to be considered is that 
division of labour is less rigid to the extent 
degree of coincidence in the work schedules 
in the smaller boards the 
that there is often a high 
of domestic cleaners and 
orderlies. In larger boards the two can more justifiably be administered 
as separate entities and domestic cleaning alone can be contracted out 
while still leaving an in-house orderly service as a working unit. When 
the smaller boards contract out domestic services the reduced division of 
labour in such institutions reqUires orderly services to be included in the 
contract. The result is that the latter services are more likely to be 
contracted out there than in the larger boards. 
In the case of dietary services, the reason often cited by management 
personnel for contracting out these services has been the difficulty of 
attracting qualified dietitians in small boards. This has primarily been 
because of the lack of both training schools and further career 
opportunities in such boards compared to the larger ones based in the main 
urban cent res. Short age of locally available ise, largely 
consequent upon smallness of institutions, has therefore been cited as a 
major factor in formulal ing boards' contracting out policies for this 
service. 
The above notwithstanding, it could be said that the scope for 
achieving scale economies by contracting out ancillary services is really 
quite limited since, in the case of dietary and laundry services, the 
plant and equipment have always remained under hospital board ownership. 
With domestic and orderly services the capital equipment is minimal by 
comparision, and so in both cases scale economies have been restricted to 
eliminating the need to employ specialised management personnel. This lack 
of opportunity for scale economy could, in part at least, explain the weak 
correlation between levels of privatisation and institutional size. Still 
left unexplained though is why two boards or individual institutions of 
similar size and with similar opportunities for scale economies, however 
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limited, may pursue very different contracting out policies? 
Some examples may illustrate the nature of the problematic. On the 
basis of scale economies in administrative procedures, the eight smallest 
boards in New Zealand (ie those with less than 200 beds in 1985) should 
contract out their ancillary services. However two of them have never 
cont ract ed out any services (Central Hawkes Bay and Waiapu), two have 
ceased to do so <Maniototo in 1980 and Dannevirke in 1986), another two 
have continuously used contractors for many years (Vincent and Taumarunui) 
while the remaining two (South Otago and Waitaki) have respectively started 
and restarted contracting out in the 1980s. 
In the case of Cent ral Hawkes Bay Board the management has claimed 
that: 
Economic studies based on known contract prices and I present 
costs' indicate that for a Board 
option is not attractive (written personal 
the contract 
communication, 28th 
April 1989, my emphasis) 
By contrast Ashburton and Vincent, which are respectively larger and 
smaller than Central Hawkes Bay, have both been contracting out their 
ancillary services at all their institutions for many years. Discussions 
with the current Ashburton management have revealed that the contract 
option is attractive mainly for administrative reasons. A reversion to 
in-house provision would involve them in extra administrative work and so 
compromise the administration of other areas of activity (personal 
communication nd). 
The contracting out policies of the 
Maniototo Boards are interesting to compare. 
neighbouring Vincent and 
In terms of both district 
populations and bed numbers the latter is about half the size of the former 
and reverted to in-house provision in 1980. In mid 1988 the Boards 
became subsumed under the newly created Otago Area Health Board and, 
shortly after, the hospitals in both former Boards had their ancillary 
services put out to competitive tender. The tenderi exercises were 
conducted by the same authority for all the hospitals concerned. While a 
new contract was let in Vincent, in Maniototo, "the in-house services were 
retained when it was established that there was no [i can t financial 
advantage to contract out" <Ot ago Area Health Board, wri t ten personnal 
communication, 29th September 1988). So why did cost factors alone 
indicate contracting out in Vincent but not Maniototo? 
When previously under contract, the former Maniototo Board management 
maintained that, the contractor's 'overhead' costs made the final 
contract price appear uneconomic compared with in-house provision 
(personal communicat ion, nd). The contract was therefore terminated. An 
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examination of the geographical location of the two Boards' hospitals in 
relation to the contract company's branch office lends weight to this 
argument. The relationship between size and contracting out may therefore 
be mediated by locational factors. 
6.9 Contracting Out and Geographical Location: 
The above comparison of Vincent and Maniototo may usefully be taken 
further by considering their spatial I accessibility' to contractors. If 
Ministry of Transport recommended road travel times'';· are used as a 
surrogate of spatial 'accessibility' then it is seen that Ranfurly 
Hospital (Maniototo) is Ihr 30min (88km) from Clyde where the contractor's 
branch office was in 1980. Also at Clyde is Dunstan Hospital (Vincent) 
and just 25min (21km) travel time away is Cromwell Hospital (Vincent) but 
in the opposite direction from Ranfurly. Clearly servicing contracts in 
Maniototo involved transportation (overhead) costs that were not incurred 
in Vincent. 
Since the reversion to in-house provision in Maniot ot 0, the 
contracting company (Crothalls) has relocated its branch office to Cromwell 
and diversified into cleaning private sector commercial premises. It has 
acquired (non - hospital) contracts in Wanaka, Queenstown and Alexandra at, 
respectively, 50, 55, 35 minutes journey time from Cromwell but still none 
in Ranfurly <1hr 45min) away. There has therefore been no scope for 
reducing contract overhead costs to the Maniototo Board in a way that has 
been possible in Vincent. Serving Ranfurly tal would still be time 
and resource consuming compared to the more locally based contracts. 
Two factors seem to be relevant here, First, is that the likelihood 
of a board contracting out may be dependent upon the distance or 
'accessibility' from a contractor's branch office and second, is the 
existence of other contract work in the locality of the board. In this way 
the diverse situation of Ashburton and Central Hawkes Bay may be explained. 
A town of 15,000 <Ashburton) just 1hr 5min (86km) distant from a city of 
300,000 (Christchurch) should have far greater business oportunities for 
contractors than a town of only 5,000 (Waipukurau) with neighbouring cities 
of just 60,000 (Palmerston North), 1hr 40min (l08km) distant and 50,000 
(Napier), Ihr (70km) distant. On the basis of locational factors alone 
a similar sized contract in both boards might therefore be expected to be 
considerably cheaper in Ashburton than in Central Hawkes Bay. The appeal 
to the factors of I spatial accessibility' as measured by road travelling 
time and' business opportunity' as indicated by settlement size may also 
ain the lack of contractors at Te Puia hospital in the Waiapu Board. 
In order to see how these two factors mediate the spatiality of 
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contract ing out across the ent ire count ry. the above correlat ion analyses 
of hospital size and services pri vat ised were reconsidered by delet ing 
hospitals considered both inaccessible and lacking further business 
oport unit y. Albeit somewhat arbitrarily those hospitals selected for 
deletion were all located in settlements of less than 5,000 people 
(business opportunity factor) and were more than half an hour (30 minutes) 
travelling time from a settlement of at least 10,000 people (accessibility 
factor). Wi th these adj ustments to the data, and with psychiatric 
hospitals excluded, the correlations obtained were little different from 
before with r values of 0.09, 0.06, 0.16 and 0.15 and still with no 
statistical significance. Table 6.6 presents all the r values of the above 
analyses in tabulated form. The consistently low values obtained, despite 
the various refinements to the input data, shows that there is much left 
unexplained. Some concrete examples illustrate this. 
TABLE 6.6: Results of Correlation between Instutional Size and 
Lev~ls of Contracting Out 
Number of 
Services r values obtained: 
Privatised 
Correlated with: 1976 1981 1986 
Regional Hospital 
Boards -0.44 -0.30 -0.31 
Significance of r 
with 29 cases 0.3494 at 5% and O. 4487 at 
Individual Local 
Hospitals 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Significance of r 
with 165-195 cases 0.1946 at 5% and O. 2540 at 
Psychiatric Hospitals 
deleted O. 13 O. 12 O. 15 
Significance of r 
with 155-185 cases O. 1946 at 5% and O. 2540 at 
Psychiatric and 
inaccessible 0.09 0.06 O. 16 
Hospitals deleted 
Significance of r 
with 90-106 cases 0.2050 at 5% and O. 2673 at 
1989 
-0. 32 
1% 
0.06 
1% 
O. 14 
1% 
O. 15 
1% 
Appealing to size and locational factors does not so easily explain 
the absence of contractors in the hospitals of the Cook and Nelson Boards. 
The hospitals of these Boards are both very distant from the nearest 
major urban centre <respectively, 6hr 30min (386km) from Hamilton and 6hr 
55min <417km from Christchurch), but their main centres of population with 
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32,000 (Gisborne) and 44,500 (Nelson) both support several contract 
cleaning firms, including Crothalls. Consequent ly excessive overhead costs 
should not be an inhibiting factor to contracting out. Also on the basis 
of the above criteria the existence of contract provision is not readily 
explained at Balclutha (4,500 population) in the South Otago Board and at 
Taumarunui (6,500 population). Both are small settlements with little 
scope for further business opportunity and are distant from their nearest 
major urban centre; the former lhr lOmin from Dunedin and the latter 2hr 
50min from Hamilton. In neither case is contracting out indicated on 
purely locational factors. 
Apart from these two cases, the contracting out of the laundry service 
at Kaikoura Hospital in the Canterbury Board is also instructive. In this 
example contracting out was resorted to because of, and not in spite of, 
locational inaccessibility. The cost of transporting laundry 200km or 2hr 
55min to, and from, the Board's central linen department in Christchurch 
made contracting out to a local Kaikoura firm economically attractive. All 
other supplies for the hospital were transported from Christchurch under 
contract with New Zealand Railways. Substantial increases in freight 
charges in 1988 resulted in there being financial advantages for the Board 
to operate its own freight service between Kaikoura and Christchurch. As a 
consequence the laundry could also be carried for virtual zero opportunity 
cost and the contract option was no longer so attractive. So while 
geographical location was problematic for services under one set of 
conditions, it ceased to be when the conditions .changed. This final 
example shows the difficulties of using purely locational factors as 
explanatory variables in the uneven development of privatisation. 
Summary and Conclusion~ 
From the analysis of contracting out undertaken in this chapter two 
broad trends have been identified. One is a progressive decrease in the 
extent of contracting out from domestic cleaning through to laundry 
services and the other is a slight overall increase in the process with 
decreasing size of hospital board. This tendency is mediated to a certain 
extent by some small boards' distant location from major centres of 
population and lack of further business opportunities for contractors in 
these board localities. Even within large boards, many of the very small 
hospi tals do not have cont ract service provision. lnst it ut ional factors 
based on size and geographical location cannot be altogether ignored in 
efforts to ain the uneven development of the contracting out. However 
the existence of numerous contradictory cases has rendered problematic all 
attempts to establish normative criteria upon which to explain the uneven 
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spatiality of the process on a broad nationwide geographical scale. 
Significantly missing from the debate so far has been the issue of 
socio-economic and political factors within both the institutions 
t hemsel ves and in societ y as a whole. By focusing on just locational or 
institutional factors, the analysis presented has been socially st at ic. 
The first part of this chapter showed that contracting out of hospital 
ancillary services has developed over a long period of time with many 
changes in policy which cannot be fully explained by appealing to 
analyses devoid of social context. As the theoretical frameworks of this 
thesis indicate, other factors must also be considered in the development 
of pri vat isat ion, such as political and financial pressures on 
bureaucracies to privatise their activities and the class conflicts 
engendered in the resistance to the implementation of these policies. It 
is towards addressing these issues that the next three chapters are 
devoted. 
Footnotes: 
The methodology adopted in the search for data and information for 
this thesis is detailed in Appendix 4. 
2 The term 'general' is used as a distinction from specialised hospitals 
typically, psychiatric, maternity and atric, 
3 Forms of Contract: There are three main forms of contractual 
arrangement for prOViding a service. Under a full contract, the ownership 
of capital equipment, the employment of the labour force and the management 
of that labour and capital is transferred to the contractor. With a 
management only contract the contractor has the responibility for manageing 
the service, while the institution retains the employment of the labour 
force and the ownership of the plant and equipment. A labour only contract 
may include the management of the service as well as the employment of the 
work force but specifically excludes plant and equipment. 
4 ADT was founded in 1914 in the USA as American District Telegraph. 
5 Major urban areas refer throughout this thesis strictly to the cities 
of Auckland, Hamilton, Palmerston North, Wellington, Christchurch, and 
Dunedin. 
6 Data is taken from the Shell Oil Company, Road Atlas of New Zealand, 
(1982, 7) and is supplied by the Ministry of Transport. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Early Development of Contracting Out Public Hospital Ancillary Services 
Prior to the 1980s privatisation has generally been considered as only 
having taken place in a minimal and piecemeal manner wi thout much of the 
currently associated political and economic pressures for its 
implementation. Any detailed examination of the process within this 
period has therefore tended to be eschewed. In the previous chapter it was 
seen that contracting out by the state to the private sector had origins in 
the New Zealand public hospital system going back to the 194-0s. The 
analysis of contracting out presented hitherto has examined the situation 
only at certain points in time. In this chapter the intention is to 
provide an explanatory account of the on-going development of the process 
upto the end of the 1960s. The time span chosen is not arbitrary since, 
as has just been seen, the development of contracting out exhibited a much 
greater geographical complexity in the 1970s and therefore requires a 
separate analysis. 
After a brief discussion of the sources of reference for this chapter, 
attention centres on the historical origins of contracting out public 
hospital ancillary services and the socio-economic conditions which led to 
its expansion and entrenchment. This is followed by attempts to explain 
theoretically the spatially uneven development of private provision. 
Regional variations in the structure of the labour market are examined in 
relation to the spatiality of contracting out. Drawing on some of the 
discussion in the previous two chapters the differences across space in the11 
institutional structures of hospital boards are examined and this is! 
followed by a discussion of the likely political pressures at both national 
and regional level for contracting out. The chapter concludes by assessing i 
the explanations advanced for contracting out, and its uneven spatiality, 
in terms of the theoretical frameworks established for this thesis. 
7. 1 Sources of Reference: 
Although the history of privatisation in New Zealand hospitals only 
extends back to the late 194-0s many difficulties were encountered in regard 
to finding relevant dat a and informat ion. Writ ten records of hospit al 
boards and the maj or cont ract or invol ved are general I y incompl et e and in 
some cases, where boards had ceased cont ract ing out several years ago, 
they have been completely absent. Even where the original contracts and 
tender documents still exist there is often little supplementary 
information relating to the circumstances under which contracting out was 
ini t iated and, in some cases, subsequent ly abandoned. Somet imes 
information on relatively recent years 
-164--
was no longer available as many 
I 
records had been destroyed. The following account therefore has had to be 
based on what few documents have been preserved together with the personal 
experiences of managers and workers 
industry. 
wi th long service records in the 
Fort unat ely there exist two original sources of reference, still 
largely intact, from which some detailed information was able to be 
deri ved on the hist orical origins of contract ing out hospital services. 
The first is a Memorandum to all Members of the [Wai pawa 1] Board in 
Reference to a Proposed Special Meeting of the Finance and General Purpose 
Committee to be held on 30th November 1948 (WHB 1948). This memorandum, 
on the issues to be considered in the private provision of hospital 
anci llary services, was compiled by the management staff of Waipawa 
Hospi tal Board, and is almost complet e. The memorandum is especially 
useful as it details of the experiences of several other hospital boards 
with contracting out their ancillary services. 
The second major source of information is a Review of Contract 
Cleaning prepared by the North Canterbury Hospital Board for a meeting of 
hospital board representatives held in Wellington on 17th October 1952 (RCC 
1952) . Apart from these lengthy reports the only other material available 
that refers to this and subsequent periods is what still remains of letters 
that have been exchanged bet ween t he boards t hemsel ves and wi t h the 
cont ract ors. Some of the early promotional literature of the contractors 
still survives and provides a useful source of reference as does some of 
the written cownunications with trade unions in more recent times. 
Basically however there is a great deal of incomplet eness in exist ing 
records. Nevertheless in spite of the general lack of recorded information 
some useful observations can still be made regarding the origins of 
contracting out of New Zealand hospital ancillary services. 
7.2 The Historical Origins of Contracting Out Hospital Services in New 
Zealand: 
The overall social context within which contracting out took place can 
be ascertained with a considerable degree of certainty. Some passages from 
the detailed historical account of the development of the New Zealand 
Nurses' Association by Pitts (1984) are illuminating as is a short article 
from the New Zealand Nursing Journal, (NZNJ April 1959). From around the 
time of World War Two onwards many hospital boards started to contract out 
to the private sector some, if not all, of their requirements for both 
domestic services such as general cleaning, table waiting in nurses' homes 
and ward dishwashing and, in some cases, 
Prior to the advent of contracting out 
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orderly and diet ary services. 
much of this work was done by 
nursing staff. 
During World War Two hospitals experienced an acute shortage of labour 
due to military service requirements. The years immediately after the War 
also saw a serious shortage of nursing staff in hospitals owing to the 
addit ional expansion of public health, pI unkeP', dist rict, and indust rial 
nursing services (Pitts 1984, 53). Demographic factors, such as the post 
war 'baby boom' and the lower birth rate of the 1920s compared to previous 
decades, served to increase the demand for nursing services while at the 
same time there was a decreased supply of potential recruits. Concern over 
nursing staff recruitment and retention, which was by no means just 
confined to New Zealand but world wide, led to a considerable reappraisal 
of the role and professional standards of nursing. An out come was the 
widespread use of auxiliary (ancillary) workers who undertook what were 
considered non-nursing duties to help with staff shortages (Pitts 1984, 
54). According to the NZNJ <1959, 39); 
... the ward cleaning duties formerly done by the nursing staff 
such as cleaning of toilet units, all dusting and polishing of 
ward and office furniture has been taken over in some hospitals 
by auxil iary workers. In ot hers those dut ies have been handed 
over to the Commercial Cleaners Company. 
Under this latter situation the duties were then contracted out to the 
pri vat e sect or. Finding alternative sources of labour to do these non-
nursing duties was indeed a major problem to the hospital boards. The 
choice was either to employ labour directly for this specific purpose or to 
hire specialised contractors from the private sector. The decision to opt 
for contract rather than directly employed laboUl', appears to have rested 
upon one fundamental premise. This was to divest the boards' management 
staff of the administrative problems related to recruiting workers in times 
of general labour scarci ty. This scarcity existed, not only in nursing 
services, but virt ually throughout the ent ire economy and wi 11 be examined 
further presently. 
~lether it was thought that contractors could overcome the problem of 
labour shortage more easily than the boards themselves is not altogether 
clear. One reason cited for this possibly being the case is that 
contractors, being in the private sector, could pay higher wages than the 
minimum set by the national award coverage for hospital ancillary workers 
which was only established in 1947 (Ferguson 1985, 156). The boards on 
the other hand have always been constrained by central government 
regulation to adhere to these minimum levels. While contractors are 
believed to have paid more than award wages from time to time, the only 
evidence found to verify this was at the Auckland Hospital Board in the 
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late 1940s. According to its Secretary (Chief Executive), .. a1 though the 
contractors offered as much as 305 per week more than [the] Board had been 
permitted to offer, [the contractors] were unable to obtain sufficient 
employees" (WHB 1948, 9). 
Another important factor in the resolution of the labour shortage 
problem is that contract services may often have involved a hi degree 
of labour productivity than boards and so more could be done with the same 
number of workers. This is revealed in a submission from the North 
Canterbury Hospital Board:3 to the 1948 Memorandum. 
[The contractors] immediately eliminated the divided duty <which 
was a source of annoyance to the average hospital worker) and 
started a system of full day, half day and so many hours and did 
the cleaning, ishing and scrubbing with up to dat e machines 
(WHB 1948, 11), 
Whatever the extent of the higher labour productivity with contract 
provision, the crucial factor for hospital boards was that contracting 
out rid them of the problem of finding labour to provide an adequate 
The secretary of Wanganui Hospital Board writing in 1948 stated service. 
that: 
The cont ract ors in this city [WanganuU appear to have had no 
difficulty in obtaining sufficient staff but one of the 
advantages of the service is that this particular problem is no 
worry to the Board. If sufficient staff is not available, the 
work is done by the supervisor or manager and the staff that is 
available even though it may necessitate unduly long hours (WHB 
1948,12). 
In the same report the secretary of Taranaki Hospital Board argued in a 
similar vein: 
The matter of obtaining sufficient staff is entirely the 
responsibility of the contractors who in terms of the contract 
are required to render an adequate service. Should they 
experience shortages of staff (which they have done on occasions) 
their supervisors work extra hours and they make use of part time 
labour. However the worry is theirs and has not so far had any 
undesirable consequences as far as this Board is concerned <WHB 
1948, 13), 
In spite of these possible advantages, all the existing evidence 
indicates that boards were very reluctant to contract out these services 
and 'they viewed the process as only a temporary expedient while severe 
staff shortages obtained. The main reasons for the reluctance seems to 
have been based on the higher cost of contract vis-a-vis board provided 
services. The loss of any direct control over the labour force through 
contracting out was also cited as an inhibiting factor on occasions. No 
evidence however exists of trade union influence or labour force agitation 
having any effect on the decision to contract out. This is most likely to 
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be explained on the grounds that contracting out at this time involved no 
job loss or reduction in working conditions. At this stage the only two 
parties involved in the process appear to have been the hospital boards' 
management structures and the contractors. 
Some of the comment s made by the secretaries of the various 
hospital boards as recorded in the 1948 Memorandum illustrate the 
reluctance to contract out. For example Palmerst on North Hospit al Board 
claimed that the contract system was adopted only, lias a last resort and 
that it was much more expensi ve than the staffing [ie in-house] systenl' 
(WHB 1948, 10), while the secretary of the Wellington Hospital Board was of 
the opinion that: 
The contract system was not comparable with the staffing em 
and although owing to staff shortages it had been forced upon the 
Board, should staff become available the old system would be 
reverted to at the earliest moment. He [the secretary] also 
stated that the contract system cost considerably more than did 
(WHB 1948, 10 my emphasi s) . 
The Wellington Board gave no ipdication in the report as to how much more 
contracting out cost but, again with reference to the Auckland Hospital 
Board: 
Although the contract price was more than 10% greater than what 
it had cost the Board previously, the service never funct ioned 
properly and after three months it broke down altogether, with 
the result that the contractors asked to be relieved of their 
contract (WHB 1948, 9 my emphasis), 
It seems that Auckland was somewhat exceptional in that, according to 
the Board Secretary, it was probably the worst off place in New Zealand for 
housing while there was a ready availability of industrial work to attract 
potential hospital workers. Largely as a consequence of this experience 
the Auckland Board initiated a special training course for domestic 
workers. In order to attract staff a career structure was established, 
"with promotional prospects to that of institutional housekeepers at 
salaries of up to £4-50 per annunl' (WHB 1948, 9). No other board in New 
Zealand has ever undert aken such a procedure, possibly because the early 
experience with contracting out was not so disastrous . 
. The North Canterbury Hospital Board, one of the earliest to contract 
out some of its ancillary services, is reported as saying that it would 
stil1 recommend, "reversion to the staffing system if it were possible to 
obtain adequate staff" (WHB 1948, 11) if only because of the cost involved. 
In the words of the Secretary of the Board, "Contract Cleaners Ltd. are not 
in this game for the good of their heelth and broadly they work on a 10% 
[ profi t1 margin" (WHB 1948, 11) . The Marlborough Hospital Board stated in 
a letter of 14th May 1951 to the Waipawa Hospital Board that its present 
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contract, "was based on a ceiling rate of £9,828 per annum as from 1st 
November 1949 which we estimated at the time was about £500 more than we 
could render the service for ourselve~'. Payment for contractors' profits 
and higher wages meant that cont ract ing out was not economic compared to 
provision by the boards themselves. 
By contrast other boards, such as Waikato and Wanganui, reported that 
the difference in costs between in-house and contract labour was similar if 
slightly· in favour of the latter. n[T]he contract rate of the Waikato 
Hospital [Hamilton] for the ensuing three years has recently been fixed at 
£24,727, whereas our own estimate of the total cost for the period given 
(when we could obtain the staff) was £24,767/1 (WHB 1948, 13). In this 
case it was reported that the introduction of contractors had been most 
beneficial in relieving junior nursing staff of domestic d~ties, and for 
this reason it was thought likely that the system would continue. Wanganui 
Hospital Board estimated a money saving of only £100 per annum through 
contracting out but maintained that the avoidance of administrative work 
achieved by the process would reveal greater although no data was 
presented in the 1948 Memorandum to justify this claim. 
Di fficul ties in present more detailed and accurate assessments of 
the cost difference between in-house (board) and contract (privately) 
provided services seem to have arisen for two main reasons. First is that 
on account of the labour shortage most hospitals were being staffed below 
what was deemed a desirable level and hence an estimate had to be made of 
what the cost of providing the service would be if fully staffed. A 
second difficulty expressed by boards was the way in which the 
contractors set the "ceiling price" or maximum price on their quotations. 
It was established on a cost plus basis insofar as the boards were 
required to pay the contractors according to the precise number of staff 
employed and the hours worked. Concern was expressed at this method of 
pricing since, according to the Secretary at Waipawa Hospital Board, "I 
cannot nominate any ways and means of arriving at the cost as to do so 
would mean having a strict check on the number of hours worked by each 
member of staff which would be impossible and would mean accepting the 
Commercial Cleaners Ltd figures" (WHB 1948, 8). As will be seen in the 
next chapter this issue still presented difficulties well into the 1980s. 
Those boards that desisted from contracting out, at this stage at 
least, seem to have done so mainly on the grounds that the labour shortage 
problem in their respective hospital districts was not so critical as to 
merit this policy. The Cook Hospital Board stated that it was not prepared 
at this stage to assign, "to a profit making concern work which should be 
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carri ed out directly by the Board .... [and] ... that although staff 
difficulties were e:l(perienced, at no time had the position become acute" 
(WHB 1948, 9). Similarly at Wairarapa in 1948, the Board was not prepared 
to consider contract cleaning unless the staffing situation, II deteriorated 
much more seriously' (WHB 1948, 12) while Hawkes Bay Hospital Board 
explained its decision to retain ancillary services in-house on the grounds 
that, "So far we have managed to scratch along as the staffing tion in 
Hawkes Bay although difficult is not embarrasingly sd' (Letter to Wairarapa 
Hospi t al Board, 1 st May 1951). 
It would appear, therefore, that the decision to contract out or 
otherwise depended upon whether the administrative burden of finding 
domestic staff outweighed the cost involved. Privatisation through private 
contracting at this time was certainly not a matter of economic expediency 
and for the most part it was an expense rather than a monetary saving. The 
1948 Memorandum, from which the above account has been based on, was made 
only a very short time after many boards had started to opt for privately 
pl'ovided services. It· was therefore too soon to assess the standard or 
level of sel'vice provided vis-a-vis in-house provision. This issue was 
taken up in the 1952 Review of Contract Cleaning referred to above. In 
addition to discussing further the costs of contract services, an 
examination was made of the standards of efficiency in cleaning services 
and the terms of the contracts themselves. It would appear that this 
Review was the basis for the consolidation and subsequent growth of 
contracting out hospital ancillary services. 
7.3 The Consolidation of Contracting Out Policies: 
By the time of the 1952 Review, prepared by the North Canterbury 
Hospit al Board, cant ract ing out had been est ablished for a few years in 
some boards. The stated task of the meeting for which the Review had been 
prepared was, "to gi ve some guideline as to the fut ure procedure ei ther 
to ret urn cleaning to our [the boards' ] own control or to improve the 
cont ractors service" (RCC 1952, 2). The posit ion of the North Canterbury 
Hospital Board at the time was that private cant ract ing could not be 
disp~nsed with. This was presumably because of the insufficiency of 
available labour although this point was not made clear in the Review. 
What was made clear was that the Board was still considering at least a 
part ial reversion to in-house provision since, "in due course the [North 
Canterbury Hospital] Board may take back the cl of one of its smaller 
institutions which would be used as a testing ground to determine how far 
the Board could extend its own activities" (RCC 1952, 2). This possibility 
however did not eventuate and the decades of the 1950s and 1960s was one of 
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consolidation in which contracting out became entrenched in the New Zealand 
public hospital system. 
From the 1952 Review the main reason for the continuance and 
consolidation of contract services appears to have been the general 
satisfaction at the standard of service rendered notwithstanding the 
already referred to contract failure in the Auckland Hospital Board. The 
sat is fact ion expressed however was by no means unquali fied. A cri tical 
factor identified in achieving the requisite level of service was that of 
contract supervision, an issue still of paramount concern to hospital 
managers at the end of the 1980s. Supervision was identified by the 1952 
Review as being of two kinds; the supervision of staff in the performance 
of their duty and the supervision of the standard of cleanliness. Albeit 
reluctantly, many boards were seeing the need for quality control 
Even though the Review stated assurance where contractors were involved. 
that, II i t should not be necessary for a member of the tal staff to 
have to point out uncleaned or poorly cleaned areas' (RCC 
was invariably a need for just such a measure. 
2) there 
The basis of the need for supervision of staff seemed to arise, not so 
much from any need to discipline a recalcitrant labour force, but rather to 
train the staff in appropriate work methods. Writing a few years after the 
1952 Review, the Domestic Superintendent at Christchurch Hospital 
commented: 
As far as standards go, medical and nursing standards of 
cleanliness as applied to hospital wards are always difficult to 
impose on lay staff who do not fully appreciate the necessity for 
all surfaces to be clean. The standard of cleaning achieved in 
the past was higher because it was carried out very largely by 
the nursing staff as part of their routine work but the methods 
used now are very much better than those used formerly, for 
example, the vacuum sweep <letter to Secretary of North 
Canterbury Hospital Board, 20th July 1956). 
It would appear from this statement that improved technology had somewhat 
deskilled the task of hospital cleaning to the point where untrained staff 
could be used without seriously compromising standards of cleanliness. 
Just as in 1948 the economics of contracting out were still of great 
concern in the 1952 Review. The North Canterbury Hospital Board presented 
to the meeting a contract labour schedule in use at one of its institutions 
together with a similar schedule for the cost of performing the same 
service in-house. These two schedules are produced in full in table 7.1 as 
they indicate the way in which cost comparisions were derived between 
private (contractor) and public (hospital board) provision. 
Board claimed that it was ent irely sat isfied with 
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Although the 
the contract, 
notwithstanding its cost plus basis as table 7.1 shows, it stated that, "in 
this rough costing it appears that a saving of just on 3% could be made if 
[the service was] done in-house. If this were applied to the whole of the 
Board's contracts, the annual saving would be approximately £1,864" (RCC 
1952, 3). 
TABLE 7. 1: Comparison of Contract and In-house Cost of Service Provision 
for a New Zealand Public Hospital in 1952 
Provision by Private Contractor 
Supervisor 1 full-time at £8/ 3/ - per week 
General Duties 3 full-time at £7111/ 6 per week 
Relievers 2 full-t ime at £6/ 7110 per week 
Additional Holiday Pay 
Insurance, Employers Liability 
Insurance, Public Risk 
Materials and Cartage 
Advert ising 
Direct Costs 
Additional Overhead and Profit Margin (19% -
Overhead £5-17- 8 
Profit £3- 8- 8 
Provision by In-House Staff 
General duties 3 full-time at £ 7/11/ 6 per week 
Relievers 2 full-time at £ 6/ 7/10 per week 
Part time workers 2 for 4 hours each at £ 4/ 8/- per week 
(including dish-washing and Sundays) 
Polisher 1 for 4 hours at £ 4/ 4/- per week 
(including Sunday) 
Additional Holiday Pay and Employers' Liability Insurance, 
Material, Cartage and Advertising (as for Contract) 
Additional 40 percent of contract overheads for supervision, 
depreciation, repairs, etc. 
Source: Review of Contract Cleaning 1952. 
£ 8- 3- 0 
£22-14- 6 
£12-15- 8 
43-13- 2 
£ 3- 7- 2 
£ 1-18- 8 
1- 6 
£49- 0- 6 
£ 9- 6- 4 
£58- 6-10 
£22-14- 6 
£12-15- 8 
£ 8-16- 0 
£ 4- 4- 0 
£48-10- 2 
£ 3-15- 8 
£ 2- 0- 2 
£ 2- 7- 0 
£56-13- 0 
The Board concluded from this that the small saving would not justify 
taking the service back in-house but went on to add that, "i f to this 
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saving in cost were added the advantages accruing from regaining full 
control over all c1 services, the changeover might be worthwhile" 
(RCC 1952, 3). The advantages of regaining full control were not t 
out in the Review but it seems that providing the cost did not become 
prohibitive and the standard of service remained acceptable then, for North 
Canterbury and most other boards, 
reverting to in-house provision, 
there was insufficient justification for 
Another issue raised in the 1952 Review was that of domestic staff 
accommodat ion. A reason advanced by some boards in favour of retaining 
contract services was that they would not have to sustain the expense of 
providing living quarters for the staff concerned. It was argued by some 
that the capital, maintenance and interest costs of provi extra 
residential accommodation to attract or retain staff tipped the balance 
strongly in favour of remaining with contract services. Ot her boards, 
such as North Canterbury, argued that this point was an irrelevance in 
view of the cost plus nature of the contracts involved: 
[The contractor] could "engage only non-resident staff (if 
possible) and pay transport charges or it could arrange hostel 
accommodation of its own. In either case, as the contract is a 
cost plus one, any additional charges fall back on the Board so 
that the final result would not be greatly different than if the 
Board had provided the same facilities for its own staff (RCC 
1952, 4), 
Basically staff accommodation was only a problem to the extent that it 
represented a financial cost, whether real or imagined, to the boards. It 
cannot therefore be separated from economic factors in 
whether to commence or cease contracting out. 
decisions over 
Once the decision had been made to contract out, the privatised 
system seemed to generate a certain administrative inertia on the part of 
the boards towards any reversion to the previous em of in-house 
provision. But underpinning the entire development of contracting out 
appears to have been the difficult labour supply proble~ Simply to state 
this factor, however, gives no consideration to either the socio-economic 
context in which labour shortages developed or the possibilities of 
political pressures for privatisation. Also requiring investigation is how 
these factors may have affected such uneven geographical development in 
contract service provision. 
7, 4 Contracting Out prior to 1970; Towards 
In the following three sections the intention is to explain the 
geographical basis to contracting out in a more theoretical context. The 
section examines, sequent ially, the macro-social environment, the 
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institutional structures in existence, and finally local and national 
political considerations. 
7.4.1 Socio-economic factors: 
Perhaps the most significant feature of the development of contracting 
out in this period, when compared to the 1980s, was that it occurred in 
od of unpredecented and hitherto unsurpassed economic expansion. 
According to Fougere (1934, 78), the Labour Part y was first elect ed to 
power in 1935 to relieve the distress of the Depression and in the late 
1930s the Government acted to stimulate economic recovery. The 
implementat ion of reflat ionary measures, together with capit al flight 
from the country through distrust of the governments policies, soon led to 
problems with the balance of payments. The remedy adopted by the 
Government was the imposition in 1938 of exchange controls and import 
licences (Fougere 1984, 78). 
Under this regime a round of import substituting industrialisation 
began which provided a considerable demand for labour, both male and 
female, skilled and unskilled. This industrial growth, which commenced 
during the War, expanded considerably afterwards and in a 1973 report by 
the Australia and New Zealand Bank (ANZ, 1973): 
In earlier post war years, import rest rict ions and di fficul ties 
in obtaining overseas supplies stimulated domestic industry and 
encouraged overseas firms to establish their own plants in New 
Zealand or to arrange for manufacture of their products by local 
firms (ANZ 1973, x). 
On this basis the number of people engaged in manufacturing almost doubled 
between 1946 and 1970 although taken as a percentage of the workforce the 
increase was much more modest (table 7.2). 
TABLE 7.2: Employment in New Zealand Manufacturing Industry - 1946-70 
Year Persons Total Percentage of Total 
Ending Engaged in Workforce Workforce Engaged in 
March Manufad uring (oOOs) Manufad uring 
(OOOs) 
1946 124.9 707.9 17.6 
1950 133. 2 735. 9 18. 1 
1955 153. 6 813.9 18.9 
1960 156.8 875.6 17.9 
1965 192.0 991.4 19.4 
1970 229. 1 1,090.7 20.2 
Data source: New Zealand Official Year Book, 1976 and 1981. 
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Unemployment, as measured by official stat ist ics, was 
virtually non-existent and the period was characterised by an overall 
shortage of labour throughout the economy which provided 
rationale for contracting out certain hospital services. 
the primary 
It is also 
apparent from various editions of the Labour and Employment Gazette in the 
1950s that the situation of almost full employment and high labour turnover 
was a problem for employers owing to the difficulty of instilling workplace 
discipline. Such difficulties stimulated the Labour and Employment Gazette 
in 1956 to publish two articles whose titles succintly capture the nature 
of the situation - I The Problem of Full Employment' (LEG, November 1955, 
48-9) and 'Making Bet t er Use of Our Labour Force' (LEG, February 1956, 
13) . 
This 'problem' of full employment, which was seen to underpin the 
workforce discipline problem, existed in spite of there being very little 
industrial activity or union militancy with the exception of a prolonged 
waterfront dispute in 1951. Figure 7.1 illustrates graphically that the 
1950s and most of the 1960s were decades of industrial tranquility and, as 
far as can be ascertained, there was no industrial action at all in public 
hospitals during this period. Nevertheless oyers often had difficulty 
in obtaining what they desired in the way of ' reliabili ty' and 
'responsibility' amongst the workforce at a time when the normal 
disciplinary mechanism of dismissal, or threat thereof, was not such an 
effective remedy in view of the labour shortage. This situation also 
seems to have applied in the hospitals judging from fragments of existing 
records, 
The nat ion wide labour short age however was neither orally nor 
spatially uniform. Although employment data for the period prior to 1970 
is sparse ced ain i ons can be gained. Taking pub 1 ished dat a on 
industry job vacancies as a surrogate for labour shortage, the Monthly 
Review of Employment for 1948 shows considerably fewer vacancies for both 
male and females in the primary sector compared to both the secondary and 
tertiary sectors (table 7.3), Female vacancies in hospitals (table 7.4) 
ranked as the most numerous in the tertiary sector at this time although no 
indication is available as to the particular kind of staff required. As 
the existing records indicate that most tal ancillary services were 
performed by women, the data may go some way t awards veri fying the 
existence of a labour shortage in these services. It must be emphasised 
that the data is given only in terms of job vacancies 'notified' by 
employers to the Department of Labour and so there is likely to be much 
under enumeration d • The data should therefore be treated with caution. 
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FIGURE 7.1: Industrial Disputes between 1948 and 1970 
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TABLE 7.3: Notified Vacancies in Industrial Sectors - 30th November 1948 
Industrial 
Sector 
Primary 
Secondary 
Tert iary 
Total All 
Industries 
Male 
787 
5,547 
5,014 
11,348 
Total 
Female Male and Female 
20 807 
5,874 11, 421 
4,243 9,257 
10, 137 21,485 
Dat a Source: Monthly Review of Employment, November 1948, Department of 
Labour, Wellington. 
This sectoral distinction of job vacancies clearly shows that the 
main demand for labour was in the manufacturing and service industries. It 
is perhaps not surpri th~refore, that the onal job vacancy profile 
shows a distinct urban bias. Unfortunately, for 1948 the regional 
disaggregation of the data, which is by the former Department of Labour's 
employment districts, 
1,000 of the surveyed 
only gives standarised figures (ie vacancies per 
labour force) for males. In view of the high 
proportion of females employed in hospitals this might not give an accurate 
representation of the labour shortage situation in this sector of industry. 
Nevertheless there is some data from the mid 1950s which presents a 
standarised job vacancy profile for both males and females by geographical 
region (table 7.5). 
This time the somewhat more accuarate 'survey' vacancy rather than 
'notified' vacancy data is used. Except for males in October 1956, 
vacancies per 1,000 employees were greater in the main urban districts 
compared to the remainder of the country. Even here caution should still 
be exercised in interpret the data as the Labour Department's survey 
as it did not include seasonal industries many of which would be based 
outside the main urban areass . Notwithstanding this limitation, the 
regional job vacancy profile may at least partially account for the early 
growth of contracting out by hospital boards even if the attempt made in 
Auckland was abortive. 
The seeming anomaly of the Auckland Board becomes clearer on 
examination of the anal job vacancy figures. In both October 1955 and 
1956, the Auckland employment district, which is almost conterminous with 
the Auckland Hospital Board district, shows the lowest job vacancy f 
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TABLE 7.4: NOI'IFIED VACANCIES IN THE TERTIARY SECTOR OF NEW ZEALAND INDUSTRY 
NOVEMBER 1948 I 
MALES ! FEMALES I Total Noti- Satis- Total Total Noti- Satis- Total 
Unsatis- fied tied or Unsatis- Unsatis- fied fied or Unsatis-
fied at During with- fied at fied at During with- tied 
31/10/48 Month drawn 31/11/48 31/10/48 Ivbnth drawn at 
during 31/11/48 
Month 
TranslX)rt and Comnunication 
Transport and Communication 2,238 363 330 2,271 133 45 38 140 
Road, water, air transport 91 29 19 101 20 5 10 15 
Post and Telegraph 597 98 54 641 74 19 21 72 
Sub-total 2,926 490 403 3,013 227 69 69 227 
Distribution and Finance 
Wholesale and retail trade 545 223 186 582 552 129 168 513 
Finance and insurance 164 37 8 193 148 18 13 153 
Other agencies 87 29 3 113 78 29 34 73 
'.J Sub-total 796 289 197 888 778 176 215 739 
co Domestic and Personal Services 
I Hotels and Restaurants 51 33 32 52 473 153 96 530 
Personal Services, Recreation 99 47 42 104 416 189 115 490 
Sub-total 150 80 74 156 889 342 211 1,020 
158 31 27 162 1,675 403 497 1,581 
and hygenic services 36 6 7 35 10 6 1 15 
Educational, professional etc. 51 21 11 61 228 49 67 210 
Government services 512 152 57 607 446 16 26 436 
Local Authorities 71 30 12 89 23 8 15 
Sub-total 828 240 114 954 828 240 114 954 
Other Services 
Sub-total 3 3 3 3 
TERTIARY INDUSTRY TOTAL 4,703 1,102 791 5,014 I 4,276 1,061 1,094 4,243 
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES 10,824 2,963 2,439 11,348 .10,207 1,500 1,570 10,137 
Data Source: Monthly Review of Employment.' November 1948. 
TABLE 7.5: Labour Shortages by Employment Districts 
Survey Vacancies per 1, 000 Survey Employees:*' 
Employment Males Females 
Districts October 1955 Oct ober 1956 October 1955 October 1956 
Auckland 32 19 52 36 
Lower Hutt 96 65 55 40 
Well ington 79 51 80 51 
Christchurch 49 34 57 43 
Dunedin 57 44- 64 49 
Sub Total: 
Urban Districts 52 35 61 43 
-~"----
Whangarei 35 29 37 22 
Hamilton 51 33 4-1 41 
Paeroa 22 20 27 22 
Tauranga 32 24- 23 27 
Rotorua 4-4- 24- 50 35 
Gisborne 4-0 36 30 27 
Napier 55 4-3 34- 40 
Hastings 4-8 36 40 28 
New Plymouth 36 34- 19 20 
Wanganui 56 4-2 4-3 35 
Palmerston North 4-9 34- 43 37 
Masterton 51 48 54 52 
Sub Total: 
Rest of North Is 46 33 38 33 
Blenheim 44- 38 38 31 
Nelson 28 21 49 36 
Westport 32 31 26 9 
Greymouth 64 37 54 56 
Ashburton 51 47 55 47 
Timaru 37 28 32 26 
Oamaru 48 42 29 32 
Invercargill 67 58 56 43 
Sub Total: 
Rest of South Is 50 40 4-6 38 
NEW ZEALAND 50 35 53 40 
'* Excluding Seasonal Industries 
Reproduced from Labour and Employment Gazette, 1957, 29 
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for all the urban centres while in the latter year it is considerably 
lower than in many of the non-urban areas for both males and females. As 
the Labour and Employment Gazette commented: 
The relative weak demand for males in Auckland district is 
reflected in the difficulties experienced in finding work there 
for unskilled males. The demand for female labour in Auckland is 
much stronger, though not as strong as in the other main centres 
(LEG, November 1957, 29). 
The relative weakness in demand for labour in Auckland could account 
for the failure of contractors to gain a substantial foothold there. This 
is clearly at variance with the views expressed earlier by the secretary of 
the Auckland Hospital Board in 1948. Although the female vacancies per 
1,000 of the labour force are not available for that year, the figure for 
males, according to the Monthly Review of Employment, was 19.4 per 1,000 
which was below the national average of 21.0 per 1,000. Clearly the view 
of the Auckland Hospital Board was based on a subjective interpretation of 
the employment situation and in reality the labour shortage there was not 
as severe as in many other ons. 
In the less urbanised areas, contracting out was slower to develop as 
can be seen from the maps for 1950 and 1960 in chapter six. It will also 
be recalled from the previous chapter that the coastal region from East 
Cape (Waiapu) to Wairarapa was the last part of the country to adopt 
contract ancillary services and three of the boards in this region (Waiapu, 
Cook, and Waipawa) have st ill not done so to this day. Significantly 
labour shortages appear not to have been so critical in some of these less 
populous areas and hence the pressure to bring in contractors was reduced. 
With the exception of Masterton (Wairarapa), which had a comparatively 
high level of job vacancies in 1956 (table 7.5), the other employment 
districts covering the eastern parts of the North Island (Gisborne, Napier 
and Hastings) each had lower job vacancies figures for males and females 
than the urban districts. 
Al though the coincidence between hospital board and (Department of 
Labour) employment district boundaries is far from from exact (figure 7.2), 
there are a sufficient number of similarities to permit a statistical 
comparison of contracting out with labour shortages. In table 7.6, data is 
given on male and female job vacancies (per 1,000) for October 1955 and 
1956. The hospitals boards, whose districts closely approximate 
employment districts, are grouped according to those which, by 1960 at 
least, had commenced wit h cont ract service provision. It will be recalled 
from the previous chapter that the exact state of contracting out at any 
time between 1950 and 1960 is uncertain. 
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TABLE 7.6: Coincidence Between HCl_s-Ri t a I Board Districts, Labour Short age 
and Contracting Out for 1955 and 1956 
Hospital Laboul' Shortages; Vacancies Per 1,000 
Board Employment 1955 1956 
Districts Districts Male Female Male Female 
Contracting Out Boards 
Northland Whangarei 35 37 29 22 
Tauranga Tauranga 32 23 24 27 
Palmerston N. 
} Palmerston N. 49 43 34 37 
Dannevirke 
Wellington 79 57 51 51 
Wellington { 
Lower Hutt 96 55 65 40 
Marlborough Blenheim 44 38 38 31 
Canterbury Christchurch 49 57 34 43 
Ashburton Ashburton 51 55 47 47 
S. Canterbury Timaru 37 32 28 26 
Southland Invercargi 11 67 56 58 43 
TOTAL 539 453 408 367 
Median 49 49 36 39 
Mean 53. 9 45. 3 40.8 36. 7 
Non-Cant rad ing Boards 
Auckland Auckland 32 52 19 36 
Thames Paeroa 22 27 20 22 
Cook 
} Gisborne 40 30 36 27 
Waiapu 
Wairarapa Mastedon 51 54 48 52 
Nelson Nelson 28 49 21 36 
Waitaki Oamaru 48 29 42 32 
---~--------------.......-------~-------------------------~» 
TOTAL 221 241 186 205 
Median 36 40 29 34 
Mean 36. 8 40. 2 31. 0 34.2 
The t-Test statistic = 1. 845 for males for 1955 
O. 789 for females for 1955 
1. 417 for males for 1956 
= 0.486 for females for 1956 
For 14 degrees of freedom the critical 5 percent and 1 percent values are 
1. 761 and 2.624 r ively. Consequently only for males for 1955 is the 
difference between group means significant and only at 5 percent. 
Source: compiled from data in Labour and Employment Gazette 1957, 29 
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As table 7.6 mean and median values for the contracting boards 
are consistently higher than for non-contracting groups of boards. With 
the job vacancy data given in rates per 1,000 (of surveyed employees), the 
group arithmetic mean is not strictly valid but the absence of raw data 
precludes the calculating of more precise mean values. Notwi thstanding 
this limitation a t-test was conducted between the means of the two 
groups for 1955 and 1956 for both males and females. This revealed that 
there is no significant difference between them except for males for 1955 
and then only at the five percent level. This would indicate that 
factors other than labour shortages may also have been mediating the 
uneven development of this form of privatisation. 
7. 4. 2 
The major limitation with using regional variations in job vacancies 
as the sole explanatory variable for spatially uneven contract out is 
that the labour shortage was still ubiquitous throughout the country even 
if not uniform wi thin it. Nowhere seems to have had a surfeit of labour 
which would, potentially at least, have given hospitals a ready supply of 
workers. Another factor which seems to have had a retarding influence on 
the development of contracting out in the less urbanised areas relates to 
the internal organisation of the boards themselves. As the previous 
chapter showed, the boards covering rural areas tended to be much smallel' 
in terms of population served and bed numbers, than those in the main urban 
areas. The relevance of institutional size here relates to its effect on 
the division of labour and degree of job specialisation likely to occur. 
The comment s of t he Secret ary at Dannevi rke Hospi t al Board in 1948 
illustrate this point. When previously employed at the North Canterbury 
Hospital Board he strongly recommended the adoption of contracting out at 
Christchurch Hospital. At Dannevirke, although the possibility of 
contracting out domestic cleaning services still existed owing to acute 
staff shortages, there were not, he maintained, the same grounds for 
recommending its adoption as in Christchurch, IIby virtue of [the 
hospital's] much smaller size and consequent inter-relation of many duties 
other than purely domestic ones by members of the staff invol ved' (WHB 
1948, 10). According to records it was not until 1958 that the Board 
finally contracted out its services although no indication was provided as 
to why such a decision was finally made. 
The Nelson Hospital Board pr'esented a similar argument even though the 
population of the board's district was over 000 in 1950. But as the 
hospital itself was very small for a district of this size, having only 
186 beds in 1950, the argument of the effects of institutional size could 
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still hold. The Board secretary is reported as having said in 1948 that if 
contractors were to be involved in providing domestic services it would 
necessitate, "the complete revision of many sections of the staff where 
dual or several services had previously been performed by individuals' (WHB 
1948, 10). Waipawa, which was around the same size as the Nelson Board, 
cited similar reasons for declining to contract out. The Board Secretary 
maintained that, "similar difficulties in regard to persons carrying out 
dual or several services have been forseen and for which the only remedies 
will add considerably to our costs' (WHB 1948, 11). 
The essential point being expressed by these boards was that 
contracting out would entail less flexibility in the control of the work 
force. Contractors would only perform according to what was specified in 
the contract, which might not always conform with the actual requirements 
at the time. By this interchangeability of staff, smallex-- hospital boards 
may have been able to achieve a greater degree of labour productivity than 
larger boards from their existing staff and thereby reduce the pressure to 
engage contractors. In this way some of them managed to provide their own 
services into the 1960s and later while a few have never contracted out at 
all. 
The question that arises then is, what factors in the end precipitated 
these smaller boards into contracting out their services? Some of the 
comments of the former~ Chief Execut ive of the Vincent Hospital Board are 
instructive in this matter: 
In small institutions such as Cr'omwell and Dunstan Hospitals, the 
person responsible for the hiring, firing, organlslng and 
supervision of household/dietary staff was "the Matron". She had 
this task in addition to her responsibilities to supply an 
adequate nursing service. All this put an extremely heavy burden 
on the Matron (in those days always a female), and her free time 
was almost non-exist ant .... So therefore the basic reason to 
contract out the household/dietary services was to free senior 
nursing staff from work they were not trained for and to leave 
them free to carryon with the work they knew best - nursing 
(written personnal communication 25th May 1989). 
The reduced division of labour in smaller boards only seems to have 
delayed, rather than permanent ly prevent ed, the implement at ion of cont ract 
service provision. Problems of work force management brought about by 
labour shortages finally made these boards succumb to the contract option. 
A further factor that seems to have precipitated contracting out was 
the role model of the larger boards. Their general sat isfact ion with 
contract provision and the existence of written correspondence between 
boards suggest that the idea of contracting out expanded through a 
diffusion like process from the larger to the smaller boards. Regrettably 
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records are too incomplete to detail the process in a comprehensive way 
but, whatever its extent, the underlying basis for contracting out 
remained the overall labour shortage generated by national economic 
development. 
7.4-.3 Political Factors 
Thr'oughout most of the time since the end of World War Two, and for 
the duration of the period in which contracting out developed, the 
government in New Zealand was formed by the National (conservative) Party. 
Although this party had a strong committment to the growth of private 
enterprise and might therefore have been thought to have encouraged the 
process of contracting out to the private sector, little evidence exists to 
support this contention. Ironically the earliest development of 
contracting out occurred in the period immediately after World War Two when 
a Labour Government was in office. Labour, with its strong commitment to 
comprehensi ve publ ic provision of services, was in power from 1945 unt 11 
194-9 during which time several hospital boards contracted out at least 
some of their ancillary services. 
During the periods of National Government, which existed from 194-9 to 
1957 and then from 1960 to 1972, considerable emphasis was placed on the 
encouragement of private hospitals in particular and private enterprise in 
general. This is illustrated by some of the parliamentary speeches of the 
time as cited in Hansard. - For example, in 1950 the member for Tauranga 
argued that: 
It is a very serious thing for this country that so many private 
hospitals and maternity homes have gone out of existence during 
recent years (Hansard 1950, 874). 
A few years later the member for Palmerston North maintained that: 
Private Hospitals should be encouraged, first because they reduce 
the number of beds required in public hospitals and therefore the 
capital cost to the Government and secondly because they provided 
a service for the class of person who preferred a pri vat e room 
and the choice of his own doctor and was prepared to pay more for 
these privileges .... The cost per bed in a private hospital would 
be much less than in a public hospital and encouraging people to 
go into pri vat e hospitals would save the Government a great deal 
of expense (Hansard 1953, 2257) 
while in 1954, according to the Minister of Health: 
The present Government believes that private hospitals perform a 
valuable function in supplementing the services performed by 
public hospitals and since we have been the Government we have 
given considerable encouragement to private hospitals to continue 
their work and in some cases expand their act i vi ties <Hansard 
1954, 376). 
The enthusiasm for private hospitals did not it seems extend to the 
private contracting of public hospital services. Perhaps in view of the 
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economic circumstances under which contracting out took place this 
observat ion is not so surprising. The process invariably resulted in 
greater financial costs to the b.oards than if they had provided the 
services themselves. Contracting out then hardly appeared to be a matter 
of economic expediency in which claims might be 1 for t he great er 
'efficiency' of private enterprise even if, as was sometimes claimed, the 
contractors made a more efficient use of labour. Unlike the case of 
private tals, contracting out ancillary services could not, in this 
period at least, be seen as a way of reducing government expenditure on 
hospital services. 
The bureaucratic arm of government, in the form of the Department of 
Health, was aware nonetheless that where contracting out was resorted to 
then it should be by periodic competitive tender. The provisions of the 
1956 Hospitals Act which the Department had to administer were such that 
hospital boards could not let contracts for terms greater than three years 
without prior consent from the Minister of Health. The Department has also 
required, or at least recommended, that competitive tenders should be 
called if only to minimise the cost of contract out. Much of the 
available evidence however suggests that this requirement was often 
observed in t he breach. According to the secretary of the Marlborough 
Hospital Board in a letter of 9th June 1969 to the Wairarapa Hospital 
Board: 
The Board could not agree that the [Department's] recommendation 
[for contracting out by competitive tendering] is as good in 
practice as it might seem in theory and consequently decided that 
it would change the basis of the contract with Crothalls and also 
review it annually .... The Department of Health still contends 
that it is desirable to call tenders for contracts of this nature 
but the Board is not prepared to agree with them. 
Whatever the views and requirements of the central government on 
contracting out for services they seemed to have had very little control 
over hospital board policy decisions in these matters. 
In respect of the regionally uneven development of contracting out, no 
evidence was found at the individual board level to indicate any 
correspondence with the political affiliations of board members. The main 
difficulty with citing the political factor at the regional level as an 
explanatory variable for uneven privatisation is that hospital boards have 
generally not been elected along party political lines, contra national 
parliament and local government elections. In the context considered here 
there has not then been any neat Labour/National divide between the boards 
to compare with any particular spatial pattern of contracting out. 
Indeed hospital board elections could be compared with the so-called 
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'reform movement' in US local administration and their advocation of 'non-
partisan' elections. "The ethos of the reform movement", according to 
Johnston <1979, 51), "was anti-partisan and in favour of 'good' government 
for all", notwithstanding the claim that, "Reform was an upper middle class 
movement and its successes were in the conservative, small suburban 
municipalities [in the USA and Canada]" (Johnston 1979, 51). 
will be discussed further in the following chapter but as 
This matter 
the New 
Zealand hospital boards, but it is worth noting that board members claimed 
to represent the community as a whole rather than a sectional or class 
interest. Furt hermore, even if any regional variations in the political 
composi t ion of board members had been discernable, it might have borne 
little relationship to the ial pattern of contracting out in view of 
the generally greater financial cost 
with board provision. 
that this policy entailed compared 
Concl usion: 
This chapter has shown how private contracting for the provision of 
public hospital ancillary services developed primarily as a consequence of 
the post World War Two boom in the national economy which entailed an 
associated high demand for labour in both manufactur and service 
industries. Changing condi t ions wi thin the hospital boards were also 
significant features in establishing the need for ancillary workers as the 
nursing profession sought to eliminate what were becoming considered to be 
non-nursing duties. By contracting out certain ancillary services boards 
were able to divest themselves of the problems of workforce recruitment. 
Explaining the cally uneven development of contract provided 
services is somewhat more problematic, primarily because the data is very 
fragmentary. Nevertheless regional variat ions in the labour market, as 
measured by job vacancies, go some way to explaining why the initial 
development of contract out occurred largely, although not exclusively, 
within the boards centred on major urban areas. The boards based on less 
urbanised districts, not only seemed to suffer less from labour shortages, 
but because of their smaller size could make more effective use of the 
labour they possessed and so obviate the immediate need for contractors. 
Two main reasons appear to have been 
persuading the smaller boards int 0 pri vat e contract 
ble for finally 
First was the 
persistence of al responsibility for ancillary workers being 
shouldered by nursing administration and second was the generally 
\ 
satisfactory experience of large boards with contract services. In I summary it may be said that the geography of contracting out public 
\ 
hospital ancillary services in the 1950s and 1960s was largely a product of 
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industrial expansion and variations in the organisational characteristics 
of the different boards. 
The remaining issue is to set the explanations in terms of the broad 
theoretical frameworks established in chapters two and three. A degree 
of reluctance on the part of board management to privatisation has been 
evident as public choice theory would suggest, although no evidence was 
found for the uneven development of contracting out to be a reflection of 
electoral political processes. In view of public sector bureaucrats' 
alleged maximisation tendencies their seeming reluctance to contract out 
services appears consistent with the theory. On closer inspection however 
the maximisation thesis is difficult to sustain since during the period 
under consideration, contracting out was not a matter of economic 
expediency. State (hospital board) provision was generally more economical 
but administratively much more difficult. As contracting out occurred 
primarily on account of acute labour shortages throughout the country the 
process may most appropriately be set wi thin terms of Weberian 
'bureaucratic rationalisation'j it eased the administrative burden of 
hospital managers. 
As the existence of these labour shortages was contingent upon the 
rapid growth of the economy or, in other words, capitalist development, 
then any comprehensive explanation of this privatisation cannot be divorced 
from the macro-social context. Constant efforts were made throughout the 
early period to raise the productivity of labour in order to overcome the 
labour shortage and it was often thought that contractors could do tr..is 
more effectively that could the hospital boards themselves. Within a 
Marxian perspective, contracting out, when set in terms of the balance of 
class forces, presents itself as a device to maximise the productivity 
(exploitation) of the existing, but numerically insufficient, labour force. 
The geographically uneven development of contracting out is perhaps 
best explained in terms of regional variations in the structure of 
bureaucracies or more specifically the hospital boards. But taken in 
isolation from the broader socio-economic context this only provides a 
superficial explanation of the process. The underlying social basis of 
contracting out must be based within the framework of enhanced national 
capital accumulation. Perhaps the most significant theoretical conclusion 
to be drawn from the empirical st udy undertaken in this chapter is that 
privatisation by contracting out, in as much as it is a means to increase 
labour productivity and/or shed managerial responsibility, is just as much 
indicated in times of economic expansion as in times of economic recession. 
It is to study the process under these latter conditions that is the 
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subject of the following chapter. 
Footnotes: 
Waipawa Hospital Board became the Central Hawkes Bay 
1986. 
tal Board in 
2 Plunket, known officially as the Royal New Zealand Society for the 
Health of Women and Children was formed in 1907, with the purpose being to 
disseminate scientific methods of feeding and training children so that, in 
the words of the founder Truby King, .. the main supplies of population for 
our asylums hospitals, benevolent institutions, goals, and slums would be 
cut off at sources" (King 1913, 151 cited in Olssen 1981, 259), 
3 Nod h Cant erbury Hospi tal Board became t he Cant erbury Hospi t al Board 
in 1983. 
4- Morrison (1989, 53) argues that over the 1981-1988 od, I notified' 
vacancies in New Zealand accounted for only about half of all advertised 
vacancies. The level of under enumeration of notified vacancies for the 
1950s has not been ble to ascertain. 
5 According to the Labour and Employment Gazette <February 
I surveyed' vacancy data, "includes working proprietors and 
employees but excludes one-man businesses, own account workers, 
employees and farming, fishing, hunting, waterfront and 
househo1 d domesti c servi ce and armed forces". 
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1957, 20), 
full-time 
part-time 
personnel, 
CHAPTER 8 
Contemporary Developments in the Contracting Out Of Public Hospital 
Ancillary Services 
Three distinct phases have been identified in the historical 
development of contracting out public hospital ancillary services. The 
first was marked by, a development in cont ract ing out which 
lasted until around the late 1960s and this was followed by a in 
which there was a period of virtual stagnation in the process. In the 
third phase, beginning in the late 1970s and lasting to at least the mid 
1980s, there were many changes by the hospital boards to their ancillary 
service provision. This occurred even though the total aggregate index of 
privatisation remained fairly constant from 1975 to 1989 as judged by the 
quantifiable terms used in chapter six. 
The previous chapter discussed the geographical devel of 
contracting out in the earliest phase while the prime purpose of this, and 
the subsequent, chapter is to analyse the process in the two more recent 
phases. In discussing the early development of contract ing out, it was 
seen that the process could only be explained with reference to the growth 
of the nat ional economy and its associated 'problem' of labour shortages. 
As the cont ract ing out assumed a very di fferent developmental 
form in the two subsequent identified, but particularly the third 
one, it is important to consider the changes that have taken place in the 
socio-economic environment of New Zealand since the late 1960s and relate 
them to the observed changes in private contract provision. To present a 
comprehensive account of New Zealand's economic development over the last 
two decades is beyond the scope of this thesis but in the first section of 
this chapter, some of the most salient features are identified. 
The second section discusses changes that have occurred over the last 
two decades in 
Together with 
the financing of hospi tal 
the changed socio-economic 
boards by cent ral government. 
condi t ions, the increasing 
financial constraints on tal boards provides the context for attempts 
to explain the geographical development of contracting out of hospital 
ancillary services since around 1970. the theoretical frameworks 
upon which this thesis is based, the subsequent three sections are devoted 
to attempts to explain the sectoral, spatial and temporal development of 
private provision in a period of general economic recession. A sixth 
section looks at how to the political composition of national and 
regional authorities may also have had an 
private sector provision. In the final 
t on t he uneven growt h of 
section of the chapter the 
relevance of certain managerial (bureaucratic) processes to the development 
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/ 
of contracting out in the 1970s 
pot ent i a1. 
are examined for their explanatory 
8,1 New Zealand's Economic Development since the late 1960s: 
The late 1960s and early 1970s marked a watershed in the development 
of the New Zealand economy, For Gould <1982, 113) the period 1967-75 was 
the end of the "golden weather" that had existed since World War Two and 
"the prosperous years of the early and mid sixties were brought to an end 
by a balance of payment crisis arising in large part from the downturn in 
growth rates in Western Europe and the UKn (Gould 1982, 114). Marking the 
period 1967-68 was the first post war devaluation, a nil general wage 
order by the Arbitration Court, the highest unemployment rate since the 
Depression and the most rapid inflation since the Korean boom (Gould 1982, 
115) . Also at this time, although much less publici was the first 
restrict ion on the spending of hospital boards, a point that will be 
commented on further in the next section, 
Economic historians whether Marxist (eg Steven 1985) or non-Marxist 
(eg Hawke 1985) maintain that, historically, economic (capitalist) , 
development in New Zealand has been largely 
trading agricultural produce (land rent) 
founded on receipts from 
rather than on profitable 
investment in manufacturing industry (wage labour). The gradual decline in 
the international competitiveness of New Zealand agriculture from the late 
1960s, provided a stimulus for the basis of national development to be 
redirected towards manufacturing industries in which profit would accrue 
from the productive employment of wage-labour rather than the receipt of 
rent (Steven 1985, 45), In part icular export manufad uring, rather than 
import substituting, industry was seen as the way ahead, 
Hawke (1985, 326): 
According to 
the fastest growing component of the international economy during 
the 1960s was the internat ional exchange of manufact ured goods 
[but] New Zealand did not share that experience,., and ... with 
the devaluation of 1967, manufactured exports were seen as the 
vehicle for participation in world economic growth 
The critical point for Steven (985) is that this policy required a 
much higher than hitherto existing degree of labour productivity so that 
domestically produced goods could compete with foreign imports. In a 
highly regulated and protected economy, such as was New Zealand, wage 
r in general, could be conceded by employers if only because wages 
could simply be passed on in price rises as there was virt ually no 
competitive market. The high value of agricultural exports in the world 
market was such that, up to the 1970s, both high wages, full employment, 
and an economy with low labour productivity could be sustained (Steven 
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1985, 45), This situation no longer held after the late sixties and 
consequently manufacturing was required, "to stand on its own feet rather 
than to be an employment sponge and a means of utili talents not 
catered for in farming' (Hawke 1985, 326) 
The crisis of the late 1960s was relieved in the early 1970s by a 
brief commodity boom but, in the words of Gould <1982, 123) II the good old 
days of the early and mid sixities refused to returnll , due largely to the 
persistence of inflation and deteriorating industrial relations. In 
respect of the latter, Gould comments that: 
Following the nil wage order of 1968 wage negotiations had moved 
definitively from the arena of the Court of Arbitration into that 
of direct bargaining, and unions which had hardly tested their 
muscle since the crushing defeat of 1951 quickly came to realise 
their strength. Big wage demands were made and conceded under 
the threat or reality of strike action; working days lost in 
industrial disputes were twice as numerous in 1970 as in 1968, 
when they were already at more than twice the average level of 
the mid 1960s (Gould 1982, 124). 
From the late 1960s, but particularly from the mid 1970s there was a steady 
rise in both the numbers of registered unemployed and the levels of 
industrial (class) conflict as measured by working days lost through strike 
act ion (figure 8. 1). 
By the mid 1970s the commodity 'boom', which had sustained economic 
growth in the early seventies, had 'bust' and New Zealand's terms of trade 
fell "continuously and catastrophically.... caused primarily by a massive 
increase in import prices of which, the component came of course 
from the first series of oil price I hikes' by the OPEC countries . .. II (Gould 
192, 131). After a brief spell of Labour Government from 1972, a 
deteriorat ing economic sit uat ion and a general mood of political 
conservatism in the population at large ensured the election of a National 
Government from 1975 to 1984. 
The need to induce higher levels of labour productivity in the 
workforce from the late 1960s required a variety of policies that have 
come to be known collectively as, indust rial (capitalist) 
, rest ruct uring' . If by the term' restructuring' is meant the exposing of 
New Zealand industry to international competition so that, II the weaker 
capi talist enterprises could ei ther become strong or be destroyed 
altogetherJl (Gallagher and Swainson 1985, 22) then this policy could be 
said to have commenced with the 1975-1984 National Government. Some the 
major changes implemented during this time were the deregulation of 
transpol~t and freezing works, taxation reform, some tariff reduction, as 
for example with Closer Economic Relations (CER) with Austral state 
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incentives to engage in new forms of agriculture such as hort i cuI t ure, 
viticulture, and silviculture, and large energy producing projects designed 
to reduce dependence on imported fuels, typically the I think big' projects 
(see Edl in 1984 and Terry 1984). According to Gallagher and Swainson 
<1985, 21) towards the end of the 1970s 'restructuring' became referred 
to as • export led' growth, while in the early 1980s it was' think big' and 
'CER' shortly after. From the 19808 onwards, 'privati8ation' has arguably 
been the predominant style of 'restructuring' taking the form of the 
corporatisation, commercialisation and sale of much of the state sector 
and the further deregulation of finance and commodity markets. 
It was not only productive activity that started to be 'restructured' 
from the mid 1970s onwards as, according to Fougere 0984, 78), It the 
breakdown of the Import Substitution Industry economy threatened the 
maintenance of Welfare State provision". 
increased state expenditure to provide 
Export manuf act uring required 
subsidies, which result ed in 
great er st ress for Welfare provision, and has been vividly described by 
Consedine (1984). Indeed fhe whole Welfare State was beginning to show 
strains in the 1970s and the growing belief that it could no longer deliver 
all that was promised contributed in no small way to the increased 
political conservatism of New Zealand society as a whole. A maj or report 
by the New Zealand Planning Council in 1979 (NZPC 1979) pointed the need 
for a reassesment of its role while Maharey (1987, 78) claimed that: 
After 40 years of constant use the welfare state was beginning to 
collapse. People could not get into the public health system, 
they had to pay for their children's education, they were treated 
like criminals by the Social Welfare Department and made to feel 
like lay-a-bouts by the Labour Department. This was not the good 
society everyone hoped for. 
During this early phase of industrial 'restructuring', significant 
changes were made by cent ral government, to hospital board financing in 
order to reduce hospit al costs. Not surprisingly t he deli very of 
hospital ancillary services came to be subjected to ever greater financial 
pressure and maj or changes were made by many hospital boards to their 
contracting out policies in this area. 
The financial pressure was indeed intensified rather than alleviated 
in the mid to late 1980s under the fourth Labour Government elected in 
1984. This government pursued the previous National Administration's 
pol icies of deregulat ion much more vigorously and ext ensi vly and, 
paradoxically for a Labour Government, followed a monetarist approach to 
economic management. If levels of unemployment are taken as a general 
proxy for the level of economic activity, it is seen from figure 8.1 that 
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depressed conditions existed in New Zealand well into the late 1980s. 
At risk of oversimplification, economic conditions in New Zealand have 
been based on expansion to the late 1960s, followed by almost a decade of 
instability to the late 1970s and ion throughout the 1980s. All 
this coincides closely with the three different 
hospi tal services identi fied earlier in the thesis. 
of contracting out 
However it must be 
emphasised immediately that changing macro-economic conditions such as have 
just been described cannot be used in any deterministic way to explain the 
development of privatised ancillary service provision. For as the previous 
two chapters have shown, cont ract ing out hospital services can occur just 
as much in times of expansion as recession. The theoret ical linkage then 
between economic growth, or in Marxian terms, capital accumulation, and 
privatisation is both complex and contradictory. In the next section the 
made by Government to hospital boards' funding are examined in the 
context of the above developments. 
8.2 The Financing of the New Zealand Public Hospital System: 
It was seen in chapter five that in 1958 New Zealand public hospitals 
became entirely centrally funded from government taxation while being 
regionally administered. This basic system has remained to the pre13ent 
but it has undergone a series of changes since the 1950s. Initially the 
government made annual grants according to each board's own ture 
estimates. Problems with boards exceeding these grants and the st rise 
in health care expenditure stimulated the government in 1968 to change 
the method by which funding took place. 
In the Hospital's Amendment Act of that year hospital boards had to 
work within allocations fixed by Government rather than by themselves and 
this seems to have been the first legislative measure taken to contain 
tal costs. But costs of hospital provision continued to rise and by 
the late 1970s the growing pressure on the Welfare State ment ioned above 
stimulated the Government to make further restrictions in the overall 
financial allocations to boards. All boards were required to accept a 
one reduction in their allocation of funds in 1979-80, 1980-81 and 
in 1981-82 (NZOYB 1984, 174). 
Immediately following these one percent reductions, an attempt was 
made, not so much to reduce allocations per 5e, but to alter their 
distribution amongst boards so as to achieve a more effective utilisation 
of resources. The system that existed since 1968 was seen to have 
perpetuated the historical pattern of expenditure over the years without 
forcing any review of services by boards or their justification in times of 
The existing system of allocation was deemed to be inequitable. 
-195-
Barnett et a1 (1980) reported on the wide variation of services provided 
between the boards, princi lyon account of their enormous size 
difference, and maintained that, "it would be impractical, as well as 
financially irresponsible, to pro\>'ide a wide range of medical services in 
each board area" (Barnett et al 1980, 252). Patients requiring specialist 
treatment only available in a few centres would have to travel away from 
their own hospital district and so the expense of their treatment is born 
by the board to which they travelled. Also these boards would have had to 
maintain specialised equipment and staff plus provide teaching and research 
facilities all of which added to their financial burden (Barnett et al 
1980, 252), 
In trying to overcome these inequities, a 'population based' funding 
formula was applied to each board, starting in 1982, and founded upon 
similar lines to the Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP) implemented 
in Britain in 1976. Instead of allocating according to previous year's 
increments, each board would have its annual grant assessed on the basis of 
changing needs where need was calculated on series of largely 
demographic characteristics of the board's population. Under this scheme 
some boards wel'e identified as being over funded and some as underfunded 
against a 'norm' and by cutting some board's allocation and increasing 
others within the overall allocation the objective was to move all boards 
to 'equity' (Barnett 1984, 986), 
In practice however this goal of equity proved difficult to achieve 
partly in view of the problematic nature of determining what equity is and 
partly through trying to implement the enormous redistribution that would 
be required to achieve it. Moreover hospital costs have continued to rise 
and boards, especially those covering the major urban centres, have 
experienced increasing difficulty keeping within their maintenance 
allocations. Consequently this method of funding for tals is 
reviewed and at the time of writing the position in respect of future 
arrangements is unclear. 
Perhaps the most critical point to emerge from the above two sections 
is that the Changes in hospital board funding from 1979 coincided with 
rising hospital care costs and deteriorating macro-economic conditions and 
growing political conservatism. Both these factors placed the welfare 
sector of the state apparatus under considerable fiscal pressure. It is 
t heref are necessary to see how hospi t al boards responded tot he changed 
fiscal conditions compared with the 1950s and 1960s in respect of the 
provision of their ancillary services. For if the or ns of contracting 
out these services was contingent upon national and regional labour 
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shortages, clearly a very different rationale for the process must have 
existed in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. These issues are 
addressed in the following sections. 
8.3 Changes to Hospital Bgards' Contracting Out Policies: Theoretical 
Considerat ions: 
In terms of theoretical explanations of privatisation, the public 
choice framework argues that state sector managers will not privatise 
service provision unless required to do so by economic and political 
pressures. Only by contracting out to introduce market forces into the 
state sector, will bureau budgets be trimmed to a level consistent with 
what public choice theorists see as the 'public interest·. The Weberian 
perspecti ve on the other hand sees managers themselves promot ing 
pri vat isation policies to ieve themselves of managerial responsi bilit y. 
This situation is deemed to hold particularly where the workforce is 
militant or generally 'troublesome' so the underlying rationale for 
privatisation may be covertly political rather than, or as well as, overtly 
economic. Finally t he Marxian- perspect i ve, like public choice theory, sees 
privatisation as being a deliberate policy to reinforce the law of value, 
but unlike the latter, sees the implementation of the process as hinging 
critically upon the balance of class forces extant at any 
or industry. 
ven time, place 
It is, therefore, largely within the terms of public choice theory 
that the development of privatised service provision might be expected to 
be a direct reflection on the variations across time and space in economic 
and political constraints on state sector service provision. In the 
following sections the intention is to see how hospital boards' 
contracting out policies have changed in the seventies and eighties due to 
both increasing financial constraints on hospital boards, and changes in 
the political preferences of power brokers within these bureaucracies. 
The financial factors are considered first and following the analytical 
methodology developed in chapter six, they are discussed in relation to the 
sectoral, temporal and spatial dimensions of the development of private 
cont ract ing. To start with however it is instructive to see how, in terms 
of cost structul-es, ancillary services have been affected, since the mid 
1970s, vis a vis other hospital services. 
8.4 Comparative Cost Reductions to Hospital Services: 
Central governments have, since 1968 at least, always specified the 
total funding for each board, but it has been left to each boards' 
management, albeit with the approval of the elected members, to decide how 
the total allocation should be divided between the different services 
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provided. The only source of data available for making sectoral 
comparisons between hospital services is Hospital Management Data available 
from 1975 to 1988. Table 8.1 shows a division of total hospital costs 
between six different services, one of which is the ancillary sector and 
all of which exclude major capital expenditure. 
An intersectoral comparative measure of rising hospital costs over 
the 1975-1988 pedod can be gained from the data in table 8.1 which is 
illustrated graphically in figure 8.2. The time span considered is divided 
into approximately two halves - 1975-81 and 1981-88 and all costs have 
been reduced, respectively, to 1975 and 1981 values using the average 
annual Consumer Price Index. This 
of the many changes to hospital 
division in time span is made in view 
boards contracting out policies that 
occurred around 1981 in that some boards went out to contract while others 
reverted to in-house provision. The means of hospital board funding also 
changed around this time with the advent of the population based formula. 
In column (7) of table 8.1 it is seen that total hospital costs, have 
risen in real terms in both time periods. It is particularly noteworthy 
that the housel<eeping sector, where most contract ing out has occurred, has 
undergone the most significant reductions in the 1981-88 period, compared 
with all other services even those within the ancillary sector. Taking the 
ancillary services as a whole, they have shown still greater reductions 
than other services for this period. The situation is not quite so clear 
cut in the earlier period, but with the exception of diagnostic services, 
housekeeping shows the lowest increase of all services. 
There are two important points to make here. The first is that no 
claim is being made that ancillary services have been the only ones to have 
had to sustain financial cutbacks. On the cont rary records show that 
virtually all sectors had to make certain savings even if their costs in 
real terms have risen. The second point is that the most stringent 
reductions, especially in the 1980s, have come in the ancillary sector, 
especially housekeeping. 
In terms of theoretical frameworks, a public choice explanation for 
this sectoral variation in cost reductions would be based on the relative 
political lobbying strengths of the i ve sect ional int erests. To the 
extent that this was the case, it will be recalled from chapters five and 
six that heads of housekeeping services do not have the same access to 
senior board managment as do heads of other services. There is not 
therefore a similar administrative structure between the different sectors 
in which participants could have an equal platform upon which to lobby for 
funds as is assumed in the pluralist variant of public choice theory. 
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TABLE 8.1: Costs of Public Hospital Services in New Zealand 1975-1988 (in NZ$10,OOOs) 
(1) ( 2) (3) (4) ( 5) ( 6) ( 7) 
General Diagnostic Hotel (Ancillary) Engineer- Adminis- Ccmnunity All Hospital 
Treatment Services Services ing/Main- tration Services Services (Total) 
Services House- Laundry Dietary tenance Services 
1975 11966 1000 1690 1000 2499 1000 460 1000 1567 1000 1818 1000 3066 1000 585 1000 23651 1000 
1976 15447 878 2109 849 -3064 834 568 840 1853 821 2198 822 3626 1206 736 856 29603 862 
1977 17590 856 2438 840 3682 867 688 87l 2182 821 2707 867 4553 1101 890 885 731 865 
--
1978 25097 1068 2812 847 5078 1035 968 1071 3588 1166 4276 1198 6135 1374 -1096 937 49049 1057 
I979 28451 1081 3127 842 5471 1004 f071 1060 3999 1162 4793 1199 7664 1019 127l 971 55613 1071 
1980 33387 1152 3683 871 6267 993 1226 1066 4682 1195 5418 1192 8441 1136 1577 1059 64606 1093 
1981 398641137 4480 905 7635 1043 1463 1086 5500 1199 6810 Q'Z2. 10825 ~ 2480 1422 79056 ~ 
1981 39864 1000 4480 1000 7635 1000 1463 1000 5500 1000 6810 1000 10825 1000 2480 1000 79056 1000 
1982 49441 1075 5931 1147 9136 1037 1776 1052 6881 1084 8261 1051 11848 949 3057 1068 96330 1055 
1983 61874 -:[582 6611 1101 9842 962 2057 1049 7584 1029 9517 1043 15053 1038 3682 1108 116134 1096 
1984 65210 1369 76:33 1091 9320 851 2205 1047 7799 887 9361 956 129-i9 829 4729 1325 118698 1041 
1985 67577 1110 7494 1096 9847 848 I 2055 920 8017 955 9610 925 13793 ~ 5170 1365 123653 1023 
1986 78161 1112 8189 1037 11071 825 2317 898 9098 938 11137 928 17934 940 6496 1486 145403 1041 
1987 103602 1302 11270-1261 13007 856 2835 971 949 13180 970 22421 1037 8570 1731 185789 1175 
1988 117108 1272 12965 1253 14811 840 2820 844 11124 ~ 14243 906 28711 ~ 109ff4 1918 212736 1163 
-_._ ....... _-
-
The right hand figures in each column have been adjusted for inflation by reducing all prices -Eetween 1975-and 1981 
to 1975 levels and be1:\veen 1981 and 1988 to 1981 levels, using annual average Consumer Price Index. 
Owing to rounding errors, costs of services may not add up to total costs. 
Data Source: Hospital Management Data .& New Zealand Official Yearbook, i various years. 
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Moreover, as already seen in a previous chapter, taking ancillary services 
in toto, the workforce does not possess relevant professional or trade 
qualifications as exhibited in other sectors and this factor no doubt 
serves to advance the political power of these other sectors within the 
bureaucracy. The sectoral variation in cost reductions, particularly as 
they relate to ancillary services, is perhaps more plausibly explained in 
terms of a Weberian framework based on differing power structures between 
services rather than political lobbying. 
This account of sect oral di fferences in costs of service provision 
still leaves open questions relating to how contracting out in 
ancillary sectors has affected the costs of service 
following sect ion examines, in a spatial and temporal 
contention that hospital boards' cont ract ing out policies 
accordance with changes to central government funding. 
8.5 Contracting Out and Financial Restrictions 
provision. 
cont ext, 
have changed 
the 
The 
the 
in 
This section is considered in two parts. The first looks at the 
contradictory nature of much of the evidence for citing contracting out as 
the source of cost savings while the second attempts to analyse the 
contracting out policies in terms of spatial variations in financial 
constraints on hospital boards. 
8.5. 1 Contracting Out and Cost Savings: The Evidence: 
After the changed method of funding introduced in 1968 the provision 
of hospital ancillary services started to come under increasing financial 
pressure, although data on costs of provision is not available prior to 
1975. Nevertheless remaining board records are supportive of this 
cont ent ion. In 1970, the Secretary (Chief Executive) of the Wairarapa 
Board reported that: 
Now that hospital boards are on fixed Government grants any 
economies effect ed will result in money becoming available for 
other purposes, part icularly replacement of equipment and 
maintenance of buildings. Weekend work with time and half for 
Saturday and double time for Sundays is particularly expensive 
and any reduction of work on these days can result in substantial 
economies. For nurses' homes, some boards have cut out all 
weekend work and despite initial opposition, the result has 
proved adequate (internal memorandum, 3rd June 1970). 
Also around this time the market for ancillary services was beginning to 
expand. For those boards which opted for competitive tendering, the 
increasing market competition could reduce costs of service provision 
although the results were not always to the boards' liking. 
Many boards, though exactly how many it has not been possible to 
determine, maintained a policy of negotiating savings with the incumbent 
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contractor. Where competitive tendering had been resorted to, the 
Wairapapa Board's Secretary, cited above, remarked that: 
A number of hospital boards have called tenders, accepted the 
lowest price and then become involved in very serious difficulty 
with a new contractor due to inexperience, too Iowa tender price 
to provide a service, poor supervision, etc. Other boards have 
made an annual review of the contract and negotiated considerable 
savings by a critical assessment of every duty laid down in the 
task schedule <internal memorandum, 3rd June 1970). 
Only a few years later, the Secretary of the Palmerston North Board in a 
letter of 3rd April 1974 to the Secretary of the West Coast Board stated 
that: 
the Vacuum [Cleaning Company] were extremely keen to obtain 
the contract for this Hospital <which is well over $100,000 pa) 
and that they reduced every cost to a minimum and this includes 
prof i t and thus have no margi n to meet the exigenc i es of the 
service. 
Economies were therefore being sought in these services in the early 
1970s but it was not until some years later that major changes started to 
occur in contract ing out arrangement s. Although no direct reference has 
been found to the one percent overall cuts that started in 1979, it is 
significant that so many changes oicurred from this time on. To continue 
using the Wairarapa and Palmerston North Boards as examples, in 1979 both 
these spatially contiguous boards decided to adopt in-house provision. 
Records for that year do not exist for Palmerston North (nor for Wanaganui 
which also terminated its contract services that same year), but for 
Wairarapa, the Secretary (different from 1970) reported to the Board 
members t ha t : 
[to] dispense with outside contractors .... would save the Board 
between $25,000 and $50,000 pa but figures are difficult to set 
out with any degree of accuracy owing to the lack of information 
available on the actual wage costs paid out by Crothall 
Industries Ltd and the size of their profit (memorandum to 
Chairman and Members of Board, 11th September 1978). 
It will be recalled from chapter six that Maniototo also found it 
financially advantageous to dispense with contract provision. Also shown 
in that chapter was that other boards having problems with contractors put 
their services out to competitive tender in order to reduce costs rather 
than revert to in-house provision. 
Around the same time however, some boards which had hitherto provided 
their own services, decided to experiment with the contract option. For 
example, the Hawkes Bay Board decided to contract out its domestic 
cleaning services in 1980 on the basis that, "cost comparisons show 
Crothalls' tender as being $391,292 pa lower than the Board's budgeted 
cost" (memorandum to Board members, nd)' Similarly the much smaller 
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Thames Board predicted savings of around $18,000 pa at Thames hospital 
alone by contracting out the domestic cleaning and orderly services 
(written communication from Crothalls Ltd to Board Chief Executive, 26th 
September 1979). Discussions with the Auckland, Otago and South Otago 
Boards also revealed cost savings as the rationale for contracting out but 
no f were available. The significant point is that these boards 
adopted the opposite policy to Wairarapa, Palmerston North, Wanganui and 
Maniototo but for the same reason; cost savings. 
In of attempts to achieve cost savings in ancillary service 
provision four policy opt ions can be ident Hied, not all of which are 
mutually exclusive; to cancel existing contracts; to contract out; to 
tender out existing contracts and; to reduce service specifications in 
existing contracts. In the first case savings could be made by 
eliminat the payout on contractors' profits and overhead expenses. The 
second case works on the assumption that the contractors' greater 
'management expertise' would enable significant savings notwithstanding 
their red profit In both the third and fourth cases cost 
reductions come from reduced contractors' profits and levels of service 
provision as well as retaining the al expertise. Faced with 
increasing financial constraints the hospital boards responded with 
attempts to reduce ancillary service costs by anyone or more of the above 
methods. Viewed from a strictly temporal perspective it is clear that 
contracting out policies changed significantly with the advent of more 
constrained financial conditions. 
The differences in response to these constraints by the various 
hospital boards is not easy to explain in terms of the theoretical 
frameworks of the thesis. It is not so much the adoption of contracting 
out that is theoretically problematic but rather the opposite icy of 
reverting to, or remaining with, in-house provision. The contract option 
is readily explained in terms of all three theories. For public choice 
theory there is the all greater economic efficiency of private 
provision while for organizat ional (managerialist) theory, the divest ment 
of managerial problems associated with the need for cost makes 
contracting out attractive. Finally Marxian theory would see the need to 
increase the oitation of the labour force as being the rationale behind 
adopting contract provision. 
On the other hand the termination of contracting out or retention of 
in-house provision, part icular ly under conditions of financial const raint, 
clearly runs counter to the first two theories. Neither can the third 
theory Marxian class conflict - be invoked as the time period in which 
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these changes in policy occurred preceded the advent of labour militancy 
and the workforce campaign against privatisation. This issue will be 
considered further in the following chapter but for the present suffice to 
note that two possible explanations exist in respect of hospital boards 
which did not adopt the contract option. 
The first, although this is not to imply any degree of relative 
importance, relates more to managerial than strictly financial 
considerations. For those boards that ended contract provision, the 
staffing 1 as specified in the contracts, would probably have been 
regarded as optimal for the desired level of service provision. The main 
problem for these boards was that often the actual standard of service 
provided was inadequate in view of the costs involved. Although not ever 
conclusively proved, 
frequently fewer 
the major reason for this appears to have been that 
workers were employed by the contractors than the 
contract document specified. 
By eliminating the contractor, the boards not only saved money on 
contract payments (profits and overheads) but simultaneously gained a 
better service by being able to ensure that the requisite number of staff 
were employed to provide the service. In other words the boards would 
make financial savings and gain a more cost effective service through 
having greater managerial control of the service. In cases where 
contractors had never been engaged it could be argued that boards' direct 
managerial control over the service ensured the optimal level of service 
provision and cost effectiveness to the extent that no further advantages 
would acrue by contracting out. 
The second explanation for rejecting the contract option is perhaps 
more reconcilable with public choice than Weberian organisat ional theory, 
and certainly more straight forward. Arguably hospital boards that opted 
to provide their own services were less financially constrained than those 
which engaged contractors. The former group could therefore afford higher, 
and hence more cost ly, levels of service provision. So the greater the 
financial constraint the greater the propensity to contract out. The main 
point to be considered is that greater cost savings may have been possible 
in the' contracting' than in the' non-contracting' boards. Alternatively 
stated, prior to privatisation, the services of the former group were 
less than the latter. To take these arguments further a 
quantitative measure is required of cost effectiveness and financial 
constraints in order to make comparisions between hospital boards adopting 
opposite forms of service provision. 
-204-
8.5.2 Financial Constraints. Cost Effectiveness and Contracting Out 
The extent of financial constraint which a board is under will 
clearly depend upon both the amount of the funding in monetary terms and 
the level of services that have to be provided with the funds. This 
latter variable is not directly quantifiable but as a first approximation 
the size of hospital board district's population may be used as a surrogate 
for the level of services required. Obviously the greater the population 
the more services a board has to provide and hence the greater its costs. 
This, however, is exceedingly crude as many large urban based boards have 
to provide certain specialised services not available in smaller more 
peripherally located boards. 
A slightly more refined measure of service requirments is to take the 
board population with adjustments for cross boundary flows. Using a 
formula devised by Barnett et 81 (1980) and detailed in appendix 3, this 
formula takes into account the people who travel specially to the boards 
having specialised facilities. A simple measure of financial constraint 
on a board, in terms of cost per capita, may then be taken as: 
Hospital Boards Operating Grants 
Hospital Boards District PopUlation with Cross Boundary Adjustments 
The cost effectiveness of ancillary services can be quantified by 
relating their cost to the size of the institution as measured by bed 
numbers. 
per bed. 
In short the greater the cost effectiveness, the lower the cost 
Instead of using total beds as the controlling variable, average 
occupied beds 1 is chosen as it excludes beds that may not be in use at any 
one time and so not demanding of the same level of ancillary services and 
therefore of costs. Cost effectiveness is then given by: 
Cost of Service Provision 
Average Occupied Beds 
A more appropriate standardisation variable at least for cleaning and 
orderly (ie housekeeping) services, might be total floor area of all the 
institutions within each board but it has not been possible to collate such 
data. Another factor that could distort the standardisation of 
housekeeping costs is the age of the institutions as newer buildings tend 
to require less cleaning and orderly services than older ones. Apart from 
the enormous difficulty of ascertaining an I age factor' for each board, the 
exercise is unlikely to be worthwhile as most boards contain institutions 
-205-
with a variety of old and new buildings. Taken across all the boards this 
factor may to a certain extent be self cancelling. 
Within any hospital, patients requiring specialised diets 
inflate the costs of dietary provision and therefore distort the data. 
might 
But 
as with the' age factor', the' specialisation factor' is equally likely to 
be self cancelling across the entire country as most individual boards 
provide a range of patient services. This argument might appear to 
contradict the observation made above that many people have to travel to 
boards outside their home areas for specialised treatment. However this 
factor is at least partly accounted for by giving the service costs per 
More importantly though there is no indication that a specialised 
treatment necessitating travel requires more, or less, costly dietary 
services. In the case of housekeeping requirements (cleaning and 
orderlies) these may reasonably be expected to be similar across all boards 
regardless of the specialities of the constituent hospitals. 
Aside from this there are two other unavoidable distortions in the 
data. The first arises from the lack of conceptual clarity applied to 
the term 'housekeeping' services. As chapter five showed, there is a 
degree of variation between boards in their method of classification. The 
second is that, as seen earlier in the thesis, most of the boards that 
contract out only do so at some and not all of their institutions. 
Consequently the data for cost effectiveness on the contracting boards may 
be highly distorted by the institutions within them that did not adopt 
contract provision. As published data on ancillary services is not 
disaggregated to the individual hospital level it has not been possible to 
make any allowance for this. In conclusion then it is stressed that all 
the data involved in this exercise must be treated with the utmost 
circumspect ion. 
The hospital boards were grouped into two cat es; those that 
adopted or retained contract provision for the 1980s and those that did 
not. Data was collated for the census years 1981 and 1986 and is presented 
in table 8.2. The former year is particularly significant as it was around 
this time that considerable change took place in the spatial development of 
contracting out but 1986 is also considered primarily in order to see how 
the two variables - financial constraint and cost effectiveness - have 
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TABLE 8.2: FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON HOSPITAL BOARDS AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF ANCILLARY SERVICES FOR 1981 and 1986 
. 1981 1986 
Hospital 
Boards 
Financial Cost Effectiveness ($ pe:r bed) Financial I Cost Effectiveness ($ pe:r bed) . 
Constraint Housekeeping Dietary constraint! Housekeeping Dietary 
($ pe:r ($ 
capita) 
Commenced or Retained contract Provision for Ancillary Services: 
Auckland 194.2 4,575 2,631 I 325.7 
Canterbury 240.5 2,576 2,828 . 380.9 
otago 311.5 2,861 2,419 I 483.7 
Waikato 240.2 3,267 3,516 375.2 
Wellington 243.6 5,094 2,935 I 395.6 
Hawkes Bay 203.9 4,093 2,611 360.1 
Northland 222.9 3,879 2,701 347.5 
S. Canterbury 211.7 2,865 1,750 370.4 
Southland 206.6 4,628 2,178 336.8 
Taranaki 231.3 4,990 2,517 365.9 
Tauranga 168.4 4,559 2,457 290.0 
West Coast 467.9 2,639 1,813 690.3 
Ashburton 246.8 3,497 2,642 370.7 
Bay of Plenty 221.0 5,868 3,131 358.2 
Marlborough 242.9 4,297 2,114 373.5 
S. otago 241. 6 3,623 2,711 377.1 
Taumarunui 174.4 3,927 2,910 282.9 
Thames 195.8 3,261 2,300 354.1 
Vincent 236.4 3,719 2,699 322.6 
Waitaki 228.4 3,648 1,839 379.9 
MFAN 225.6 3,878 2,725 364.5 
Terminated or Refrained from Contract Provision for Ancilla Services: 
Cock 268.2 4,580 4,213 435.8 
Nelson 353.0 2,240 2,739 538.1 
Palmerston N. 272.2 2,777 1,656 461.1 
Wanganui 199.5 3,235 2,802 343.9 
C. Hawkes ray 487.1 3,182 1,735 797.7 
Dannevirke 243.4 4,351 1,868 372.8 
Maniototo 219.8 4,297 1,455 351.6 
Waiapu 216.9 4,774 5,397 336.4 
Wairarapa 187.0 3,651 2,156 324.5 
MFAN 265.8 2,953 2,260 439.1 
Financial Constraint = Grant per capita (with cross boundary adjustments) 
Cost Effectiveness = Housekeeping and Dietary Costs per Ave O:::c Bed. 
8,858 
4,713 
4,673 
4,588 
5,043 
6,698 
4,675 
4,955 
7,272 
5,690 
8,178 
3,888 
4,590 
8.147 
5,516 
6,264 
9.174 
5,543 
5,582 
4,843 
5,900 
7,732 
4,154 
4,741 
5,111 
6,557 
5,872 
3,761 
7,055 
6,154 
5,140 
4,938 
5,425 
4,445 
5,441 
4,384 
4,662 
4,545 
3,593 
5,223 
4,370 
4,988 
3,060 
4,676 
4,305 
3,647 
5,167 
6,581 
4,207 
4,124 
3,731 
3,978 
7.151 
4,248 
3,866 
4,460 
3,492 
3,615 
4,205 
8,530 
3,697 
4,281 
1 Houskeeping services in Dannevirke were provided by contract until 1985 but the Board is included in the 
non-contracting group since the rationale for termination was very similar to the other boards. 
Data Source: Department of Health records, and Hospital Management Data. 
changed over a five year time period. Regrettably the census data 
required to calculate cross boundary flows was not provided in 1986. In 
order to provide a degree of refinement to the 1986 figures for financial 
constraint, the hospital board districts' populations were each adjusted 
according to the percentage required to be made to 1981 board 
populat ion figures. While it is readily conceded that this does not 
provide an optimal data it is still an improvement upon using 
unadjusted population figures. 
As was seen in an earlier section, during the 1980s a population based 
funding formula was applied to the hospital boards. Whatever the effect of 
financial constraint on a board's propensity to contract out this cannot 
be adduced directly from the formula since its effects may be quite 
ambiguous. Whether under or over funded according to the formula, all 
boards experienced a of financial constraint and might therefore 
be tempted to contract out their services. The population based funding 
concept is therefore of Ii tt Ie analyt ical value in itself. Nevertheless 
the 1986 figures for per capita (financial constraint) reflect the 
application of the formula to different boards. 
The data given in table 8.2 is summarised in table 8.3. Starting with 
the mean grant per capita, t his variable was lower (ie greater financial 
constraint), for the contracting boards than for the non-contracting ones. 
This was to be expected although t-Tests2 showed the differences in group 
means to be statistically significant only in 1986 at five percent. Not 
so expected however was that cost effectiveness, in 1981, for both 
housekeeping and dietary services, showed lower costs per average occupied 
bed for non-contracting as against contracting boards. Here the 
differences in group means was only significant, albeit at 1 percent, for 
housekeeping services. 
By 1986 the differences in cost effectiveness between the two groups 
had narrowed to the extent that t-Tests revealed no significance between 
them. In the case of dietary services, the tion had reversed from 
1981, even if only slightly, with the contracting boards appearing to be 
more. cost effective. As this group of boards would have been making cost 
savings for which there was arguably less scope for in the non-contracting 
boards, the narrOWing of differences over time is not particularly 
surprising. A rather more surprising feature is that, fot~ the most part, 
the differences in mean values has been insignificant. 
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TABLE 8.3: Summary of Data and t-Tests for Contracting and Non-Contracting 
Hospital Boards for 1981 and 1986 
Mean Financial Constraints: 
(Operating Grant per Capita) 
Contracting Boards 
Non Contracting Boards 
t-Test statistics 
Mean Cost Effectiveness 
for HOUSEKEEPING Services 
(Operating Costs per Bed) 
Contracting Boards 
Non Contracting Boards 
t-Test statistics 
Mean Cost Effectiveness 
for DIETARY Services 
(Operating Costs per Bed) 
Contracting Boards 
Non Contracting Boards 
t-Test statistics 
1981 
$225. 6 
$265.8 
1. 36 
$3,878 
$2,953 
2.61 
$2, 725 
$2,260 
1. 42 
t-Test statistics, critical values for 27 degrees of freedom at: 
percent significance = 2. 473 
5 percent significance = 1. 703 
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1986 
$364.5 
$439. 1 
1. 71 
$5,900 
$5, 140 
1. 25 
$3, 978 
$4,281 
O. 64 
One possible reason for this, which has already been suggested, is 
that there is much variation in the levels of contracting out within the 
group of contracting boards. To refine the analysis, the privatisation 
indices calculated in chapter six (table 6.5) were correlated with measures 
of financial const raint, housekeeping and dietary service cost 
ef f ec t i veness. As any effect of low operating grants or high 
housekeeping and dietary costs on the propensity to privatise would most 
likely be delayed, the correlations were time lagged. The financial 
constraint variable had to be based on the census years 1981 and 1986 
because of the requirements for including cross boundary population flows 
in the standardisation. Regression analyses were then done with 
privatisation indices, calculated in exactly the same way as in chapter 
six, for 1983 and 1988 respectively. The resulting correlation 
coefficients are given in table 8.4. 
TABLE 8.4: 
Dietary Services 
Financial Constraint 
Operating Grant 
per Capita 
Index of 
Privatisation -0.24 
for 1983 
Index of 
Privatisation -0.36 
for 1988 
Significance of r for 29 cases 
Cost Effectiveness 
Housekeeping 
Costs per Bed 
1981 
0. 27 
1986 
O. 20 
0.45 (one percent) 
~ 0.35 (five percent) 
Dietary 
Costs per Bed 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-------
A larger operat ing grant per capit a would be expect ed to reduce the 
likelihood of privatisation and this contention is borne out by the 
negat i ve correlat ions for both years. On the ot her hand 
housekeeping/dietary costs per bed should precipate more privatisation in 
order to realise a more economical service. This again is confirmed by the 
positive correlation for housekeeping while for dietary there is virtually 
no relationship at all. Only for grant per capita and privatisation in 
1986 is there a statistically significant correlation and then only at five 
percent. The absence of any relationship in the case of dietary may 
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possibly be explained on the grounds that, compared with housekeeping, 
there is far less contracting out of the service, there are different 
management structures, and greater levels of professionalism within the 
service as chapters five and six showed. 
Rather than simply analysing these variables relative to each other at 
two points in time, it is also worthwhile to see how their change over 
time may have affected the levels of privatisation (table 8.5). 
Percentage changes between 1981 and 1986 fol' financial constraint and cost 
effectiveness were correlated with the indices of privatisation for 1988 
and the results are given in table 8.6. From table 8.5 it is seen that the 
non-contracting boards showed slightly greater mean increases in ancillary 
costs per bed than the contracting ones. This however is to be expected 
and foe the same reason as given above; the conteacting geoup of boards 
would have been implementing cost savings for which there was much less 
scope for than in the non-contract group. Also noteworthy is that the 
difference in changes to financial constraints between the two groups is 
negl ble with t-Tests on the group means showing no statistical 
significance. The within group variations are therefore of more interest. 
A board which has undergone a comparatively low increase in operating 
grant between 1981 and 1986 would be coming under greater financial 
constraint. It might therefore be expected to implement more 
privatisation than a boaed whose financial position had become less 
restrained with the operation of the population based funding foemula. As 
predicted a negative correlation was found although it was too low to be 
significant while for changes over time in cost effectiveness no 
relationship was found with levels of privatisation. 
The lack of statistical significance in any of the correlations 
clearly indicates that other factors beyond these considered here must be 
mediating the spatiality of the contracting out peocess. Taking into 
account the pOOl' quality of the original data base, the results of the 
analysis are somewhat inconclusive. The original hypothesis that there is 
mOl'e cont ract ing out where financial const raints are high and where cost 
effectiveness is low, is not entirely contradicted but neither is it 
unequivocally confirmed. In the following section consideration is given 
to possible regional variations in the political pressures that might 
dominate ovel' any case fOl', or against, 
economic criteria. 
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contracting out based on overtly 
TABLE 8.5: Percentage Changes to Financial Constraints and Cost 
Effectiveness of Ancillary Services from 1981-86 and Levels of 
Privatisation for 1988 
Hospital Financial Cost E f f ect i veness ($/bed) Index of 
Boards Constraint Housekeeping Dietary Privatisation 
($/capita) 
Commenced or Retained Contract Provision for Ancillary Services: 
Auckland 67.7 93. 6 87.7 0:*: 
Cant el-bury 58. 4 83.0 91. 8 15.4 
Otago 55.3 63. 3 83.8 14.9 
Waikato 56.6 40. 4 54. 7 13. 6 
Wellington 62. 4 -1. 0 49. 4 18. 4 
Hawkes Bay 76.6 63. 6 78. 6 27.2 
Northland 55. 9 20. 5 68. 3 66. 7 
S. Canterbury 75.0 72.9 105. 3 29. 6 
Southland 63.0 57. 1 139.8 93. 7 
Taranaki 58.2 14.0 73. 6 28. 6 
Tauranga 72.2 79. 4 103.0 62. 2 
West Coast 47.5 47.3 68.8 19. 1 
Ashburton 50. 2 31. 6 77.0 100.0 
Bay of Plenty 62. 1 38. 8 37.5 97.5 
Marlborough 53.8 28. 4 72.5 60. 6 
S. Otago 56. 1 72.9 90. 6 65. 2 
Taumarunui 62. 2 133. 6 126.2 66. 7 
Thames 80.8 70. 0 82.9 64. 6 
Vincent 36. 5 50. 1 52.8 100.0 
Waitaki 66. 3 32. 8 102.9 50. 2 
MEAN 60.8 54. 6 82. 4 49. 7 
Terminated or Refrained from Contract Provision for Ancillarx: Services: 
Cook 62.5 68. 8 69. 7 0 
Nelson 52. 4 85. 4 55. 1 0 
Palmerston North 69. 4 70. 7 133.5 0 
Wanganui 72.4 58.0 59. 2 0 
Central Hawkes Bay 63.8 106. 1 101.3 0 
Dannevirke 53. 2 35. 0 93. 5 0 
Maniototo 60.0 -12. 5 189.0 0 
Waiapu 55. 1 47.8 58. 1 0 
Wairarapa 73. 5 68. 6 71. 5 0 
MEAN 62. 4 58. 6 92. 3 0 
t-Test statistics O. 06 0.31 0.77 
t-Test statistics, critical values for 27 degrees of freedom at: 
percent significance = 2.473 
5 percent significance = 1.703 
• Auckland ceased contracting out in 1988. 
Data Calculated from Department of Heal th records, and Hospi tal Management 
Data 
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TABLE 8.6: 
Index of 
Privatisation 
for 1988 
Percentage Changes from 1981 to 1986 in 
Operating Grant 
per ta 
-0.21 
Housekeeping 
Cost per Bed 
-0.08 
Dietary 
Cost per Bed 
-0. 06 
8.6 Political Power and the Contracting Out of Ancillary Services: 
Insofar as economic conditions provide a reasonable contextual 
explanation of the t dimension to contracting out at the e 
level, the spatial dimension of the process is still left unexplained. In 
an at tempt to gain a further underst anding of the lat t er process the 
existence of political pressures for privatisation at both the national 
and regional level needs to be considered. As both Governments and 
hospital board members are elected, and not appointed, to political power, 
any pressure for vatisation from these quarters might be ed to 
reflect 'public choice' and hence the I public interest'. 
It has already been seen that in the very early phase of contracting 
out, little could be attributed to electoral political considerations. To 
the extent that directives from central Government had been issued to the 
boards, they had often been rejected and, moreover, no spatial variations 
in hospital boards' political composit ion could be discerned. A similar 
situation seems to have obtained in the 19708 and for much of the 1980s. 
At the nat ional level there has cont inued to be a st rong political 
impetus towards private hospital care in general as evident from 
parliamentary recorded in Hansard. Yet apart from the 1984 quote 
from the Minister of Health, cited earlier, no record has been found 
expressing commitment to the cont raet ing out of ancillary services, both 
from Parliament or from its bureaucratic arm in the form of the Department 
of Health. For central government, at least, the ancillary sector of the 
public hospital em was still 'A Forgotten Sector' through to the 19805. 
At the local level however, the sit uat ion in respect of t he membership of 
hospital and area health boards, is worthy of further consideration. 
A detailed review of the extent of democratic community representation 
by hospital and area health board members by Baker (1988) provides an 
informat i ve account of pol it ical factors underpinning these inst it ut ions. 
Based on the contention that, "competitive elections represent a major form 
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of accountability within regional and district government" (Baker 1988, 6), 
the account demonstrates the limitations of hospital boards have had in 
represent ing this ideal. An important factor in increasing the potential 
for greater accountability of elected representatives, according to Baker 
(1988, 6) is party political membership. He maintains however that: 
only 13% of candidates in the 1983 hospital board elections stood 
on a party platform. This included 25 citizens and 38 Labour 
candidates. This is consistent with a dominant trend towards 
independent candidates in local body elections (the only 
exception being the city councils in the larger centres). 
Local body politics in New Zealand, including the hospital boards, has 
traditionally been I depoliticised' and this, as is argued below, may have 
tended to give local authorities a generally politically conservative bias. 
The evidence for the existence of a politically conservative bias can 
only be indirect in the absence of political party affiliation but it is 
nonetheless suggestive from examining the socio-economic status and 
occupational categories of elected members. With reference again to Baker 
(1988), an analysis of the 1986 local body elections shows, in the case of 
hospit al boards, an ovel-whelming proport ion of members in socio-economic 
classes 1 - 3 as based on the UK Registrar General's Classification (figure 
8.3), The figure was 96 percent for the boards as against 49 percent for 
the general population (Baker 1988, 4). Citing the work of Halligan and 
Harris (1978) and SCROW 0977>, Baker (1988, 5) maintains that similar 
patterns were found in council members following the 1974 local body 
election and in analyses of school committees in the mid 1970s. In respect 
of hospital boards he argues that, "the trend towards over-representation 
by upper soci o-economi c cl asses seems even more pronounced' (Baker 1988, 
5) . 
The occupational composition of hospital board members has also been 
skewed towards part icular categories which is perhaps not surprising in 
view of the above. In 1986, 75 percent of board members could be 
classi fied as one of the following; health workel-, fat-mer-, home worker or 
retired, while a further 10 percent had business and legal occupations. Of 
the health workers, the first category comprised primarily, medics, 
paramedics, nurses and social workers. Very few people occupying wage-
labouring t ions, either wi thin or outside of hospital services, have 
gained election to hospital boards. Halligan and Harris (1978) argue that 
the reason for this lies largely with the nature of the work required by 
board/council members: 
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Figure 8.3 Elected Members by Socio - Economic Group, 1986 
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Although the job of being a councillor is regarded as a part-time 
role, much of the work occurs during the day, so it is necessary 
to have an occupation that is sufficiently flexible to allow for 
such demands. The occupations that meet this criteria tend to be 
of a particular type and to exclude those on the lower part of 
the SES scale (Halligan and Harris 1978, 241 cited in Baker 1988, 
5) . 
Even though it by no means always follows that upper and lower socio-
economic groups and occupational classifications cleave along party 
poli tical lines int 0, respect i vely, conservative-radical axes, the 
composition of hospitals boards is indicative of there being an in-built 
poli t ically conservati ve tendency. Where people have been elected on a 
Labour platform they have nearly always been in a minority in the board and 
have therefore had little scope to change established policies. 
The relevance of this to the contract out of ancillary services is 
that the class composition of board members has been quite different from 
that of hospital ancillary workers. The former belong predominantly to the 
so called 'professional, t cal and managerial strata' or, in Marxian 
terms, • new petite bourgeoise' (Wright 1976) whereas the latter are of the 
traditional working (proletarian) class. Contracting out and associated 
cost reductions to ancillary services have perhaps for this reason met with 
very little opposition from board members. The workers in these services, 
because of their anonymity within the administrat i ve st ruct ure, can be 
convenientially forgotten about. The usual justification for cutting 
anci llary service cost 5, as put forward by hospit al board management to 
board members is that, there will be relatively more funds available for 
direct patient care services 
been drawn. 
services from which many board members have 
Wnatever the merits of the above argument, the difficulty of applying 
it to the spatio-temporal dimension of the contracting out process is that, 
as far as can be ascertained, the political structure of hospital boards 
has been fairly uniform across both space and time. The 1986 local body 
elections did see the election of two hospital ancillary workers to the 
Auckland Hospital Board, which certainly had a part to ay in the 
termination of the contracts in that board. This case will be discussed 
further in a subsequent chapter but for the suffice to note, that 
this is the only example known of active worker participation in hospital 
boards and subsequent policy change in the form of anCillary service 
provision. 
Rather than electoral political factors explaining the iality of 
contracting out, there is more plausibility in citing these factors as 
explaining the sect oral variat ion in cont ract ing out as discussed in an 
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earlier chapter. Instead of appealing to public choice explanations, the 
effect of political factors on contracting out ancillary services can be 
better explained within the Weberian perspective based on the different 
levels of political power within the boards' administrative structures both 
at the level of the bureaucracy (managers) and the democracy <members). 
Also within a Marxian framework there is a clear class cleavage between the 
proletarian nature of the ancillary service workforce and the petit 
bourgeois, if not entirely bourgeois, membership composition of the boards. 
The pressure on hospital boards from financial constraints and, to the 
extent that they existed, political forces still do not provide a 
sat isfactory explanation of the uneven spatial development of cont ract ing 
out in view of the very different policy options adopted by the boards. 
It has already been noted that where the contract option was either 
adopted, or retained, the claim for the greater cost savings of this form 
of service provision has rested on the basis of a lack of in-house 
management expertise being available. The precise nature of this alleged 
expertise requires further consideration in its relation to the uneven 
development of contracting out. 
8.7 Managerial Considerations: 
Since housekeeping and, to a lesser extent, dietary services, are 
highly labour intensive, the management expertise required demands more an 
ability to control the labour force rather than any detailed knowledge of 
complex technological processes. Therefore the savings made in this sector 
of hospital activity are realised mainly through increasing work intensity 
in order to reduce the size of the labour force, rather than by 
introducing labour saving technology. Essentially the expertise required 
to reduce the costs involves minimising the labour in-put for any given 
level of service provision. Why then have the hospital boards themselves 
not made the required cost savings by introducing new schedules with an 
appropriately reduced labour force? 
A more fundamental reason than cost savings behind hospital boards 
contracting out housekeeping and dietary services seems to have rested on 
what may loosely be termed, 'managerial considerations'. In chapter two it 
was seen that in the <Weberian) theory of 'bureaucratic rationalisation', 
the ultimate aim of contracting out was to eliminate troublesome aspects 
of managerial responsibility. The foundation for this argument comes 
primarily from personal interviews with hospital boards' management staff. 
Perhaps not suprisingly, documented evidence on this is sparse since it 
does not reflect positively on boards' management skills but some indirect 
cross references have been found to support the contention. 
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In response to a suggestion that the Wairarapa Board should revert to 
contract provision again, a member of the management team cited the case of 
the Bay of Plenty Board where: 
A financial study was carried out sometime ago and that it would 
have been financially beneficial for them to carry out their own 
cleaning but they did not want to carry the burden of the hassles 
that would be involved (internal memorandum, Wairarapa Board, 
29th October 1982, my ). 
More recently a Waikato Board staff member commented, in response to an 
earlier suggestion to extend the existing cl contract without 
retendering, that: 
At that time I was to an extension as I considered 
Hospi tal cleaning could be done with our own forces cheaper. A 
review of the tender, and the conditions of employment that 
Crothalls gi ve, soon proved my theory wrong. I could neither 
compete financially nor treat my staff in the same manner 
(int ernal memorandum, Waikato Board, 13th Novembe"r 1987, my 
emphasis) . 
The implication is that through contract out) hospi tal board 
management has been . to let others do what they have not been 
to do t hemsel ves. In defense of this policy management has 
that contractors can more easily instill workforce discipline by 
dismissal, or threat thereof, since unl ike the tal boards, there has 
been no appeals procedure available. Anyone dismissed from a hospital 
board has had the right of appeal to the eleded board members, although 
this procedure ceased with advent of the manager concept of 
administration in 1988. The boards therefore have had to adhere to a 'good 
employer' policy in a way which contractors have not, but whether a 'hire 
and fire' mentality is any more conducive to higher labour productivity 
than one of secure employment may be highly ionable. What ever the 
case may be the rationale underlying the contracting out of domestic 
services in the Otago Board in 1982 is instructive to consider. 
A management report to the <elected) membership maintained that they 
could not achieve further cost savings in domestic services because of 
difficulties with industrial relations. to the report the 
industrial problems related to restraints imposed by the trade union on 
labour force 
made that: 
reduction, redeployment and productivity and the claim was 
The intransigent attitude revealed by the local Branch of the 
Domestic [Hotel and Hospital] Workers Union in their approach 
toward the Board's difficulties with cost constraints highlights 
the problems faced by management in this area (Managememt Report 
to Otago Board 11th March 1982), 
The conclusion that the management team came to was that: 
It is clear that further significant savings can be made in this 
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area (emphasis in original) ... [andJ ... There can be no 
justification in a soft management approach (my emphasis) to our 
serious and pressing cost containment problems (Management Report 
to Otago Board 11th March 1982). 
So rather than dealing with the si tuat ion themselves, arguably the • soft 
management approach' was taken by the decision to cont ract out the 
service and thereby give the' hard management approach' to someone else; a 
private contractor. No reason was presented in either this report or in 
the case of Waikato, as to why the contractors, but not the management 
staff, could tackle the' intransigent attitude' of the union. 
It is difficult therefore to avoid the conclusion that contracting out 
took place, not so much for financial reasons, but to avoid having to 
undertake a difficult administrative problem in the field of industrial 
relations. Instead of being a matter of economic efficiency, as 
contracting out might at first appear, the process is rather a symptom of 
managerial inefficiency even though set in a framework of 'bureaucratic 
rationality' . Previous work though has pointed to cases in which contract 
services have been brought back under board provision and this 
counterposing process has also had an underlying rationality of its own. 
While the stated reason in written documents for this has virtually always 
been financial, through the elimination of payouts on contractors' profits, 
management staff have often reported verbally on the er control 
thought ble over the workforce by not having to work through a third 
party in the form of a contractor. 
The opposing arguments advanced by board managements for, or against, 
contracting out could more usefully be seen a being indicative of the 
contradictory position in which they operate rather than in relative 
degrees of (in)efficiency. Hospital board management staff are expected to 
act as if they are employers (of ancillary workers) while they are 
themselves still employees of the board. Being trade union members 
(Clerical Workers Union) they have their employment conditions negot iat ed 
in the same way as the ancillary workers with the exception of the chief 
and deputy chief executive, whose renumeration is set by the Higher 
Salaries Commission. 
With managers being in an employee situation it is perhaps not 
surprising that they have opted for whichever form of service provision 
entails the least administrative (ie work) burden. At least by contracting 
out a service they relieve themselves of the double, and inherently 
contradictory, burden of being both employer and employee3 • Their 
frequent, although by no means universal, advocation of the icy should 
rat her be seen as a reflection of the structural contradictions under 
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which they operate rather than of any specific management inability as 
such. 
Conclusion 
To conclude the debate it can be said that the underlying basis for 
contracting out does not appear to be so very different from the 1950s and 
1960s. The stated reasons have been very different in each case, as have 
been the socio-economic conditions, - respectively, labour shortages and 
economic expansion as against cost savings and economic recession. But 
the concept of bureaucratic rationality appears to have been a common basis 
to contracting out from the earliest times. More specifically, in the 
early period the process divested management of labour recruitment 
problems, whereas in more recent times it has been invoked to avoid 
confront ing problems of labour force unrest, whether threatened or 
exist ing. The exerci of management prerogative is then likely to be 
mediated spatially by regional variations in the industrial strength of the 
workforce. 
Contracting out, as this and the previous chapters have showTI, is not 
a universally adopted response to fiscal constraints and management 
decisions. Consideration must also be given to the nature of the labour 
force concerned. Hitherto it has been treated as merely a passive 
byst ander on the scene. Both public choice and managerialist theories 
are predicated on factors that predispose public bureaucracies to adopt 
private contracting. Arguments based on cost savings <public choice) and 
bureaucratic rationalisation (managerialist) are too deterministic as they 
assume a unilinearity in the direction of the contracting out process and 
the theories can both be applied aspatially. Clearly such a unilinearity 
does not exist in social reality. Therefore the social forces, or in 
terms of Marxian political economy. the class forces that may influence the 
contracting out process must also be considered to complete the analysis of 
geographicall y uneven pri vat isat ion. 
chapter is addressed. 
Footnotes; 
It is to this issue that the next 
The quantity, average occupied beds, is defined as: 
[I<bed days)J/365 
2 As was pointed out in chapter seven, data ven in the form of rates 
is not strictly applicable to t-Tests because the group mean values are not 
the same as the mean of the individual rates. The t-Tests were nonetheless 
conducted because of the lack of alternative testing procedures. 
3 The contradictory position of hospital managers is exemplified through 
their trade union membership. On the one hand they are employees and 
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belong to the Clerical Workers' Union while on the other hand they are 
of members ,of the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union the 
anci llary staff. At nat ional Award negot iat ions an individual hospit al 
manager may find him/herself on the union side of the bargaining table for 
the Clerical Workers' Award and on the employers' side for the Hotel and 
Hospital Workers' Union. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Contracting Out and Class Conflict 
In this chapter the issue of labour relations or, when stated more 
controversially class conflict, is discussed in respect of its likely 
mediation in the geographically uneven development of contracting out 
public hospital ancillary services. The opposition to private sector 
contracting by the ancillary sector workforce, while having roots back in 
the early seventies, did not gain significant momentum until the early 
eight ies. It has virtually coincided with the advent of national economic 
recession and the start of major restrictions on central government funding 
to hospital boards. As the previous chapters showed the ancillary service 
sector of public hospitals has undergone the most stringent financial cuts 
in the 1980s and consequently in such a labour intensive industry, the 
workforce has been particularly affected. Therefore the advent of 
increased labour militancy during this same period has not been 
coincident ial. 
The chapter is pre~ented in three parts. The first part discusses 
the rationale behind worker opposition to contracting out as expressed by 
their trade union representatives. A comparative analysis is made of the 
employment conditions of ancillary workers under hospital board and private 
The second part present s an account of the contact employment. 
policies adopted by these workers, through their trade union 
organisation, to combat the existence, and pot ent ial expansion, 
private sector contracting in public hospitals. In this sect ion 
attempts are made to explain the uneven spatiality of contracting out with 
reference to regional variations in the strength of labour force 
opposi t ion. To provide further illustration of the role of class struggle 
in mediat ing t he geography of pri vat isat ion, some part icular case st udies 
are presented in the final part of the chapter. 
9.1 The Rationale for Labour Force Opposition to Private Contracting of 
Hospital Services: 
Earlier chapters have shown that contracting out ancillary services 
has predominated in the domestic cleaning sector. On this basis the policy 
prescription of the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union 1 , which represents 
nearly all ancillary workers, has been simply to, 'clean out contractors' 
(figure 9.1) from the public hospital system and indeed all other areas of 
the state sector. The rationale for this policy of opposition to private 
contractors is also given in figure 9.1 directly beneath the headline. To 
summarise the three objections cited, thet-e is an ideological aversion to 
private profit from public service, an alleged lack of public 
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FIGURE 9. I: Trade Union Policy on Contract ins Out Public Servivces 
NTRA TOR 
The New Zealand Trade Union Movement is totally opposed to· 
private contractors operating within the Health system, the Education 
system, and other areas of the Public Service. 
We are opposed to private contractors for the following reasons: 
• we believe public money should not be used for private profit-making. 
Contractors are not involved in the Public Service because they are 
community-minded. They are there to make as much profit as they can. 
e we believe that all areas of the Public Service should be directly 
accountable to the public. It is more difficult to make a private contractor 
accountable for its actions than a publicly elected Hospital or Education 
Board. 
• despite their promises, private contractors make their profits through 
cutting working hours, increasing workloads and lowering standards 
of the service being offered. 
Source: New Zealand Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union, 
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accountability on the part of private contractors and a deterioration of 
employment conditions and standards of service provision consequent upon 
contracting out to the private sector. 
It may be argued that the ideol cal aversion to private enterprise 
in public services stems largely from the empirical observation of the 
effects of the privatisation process as detailed in the second and third 
obj eet ions just ci ted. These objections are worthy of further 
investigation in view of the enoromous significance that the trade union 
movement has att ached tot hem. 
fi rst. 
The issue of accountability is considered 
9.1.1 Public Accountability and Private Contacting- of Hospitgl Services: 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the public accountability provided 
by elected hospital boards, as detailed in the previous chapter, the main 
stand of the trade union has been that these boards are at least nominally 
accountable to the public through periodic elections. Hospi tal board 
members are empowered to provide substantial control over management staff 
and can be voted out of office if in default of their responsibilities. On 
the ot her hand, neither company shareholders nor directors are subjected 
to such constraints and public recall. 
It was seen in chapter six that all spatial scales of capital 
(business) have been involved in providing hospital ancillary services, 
from the distinctly local to the multinational. At both ends of these 
scales there have been problems of accountability that have been of direct 
concern to the work forces involved. In the case of very small, and some 
not so small, private operators contracts have often been obtained by 
undercutting larger operators. The former do not have such overhead cost s 
and therefore, superficially at least, appear economically at t racti ve for 
financially hard pressed hospitals to engage. Frequently underc talised 
in relation to the size of their operation, these small companies are very 
prone to bankruptcy. McCready (1981, 1), writing in the trade union 
journal HOS~ argued that: 
In this situation [of bankruptcy], the Union which has almost 
certainly been fully involved for some time trying to see that 
staff receive the correct Award wages has to get in and pick up 
the pieces for members who have been left with wages and hOliday 
pay owing from the bankrupt contractor. 
Sometimes called, I cowboy' contractors to the people who suffer their 
consequences, these organisations can almost literally be, • here today and 
gone tomorrow' and all public accountability along with them. 
At the other end of the spatial scale the problems of public 
accountabilit y with mult inat ional companies are legion. Since t hey are 
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well documented in the geographical lit erat ure on industrial rest ruct uring 
(eg Susman 1981, Ross 1983, Tl-achte and Ross 1985) they need not be 
elaborated upon here. In the particular case of hospital services, where 
multinationals are the contractors, bankruptcy and overnight disappe·arance 
are not so much the problem. Rather their enormous resources and 
diversified operations, can present serious difficulties for public 
authorities, like hospi tal boards, in ensuring that they adhere to the 
terms of contracts. For the workforces concerned these companies can 
withstand prolonged industrial action in the event of failure to reach or 
maintain negotiated agreements with work forces. 
The issue of accountability has not only been a concern for the 
trade unions trying to advance, or at least maintain, the condit ions of 
employment of their members. The hospit al boards t hemsel ves have oft en 
experienced great difficulty wi th ensuring adequate standards of service 
provision especially when in a very compet it i ve environment. A poignant 
example of this, which verges.on the humourous were it not so potentially 
serious, was ed by the Auckland Board as follows: 
Many s have been made for standards to improve.... A 
practice has been adopted whereby old cordial bottles are used to 
store detergents Ivhich resulted a few weeks back in a serious 
incident. A cordial bottle was left on top of a refrigerator 
containing detergent, a nurse drank some and had to receive 
medical treatment. Your staff were spoken to but still the 
practice persists (Written communication to Crothalls Ltd., 21st 
Sept ember 1987). 
Regarding financial reliabilit y, a tal board, just as much as a 
trade union, does not want a contractor to go bankrupt in the middle of a 
cont ract, in view of the service disrupt ion it causes. This lesson was 
learnt by the Otago Board as far back as 1974 when the contractor stated 
baldly, "We will have to liquidate as at 16th June 1974. fve can 't 
financially carryon wi th the Contract" (Minutes of meet ing between Ot ago 
Board and Vacuum Cleaning Company 12th June 1974), This resulted in the 
Board having to assume service provision itself. The inherent difficulty 
of public accountability of contractors is further apparent from the 
frequent need for hospital boards to ensure strict quality control of 
contract-provided services and to invest e thoroughly the business 
reputation and financial status of all contractors before engaging them. 
9. 1. 2 Employment Conditions of Public Hospital Ancillary Workers: 
If the changes in the ~~~and standards of service provision are the 
prime concern of the hospital boards, then changes in the staff numbers and 
their conditions are decidedly the concern of the workforce and 
its representative trade union. Only insofar as the latter affects the 
-225-
former are they of interest to employers, whether in the public hospital 
(board) or private (contractor) sector. One of the main targets therefore 
of economies in housekeeping and dietary expenditure has been the trimming 
of the labour force and, as seen in the previous chapter, the involvement 
of the private sector has often, although by no means always, been thought 
to be instrumental in achieving this end. 
Superficially there would appear to be little difference in employment 
conditions between contract and board employment for ancillary workers. 
Under existing industrial legislation in New Zealand all hospital workers 
are covered by an annually negotiated, nationally based Award;2 document. 
The conditions of the Award apply whether workers are, a) employed in the 
state sector or in the private sector that is by the hospital boards or 
by contractors or b) employed as cleaners, orderlies or dietary service 
workers. These conditions govern such factors as minimum hourly wage 
rates, overtime and unsocial hours payments, holiday, long service and 
sick leave entitlement and rights to a minimium notice of dismissal. 
Structurally then the conditions between employment by (private) 
contractors and by (public) hospi tal boards are identical:::'. The 
contentious issues relate primarily to the numbecs of workers employed, the 
security of employment from arbitrary dismissal, the genecal flexibility of 
their hours of work and the work intensity cequired within them. In 
respect of wages, the rates are covered by the national Award but the I take 
home' pay can drop substantially with the change to employment by private 
contractors. Weekend and night work, which attracts enhanced pay rates, 
may be greatly reduced and formerly full time, eight hour jobs may be 
reduced to part time ones, all of which entails reduced pay packets even 
though still adhering to the statutory pay rates. 
Many other difficulties have also been encountered with contract 
employment notwithstanding the continuity of pay rates and formal 
conditions. A report on contracting out for the Hotel and Hospital 
Workers' Union (Mullins 1987) summarised many of the problems confronted 
by workers employed by Crothalls Ltd. at Auckland Public Hospi tal and is 
worth quoting at length: 
- Crothalls management not sticking to agreements with the union 
about disput es. This result ed in endless meet ings and 
negotiations to resolve problems. 
- impossible workloads due to staffing levels sinking and people 
not brought in to replace workers on sick leave or annual leave 
et c. 
no duty lists, workers moved randomly around the hospital 
instead of having set areas. 
lack of consultation with workers or union about changing 
shifts or workloads. 
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- workers expected to produce medical certificates whenever they 
are sick (the award provides that a medical ceri ficate is only 
necessary after 3 consecutive days sick leave)4. 
- people received short pay due to problems with Hamilton making 
up pay. 
workers returning from maternity leave were put in less 
favourable positions. 
supervisors were given cleaning work when their jobs are 
supervising only. 
- there is not enough equipment and it is run down (Mullins 1987, 
10), 
The main response of the cont ractors tot hese argumen t s has been 
articulated by Crothalls in a report of their activities presented to 
the Minister of Health in 1986 in the wake of a large industrial dispute in 
the Northland Board in 1985. Their main stance has been that trade 
unions oppose contractors being involved in the health system because: 
we [Crothalls] are fair but firm employers who ensure that our 
staff do 'a fair day's work' .... [and]. . . . . we 
exceedingly patient despite what can only be described 
provocation and have in the main avoided major 
conflicts. (Report by Cr6thalls to Minister of Health, 
have been 
as extreme 
industrial 
1986) . 
Regardless of the validity of these claims and counterclaims 
industrial relations have often been exceedingly strained. One point 
however upon which contractors, hospital boards and the trade union are 
in agreement; substantial staff reductions have occurred through 
contracting out. The next section looks at this issue more closely. 
9. 1. 3 
Where services are contracted out under conditions of competitive 
tender, most contractors tender on the basis of forming the service at 
a lower price, and hence with fewer workers, than under the previous 
arrangement, whether this was by in-house provision or by an existing 
cont ract. Compet it ion in the market place virt ually obliges the 
contractors to take this price cutt and hence job cutting, course of 
action. Understandably enough the trade union's stance has been one of 
opposition to all redundancy. 
In view of this likely tion, the boards and contractors have 
often disagreed over who should bear responsibility for job losses through 
paying for any redundancy deal 
Contractors often maintained that this 
iated with the trade union. 
issue was the responsibility of 
the hospital board since it was they who made the decision to change the 
terms of a contract either by negotiation or competitive tender. For their 
part hospital boards usually argued that, as the contractor was the 
oyer, then the responsibility resided with the company 
consequencies of redundancy. 
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for the 
In most cases the position of hospital boards has prevailed but as a 
compromise solution a 'waste out formula' has often been implemented, The 
agreement has been for the board to pay those workers, deemed to be 
surplus to requirements by the incoming contractors, until they leave the 
job whereupon they would not be replaced, Such an agreement has 
sometimes proved costly to the boards concerned especially where labour 
turnover has been low as in many parts of New Zealand outside the major 
centres of population during the 1980s, Consequently some hospital boards 
have found themselves paying out for surplus staff for much longer than 
ever ant icipated, In other cases where no such agreement has been entered 
into, the trade union has been able to achieve, often only after protracted 
struggle, a similar end in which job loss was to take place through 
'natural wastage' or attrition rather than redundancy, Under these 
circumstances the contractors themselves have then had to bear the burden 
of 'excess' staff, According to Crothalls: 
, , ,despite very significant staff reductions over the last ten 
years we have not declared any individual redundant but have 
relied on natural attrition to bring staff numbers down to the 
required levels, This has cost the company hundreds of thousands 
of dollars and it is our belief that this union unlike many 
others in New Zealand has yet to come to terms with current 
economic realities (Report by Crothalls to Minister of Health, 
11th June 1986, my emphasis), 
Data on the number of staff employed by the hospi tal boards in the 
housekeeping and dietary services is recorded from 1975 onwards in Hospital 
Management Data just as with the financial data, Unfort unat ely the 
numbers of contract staff employed in these services has only been recorded 
since 1984 when the Department of Health Statistics required the hospital 
boards to acquire this information from contractors, Even though prior to 
1984 no requirement for such statistics exist ed, some boards had been 
asking the contractors to supply them but, except for a very few cases, 
it has not been possible to detail the staff numbers employed as far back 
as 1975, Neither has the required data been available from the contractors 
concerned since records have either not been kept or else been lost, with 
the latter occurring especial~y where there has been a 
cont ractors, 
change of 
In tables 9,1 and 9,2 data is given, respectively, on Changes to 
housekeeping (domestic and orderly) and dietary staff numbers for the 
period 1980 to 1988 for those hospital boards from whom a comprehensive set 
of data could be obtained, Where applicable, the figures are given as an 
aggregation of board and contract staff, Although data prior to 1980 is 
very sparse, what is available has been shown for 1975 to counter the 
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TABLE 9, 1: Staff Reductions in HOUSEKEEPING Services 1980-1988 
Commenced or Retained Contract Provision for Ancillary Services: 
Hospital 
Boards 1975 1980 1984 1988 
Percentage Changes 
1980-84 1984-88 80-88 
Canterbury 
Otago 
Hawkes Bay 
S, Canterbury 
Taranaki 
Tauranga 
West Coast 
Ashburton 
Bay of Plenty 
South Otago 
Thames 
Vincent 
Waitaki 
TOTAL 
.. 
417.2 
253. 4 
.. 
'* 
'* .. 
'* 
* 37.0 
71. 4 
.. 
'* 
Group mean values 
619.7 
436.7 
231. 0 
84.9 
204.8 
97.0 
116.2 
49.9 
71. 8 
42.0 
67.9 
14.2 
39.4 
489. 2 
312.0 
162. 4 
78. 5 
177.7 
82. 7 
110. 1 
35.8 
53. 5 
28. 5 
60.4 
10. 2 
28.8 
2,075.5 1,629.8 
470.9 
253. 7 
162. 3 
78. 2 
160. 8 
92. 1 
102,2 
30. 3 
53. 1 
19.5 
46.2 
8.5' 
22.5 
1,500.3 
-21. 1 
-28.6 
-29. 7 
- 7.5 
-13.2 
14. 7 
- 5.2 
-28.3 
-25.5 
-32.1 
-11. 0 
-28. 2 
-26.9 
-21. 5 
- 3. 7 
-18.7 
o 
- O. 4 
- 9. 5 
+11. 4 
- 7. 2 
-15.4 
- O. 7 
-31. 6 
-23.5 
-16.7 
-21. 9 
- 7.9 
-24.0 
-38.2 
-29. 7 
- 7.9 
-21. 5 
- 5. 1 
10.3 
-39.3 
-26.0 
-5.3.6 
-3:;:.0 
-40.0 
-42.9 
-27. 7 
Terminated or Refrained from Contract Provision for Ancillary Services: 
Cook 
Nelson 
Palmerston N 
Dannevirke 
C. Hawkes Bay 
Maniototo 
Waiapu 
Wairarapa 
TOTAL 
115. 1 
.. 
'* 
.. 
49. 3 
* 10. 8 
85. 9 
Group mean values 
.. Data not available 
92.6 
147.4 
281. 2 
31. 3 
50.4 
5.2 
9.5 
75.0 
692.6 
79. 1 
131. 1 
259.9 
22. 7 
41. 9 
5. 4 
8.0 
69.3 
617.4 
80. 2 
133. 9 
256.8 
28.9 
38.6 
5.2 
7.0 
72.4 
623.0 
14.6 
-11. 1 
- 7.6 
-27.5 
16.9 
+ 3.8 
15.8 
- 7.6 
10. 9 
t-Test results on group mean values for percentages changes 
1980-1984 2.72 
1984-1988 1. 63 
1980-1988 3.05 
t"ri.t.:lt.::Ill\l for 19 degrees of freedom: 
1% significance 2.539 
5% significance 1.729 
10% significance 1. 328 
+ 1. 4 
+ 2. 1 
- 1. 2 
+27.3 
- 7.9 
- 3. 7 
-12.5 
+ 4. 5 
+ O. 9 
Data Source: Hospital Management Data, 1975, 1980, 1984 and 1988. 
- 22.9-
11';. 5 
- n.2 
- a. 7 
- 7.7 
-2:1.4 
o 
-2G. 3 
~\. 5 
-10.0 
TABLE 9, 2: Staff Reduct ions in DIETARY Services 1980-1988 
Commenced or Retained Contract Provision for Ancillary Services: 
Hospital Percentage Changes 
Boards 1975 1980 1984 1988 1980-84 1984-88 80-,88 
Auckland 404,0 596.2 543. 9 603.9 - 8.8 +11. 0 + 1.3 
Otago .. 221. 9 211. 8 176.3 - 4.6 -16.8 -2(1,5 
Waikato 
* 
482. 1 456. 3 422.2 - 5.4 - 7. 5 -12..4 
Wellington .. 335. 2 368.6 352.3 +10.0 4. 4 + C. 1 
Hawkes Bay 62.8 78.9 74.6 75.5 - 5. 4 + 1.2 - 4·.3 
S Canterbury 36.8 39. 1 38. 5 38. 2 - 1.5 - 0.8 - 2.3 
Southland 56. 3 57,2 54, 7 53.2 4.4 - 2. 7 - 7.0 
Taranaki 66.8 70.9 68.2 77.2 - 3.3 +13.2 + 8. 9 
Tauranga 36.5 39.9 35.8 37.3 -10.3 + 4.2 - 6.5 
West Coast 
'* 60.2 48.4 50. 1 -19.6 + 3.5 -16.8 
Marlborough 20.7 23.2 20. 4 20. 4- -12. 1 0 -12. 1 
South Otago 18. 7 20. 4 18. 5 16.7'. - 9.3 - 9. 7 -18. 1 
Taumarunui 17.3 17. 1 17.8 17.9 + 4. 1 + O. 6 + ";.7 
Vincent 
'* 
6.5 7.0 6. 4 + 7.7 - 8.6 - 1..5 
Waitaki .. 14. 6 13, 2 13. 1 - 9.6 - 0.8 -10.3 
TOTAL 2,063.4 1,977.7 1,960.7 
Group mean values - 4,2 0.8 - 5.0 
Terminated or Refrained from Contract Provision for Ancillary Services: 
Cook .. 61. 5 65.9 59. 1 + 7.2 -10.3 
Nelson 
* 
134.4 125.9 105. 2 - 6.3 -16.4 
Wanganui 
'* 
142.7 119.3 109.8 -16.4 - 8.0 
Dannevirke 
* 
9. 1 8. 3 12.3 - 8.8 +48. 2 
C Hawkes Bay 10.8 12. 4 11. 3 11. 4 8. 9 + O. 9 
Maniototo .. 3.0 2.2 2.2 -26. 7 0 
Waiapu 
'* 8.3 7.2 7.0 -13.3 - 2. 8 
Wairarapa 19.0 19.8 22. 4 22.0 +13.0 + 1.8 
TOTAL 391. 2 362.5 329.0 
Group mean values - 7.3 - 9.2 
.. Data not available 
t-Test results on group mean values for percentages changes 
1980-1984 1. 34 
1984-1988 1. 88 
1980-1988 3. 18 
tcriti~~1 for 21 degrees of freedom: 
1% significance 2.518 
5% significance 1.721 
10% significance 1.323 
Data Source: Hospital Management Data, 1975, 1980, 1984 and 1988. 
-'2~o .. 
- E. 1 
-21. 7 
-23. 1 
+35.2 
- 8. 1 
-2f). 7 
H>.7 
..,. 1 ~. 1 
-16.0 
possibility that the staff reductions in the eighties may have simply 
continued a pre-existing trend. In a few instances this seems to have been 
the case but in the main, numbers increased slightly to around 1980 and 
then reduced significantly thereafter. 
For comparative purposes, and following the methodology of the 
previous chapters, the hospital boards in tables 9. 1 and 9. 2 are grouped 
according to the form of service provision adoptedj contract or in-house. 
Taken over the complete period 1980-88, both services under both forms of 
provision have undergone substantial staff reductions and a t-Test on the 
group mean percentage changes revealed differences between the two groups 
to be statistically significant even at 1 percent. For the contracting 
boards, housekeeping showed greater reductions than dietary services 
whereas the situation was reversed for the non-contracting boards. 
This may possibly be explained on the grounds that all boards except 
South Otago and Vincent, in the contracting group provided their dietary 
services in-house and contract provision was confined strictly to the 
housekeeping sector. As already seen in this thesis, dietary services have 
not been subjected to the process of contracting out to anything like the 
extent of housekeeping. A further noteworthy feature is that in both 
services the major staff reductions occurred mainly in the first half of 
the period under consideration (1980-84), although only in housekeeping was 
the contracting group reduction, in statistical terms, significantly 
greater than in the non-contracting group. 
the first period would be expected in 
contracting out policies that occurred 
associated managerial scrutiny to which 
exposed. 
This greater staff reduction in 
view of all the changes in 
in the early 1980s and the 
the ancillary services were 
Within the terms of the theoretical frameworks of the thesis it might 
be expected that regional variations in the increase of government 
financial restrictions to hospital boards would have a spatially varying 
affect on staff reductions. Accordingly percentage changes in operating 
grants per capita for the period 1981-86 (as used in table 8.5 of chapter 
eight) were correlated with percentage changes in housekeeping and dietary 
staff between 1980 and 1988 (table 9.3). The use of a longer time period 
for staff changes than for financial changes is justified through the need 
to allow for a time lag between cause <financial constraint) and effect 
(staff cuts). As expected a positive correlation was found between changes 
to operating grant and staff changes both for housekeeping (r = 0.30) and 
dietary (r 0.21) although neither is statistically significant. Staff 
numbers have therefore tended to show the lowest increases, or rather 
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TABLE 9.3: 
Hospital 
Boards 
capita) 1981-86 and Ancillary Staff 1980-88 
Percentage Changes to: 
Operating 
Grants 
Housekeeping 
Staff 
Dietary 
Staff 
Commenced or Retained Contract Provision for Ancillary Services: 
Auckland 
Canterbury 
Otago 
Waikato 
Wellington 
Hawkes Bay 
Northland 
S. Canterbury 
Southland 
Taranaki 
Tauranga 
West Coast 
Ashbud on 
Bay of Plenty 
Marlborough 
South Otago 
Taumarunui 
Thames 
Vincent 
Waitaki 
67.7 
58.4 
55.3 
56. 6 
62. 4 
76.6 
55.9 
75.0 
63.0 
58. 2 
72.2 
47.5 
50.2 
62. 1 
53.8 
56. 1 
62.2 
80. 8 
36.5 
66. 3 
* 
-24.0 
-38.2 
'* 
* 
-29. 7 
* 
- 7.9 
*" 
-21. 5 
5. 1 
-10.3 
-39.3 
-26.0 
'* 
-53. 6 
'* 
-32.0 
-40.0 
-42.9 
+ 1. 3 
'* 
-20. 5 
-12.4 
+ 5. 1 
- 4. 3 
'* 
- 2.3 
- 7.0 
+ 8. 9 
- 6. 5 
-16.8. 
'* 
'* 
-12. 1 
-18. 1 
+ 4. 7 
- 1. 5 
-10.3 
Terminateq or Refrained from Contract Provision for Ancillary Services: 
Cook 62.5 -15.5 - 5. 1 
Nelson 52. 4 - 9.2 -21. 7 
Palmerston North 69. 4 - 8. 7 
* 
Wanganui 72.4 * -23. 1 
Dannevirke 63.8 - 7. 7 +35. 2 
C. Hawkes Bay 53. 2 -23. 4 - 8. 1 
Maniototo 60.0 0 -26. 7 
Waiapu 55. 1 -26.3 -15.7 
Wairarapa 73.5 - 3. 5 + 11. 1 
Data calculated from Department of Heal th records, Hospi tal Management Data 
and figures supplied by hospital and area health boards and contracting 
firms 
* = data not available 
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greatest decreases, where the increase in operating grant has been lowest 
although the correlation is very weak. 
Nevertheless, te the weakness of this association, jobs have 
certainly been lost in the hospital ancillary sector particularly in the 
housekeeping services. Moreover the contracting out of these services 
would certainly have been a major factor in achieving this in view of the 
cost savings thought possible. But beyond the issue of job loss alone, 
the industrial relations scene has probably been exacerbated by the nature 
of hospital ancillary services themselves. 
It was seen in chapter five that the services considered here, 
especially cleaning and orderly work, are highly labour intensive and, 
unlike many other industries outside of the health sector, it has not been 
ble to reduce the workforce significantly by introducing new 
technology. This is not to say that modern machinery and cleaning s 
have not played a part in reducing staff but rather, in spite of these 
advances, productivity increases have had to come more through 
intensifying the physical nature of the work process - that is through work 
speed-ups. It is therefore hardly surpr that substantial workforce 
resistance has been encountered. 
The last two decades have seen many labour intensive manufacturing 
industries, employing skilled and semi-skilled workers, relocate to the 
Third World on account of the readily available pools of cheaper labour. 
Clearly this cannot be done with the hospital services and hence the 
contradictions of workforce resistance to productivity pressures has had to 
be resolved in situ rather than by exercising the option of geographical 
mobili ty. An inherently labour intensive and spatially fixed industry has 
meant that product i vi ty increases have placed great physical pressure on 
the workforce. In the next section some of the consequences of, and 
resistance to, this pressure applied by contractors are examined. 
9.2 Trade Union Policy and Contracting Out Ancillary Services: 
A consideration of the theoretical frameworks introduced in chapters 
two and three would suggest three possible means by which workers can 
combat privatisation. Prom a public choice perspective they might campaign 
to raise public awareness of what trade unions see as private contractors 
lack of public accountability and responsibility for deteriorating 
standards of public (hospital) service provision. This would probably be 
supplemented by campaigns for election to the hospital boards in which the 
political power achieved is used to inhibit or reverse any contracting out 
policy. 
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A Weberian Cmanagerialist) approach to the issue might entail the 
workforce attempting to acquire relevant occupational skills or knowledge 
in order to 'professionalise' their status. On the basis of 'knowledge is 
power', they could expect to attain a greater degree of authority or at 
least bargaining power in the policy making decisions of the hospital 
boards in respect of contract service provision. The 
combat ing the process comes within the Marxian perspect i ve. 
final way of 
This policy 
necessitates class action at the point of production by the workforce 
withdrawing its labour from service provision until certain conditions are 
met such as the termination of a private contract. 
The first two policy options have already been covet'ed in earlier 
chapters, albeit in a different context, and found problematic. For the 
public choice perspect i ve, the heavy time commitment of hospital board 
members and the need for ancillary workers to earn a living makes it 
exceedingly difficult for the latter group to participate actively in the 
former. The principal, if not t he only example. of elect oral politics 
influencing hospital board contracting out policy is considered later in 
this chapter. With regard to professionalism, ancillary services are 
inherently unskilled, or at best semi-skilled, and there are few 
opport uni ties 
qual if icat ions. 
available for acquiring profeSSional job related 
It is perhaps not surprising then that the main 
oppositional thrust against contracting out has been focused on the point 
of production itself. 
A campaign of industrial action against contract employment developed 
in the 19808 but this policy must also be seen as part of a broader 
campaign to involve the workforce in trade union affairs and the 
maintenance of the public hospital system. In the words of a prominent 
official of the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union: 
The whole drive was to bring the union back to the members. 
If they f eIt an act i on by an employer was unj ust, t hey had to 
decide: does it go to court again or should they take direct 
industrial action. We advocated a direct response to injustice 
rather than waiting for the 1 system to take effect. 
We also improved communications with members. We started a 
union newspaper, published a training manual, hired an education 
officer, elected more delegates and got all of them more involved 
with the decision making process (Metro, 1989, 116). 
The previous chapter showed that contracting out can be a way of 
divesting management of administrative responsibility. This policy though 
may only be viable to the extent that services are still provided once 
contracted out. Should major industrial conflict occur, so that 
services are disrupted, then the desired effects of privatisation may not 
-234-
be achieved and there might have to be a reversion to state provision. 
At the very least the effects of privatisation in terms of job loss and 
wage cuts may be minimised by an industrially organised workforce and, 
moreover, just the potential of major conflict could inhibit the 
execution of privatisation policies because of the anticipated disrupti,?n 
to services. It might therefore be expected that the geographical 
development of privatisation would be mediated by the extent of work force 
opposi tion; in effect the level of class conflict. From within a Marxian 
framework, the balance of class forces could be of critical importance in 
the development of privatisation policies. 
The critical issue then is to test empirically the theoretical 
proposition that spatial and temporal variations in the level of class 
conflict, or 
pri vat isat ion. 
workforce mili tancy, mediate the uneven development of 
This requires determining quantitatively whether in any 
given service or institution, the workforce in region A is more or less 
mili tant than in region B. In terms of this study, there is a need to 
find out which hospital board districts have had the most militant 
ancillary workers and relate this militancy to the spatial development of 
contracting out. By analogy with the index of privatisation developed in 
chaper five, a numerical index of class conflict needs to be established. 
9. 2. 1 An Index of Class Conflict: 
As first seen in chapter two, Peet (1983) constructed a single 
composite index of levels of class struggle by ranking all States in the 
USA in terms of differences in numbers of work stoppages, 
wage rates, and 'business climate'. The lat t er variable 
union membership, 
was taken as a 
measure of the Oocal) state's attitude towards capital and labour and 
comprised measures of tax levels, union and cot'porate legislation, the size 
of government and other indices showing how favourable the attitude of the 
local state was towards business (Peet 1983, 124). Within the context of 
this case study such a comprehensive index is not possible. 
In New Zealand union membership and wage rates have remained, 
respect i vely, universal and uni form across all hospit al boards throughout 
the duration of time for which data is available (ie around the mid 1970s). 
Apart from a period of voluntary unionism from February 1984 to May 1985, 
which did not signi ficant ly affect hospital domest ic workers, there has 
been a universal union coverage for most industrial occupations in New 
Zealand. While not denying the existence of some spatial variations in 
wage rates outside the hospital sector (see Hoare 1986), the wage rates in 
the hospital ancillary sector, have been set nationally, not regionally or 
locally, hence their aspatiality. For the most part New Zealand wage rates 
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vary across industries not regions. In respect of business climate no such 
regionally based index exists in New Zealand as it does in the USA. This 
is primarily because of the more centralised government administration and 
a nationwide application of all industrial legislation in New Zealand with 
no regionally specific variations. 
The only remaining variable to indicate class conflict in Peet's 
formulation is the levels of work stoppages but even with this several 
empirical difficulties were encountered in trying to quantify it. Not the 
least of these difficulties arose from a lack of official data. The main 
statistical source on this subject in New Zealand has been the Department 
of St at ist ics annual publicat ion, Work Stoppages and Industri a1 Unions4. 
Unfortunately it does not contain a sufficient disaggregation of data to 
detail work stoppages in public hospitals and therefore the publication is 
of little assistance in this case study. 
Another important factor to consider with collating data on work 
stoppages is the particular form in which to present the information. Work 
stoppages, whether complete, as with strikes, or partial, as in the 
banning of cert ain dut ies, can be classi fied according to the number of 
either st oppages themsel ves, working days lost or workers involved. So a 
year with a low number of st oppages might have a high number of working 
days lost and vice versa, with a very different perspective on the level of 
class conflict emerging according to which particular statistic is used. 
There are also a great many workplace activities that could plaUSibly be 
regarded as class conflict or militancy but are not in any way 
quant i fiable such as, sabotage of machinery, unofficial • go-slows' , 
absenteeism and deliberate policies of non-cooperation with the employer. 
A further unquantifiable factor is the extent of threatened work stoppages 
which do not come to fruition because of either a retraction by one or 
bot h part ies or a mut ual compromise, Therefore in collating data on this 
issue there is the inherent danger of seriously underestimating the extent 
of labour force militancy. 
With the absence, or at least the inapplicability, of official 
statistics, the data on work stoppages by public hospital ancillary workers 
has had to be gathered at first hand. Data was sought from each branch of 
the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union on the work stoppages, whether 
complete or partial, that have occurred in public hospitals throughout the 
four~ decades in which contracting out has existed. The incompleteness of 
many trade union records made it necessary to rely on t he memories of 
workers and union officials and the fragments of records on this issue 
belonging to hospital boards all of which has made verification exceedingly 
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difficult. 
Another contributory factor to the difficulties of quantification has 
been the degree of variation in the extent of industrial action within as 
well as between boards, Any number of institutions within each board may 
be affected at anyone time and different categories of ancillary worker 
can be involved at different times with numbers varying from just a 
handful to a few hundred while the work stoppages themselves have lasted 
from only a few hours to several weeks. To obtain the numbers of workers 
involved in all these industrial disputes has meant resorting to little 
better than guess work. In many instances part time workers have been 
involved which has made for problems in determining the number of working 
days lost in terms of 'full time equivalent' employment, Also the 
duration of industrial actions, while slightly easier to detail, has been 
of questionable statistical relevance. A strike of just three hours 
involving no more than about ten people cannot readily be scaled 
one of three weeks where a few hundred are involved even if allowance is 
made for the large differences in the size of boards and their individual 
inst it ut ions, 
In spite of the limit at ions point ed out earlier of just us the 
numbers of stoppages per se as the discriminating variable, this has been 
the only practical way for ascertaining the relative levels of militancy 
in the different boards. These levels of militancy are shown, as an 
'index of class conflict' which comprises simply the number of work 
stoppages to have occurred and is shown, in table 9.4. The information 
has been presented spatially with reference to hospital board boundaries in 
figure 9.2 and all known work stoppages have been included whether or not 
related to contract employment. In view of the inherently unreliable 
nature of this exercise, the data can only be regarded as showing the 
crudest indication of the uneven spatiality of class conflict. 
Work stoppages in public hospitals have occurred at two different 
ial scales. The first are primarily local and regional based conflicts 
involving a padicular tal board or contractor and they are mainly 
rela.ted to disputes over work practices. The second occurs at the 
national scale and arises principally from breakdowns of annual Award 
negotiations over pay and employment conditions. In this second case, 
industrial action has been much more widespread than the first and not 
confined to anyone hospital board, 
The hospital boards in table 9.4 have been grouped into the two major 
cat es of contracting out policy. Board size, as given by bed numbers, 
and indices of privatisation for 1931, 86 and 89 are also presented. 
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TABLE 9.4: Jndices of Privatisation and Class Conflict 
Hospital 
Boards 
1989 Bed Indices of Privatisation 
Numbers 1981 1986 1989 
Index of Class 
Conflict 
Commenced or Retained Contract Provision for Ancillary Services: 
Auckland 4,225 6.2 8.9 11 
Canterbury 
Otago 
Waikato 
Wellington 
Hawkes Bay 
Northland 
S. Canterbury 
Southland 
Taranaki 
Tauranga 
West Coast 
Ashburton 
Bay of Plenty 
Marl borough 
S. Otago 
Taumarunui 
Thames 
Vincent 
Waitaki 
2,970 
1,300 
2,457 
2,444 
716 
780 
488 
731 
634 
386 
625 
234 
247 
185 
134 
105 
234 
67 
185 
15.5 
1.7 
12.0 
18. 4 
27. 4 
66. 7 
29. 2 
61. 6 
27.0 
62. 2 
33.8 
100.0 
95.0 
61. 1 
66. 7 
41. 8 
100.0 
16. 1 
12. 9 
11.8 
18.2 
27. 4 
100.0 
29. 6 
93. 2 
27. 1 
62. 5 
34. 5 
100.0 
95.3 
61. 3 
68. 1 
66. 7 
64.6 
100. 0 
50. 2 
16.5 
15. 1 
12.6 
17.9 
26.8 
66. 7 
29.6 
93. 7 
28. 5 
62.3 
19.0 
100.0 
97.6 
63.3 
64.2 
66. 7 
73.0 
100.0 
50.5 
9 
7 
3 
11 
3 
6 
7 
2 
2 
4 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
Mean Level of Class Conflict (Labour Militancy) 3.9 
Terminated or Refrained from Contract Provision for Ancillary Services! 
Cook 317 4 
Nelson 
Palmerston 
Wanganui 
Dannevirke 
C. Hawkes 
Maniototo 
Waiapu 
Wairarapa 
Mean 
Source: 
958 
N 1,315 
714 
114 
Bay 234 
46 
38 
275 
Level of Class 
66. 7 
Conflict 
2 
6 
3 
2 
3 
2.6 
Department of Health records and information supplied by regional 
offices of the New Zealand Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union 
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Figure 9.2 
Regional Variations in Number of Work Stoppages in 
New Zealand Hospital Boards since 1970 
Key 
N umber of Work Stoppages 
>9 m 
6-9 ~ 
3-5 ~ 
<3 D 
Source: 
compiled from information 
supplied by officials and 
members of the New Zealand 
Hotel and Hospital Workers ' 
Union, 
WEST COAST 
SOUTHLAND 
.~ . 
SOUTH CANTERBURY 
MANIOTOTO ( Ronfurly) 
OTAGO 
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Unlike the privatisation index established in chapter six, the militancy 
index has had to be given as an aggregate across time as work stoppages in 
many boards have been too infrequent to allow a meaningful index to be 
determined for each year under consideration. It may be seen immediately 
that all boards have recorded at least one stoppage owing to a national 24 
hour strike, called in conjunction with nursing staff, in February 1989 
over pay and conditions. In the following sections a more detailed 
analysis is made of the spatial and temporal growth of labour militancy 
and its relationship to contracting out. 
9.2.2 The Growth of Industrial Militancy in the Ancillary Sector Workforce: 
Comparing the two groups of contracting out policies, those hospital 
boacds that dispensed with contractors around 1980, have shown a lower mean 
level of militancy, as a collective whole, than those that adopted the 
cont ract opt ion. This is not part icularly support i ve of the hypothesis 
that high levels of class conflict inhibit privatisation although a t Test 
conducted on these mean values .showed there to be no ficant difference 
even at the five percent level. The situation appears slightly different 
when the index of class conflict is correlated nst the index of 
privatisation. 
For the years 1981, 86 and 89 respectively r values of -0.19, -0,14 
and -0.20 were obtained. 
but nonetheless negative, 
levels of privatisation 
All are very low and statistically insignificant 
indicating a slight tendency towards lower 
where militancy is highest. The strongest 
correlation however was found between board size and militancy ving an r 
value of 0.82 on 1989 bed numbers. While this may partially be accounted 
for y on the basis of there being more hospitals in larger boards and 
hence more opportunity for militancy, this factor can I y be discounted 
for two reasons. First is that where work stoppages have involved more 
than one tal, this has only been recorded as one incident in the index 
of class conflict. The second is that work stoppages in large boards have 
tended to occur repeatedly in the same hospital. A more plausible reason 
for the high correlation is that the largest boards also contain the 
inst it ut ions and are cent red on maj or urban areas where working 
class sat ion tends to be stronger, compared to smaller institutions 
and rural settlements. But as chapter six showed, board size itself was 
not a particularly strong explanatory variable in the geogragraphy of 
contract service provision. 
One clear factor to emerge from the data collection is that 
workforce militancy has been spatially variable and almost exclusively 
confined to the 19805. Table 9.5 lists the major industrial confrontations 
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TABLE 9,5: Principal Work Stoppages in New Zealand Public HosDitals by 
Members of Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union 
Hospital 
Board 
Otago 
Otago 
Well 
Auckland 
on 
Year 
1974 
1980 
1981 
1983 
Various Boards 1985 
Wellington 
West Coast 
<Greymouth) 
Northland 
(Whangerei) 
Palmerston N, 
Ashbudon 
1985 
1985 
1986 
1986 
1986 
Various Boards 1986 
Various Boards 1987 
Various Boards 1988 
Various Boards 1989 
Staff 
Category 
domestics 
domestics 
domestic 
domestic 
all cat egories 
orderlies 
domestic & 
orderlies 
dietary 
domestic 
orderlies 
all cat egories 
all categories 
all categories 
all categories 
(+ nursing staff) 
Employer at 
Time of Work 
Stoppage 
contractor 
hospital board 
contractor 
contractor 
State 
(Award Breakdown) 
hospital board 
contractor 
contractor 
hospit al board 
contractor 
State 
(Award Breakdown) 
State 
(Award Breakdown) 
State Sector Bill 
State 
(Award Breakdown) 
Duration 
of Strike 
day 
2 days 
4 weeks 
6 weeks 
various 
12 days 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
2 
4 days 
various 
2 days 
day 
day 
Source: Regional offices of the New Zealand Hotel and Hospital Workers' 
Union 
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that have occurred in public hospitals. Apart from a 24 hour strike in 
Otago in 1974, prolonged di ions did not start until the early 1980s. 
A factor not so apparent from table 9.5 is that during the decade 
industrial disruption has tended both to intensify and to expand 
geographically in two important respects. 
The first is that while industrial disputes over contracting out have 
predominated in the first half of the 1980s, the second half has seen the 
growth of militancy as a result of breakdowns in Award 
negot iat ions. A of this has been that t he spat ial ext ent of 
industrial disruption has increased in the second half of the 1980s since 
the cause has been at a national rather than local level. The result of 
this has been that many hospital boards in the mid and late eighties have 
seen industrial disruption in their institutions even though the workforce 
has not been employed by private contractors. 
The second point is that with national Award breakdowns the form of 
industrial action has intensified insofar as it has had more serious 
affects on service provision. From being predominantly just 'limited 
action' in 1985 such as the banning of certain duti the late 1980s have 
seen complete strike action in many, if not most, tal boards. So 
whi Ie in the necessarily crude quant i tat i ve measures used labour 
militancy does not appear to have increased overall, empirical 
investigation reveals a distinct qualitative increase. 
An explanation of the breakdown of Award negotiations needs to be 
set in the context of falling real wages in the hospital ancillary sector 
and the ever more restrained financial climate with the consequent 
difficulty of achieving pay settlements. Table 9.6 shows that, when 
adjusted for inflation, ancillary workers basic pay in 1989 was only 70 
percent of that in 1981. Viewed spatially, the relatively higher cost of 
living, and hence lower real wages, in Auckland and Wellington compared to 
the remainder of the country, may explain some of the higher level of 
militancy in these boards. Be this as it may. a managerialist (Weberian) 
perspective on the process might have predicted a progressive spatial 
development of contracting out throughout the 1980s as a direct result of 
the increasing militancy. 
Such a development has not occurred and, as t he maps in chapt er six 
show, there has since 1985 been a reduction, if only a slight one, in the 
spatial extent of contracting out. The ive correlation between levels 
of privatisation and labour militancy cited above rather conflicts with 
managerialist theories that predict greater privatisation with labour 
militancy in order for managers to rid themselves of industial relations 
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TABLE 9.6: Public Hospital Ancillary Workers Weekly Wages 1981 - 1989 
Year Basic Weekly Average Annual Consumer Weekly Weekly 
Wage 1 Percentage Rise Price Wage Wage 
Consumer Prices2 Increases Increases Reduced 
since 1981 since 1981 to 1981 
1981 193. 56 15. 4 1000 1000 1000 
1982 211. 43 16. 1 1154 1092 946 
1983'" 211. 43 7.4 1340 1092 815 
19844 219. 43 6. 1 1439 1133 787 
1985 234. 79 15. 5 1527 1212 794 
1986 282.03 13.2 1764 1456 825 
1987 301. 35 15. 7 1997 1556 779 
1988 322. 44 6.8 2311 1665 720 
1989 334. 44 2468 1727 700 
as per New Zealand Hospital Domestic Workers Award 
2 as given in New Zealand Official Yearbook, various years and Key 
Statistic~ Department of Statistics, February 1989 
3 Wage Freeze from June 1982 to December 1984 
4 Cost of Living Allowance of $8.00 per week as from 1st April 1984. 
Source: calculated from data given in New Zealand Hospital Domestic 
Workers Award, New Zeal and Official Yearbook, various years and Key 
Statistics, Department of Statistics, February 1989 
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problems. As was indicated earlier in the chapter, where there is major 
service disruption consequent upon industrial conflict this may inhibit 
privatisation and the analysis here lends some limited support to this 
cont ent ion. 
Rather than contracting out being a result of mili tancy, the latter 
may be said to have been in part a consequence of the former which has been 
underpinned, as the last chapter showed, by the deteriorating socio-
economic conditions of the 1980s. Paradoxically however it has been 
precisely in this most recent period that significant moves have been made 
to privatise other sectors of the public health system and the state sector 
in general. The issue to be decided then is what role has workforce 
militancy played in displacing the locus of contracting out policies away 
from the ancillary sector? 
In certain cases there would seem to have been virtually no 
relationship between contracting out and wor-k force militancy which may 
largely explain the weakness of the correlation between the two variables. 
The case study presented in chapter- six showed that the termination of 
contract service provision in Maniototo as well as the permanent in-house 
provision in Waiapu certainly could be at least partly be explained on the 
basis of factors other than workforce militancy. Similarly the ending of 
contracting out in Wanganui, Palmerston North ahd Wairarapa took place 
before the advent of the union campaign against contracting out and the 
growth of union militancy. Al though the contract provision in Dannevirke 
was terminated in 1985, a year of considerable militancy thr-oughout the 
hospitals in New Zealand, there appears to have been very little 
disrupt ion in that particular Board. In this case, according to the Board 
management, the change to in-house provision was made, like the others 
cases just cited, "for reasons of both efficiency and cost saving' 
<Dannevirke Hospital Board, written personna 1 communication, 20th Septembel' 
1988) . 
To the extent that workforce militancy has influenced the contracting 
out process, it has perhaps been more as an inhibiting factor to its 
expansion rather than a mechanism for reversing the process once 
established. If the trade unions have not been able to 'clean out 
contractors' then at least they have not been 'cleaned out' by them. 
Numerous interviews with hospital board managers revealed the existence of 
two counterposing possibli ties. On the one hand it was widely recognised 
that the ancillary secvice workforce has become much more miIi tant of 
recent years while on the other hand the savings still to be made have 
become progressively less significant. 
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This is especially so when viewed 
in proportion to the highly increased levels of cost cutting required 
throughout all sectors of the hospital service at the end of the 1980s. 
Far larger savings may be made in other hospital services where the 
workforce is not so industrially militant. 
One hospital board manager made the illuminating comment that: 
If we contracted out the domestic services we could probably save 
around $50,000 a year - not worth it for all the trade union 
opposi tion that would follow. But if the saving was to be 
$500,000 then we would certainly think again (personnal 
communication 18th November 1988). 
In some respects it could be argued that trade union opposition has been 
too little too late and, judging by the data illustrated in figure 9.2, 
possi bly too ially fragmented to have achieved the goal of completely 
cleaning out contractors, Yet insofar as the contracting out process has, 
temporarily at least, been halted then perhaps the campaign has been better 
lat e than never, 
In order to n a further insight into the uneven development of 
contracting out and the role of class conflict, it is instructive to make a 
comparative study of some hospital boards that have adopted opposing 
policies for ancillary service provision. ficantly lacking from the 
discussion of workforce militancy so far have been the examples of the 
Northland and Auckland Boards, both of which have terminated contracts, the 
latter all of them in 1988, and both having been the scene of major 
industrial conflicts, These two cases are considered further in the next 
section. 
9.3 The Geography of Contracting Out and Class Conflict: Case Studies 
To provide further understanding of the geographically uneven 
development of privatisation, it is worthwhile to compare the form of 
ancillary service provision in Northland and Auckland with the Southland 
and Ot ago Boards. Both Auckland and Otago contracted out their domestic 
cleaning services in 1981 and 1982 respectively and similarly Southland and 
Northland contracted out their dietary services in 19B3 and 1985 
respect i vel y. While Otago and Southland have retained contract provision 
the other two reverted to in-house provision in 1988. The question then is 
why have the two northern Boards changed their policy and not the southern 
two? In the following section the relevance of some of the explanatory· 
factors advanced in earlier chapters in respect of geographically uneven 
pri vat isat ion is discussed prior to analysing the 
militancy in these examples of contracting out. 
ficance of labour 
9.3.1 Statistical Comparison of Northland with Southland and Auckland 
with Otago Hospital Boards: 
When comparing Northland wi th Southland and Auckland with Otago, a 
number of similarities emerge in terms of gross characteristics like bed 
numbers, board dist rict and main ci t Y populat ions and accessibility from 
major urban centres. Although the population and bed numbers of the 
Auckland Board are much greater than Otago, compared to other boards in the 
country these two are in the same size category in as much as they each 
have over 1,000 beds, offer highly specialised services and have medical 
schools. The main urban settlements in Northland (Whangarei) and 
Southland (Invercargill) are each of similar size and travelling distance 
from principal urban centres of population; respectively Auckland and 
Dunedin. Table 9.7 presents -these gross characteristics in tabulated 
form. From this it should be clear that very little explanatory value 
for uneven development of contracting out can be placed on institutional 
(scale economies) and locational (accessibility and investment opportunity) 
factors which were considered in chapter six. 
Hospital Principal Beds Board Population 
Board Urban Centre Numbers Population of Urban 
Centre 
Auckland Auckland 4,355 913,500 820, 754 
Otago Dunedin 1,317 121,300 106,864 
Northland Whangarei 827 129, 600 44,043 
Southland Invercargill 731 116,000 52,807 
Data Source: Hospital Management Data, 1986 Census, and 
Health 
Accessi bilit Y 
3hr OOm 
<171km) 
3hr 10m 
(217km) 
tment of 
A similar lack of explanatory significance holds in respect of the 
relative degree of financial constraint on the Boards. In the most recent 
census year (1986) the operating grant per ta, with allowance for cross 
boundary population flows, for Auckland ($325.7) was considerably lower 
than for Otago ($433.7) while Northland and Southland had fairly similar 
levels of financial constraint; $347.5 and $336.8 respectively (see chapter 
eight, table 8.2). As Otago was less financially constrained than 
Auckland, the termination of contracting might more readily be expected in 
the former rather the latter Board. 
With reference to the concept of cost effectiveness this can be 
understood here not only as service costs per bed, as in chapter eight, but 
also in terms of contract staff numbers per bed since data on the latter 
quant it Y is available since 1984. In table 9.8 comparative data on cost 
eff ect i veness bet ween t he boards is present ed based on the hospit als and 
services where contract service provision obtained. It can immediately be 
seen that in 1988, the year of contract termination in Auckland and 
Northland, services were less cost effective than in either Otago or 
Southland for both staff and costs per bed, 
Viewed over time the situation is not so clear cut. As the dietary 
contract in Northland only commenced in November 1985 which was the 1986 
financial year, it has not been possible to ascertain the relative cost 
effectiveness with Southland over a meaningful time period. With Auckland 
however contract staff numbers per bed have remained fairly constant over 
the period 1984-88 whereas in Otago they have decreased from 19. 6 per 100 
beds to 14.8 100 beds. . Considering Auckland's consist ent ly great er 
staffing levels than in Otago it is perhaps surprising that their costs per 
bed are the lower of the two in 1984 and 1986. In such labour intensive 
industries changes in staff numbers might reasonably be expected to 
parallel changes in service costs. Yet whatever the contradictory nature 
of the data there is then little substance to the argument that by 1988 
the contractors had cut the staff level and service costs to an 
irreducible minimum in Auckland and Northland so that the only savings to 
be made were on the contractor's overheads and profit. 
A further factor that can be ruled out as an explanatory variable in 
these cases is that of the professionalism and skill acquisition of the 
ancillary workforce since these requirements vary between sectors of 
hospital services and not regions. Conseq uen t 1 y, inst it ut ional, 
locational, financial and professional considerations cannot be invoked in 
attempts to explain the adoption of different forms of service provision in 
1988. This only leaves the managerial and political factors discussed in 
the previous chapter t her with the difficulties in industrial 
relat ions. These are discussed in er detail in the following 
sections, starting with the latter, if only because they provide the most 
striking contrast between the two southern and northern boards. 
9.3.2 Labour Force Militancy in Auckland and Northland: the 
Implications for Contracting Out: 
The higher levels of industrial disruption in the ancillary services 
of the Auckland and Northland Boards provide an immediate point of 
contrast with Otago and Southland. At first sight this contradicts the 
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TABLE 9.8: Com~arison of Cost Effectiveness in Contract Service Provision 
between Auckland and Ota~o and Northland and Southland Hospital 
Boards 
HOUSEKEEPING 
1988 Auckland 
Contract Staff 
in FTEs 146.5 
Total Contract 
Cost in $ 3,140,409 
Average 
Occupied Beds 664.2 
Contract Staff 
per 100 beds 22. 1 
Cont rad Cost 
per bed in $ 4, 728. 1 
1986 Auckland 
Contract Staff 
in FTEs 188.0 
Total Contract 
Cost in $ 2,653,671 
Average 
Occupied Beds 895.2 
Contract Staff 
per 100 beds 21. 0 
Contract Cost 
per bed 2,964.3 
1984 Auckland 
Contract Staff 
in FTEs 161. 9 
Total Contract 
Cost in $ 2,225,476 
Average 
Occupied Beds 727.8 
Contract Staff 
per 100 beds 22.2 
Contract Cost 
per bed 3,057.8 
Services 
Otago 
61. 5 
1,838,530 
415.3 
14.8 
4,427.0 
Otago 
61. 5 
1,191,268 
362.8 
17.0 
3,283.5 
Otago 
80.1 
1,389,922 
408. 2 
19.6 
3,405.0 
DIETARY Services 
Northland Southland 
89.8 42.2 
2,049,009 1,372,627 
597.8 497. 1 
15.0 8. 41 
3, 427. 5 2,761.3 
Northland Southland 
Board Provision 
to November 1985 
Northland Southland 
Board Provision 
Source: calculated from data in Hospital Management Data, 1984, 1986 and 
1988. 
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index of labour militancy, admittedly oversimplified, shown in table 9.4, 
in which Nor'thland and Southland appear to have had roughly equal number of 
work stoppages. The situation becomes clearer upon realising that 
Northland, as well as Auckland, were the scenes of two highly protracted 
work stoppages, the significance of which is not adequately pOI'trayed in 
si enumerat ion. At the end of 1983 there was a six week strike of 
domest ic cleaners employed by Crothalls Ltd at Auckland Hospital and, in 
early 1986, one of four weeks duration, preceeded by nine weeks of limited 
industrial action, by dietary service workers empl by Advanced Food 
Services Ltd in all the hospitals in the Northland district. 
By comparison the industrial scene in Otago and Southland has been 
characterised by disputes of a much smaller scale both in terms of 
duration and numbers of workers involved. While limited industrial action 
was quite extensive in Otago by the workers under contract 
employment, (Otago Daily Times 26th June 1984 and 3rd September 1985), no 
prolonged disruption occurred 'in either Board, with complete stoppages (ie 
strikes) being restricted to just a few days at the most. In the Southland 
Board strikes were somet imes just 
shift rather than all wi thin the 
confined to workers 
ent ire service. So 
on one part icular 
While there was 
cert ainly resistance to the condit ions of work under cont ract employment, 
particularly in Otago, the campaign appears to have been less intense than 
in Auckland and Northland. 
In Auckland the domestic cleaners' strike after the contract had 
been in operation for 27 months and staff numbers had been reduced from 182 
at the commencement of the contract to 105 (Hotel and Hospital Workers' 
Union circular to all affiliates, no date) while Crothalls cited a 
reduction to 102 although no independent verification of any of these 
figures was available. The company justified this reduction on the 
grounds that, "the productivity rate of the Auckland Cleaners is lower than 
that which exists in our other 46 contracts" (Crothalls circular letter to 
all hospital boards, 22nd November 1983) but no indication was presented as 
to how the productivity rate was calculated. 
The prime reason for the strike was in order to achieve increases in 
staffing levels to combat falling service standards and increased workloads 
since attempts to realise this through negotiation were seen by the union 
to have failed <Union circular to all affiliates, no date), After six 
weeks the Government intervened with the Minister of Labour Ol'der a 
compulsory conference under the mediat ion of an indust rial conci liat or, 
After two days of deadlocked negotiation, the conciliator ordered the 
strikers back to work with the condition that Crothalls had 'to employ an 
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extra six workers and replace one who had left (SHIFT 1984, 3). The strike 
therefore simply altered, as was intended, the conditions of service 
provision rather than the form of provision, and another fi ve years 
elapsed before the contract itself was terminated. 
The cause of the industrial action in Northland was mainly over the 
principle behind the letting of the contract for the dietary services 
without there any prior consultation between the workers 
involved and the Northland Area Health Board. Rather than specifically 
seeking an improvement in the conditions of employment, the strike was more 
in anticipation of reduced staffing levels and lower standards of service 
provision under contract. The prime purpose of the strike was to have 
the contract cancelled and a return to service provision by the Board. The 
strike itself had been preceded by a period of limited action from 18th 
November 1985, the date of commencement of the contract, to January 19th 
1986 (9 weeks) after which there was a complete work stoppage to the 15th 
of February 1986. Shortly prior to the end of the strike, a meeting 
between the Hotel and Hospital Workers Union, the Federation of Labours and 
the Employers' Federation proposed that a committee of enquiry be formed 
to investigate the way in which, "the contract fvas let, the lack of 
consul tation [with the union] and the appropriateness of the contract" 
(SHIFT 1986a, 11). On this basis a High Court injunction was issued 
ordering a return to work. The strike however did not succeed in 
terminating the contract and instead the formation of a committee of 
enquiry was the immediate outcome. 
These m.ajor strikes were only the most visible part of trade union 
campaign against the contractors in these two boards. Apart from these 
there were also, in the case of Auckland at least, numerous strikes of 
shoder duration while in Northland workers adopted, "a non-cooperation 
attitude to the contractor~' (written personal communication from Hospital 
Workers' Union, 10th August 1989) which meant, for example. that workers 
would collectively refuse to undergo changes to their hours of work, the 
areas in which they were to work or the duties red of them. Figure 
9. 3 exempli fies some of the strategies adopted in the ' non-cooperation' 
campaign. The effect of this was that, "no moves could be made by AFS to 
implement changes which would resul t in profi t making for the company" 
(wri tt en personal communicat ion from Hot el and Hospit al Worker's' Union, 
10th August 1989). Similarly in Auckland, non-cooperation strategies made 
it very difficult to implement all the cost cutting measures deemed 
necessary by the contractor. For example Crothalls cite the case of night 
workers being unwilling to transfer to day shift and, "all pressures we 
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FIGURE 9.3: Trade Union Activity in the Work Place 
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Source: Northern Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union 
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have applied to move this group have met with union involvement by way of 
support for their members" (Letter from Crothalls to Auckland Hospital 
Board, 6th October 1982), 
The central question then is to ascertain the precise linkage between 
the industrial disruption that took place and the action of the two Boards 
in terminating the contracts. As was detailed in chapter five hospital and 
area health boards comprise both a management (appointed) and a membership 
<elected) structure. The respective roles played by these structures in 
the reversion to in-house provision must also be examined in the context of 
the trade union campaign. In the next section the attitude of hospital 
management staff in Auckland and Northland is considered and, where 
appropriate, comparisons are drawn with the Otago and Southland Boards. 
9.3.3 The Management of Ancillary Services in the Auckland and 
Northland Boards: 
In the light of the intense industrial disruption with contract 
services, reversion to Board provision counters any theory of I bureaucratic 
rationalisation' . It might therefore be expected that the Boards' 
management staff would be highly opposed to such a move but from the 
proposals made by the management to the Board members this was not case. 
According to the available records, in all three hospitals in the Auckland 
Board where contractors were engaged Auckland, North Shore and 
Sutherland, the respect i ve hospital managers advocated the t erminat ion of 
the contracts in their reports to the Board membership. The justification 
presented for recommending the termination of the contracts was based 
primarily on the inadequacy of standards of service provision and the costs 
involved with this form of provision. 
Of the three contractors who submitted tenders for Auckland Hospital 
in 1987, two were thought by management to be insufficiently resourced to 
ensure an adequate and reliable service. The third contractor, which was 
the incumbent Crothalls, was deemed to have submit t ed t he most realist ic 
tender and the company ci t ed three possi ble opt ions for t he Board, the 
most economical of which required the elimination of rotating shifts. In 
an internal memorandum of 11th November 1987 from the Executive Officer, 
Hotel Services to the Board's Chief Executive, it was written, "Such 
changes may cause adverse reaction from staff, it would affect thirty nine 
people, possi bl V creatinii more industrial act ion" (my emphasis). This 
point however was not made in the report to the Board membership. Instead 
the management submitted a proposal detailing how the service could be 
provided more economically in-house. This would be achieved by reducing 
what were thought of as the contractor's excessive allowances for, "sick 
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pa~ annual leave and the miscellaneous insurance~' (Management Report to 
Auckland Hospital Board, 30th November 1987>. 
In spite of the formal justification for contract termination on 
financial grounds,' the possibili ty of further industrial disruption and 
consequent suspension of service appears 
recommendation of in-house provision. 
an important factor in the 
For both North Shore and 
. Sutherland Hospitals the stated reason in Board reports for reverting to 
in-house provision was based more on poor standards of service rather than 
indust rial act ion. North Shore management reported that, "The present 
staff of approximately 23 full time equi valent persons is barely adequate 
to maintain a satisfactory cleaning standard (Management Report to Auckland 
Hospital Board, 16th March 1987>, but also mentioned was that the Hospital 
Workers Union, "has indicated its willingness to cooperate closely wi th the 
Board, to ensure the maximum possible flexibility, effectiveness and 
efficiency". The clear implication is that the workforce did not cooperate 
closely with the contractor ~nd this doubtless adversely affected the 
standard of service. 
For the Northland Board, the management argued that, by terminating 
the diet ary service cont ract, cost savings would arise: 
through not having to pay a salary for the Base Hospital food 
services manager ($36, 500 pa), a pay clerk's salary ($20,000 pa) 
and an estimated profit of $104,000 pa, [and] elimination of 
excess wastage of food would result in savings of at least 
$94,000 per year. (Management Report to Northland Area Heal th 
Board, 3rd October 1988~ 
Signi f icant 1 y, however, the Board minutes also made the following 
observation in support of the termination of the contract: 
The Personnel Manager has commented that the Board spends more 
time settling kitchen labour relations issues than it does for 
any other section of Board staff, and in the event of strike 
action it has been the Board's staff who have taken total 
responsibility for organising volunteers (Management Report to 
Northland Area Health Board, 3rd October 1988)" 
Even more pertinent however to the termination of the contract, and 
confirmed from discussion with Board management, was the agreement of the 
trade union to end its non-cooperation policy. A written communication of 
7th October 1988 from the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union to the 
Northland Board General Manager highlights this point and is quoted at 
length in view of its importance: 
The situation should Advance Foods be contracted to continue to 
run the kitchens in Northland will mean that previous agreements 
made between that company and this union would prevail. These 
agreements thrashed out during the period of that dispute are 
quite clear in guaranteeing the continued privileges of all those 
workers in respect to rosters, the ability to maintain their 
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level of earnings and the other conditions they had enjoyed 
whilst employed by the Area Health Board previously. We believe, 
having discussed with those members the current situation, that 
they have much to offer the Board in the way of efficiencies and 
economies for the future. That level of co-operation would be 
available should the Board decide to take back the employment of 
our workers. 
Should, however, the contract go to Advanced Foods or any other 
contractor, clearly that level of co-operation from those members 
would be very difficult to deliver. 
This passage and the earlier quotes makes clear that while economic (ie 
cost savings) or managerial (ie standards of service) arguments could be 
presented for terminating contracts, underpinning both of them was the 
desire by the Boards to end industrial disruption and gain workforce co-
operat ion. With the case of Auckland however a further factor to be 
considered in the contract termination was the workforce involvement with 
the elected Board membership. Curiously this involvement went much further 
in Auckland than Northland to say nothing of Otago and Southland. 
9.3.4 Political Factors in the Termination of Contract Services in the 
Auckland Hospital Board: 
The composition of the Auckland Hospital Board has been unique in New 
Zealand through the election in 1986 of members of a COITUIlunity Health 
Coali tion. This was specially formed in, "an effort to get worker 
representatives onto the Hospital Boards throughout the Northern Region [of 
the Hotel and Hospital Workers Union)" (SHIFT 1986b, 5). The policy was 
largely born of a view held by many trade unionists that existing hospital 
board members had very little interest either in maint aining a 
comprehensive public health system or in the employment conditions of many 
of its workers, particularly in the facE; of mounting pressures to expand 
privatisation policies in all other areas of the hospital service. Such a 
view is given at least indirect support from Baker (1988) as discussed in 
the previous chapter. 
According to SHIFT (1986c, 7), the newspaper of the Northern Region of 
the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union7 , the main aims of the Coalition 
were, "to support a free, public health system and to elect people to the 
board who are prepared to pressure local government to ensure this 
happens'. More specifically a major concern of the Coalition was, "the way 
staff are treated at the hospital - orderlies, domestics, kitchen workers 
and nurses do not get a good deal". The removal of contractors from the 
hospital system was clearly a principal objective as evident from the 
campaign literature distributed to the workforce. As the placard depicted 
in figure 9.4 makes clear, "We want contractors OUT of our heal th system' 
(SHIFT 1986C). 
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FIGURE 9.~: Trade Union Campaign for Election to the Auckland Hospital 
Board 
1 
r 
· 's ti to g tnt e 
i 1 
We are sick of the way we are treated. 
We want a free, public health system. 
We want to see domestics, orderlies, kit 
: chen staff and nurses treated fairly. 
We want contractors UT ·of our health 
system. 
It's about time WORKERS were repre 
sented on the board. 
Source: SHIFT, April/May 1986 
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Of the eight people who formed the Coalition, four gained seats on the 
fourteen person Board in the October 1986 election. The Board itself was 
structured into six committees of which the Finance and General Purposes 
Committee was the one which handled issues related to contract service 
provision and received reports from the Board management staff on this 
issue. Six served on this committee, two of whom were from the 
Community Health Coalition and one of these was a member of the Hotel and 
Hospital Workers Union employed at Auckland Hospital. All policy decisions 
had to be approved by this committee before being passed by a full meeting 
of all Board members. The Coalition members were not therefore in a 
majority position on this committee but certainly had a platform from which 
to make their views known and to present arguments for termination of the 
contracts. 
As seen above the reports from the Board management recommended, even 
if not particularly persuasively, that in-house pt'ovision be reverted to. 
It is hardly surprising then that the cont ract was terminated. 
Nevertheless it is clear from the arithmetic of the Board membership alone 
that the four other members of the Finance Committee, none of whom had any 
trade union connection, could have out voted the two from the Coalition and 
overturned the management's recommendation had they been so inclined. An 
argument that the changed form of ancillary service provision in Auckland 
was purely the result of the election of a special interest group cannot 
readily be sustained although this was undoubtedly an important factor. 
To summarise the situation, three factors seem to have operated in 
conjunction with each other in securing the termination of the Auckland 
Board contract s. First has been that of a militant, organised workforce 
likely to create further service disruption if placed under greater 
pressure from the contractors. The prospect of greater industrial I 
tranquility therefore made a return to in-house provision look more ( 
attractive from a management perspective even if difficult to Justif Y\ 
financially. The second factor then has been a management structure 
prepared to undertake further administrative responsibility albeit with a 
\ 
guarantee of workforce co-operation and a less traumatic climate of 
industrial relations. 
That a satisfactory standard of service provision could not possibly 
be achieved from the staffing level, when under contract, is not readily 
indicated from the data given above on cost effectiveness in Auckland <and 
Northland) compared with Otago (and Southland). 
is that the union non-cooperation strategies 
A more ausible argument 
detailed earlier have 
inhibited the attainment of production levels sought after by the 
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contractors (and the Board) to the extent that further attempts to make 
such ns would have seen even more industrial disruption. Whether this 
is seen in terms of a class conflict in which workers struggle to retain 
their rights and conditions of employment or as merely union intransigence 
towards greater efficiency depends entirely upon the conceptions of the 
public interest which was discussed in chapter one. 
The third factor involved comes from the observation that neither the 
workforce, no matter how militant, nor the management, no matter how firm 
in their policy proposals, have the final say in policy decision making. 
This duty falls to elected members of the Board. To this end the gaining 
of political power by workforce representives has been an important factor 
in bringing about the end of contract service provision, Yet this 
political power has only been founded on the basis of on going class 
struggle in the workplace. None of the three ractors just cited here has 
operated so forcefully in Otago and Southland where, by contrast, the 
industrial disruption was less protracted although by no means non-
exist ant. There were no worker representatives elected to either of these 
two Boards and no management proposals advanced for contract termination. 
In this chapter the effect of class conflict (or labour militancy) has 
been assessed for its part in the geographically uneven development of 
private contract Its ing role would seem to have more 
explanatory potential when viewed temporally rather than spatially since 
increasing militancy 
boards in the 1980s, 
by workel's, and financial restrict ions on hospital 
has not seen a growt h in cant ract ing out as public 
choice and managerialist theories might predict. Instead strong workforce 
organisat ion has managed to halt, if not entirely reverse, the process, In 
terms of the spatial dimension, the role of class conflict is less clear 
cut. Contracts have been terminated in places where clearly labour 
militancy was not an issue. 
Even where the work force is industrially strong, as in the above 
examples, the reversion to in-house provision has required a major 
electoral campaign as well as an industrial one. The role of elected 
bodies in determining patterns of resource allocation cannot therefore be 
held as insignificant as a crude Marxian perspective might suggest. On 
the other hand any theoretical explanation of uneven privatisation which 
neglects the role of the class forces at play would be equally remiss. 
To locate explanations for privatisation in terms of over powerful 
trade unions, as is the tendency in public choice theories, is to ignore 
the contradictory aspect of the process. As this chapter has shown, a 
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mili tant unionised labour force can inhibit, and occasionally even reverse 
privatisation policies. But this in no way means that the employment 
conditions of ancillary workers then cease to be subjected to further 
pressures. In the next chapter, which forms the concluding one of this 
the theoretical frameworks for explaining privatisation are 
reexamined in the context of both the uneven development of private 
contracting, as detailed in this study, and some of the current changes in 
tal service provision as they affect the ancillary sector workforce. 
1 The Hotel and Hospital Workers Union exists as eight regionally 
autonomous units. Besides public hospital ancillary workers the Union also 
represents, the same category of workers in private tals and rest 
boarding houses, hotels, motels, resturants and tearooms. At a 
national level, the eight regional units are ed with the 
Cleaners and Caretakers Union and together comprise the Service Workers 
Federation of Aotearoa (New Zealand). 
2 In New Zealand employment· conditions are set either by an Award or an 
Agreement. The former is industry based and applies to all workers within 
that industry regardless of geographical location. An however is 
and only applies to workers on a particular site. There would 
then be considerable geographical variations in conditions obtaining under 
different site agreements. 
3 This condition does not extend to workers in private tals who, 
while being in the same trade union, are covered by a different Award in 
which the basic pay rate is lower than in the public hospitals. Workers in 
Rest Homes are on yet another Award with still lower rates of pay. In June 
1989 the following basic weekly (40 hours) pay rates obtained for, 
domest ics (cleaners), kit chen hands, and orderlies: 
Public Hospitals $334.44 
Private Hospitals $326.02 
Rest Homes $308.60 
4 In New Zealand, all visits to General Practioners, while subsidised by 
the Government, have to be paid for by the patient at rates of between $20 
and $30 per consultation at 1989 prices. 
5 Work stoppages are forms of industrial action which can be classified 
in two ways; complete and partial stoppages. The former refers to strike 
action (ie the withdrawl of labour from the productive process) while the 
latter means the banning of certain duties normally required of the 
workforce and is generally termed, 'limited industrial action'. 
6 The Federation of Labour (FOL) together with the Combined State Unions 
(CSU) were two umbrella organisations which between them spoke collectively 
for the New Zealand trade union movement. In 1987 the two amalgamated to 
form the Council of Trade Unions (CTU). 
7 In addit ion to SHIFT t here are two ot her newpapers i Bsued by t he Hot el 
and Hospit al Workers Union which together deal wit h all of New 
Zealand. PUSH, issued by the Wellington branch of the Union, covers the 
lower part of the North Island while the whole of the South Island is 
covered by HOSP produced by the Canterbury Branch. 
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CHAPTER 10 
The Geography of Privatisation and the Provision of Public Hospital 
Services in the 1~90s: A Reconsideration of Theory 
There are two main purposes to this final chapt er. The first is 
to summarise the findings of the empirical research conducted in this 
thesis and to assess the explanatory powers of the theoretical frameworks 
that have been used throughout. The second is to draw some conclusions on 
the relevance of the mode of geographical enquiry adopted here for further 
C'.~ ____ _ 
research. Parallels are drawn wi th some recent work in t he field of 
regional r-and locality studies, and the contribution of the thesis is 
examined in the light of this work. To illustrate the theoretical 
contribution of the thesis, some contemporary developments in the 
privatisation of public hospital services are discussed in the context of 
the previous empirical research. 
The chapter is ed in six parts. The first details the 
exp lana t '";"""~~_-c,_:" ors identified,in earlier ers as being responsible for 
mediati development of privatised tal ancillary services. 
In the second part an att is made to set these factm-s into the 
theoretical frameworks of the thesis. The third part begins to address 
the second issue-of ~~:mcern to the chapter and starts by examining the 
limitations of tryiElg_ to apfJly these framewOl-ks in the given empirical case 
~---- .. -
study. These limitations notwithstanding, the contribution of the 
l-esearch towards underst anding the on-going developments in the 
privatisation of public 
In the fifth section 
tal care forms a fourth part to the chapter. 
some of the theoretical insights gained from the 
thesis are illustrated in a short account of the likely future 
development of public service provision under conditions of inc 
state fiscal stress. The concluding section outlines some future avenues 
for geographical enquiry in the light of the research undertaken here. 
10. 1 
Throughout the discussion on t he uneven development of pri vat isat ion 
in the preceeding chapters, a number of empirically observable factors 
have emet'ged as offering a measure of explanation. 
identified and can be classified as: 
1 Institutional 
2 Locational 
3 Professional 
4 Managerial 
5 Financial 
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Eight have been 
6 Political 
7 Industrial 
8 The socio-economic context 
All of them vary in importance across space and time and each is considered 
in order. 
Insti tutional: variations in the size of institutions, such as 
tal boards and individual hospitals, has clearly affected the 
ialit y of cont ract ing out. The desire to achieve scale economies 
in production has led to contract provision in the smaller rather than 
larger inst it ut ions. Hospital boards which have not been of sufficient 
size to merit the employment of managers specifically for ancillary 
services have found it administratively advantageous to contract out. On 
this basis it has been possible to explain the (slightly) er degree of 
contract provided ancillary services in the smaller hospital boards. 
2 Locational: the relevance of the spatial location of an institution 
to contracting out for its se~vice provision is reflected in the physical 
accessibility to contractors and the existence of a competitive market 
en vi ronmen t . Consequently contracting out becomes economically 
disadvantageous in remote geographical locations. Most of the institutions 
in these locations are also very small and so on the basis of size alone 
would be expected to contract out. The loeational factor therefore has 
worked in a countervailing direction to what the institutional factors 
based on scale economies indicate in respect of privatisation. 
3 Professional: a distinct variation usually exists between the sectors 
of any industry in the levels of formally recognised skills and 
ifications possessed by the workforce and management. The greater the 
of skill, expertise or professionalism, the more likely personnel 
are to have a much more powerful position in the bureaucracy compared with 
those in what are commonly regar-ded as unskilled occupations such as 
cleaning and orderly work. Contracting out of hospital ancillary services 
has therefore been implemented far more extensiyely in the least skilled 
sec.tors where there is not the same 0ppol~tunity for control of resources by 
the-personnel employed. The er degree of professionalism involved in 
dietary and, to a lesser extent, laundry services largely explains their 
lack of privatisation compared to the cleaning and orderly services. 
4 Managerial: by privatising a service, managers are relieved of the 
administrative burden that is entailed in its provision. In times of 
economic expansion the hospital boards in ons with the est labour 
shortage tended to opt for contract provision to rid themselves of staff 
recruitment and retention difficulties. In recessionary times however 
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cont ract ing out was resort ed to to dispose of the problems arising from 
the likely deterioration in industrial relations brought about by the 
need for greater cost effectiveness in service provision. This often cited 
claim by hospital boards was somewhat belied by the observation that 
regions with the most labour militancy did not exhibit the highest levels 
of privatisation. 
To some degree the managerial factor coincides with the professional 
one since some professionally qualified staff also have managerial 
functions. A separation of the two factors is merited on the grounds that 
managers necessarily have an administrative function in the bureaucracy in 
a way that many professionals do not have. The latter, whether dietitians, 
nurses or technicians, form a distinct part of the hospital workforce in a 
way which those in a purely administrative role (ie managers) do not. 
5 the greater the degree of cost savings an institution has 
to make, the more likely it is to contract out a service with the spatial 
variations int he extent of -the process reflecting different levels of 
financial constraint. This observation has found some empirical support 
in this case study in as much as service provision only came to be 
seriously reassessed with increasing financial restrictions on boards. 
Those boards that contract out have generally been under greater financial 
const raint than those that have not. However no convincing evidence was 
found to substantiate the claim that boards under the greatest (or- least) 
financial constraints showed the greatest (or least) levels of 
privatisation. The financial factor has had more explanatory value in 
determining the development of contracting out over time rather than in 
identif ng purely spatial variations in the process. 
6 Political: the spatial extent of privatisation should reflect 
variations in the political composition of different elected public bodies 
such as hospital boards. The election of conservatively minded officials 
could be expected to initiate a trimming down of the size of the public 
sector and the associated costs involved in favour of private provision. 
The lack of partisan based elections to hospital boards has prevented any 
empirical verification of this contention. Only in the case of Auckland 
in the latter half of the 1980s did pluralist politics play an obvious role 
in changing the form of service proviSion but even then industrial and 
managerial factors weee found to be equally, if not more, important. 
As far as could be ascertained hospital boards exhibited a degree of 
political uniformity across space and time, This very uniformity, though, 
considerably affected the sectoral variations in contracting out. A 
social class difference was found between the workforce in the ancillary 
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services and those members of the public elected to political power. In 
areas of hospital activity outside of the ancillary sector, the greater 
levels of staff professionalism involved has meant that the class cleavage 
with the elected bodies is not so marked, Consequently less political 
pressure has existed for privatisation in those areas compared with the 
ancillary services, particularly the cleaning and orderly sectors, 
7 the existence of a particularly militant and trade union 
organised workforce has manifested itself in two principal ways, Either 
hospital boards have been inhibited from adopting any privatisation 
policies or, where privatisation has been implemented, service disruption 
occurred to the extent that contract provision became neither economically 
worthwhile nor administratively practical, Both these findings 
contradict the managerial factor as a rationale for contracting out, In 
the latter case militancy induces contracting out, in the former it 
inhibits it, A critical factor to emerge from the study is that the 
magnitude of labour militancy .is all important in influencing the form of 
service provision, Limited and sporadic industrial action which may be of 
little more than' nuisance value' to hospital managers can satisfactorUy 
be left to private contractors to handle, Where there is major and 
prolonged indust rial act ion with service provision seriously compromis'3d, 
managers can no longer delegate their responsibilities to outside 
contractors. There arises therefore an arbitary and undefined 'threshold' 
between provoking and preventing privatisation, 
8 The Socio-Economic Context: the overall growth of the national 
economy has had an integral role to play in the development of contracting 
out in times of both economic expansion and recession. In the former case 
labour shortages 
while in the 
<government) J 
produced a 
often resulted in the introduction of private proviSion 
latter, the increasing fiscal stress of the state 
reflected in the reduced funding of hospital boards, 
pressing need to reassess the form of ancillary service 
provision. When labour was scarce it was necessary to make optimal use of 
it by maximising service cost effectiveness. In the converse sit uat ion, 
when labour was plentiful, it was also necessary to make optimum use of it 
because then finance was scarce, It is noteworthy that two very diffenmt 
sets of macro economic forces have produced the need for the same result, 
more cost effective service provision. 
Having summarised the empirical findings of the research the next 
issue is to relate them to the theoretical frameworks of the thesis. 
Wi thout rehearsing the basis of these theories which were presented in 
chapter two and three, it may be noted that they posit respectively the 
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processes of uralist politics, bureaucratic rationalisation and class 
conflict as being the critical anatory variables in the privatisation 
of service provision. Geographical variations across space, time and 
service in the development of privatisation should be a reflection of 
changes to these processes. 
10. 2 
At least four of the eight explanatory factors identified above 
readily come within a Weberian managerialist framework of bureaucratic 
organisational theory. These are the institutional, the locational, the 
professional and the managerial factors. In the case of the first two, 
private contracting may be either adopted to achieve scale economies on 
account of institutional size, or on the other hand, rejected because of 
cont ractors' high overhead costs due to remoteness of locat ion. Contrary 
to much cont ernporary publ ic choice 1 i terat ure, which argues that public 
sector bodies are inherently inefficient, the citing of institutional and 
locational factors shows that, on economic grounds alone, privatisation is 
not always indicated. 
The Weberian contention that bureaucratic (public) pt'ovision can be 
both rational and efficient, and therefore in the public interest, finds 
justification in this study. Structural limitations have been seen on the 
possibilities for both internal <public) and external <private) provision. 
If private is understood as simply 'external' provision and public as 
I internal' provision then even in a comprehensively 
there would still need to be a varying mix between 
provision depending of the balance of institutional 
location factors. Contracting out would still exist 
even though it would not then be private contracting. 
socialised economy 
the two forms of 
size and spatial 
in such an economy 
The dominance of in bureacracies was very much a concern 
of Weber on account of the knowledge they and the power this 
ga·ve them to influence al decisions. Insofar as allocation by 
market forces, rathel' than by bureaucrat ic control from ionals, 
would threaten the dominance of the latter, privatisation in the case of 
hospital services has tended to occur most extensively in the services 
involving the least of professional qualification. This 
explanatory framework though is also echoed in public choice t which 
argues that professionals, and indeed managers as well, will over supply 
outputs to maximise their status andlor within the bureaucracy. 
The Weberian framework however justifies the professional dominance on the 
grounds that the services concerned are critical to patient care and cannot 
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be left to the vicissitudes of the market place. Here public provision has 
a distinct (Weberian) rationality to it even if it is not necessarily 
efficient by the criteria of public choice theory. 
In terms of speci fically managerial factors, the Weberian approach 
argues that managers privatise their operations to ease administrative 
burdens. This again can be seen as a rationalisation process and it can 
be argued that hospital managers exhibited very little reluctance to 
contract out services in view of the problems it would relieve them of. 
By contrast with the predictions of public choice theory, all initiatives 
to privatise ancillary services came from managers themselves rather than 
from some external body insisting that the managers implement the policy. 
The results of this research provide substantial support for this argument 
and parallel the findings of Ascher (1987) in her study of contracting out 
in the UK. 
The role of financial considerations in the uneven development of 
privatisation can be placed more readily within public choice theory. In 
the public economy variant of this theory, state sector managers, being 
'maximisers', rather than 'satisficers' as in Weberian managerialism, will 
not pri vat ise services unless obliged to do so eit her by poli tical or 
financial pressures. Some support for this argument could be found on the 
basis that contracting out hospital ancillary services only came to be 
seriously reassessed when financial restrictions started to be applied to 
hospital boards. But as just seen managers saw privatisation as a ready 
solution to the problems brought about by greater financial constraint 
rather than an attack on their status within the bureaucracy. They did not 
therefore oppose the process. 
Invoking the role of political factors as explanatory variables needs 
to be set in the context of all three theoretical frameworks. The 
particular framework selected depends heavily upon whether the conception 
of politics employed is based on the operation of democratic electoral 
procedures or on social class forces. In the former case, pluralist 
public choice theory argues that voter preferences, taken as being a 
surrogate of consumer preferences and the public interest in general, will 
pressurise managers into trimming the size of their administration and 
levels of service provision. Alternatively public demand for higher levels 
of services than what the market would supply should see pressure on 
bureaucracies to take over the provision themselves. It has already been 
seen in the previous section that this framework had little explanatory 
significance in the case study undertaken here. 
In the Weberian perspective bureaucracies are dominated by 
-264-
appointed managers and 
social class difference 
formally qual Hied professionals resul t ing in a 
between this group and the ancillary workers 
employed. The former group is therefore able to exercise a degree of 
pol! tical power over the latter. As already seen this provides at letist 
part of the explanation for the sectoral uneveness of contracting out 
hospital services. Contracting out ancillary services is a means by which 
managers and professionals exercise their political dominance within the 
bureaucracy. 
In many respects the Marxian framework of class politics differs 
little from this Weberian concept. The knowledge and skills of the 
professionals gives them a control over productive processes and the 
workforce involved while they themselves do not have any economic ownership 
of the resources to be allocated. As to whether this theorisation falls 
wi thin a Weberian or a Marxian framework depends largely upon how 
11 berally the concept of product i ve asset s is appliedj whether st rictly to 
physical assets such as plant and equipment or to more nebulous forms such 
as the educational qualifications possessed by managers and professionals. 
Regardless though of which theoretical framework is invoked, political 
considerat ions do not provide much insight into the spat ial or temporal 
development of contracting out as revealed in the case of hospital 
services. 
The operation of industrial factors, by which is meant the labour 
militancy or class conflict engendered in the opposition to privatisation, 
can be set in a Marxian framework much more clearly than the poli t lcal 
factors just discussed. Here the focus of privatisation is centred in ~he 
sphere of material production rather than in market exchange relations (ie 
cost savings) or electoral political considerations <ia consumer 
preferences). The level of class conflict is posited as being a retard:~.ng 
factor in the development of privatisation and works in opposition to '.he 
managerial factors. Through effective organisation aimed to preserve 
working conditions, an attempt to raise productivity can be resisted. This 
resistance will likely involve service disruption and threaten the profit 
margins of the contractor making private provision economically unviable. 
Finally the role of socio-economic factors in the development of 
privatisation is another issue which can be analysed in terms of more than 
one t heoret ical framework. The cont radict ion engendered in increasing 
consumption of public services on the foundation of a narrowing economic 
(productive) base is recognised in the methodology of both public choice 
and Marxian political economy. The former cites demand for public 
services outgrowing the supply of resource while the latter is based on the 
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class antagonisms engendered in capitalism. The difficulty with these 
do not account for why explanations as they stand is that they 
privatisation first developed in times of economic expansion when there was 
neither state fiscal stress nor labour militancy. 
At that time the key factor was the shortage of labour brought on by 
economic expansion. Apart from implementing mass immigration policies 
to increase the labour supply, a requirement for sustained expansion in 
such a situation is to make optimum use of the available labour supply. 
Within Marxian methodology this means maximising labour exploitation to 
increase capital accumulation and contracting out is a means of realising 
this goal. A Weberian approach would cite the need to relieve public 
bureaucracies of administative problems connected with labour recruitment 
while public choice theory would look to the growth of private 
entrepreneurial activity in hospital services and development of mal-ket 
competition in forms of service provision. In this way the growth of 
private provision for public services can be explained within a theoretical 
framework, under conditions of economic expansion as well as recession. 
To~~mm~ri~:~!~e debate it can be said that public choice and 
Weberian perspectives ground their analyses in frameworks based on the 
actions of individuals; either elected representatives or appointed 
managers. By contrast the Marxian perspective ci tes pressure for 
privatisation as being an inevitable outcome of the development of the 
capitalist economy and the class structure of society engendered by 
capitalism. In the first two perspect ives the explanat ions rest primarily 
on the agents (individuals) within society while in the latter it is on the 
(class) structures of that society. 
Neither approach can be rejected but nor can any one of them be 
>",".---~-----
applied to the exclusion of the other. A prominent feature to emerge from 
this research is that the same socio-economic structures at the national 
(macro) level have produced some very different pri vat isat ion policies at 
the regional (m~so) and local (micro) level. Conversely however no 
privatisation can be said to have taken place in isolation from the socio-
economic environment. The development of private provis'ion for hospital 
anci llary services has in large part 
national economy. 
been a response to changes in the 
No single theoretical framework therefore can provide a comprehensive 
anation of the geographically uneven development of privatisation. 
Instead it is necessary to invoke all three theories to explain the 
spatial, temporal, and sectoral dimension of the process. Of equal 
importance is the recogni tion that the theoret ical frameworks have 
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I 
different explanatory strengths according to the time, place and industrial ) 
sector in which privatisation occurs, Weberian managerialism centring on J 
inat it ut ional, locat ional, profeSSional and managerial fact ors seems much 
better equipped to explain the sectoral unevenness of privatisation than 
eit her of the other two theories, On the other hand it presents a static 
analysis with little to say about changes to privatisation over time. Here 
public choice and Marxian theories fare better with their respective foci 
on increasing financial constraints and class conflict, 
The spatial dimension of the privatisation process at anyone point in 
~-,-
time often n-eedSlo-5e~expralned In ermsof~more than one theoretical 
framework, So whereas Marxian class conflict theory offers insights into ! 
the contemporary spatial pattern of privatisation, the situation that 
existed in earlier times is more readily explained in terms of a Weberian 
framework of analysis. In the next section further consideration is given 
to the inherent difficul ties involved in explaining uneven privat isat ion 
within a theoretical framework. 
10.3 The Limitations of Explanations of the Uneven Growth of Privatisati:m: 
Throughout the empirical part of this thesis it was seen that so Eany 
of the explanatory factors operate in a contradictory way with each other, 
So while smallness of institution was indicative of the desirability of 
contract ing out, it was countered by the remoteness of the locat ion, which 
applies to many of the small hospital boards in New Zealand. Similarly 
labour militancy either provoked or revoked contracting out largely 
depending upon either managerial prerogative or the relative industr'ial 
stength of the contending classes. Increasing financial restrictions on an 
institution have not always induced contracting out if the cost 
effectiveness of service provision has been deemed incapable of further 
improvement. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, When any of these explanatory variables 
have been quantified they have not shown any strong correlation with the 
observed level of privatisation. A further barrier to providing any 
assessment of their relative importance in presenting an overall 
explanat ion is that I as pointed out above, some of these factors have 
varied according to time, place and sector. So the industrial factor, in 
the form of workforce opposition to contracting out, has only been an 
important issue in the 1980s and then only in some of the largest urban 
centres. 
Financial restrictions, on the other hand, started to apply to 
hospital boards in thelS70s somewhat before labour force opposition ar'ose 
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to privatisation. Therefore changes to some hospital board's contracting 
out policies, at the end of the 1970s tended to be founded more on how 
institutional and locational factors affected the costs of provision rather 
than on issues of industrial class conflict. Rather than providing a 
convincing explanation of the spatial pattern of privatisation at anyone 
time, perhaps the maj or significance_of the industrial factor lies in 
explaining the stagnation in the development of the process after the mid 
1980s. 
Some of the explanatory factors have played a prominent role at 
various stages throughout the ent ire development of cont ract ing out with 
-~~~ .. ~ 
the ma~i~L_gE'le being particularly noteworthy. Contracting out to 
relieve managerial bility has been at least partly mediated 
spat ially by onal variations first in labour shortages and much later 
in labour militancy. The financial, managerial, and industrial factors all 
have a temporal and spatial dimension while ot such as the 
institutional and the locational, have been 
variable. 
primarily just ially 
The over time in these lat t er two could come about through 
changes in technology as this might 
economies, or accessibility criteria, 
alter the achievement of scale 
in service provision. Also changes 
in technology could affect the factor of professional dominance in the 
sectoral dimension as modernisat ion may effect i vely deskill the labour 
force. This case study of the development of privatisation is perhaps 
remarkable for the lack of technological innovation to have occurred in the 
servi ces concerned. A f urt her not ewort hy f ea t ure has been t he vi rt ual 
insignificance of pluralist politics to the process of privatisation as 
hospital board members have not generally been elected on a party political 
basis. It has not then been possible to assign a ial or temporal 
dimension to elector'al considerat ions. 
conditions, and levels of staff 
To the extent that 
prof essionalism, have 
.RQllt~Cftl_! 
affected 
privatisation it has been more in the sectoral dimension of the process. 
Services involving the least professional or skilled staff and whose 
I q 
social class 
and 
pri vat isat ion. 
category 
elected 
is quali tat i vely dist inct 
regional representatives, 
from that of appointed / 
have undergone the most J 
When viewed as an aggregate whole it is not therefore possible to cite 'y, 
I ~ 
:1 any one or 
Jj 
more factot's, at any one point in time, as being of greatet' 
explanatory significance than another to the uneven development of 
pri vat isat ion. The prolonged time period over which the growth has taken 
place " more than four decades - has meant that fact ors which became 
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prominent in the more recent periods have operated on an al existing 
pattern of uneven spatiality. This has rendered the establishment of! 
generalisations in the geographical development of privatisation as being 
highly problematic. 
In this respect parallels can be dra~1 with recent cal work 
in the study of localities and ons as exemplified by (1984) and 
the CURSl ini t iat i ve <Cooke 1986). Massey (1984) talks of the effect of 
new rounds or layers of invest ment being imposed upon ons with very 
different social histories and divisions of labour. She argues that, "the 
structure of local economies can be seen as a product of the combinations 
of layers of the successi ve imposi ti on over the years of new rounds of 
investment, new forms of acti vi ty" (Massey 1984, 117). As the 
privatisation process seen in this study has devel over time, and 
according to the structural conditions of the socio-economic environment, 
there have been in effect different 'layers' of privatisation. These 
'layers' have been i over the pre-existing spatial patterns and 
sectoral distributions of privatisation. 
It is perhaps tempt ing to conclude that each local1 t y/region or, in 
this case hospital board, is unique and that further geographical enquiry 
at the scale of concrete reality can but be a succession of case studies in 
which all attempts at theoretical integration will be forlorn. The shared, 
even if uneven, economic circumstances of all hospital boards across all 
time and space have provided the rationale for att s to cut the 
ancillary sector work forces. As to whether this has resulted in 
privatisation has upon a series of factors all of which are 
con~~~.£l_t_ across ti and industry (sector) such as regional labour 
shortages, location of institutions to markets, bouts of labour militancy 
etc. The search for necessary relat ions at the micro level has been 
somewhat less than fruitful as Massey--he-rself her 1984 work. It 
has not been possible to say, for example, that if a hospital 
certain size and location with a certain management and labour 
has a 
force 
structure, it will or will not privatise its services. 
example can usually be set alongside a counter example. 
Thrift <1987, 401) in a rej oinder to Harvey (1987) 
there is only a certain amount that can be pulled out 
Each support ive 
maintains that 
of the Marxian 
tradition to with the attempts to relate_13.geI1Sj' tostrt!t:tl.Il-::.§_ and vice 
-,~--
versa. He argues that one is forced to look to other traditions for 
illumination as the research in this thesis has made clear. It has to be 
emphasised though that appeals to other theoretical frameworks 
in \ 
explaining social phenomena like privatisation must not be to the exclusion 
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of structural theories grounded in class conflict. 
This conclusion however leaves the debate open to what Cochrane (1987, 
359) in his critique of Massey (984) calls a, I theoretical pluralism' 
which means using whatever methodology suits the argument at the time and 
place, 
bet ween 
So while this allows 
issues of national 
to, "move 
and international 
rather too easily 
restructuring and 
restructuring within individual enterprises" (Cochrane 1987, 359), in this 
study different theories had to be applied to ain, for example, the 
termination of contracting out in Maniototo and Auckland. The separat ion 
in time and space and the different contingent factors in each case has 
prohibited the application of any universal theory. Has then the retreat 
from structural Marxism, asks Cochrane 0987, 361), .. been replaced by an 
almost equally unhelpful search for structural relationships at the micro 
level - by a search for necessary relations where none exist". Smith 
(1987) in what he calls the I of the Empirical Turn' I maintains that 
Massey had to concede in the end, "that the case studies of local 
transformation could not be ised to provide an overall picture of 
change in the British space economy but rather had to be viewed as 
demonstrating only the di versity of potential 
63) . 
ences' (Smith 1987, 
Nei t her Massey nor any ot her geographer in locality/regional 
studies appears to have undertaken detailed studies of privatisation but 
the this research seems to bear a ressemblance to those of 
Massey. It might be tempting to conclude that locality/regional st 
are leading to a theoretical cul de sac and amount to little more than a 
retreat into the empiricism and ideographic studies of yesteryear. While 
there is certainly a danger of this, the conclusion may be somewhat hasty 
and is strongly denied by Cooke 0987>, responding to the critici:3ms of 
Smith 0987>, and by Sayer (989). 
In the first place this thesis has only undertaken one or case 
study and, at the time of writing, a definitive account of the CURS 
initative in Britain is not available. Secondly, to the extent that a ~III 
convincing theoretical framework for explaining regional uneven development III 
is still wanting, the rical approach adopted in this thesis does permit \' 
some broad generalisations to be made on privatisation which may be of i 
particular significance in the forthcoming decade. 
To take the matter further some comments are made on the current 
developments in the privatisation of public hospital care in the following 
sections. This may appear as a shift in emphasis from the previous 
discussion but it is ven on the grounds that it attempts to show how 
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this research has contemporary relevance for studying the privatisation of 
public service provision both within, and beyond, the public hospital 
sect or. Guidelines are given for developing further research areas. 
10.4 Recent Developments in the Privatisation of Public Hospital Care and 
the Provision of Ancillary Services: 
Towards the end of the eighties major changes started to occur in 
the provision of hospital services in areas other than the ancillary 
sect or. These changes need to be seen in the context of the increasing 
financial restraints imposed by central government on all area health 
(formerly hospital) boards. The immediat e result of t hi s has been an 
ext ensive reduct ion and somet imes complete eliminat ion of services in 
certain institutions. Some of the policies which boards have either 
implemented, or are giving consideration to are: 
a The complete closure of certain hospitals, and the sale or leasing to 
the private (hospital) sector of others, 
geriatric or maternity hospitals. 
most of which are 
b The reduction of services at weekends and nights by changing, wherever 
c 
possible, to day ward only treatment. 
The transference of provision from institutions, especially 
psychiatric ones, to community care under the guise .of a so-called 
'normalisation' process. 
d The contracting out to the private sector for, i) the care of 
geriatric patients upon closure of the public hospital and, ii) the 
provision of all services that are thought to be contestable in the 
market place. 
this could 
engineering, 
Apart from the ancillary services already discussed 
include pathology, orthotics, transport, gardening, 
works and maintenance services. 
e The establishment of a Resource Utilisation System (RUS) Consortium2 
to introduce a price mechanism within all boards and thereby set up an 
int ernal market exchange process. By impart ing a monet ary val ue to 
all resources and procedures it is intended to place individual 
departments on a stand alone financial basis and create a greater 
degree of transparency and accountability across all sectors of the 
hospital service. 
In addition to aiming for cost reductions many area health boards are 
establishing revenue generating policies. Leasing surplus residential 
accommodation to the private sector is one example, while another- is the 
contracting in of laundry from private institutions to be processed by the 
boards' own facil it ies where surplus capacity is avai lable. A further 
aspect of the recent privatisation trend in hospital services has come 
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directly from central government through there being greater deregulation 
of the market for private hospital growth. Government controls regulating 
the number of private hospitals that can be established have gradually been 
removed. 
Within the public hopital sector itself it is significant that there 
has not been, to date at least, any further contracting out of ancillary 
services. Upto the mid eighties private contracting of ancillary services 
was resorted to, largely in order to cut costs of service provision and 
relinquish administrative responsibility. By the late 1980s boards not 
only had to make far greater cost savings than could be obtained by merely 
cost cutting in the ancillary sector but in addition were faced with an 
industrially organised and militant workforce in this sector. Attention 
then spread to other services to the extent that entire hospitals, or 
parts thereof, started to be closed. An immediate effect of this was a 
further reduction, or elimination, of ancillary service requirements. 
There are two important d~fferences in the current situation compared 
with earlier times. The first is that attrition alone is no longer seen 
by the boards, as being sufficient to reduce workforce numbers to a level 
consistent with the budgetary allowance and therefore the trade union has 
had to enter into redundancy negotiations with the boards. Secondly, it is 
not only ancillary staff affected in these cuts but virtually all hospital 
staff. Instead of there being a direct attack on the ancillary services 
though contracting out and competitive tendering, the current cut backs on 
these services are coming about indirectly through moves to reduce the 
levels of other services particularly through selective hospital closures. 
In this case the privatisation process goes a stage beyond private 
contracting. Where formerly the state was the funder, although not 
the provider, the withdrawl of services or closure of institutions means 
that the former function is also relinquished. In such cases both the 
funding and provision then has to come from the private or even the 
voluntary or domestic sector. 
For ancillary or indeed any other hospital workers the issue becomes 
no longer just one of resisting productivity increases and maintaining 
standards of service provision but rather one of trying to counter the 
liklihood of substantial redundancy. Largely consequent upon the moves to 
greater community care ('normalisation'), hospital closures and the 
private contracting of geriatric services, the private hospitals and rest 
home businesses have increased considerably. As pointed out earlier this 
growth has also been stimulated by government deregulation of the private 
hospital sector. Not only are pay and employment conditions considerably 
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lower in these private places than in public hospitals (see footnote two. 
chapter nine). but their smaller size and more decentralised location 
makes workforce militancy much more difficult to organise. 
On the basis of these current developments it is worthwhile to recall 
the comment in chapter three by Ross <1983, 249) that. 'II each local advance 
or reform [by workers] may be subverted by the investors ability to evade 
it by moving again". While Ross was refering to the geographical mobility 
of private sector investors it is significant that in the state sector a 
not too disimilar process has started to occur. Here the state has 
, moved', not to a di f ferent geographical region but to a .di fferent 
No sooner have tal workers become industrially organised. albeit in a 
geographically uneven context, than their advances have started to be 
subverted by area health boards restructuring and privati other 
sectors of the tal service. As seen this has had adverse flow on 
affects for the ancillary workers. 
were amounted by the trade unions to gain seats on the 
area health boards in the 1989 local body elections with the intention of 
being able to infl uence fut ure policy making. In t he event none of the 
Community Health Coalition candidates gained seats on any of the boards in 
the 1989 elections. With the effectiveness of electoral <political) 
procedures be seen as wanting, current trade union policy is developing 
further along what may be called, using the terminology applied in this 
thesis, a 'managerial' and an I industrial' strategy. 
The first has seen an effort by the Hotel and Hospital Workers Union, 
in conjunction with the Council of Trade Unions, to have an 'industrial 
democracy' clause introduced into the 1989 national award document. The 
basis of this is that: 
The employer and the union recognise that they have a mutual 
interest in ensuring that health services are prOVided 
efficiently and effectively and that each have a contribution to 
make in this regard (Public Hospital Domest ic Workers' Award, 
1989. 45), 
Although the stated aim of the trade union movement in this area is the 
defense and ultimate improvement of the public health system <Harris 1989), 
the policy is born of a recognition that major is inevitable within 
the public tal system. 
By following a dist inctly • corporat ist I st rat egy. trade union 
representatives are seeking an opportunity to become involved in management 
decision making processes. Through such an initiative it is hoped that the 
introduct ion of workforce knowledge and experience into the management 
structure will illuminate ways for making more effective use of existing 
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resources without resorting to hospital closures, contracting out and 
further privatisation. The effectiveness of the policy in achieving this 
remains to be seen but viewed from a strictly theoretical standpoint it may 
be observed that trade union policies based on the electoral pluralism of 
public choice theory have been supplemented, if not supplanted, by those of 
managerial corporatism. 
By contrast with the distinctly Weberian strategy of management 
involvement in the decision making process, the industrial option relies 
upon expanding the base of Marxian class conflict. The intention is to 
enhance both the extent of the public health system and the employment 
conditions of those working within it. Some sectors of the trade union 
movement, according to Harris (1989) perceive a desire on the part of 
government and hospital managements to adopt a particularly hard line 
towards trade unions from which the latter concludes that there will be 
no payoff for their co-operat ion wi th either of the two bureaucracies. 
Harris (1989) maintains further. that: 
There is a growing call to resist cuts through mass action and it 
is a direct response to perceptions that the [health board] 
agenda is to cut back, casualise, contract out and privatise 
health care, not to restore the integrity of the public health 
system. 
To this end moves have been made both within the trade union movement 
as a whole and the unions sped fically represent ing hospit al workers to 
replace occupationally based award documents with composite awards based on 
entire industries, The ultimate aim would be to create a single federat1.on 
of health service workers covering all grades of employees from cleaners 
to physiotherapists and drivers to nurses, The establishment in 1986 of 
the inter-union Combined Health Employees' Committee (CHEC) was a notable 
move in this direction. Again it is much too soon to see the extent to 
which such inter-union coordination may be realised. Suffice to say 
though that a great deal of potential exists for conflict between 
managerial decisions, made in the name of market efficiency and cost 
cutting on the one hand and the employment conditions of the worl<forces 
and standards of service provision on the other hand. This means that the 
subsequent development of privatisation in the provision of hospital 
services in the 1990s should be particularly amenable to analyses within 
both a Weberian and Marxian theoretical framework. The likely unevenness of 
implementation should provide much scope for further geographical enquiry. 
It is already apparent that the sectoral dimension to the contracting 
out of hospital services is expanding beyond the confines of the ancillary 
sector. Within the ancillary sector itself, the question arises as to how 
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in the 1990s the spatial extent of contracting out is likely to develop. 
Certainly trade union opposition to the process will remain but with the 
recent changes to area healt h boards det ailed in chapt er fi ve, management 
will be freer to implement privatisation policies 
elected board membership no longer need be sought. 
as approval from the 
This may not be such a 
critical factor since earlier work in the thesis showed that the latter, 
for the most part, has not been much of an impediment in this matter. 
On the other hand with the establishment of internal markets, there 
may be a much lower financial attractiveness for external private 
provision 
considered. 
particularly when the element of contractors' profit is 
As hospi tal administration becomes predicated more on the 
operation of internal markets, the boards may find themselves being 
required to take management decisions which previously they would have left 
to contractors. Nevertheless downward pressure on staff numbers may remain 
for some time to come if cutbacks in other areas continue and to this end 
temptation will present itself to contract out to avoid having to deal with 
the militancy of the labour force. Again however the possibility of severe 
disrupt ion through industrial action, especially if there is an 
amalgamation of trade union representation on hospital sites, may inhibit 
the process. 
Since many of the policies just outlined are still only at a planning 
or feasibility stage it has not been possible in this account to detail 
their precise geographical context. However it should be clear from the 
work of previous chapters that whatever expansion in pl-ivate provision 
occurs, it will do so very unevenly across space. Of equal importance is 
the realisation that the contracting out of ancillary services represents 
one of the earliest policy attempts to introduce market criteria into the 
hospital service and has been something of a forerunner to the current 
developments in privatisation. 
It is therefore important that all the factors found to be relevant in 
explaining the uneven privatisation of ancillary services are also 
considered when studying the process in other sectors of the public 
hospi t al syst em. Financial constraints on the area health boards may be 
.,.=-------- ----
instrumental in stimulating further privatisation. The empirical research 
conducted here though makes it clear that the response to such constraints 
in respect of pri vat isat ion will probably be very uneven geographically. 
This thesis has demonstrated that different institutions operating within 
the same economic environment adopt very different policies regarding their 
form of service provision. In this way the work of Aschel- (1987) on 
contracting out and the contributions to Scarpaci (1989a) have failed to 
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provide a comprehensive analysis of why the process of privatisation 
develops unevenly across space within any given set of economic 
political conditions. 
I and II 
\' 
In spite of the limitations of explanations appealing to anyone 
theoretical framework, it is claimed here that only by examining the 
interacting and counteracting empirical factors identified in this thesis 
can an understanding be gained of the geographical development of 
pri v,?-jj_~c:\ti ()n. It must also be stressed that the methodological approach 
~, 
adopted in this thesis should also have applications to many other sectors 
of the public economy beyond that of hospital care. In the following 
section some comments are made on the likely trajectories for public 
service provision in the coming years by drawing some theoretical 
conclusions from the empirical work undertaken here. 
10.5 Geographically Uneven Privatisation Beyond the Public Hospital 
Sect or: 
The empirical case study in this thesis has show'n that public 
hospital ancillary services in the late 1980s have come under increasing 
pressures but without further pri vat isat ion by cOI2~ract ing out. It is 
primarily service cut backs in other sectors of the public hospital service 
that are having, albeit indirect ly but no less dramatically, such an 
adverse affect on the ancillary sectOl- workforce. PO:3sibly the major 
lesson to be drawn from these current developments, and from the thesis as 
a whole, is that the cont ract ing out p~~<:§.s§_ f.9r sel~\lice provision can 
(~-~"---,.. -, ,- -.----"_.--
event uall y~,,:~~~l t_~~!l the curtailment of the entire service. By the time 
-~------.--------~--- ,-~-- -------
hospital ancillary workers became sufficiently organised industrially, in 
certain regions at least, to resist some of the changes brought about by 
private contractors, the effectiveness of this militancy has been 
undermined as reductions and reorganisation take place 
of the hospital service. 
in other sectors 
Private contracting of a public service may be resorted to as a first 
attempt at cutting the costs of state provision with the geographically. 
uneven development of the process depending on at least some of the factors 
indentified in the case of hospital ancillary services. For example in a, 
deregulated transport industry, passenger transit services could be put out 
to competitive tender with the result being a very uneven geographical 
distribution in the private/public mix of service provision. In some 
regions the services might be retained under public (state) provision, 
while in others they would be contracted out to the private sector. Cases! 
might also exist in which there is sufficient resistance on the part of 
public body managements and/or work forces that in some regions the 
tendering out initiative itself is inhibited. 
the spatial development of privatised service 
highly uneven across space. 
Whatever situation prevails ( /, 
provision is likely to be 
Precisely the same analysis could be applied to many other public 
services that are administered on a res:iynaLoI~ub-=1l~ttt9Jl_~l __ ~~_§._~_~~_In the 
specifically New Zealand context the recent reorganisation of (i~~;';-t,) 
~------- -.~_/ 
government administration and the imminent deregulation of urban passenger 
transport will doubtless result in a distinctly uneven geographical 
pattern to the privatisation of many public services throughout the next 
decade. To the extent that these initiatives are occurring as a perceived 
need to reduce levels of state expenditure, serious consideration should be 
given by user groups and employee organisations to the possibility of 
service reduct ion if not event ual eliminat ion. 
Increasing restraints on pubUc _____ .§:<pendi t ure_ may therefore see 
pressure to eliminate some contracted out services entirely, with the 
ultimate effect being that the public sector economy contains a greater 
predominance of revenue generat ing 01' commercial services. There remain 
however a variety of public services that could not conceivably be revenue 
generating but whose provision must always be ensured by the state. 
Municipal refuse collection, highway maintenance and the hospital 
ancillary services considered in this study would be typical examples. 
These services may be subjected to privatisation through contracting out to 
the private sector but their continuity must be ensured to maintain basic 
public health or economic (productive) activity. 
When considering services that are provided in an institutional 
context, like public hospitals and schools, their component services such 
as cleaning and maintenance may be contracted out as a first cut at cost 
reduction. Similarily st at e subsidised passenger transport services or 
post offices may be contracted out to private (or voluntary) operators in 
the first instance. The provision of these contract provided services is 
ensured for as long as the funding authority - the state - is prepared to 
continue in its capacity as funder. Once this funding is no longer 
forthcoming then the entire school or hospital may close and the transport 
or postal retail service is discontinued. In these situations any 
residual provision tends to fall to the vol unt ary or domest ic sect or as 
there would not generally be sufficient commerical viability in the 
services to attract the private sector. 
Those state services regarded as revenue generating or commercial can 
be established as business (ie profitable) enterprises with the further 
option of sale to the private sector if desired. 
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On the other hand those 
that do not fall into this category insofar as they cannot generate any 
revenue or at least sufficient to be judged self financing present 
themselves as immediate candidates for contracting out to minimise costs. 
If still greater cost reduction are deemed necessary, then the service or 
institution can only be suspended or closed. Lack of potential 
profitability in these cases inhibits the entry of the private sector and 
so the voluntary sector is required to undertake provision. The extent to 
which many state funded, but privately provided, services remain provided 
at all could be a matter of intense political and industrial conflict 
during the decade of the 1990s. 
Returning to the geographical context of the debate, these conflicts] 
may be highly fragmented spatially in view of the uneven development of 
public service privatisation and curtailment. This observation should 
spark a note of caution in the undertaking of locality studies in respect 
of pri vat isat ion. According to Cochrane <1987, 361) there. is a danger 
that locality stu~.i_e~_.:nay, "reflect a shift away from attempts to confront 
or challenge capital at the national (Jet alone international) level and 
implies that instead we can aprfoach the problem on a piecemeal basis: 
sector by sector, type by type, locality by locality, unique labour process 
by unique labour process" to say nothing of hospital board by hospital 
board. By way of example the spatially fragmented nature of the workforce 
opposH ion to pri vat e contract ing of hospital ancillary services may be 
recalled for its inability 'to clean out contractors' across all space. 
Moreover the fragmentat ion of workforce opposition across sectors of the 
hospital service has also had a divisive affect on a variety of grades of 
hospital worker both within, and outside of, the ancillary sector. 
Findings of this nature beg the question of how future geographical enquiry 
into public service provision could proceed and this issue is addressed in 
the concluding section. 
10.6 Future Directions in Geography; Some Concluding Comments: 
'What is left to do?' is the challenging quest ion by Walker 
(1989) . In the paper he s a spirited defence of the relevance of 
Marxian methodology to the discipline of human geography. Being so 
broadly focused it is rather long on generalisation and extremely short on 
specifics. While it is hard to disagree with Walker <1989, 160) that, " ... 
we must continue to learn and expand our understanding of the world and how 
it must be changed ... ", he ves little indication of the precise nature of 
research required to realise this ultimate goal. His claim that 11 
historical geographical materialism remains an irreplaceable tool for 
social scientific insight and political direction. .. II is well made. Yet 
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the question still remains as to what specific form of research should be 
engaged in by geographers who are committed to working for enhanced and 
improved public service provision. 
The question of why privatisation takes place in region or industry A 
but not B has been addressed in this thesis using both Marxist and non-
Marxist theories. The main justification for this multitheoretical 
approach is that an analysis based only on a single theoretical framework 
will lead to an incomplete understanding of the privatisation process. 
This in turn could result in an inappropriately formed campaign of 
opposition by those adversely affected. Gaining a comprehensive 
knowledge of why such processes as privatisation develop unevenly within a 
similar socio-economic environment must be the first, if not the most 
fundamental, point of entry for future geographical enquiry. Clearly 
Marxian class conflict theory cannot, nor will not, be able to explain 
adequately the future regionally uneven development of public service 
provision and neither for that matter can the individualist framework of 
public choice and Weberian perspectives. 
The particular appeal of Marxian informed enquiry as illustrated by 
this thesis, is the way in which concerted campaigns of labour militancy 
can substantially alter the geography of privatisation. In so doing, 
business is then forced to look elsewhere for its profits, either in other 
geographical regions, or in sectors of industry, where the workforce is 
less well organised. If nothing else this thesi,:; ha,:; demonstrated that 
labour force militancy has been a potent force in inhibiting the drive to 
privatisation in hospital services. The extent to which this conclusion is 
valid in industries outside of the health services is particularly worthy 
of future research. 
For developing a geography aimed towards identifying political 
strategies for enhanced public service provision much closer attention 
should be given to studying how people resist and challenge policies that 
This will first require 'I' 
an understanding of why the policies of privatisation and service reduction 
services. seek to privatise and dismantle public 
are implemented in a spatially uneven manner since the formation of 
appropriate oppositional strategies may have to take different forms in 
different regions. So while in one geographical context electoral 
campaigning and public protests may be the most effective policy, in 
another large scale industrial action would be called for. Also to be 
considel'ed is the potential for the mutual reinforcement of oppositional 
campaigns. For example, public protests aimed to prevent hospitals and 
railway services from closure and cut backs should be analysed for their 
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ability to reinforce the industrial action that may be taken by the 
workforces in those services affected by job loss and reduced working 
condi t ions. 
In no way is it suggested that various modes of resistance adopted 
have been or always will be successful in their endeavours but this in 
itself calls for further research if only to try and understand why a 
campaign in one region succeeds whereas in another it may fail completely. 
A common tendency in both Marxist and non-Marxist social and industrial 
geography is to portray people, whether in or outside of the labour force, 
as being almost passive bystanders in the whole capitalist restructuring 
. process. While the earlier quote from Ross (1983) points to the relevance 
of class opposition to talist restructuring his account ects to 
detail the specific mechanisms by which labour has made advances in one 
region while undergoing setbacks in another. 
Redfern (1987) admonishes Marxist geographers with the well known 
quat e that the point is, 'not to understand the world but to change it'. 
and he argues that, "all the historical materialist studies in the world 
are so much fatuous posturing if they are not capable of advancing that 
end' (Redfern 1987, 417). This is certainly a persuasive viewpoint and 
the research in this thesis has provided a concrete example of ho~ if not 
the world, then certainly the geography of pri vatisat ion can be changed. 
It should also be stressed that Redfern's challenge is also applicable to 
all geographers who retain a concern for expanding and strengthening the 
public sectot' economy, be they Marxist or othel'wise. Walker (1989, 153) 
maintains that, "the relation between practical activism and worthwhile 
scholarly analysis is surprisingly loose" while Redfern taunts Harvey 
to, "abandon the reading groups for a while and go canvassing for 
the Labour Party in Oxford during the next election" <Redfern 1987, 417 ). 
Although verging on the polemical the point remains that much greatet' 
attent ion to details of people's working life ' at the coal face' would 
enable human geography to attain a more profound and ve social 
relevance in the coming decade. 
With the likely expansion of privatisation and deregulation, not only 
in Western but perhaps increasingly within the Eastern bloc countries as 
their economies undergo major transformation, it is perhaps appropriate to 
finish on Harvey's oinder to those who demur from applying the 
'totalising' perspective of Marxian methodology. What according to Harvey 
<1987, 374) is more 'totalising' than, II the penetration of capitalist 
social relations and of the commodity calculus into every niche and cranny 
of contemporary li fEl'. The highly uneven way in which privatisation 
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ensures, • the re-establishment of capitalism', to return again to Lord 
King's phrase <chapter one), clearly demonstrates that I geography matters'. 
But as the totalising force underlying the privatisation drive, the 
quest ion may be posed pace Massey, does geography matter? For 
understanding the development of privatisation, and its effects upon 
public services, it is imperative that the capitalist economy is considered 
as a totalising force and not a geographically fragmented one operating in 
a merely localised or regional context. 
CURS: Changing Urban and Regional Systems. 
2 The RUS Consortium comprises the Department of Health, Hospital 
Boards' Association and the RUS management board. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in Relation to Hospital Board Size 
(by Bed Numbers) and Number of Ancillary Services Contracted Out 
The 29 hospital boards (n=29) are grouped into 4- categories (k=4) 
according to the number of services contracted out. The number of services 
can range 
number of 
The 
from 0 to 3. The size of each hospital board is ven by its 
beds X for the years 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1989. 
of freedom between the groups is given by k-1 = 4-1 
and 
Research 
within the groups is given by n-k = 29-4 
hypothesis: Variation between the groups is Q..t.-=~.t.... than the 
Null hypothesis: 
variation within the groups. 
Variation between the groups is less than the 
variation within the groups. 
Analysis of Variance for Hospital Board Size 
Source 
Between 
Groups BSS 
Within 
Groups WSS 
Total 
Between 
Groups BSS 
Within 
Groups WSS 
Total 
Between 
Groups BSS 
Within 
Groups WSS 
Total 
Between 
Groups BSS 
Within 
Groups WSS 
Total 
Sum of 
Squares 
12,864,759 
28,964,791 
41,829,550 
16,160,582 
21,024,738 
37, 185,320 
15,585,955 
16,744,650 
32,330,605 
6,912,129 
21,533,147 
28,445,276 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
1976 
3 
25 
28 
1981 
3 
25 
28 
1986 
3 
25 
28 
1989 
3 
25 
28 
Variance or 
Mean Square 
BSSI (k-1 ) 
4,288,253 
si.i" = WSSI (n-k) 
F ratio 
= 3. 70 
= 1, 158,592 
BSS/(k-1) 
= 5,386,861 
sw 2 WSS/(n-k) 
= 840, 990 
= BSSI (k-1) 
:= 5,195,318 
Sw2 = WSS/(n-k) 
786 
S8;2 BSSI (k-1) 
;::: 2,304,043 
= WSS/(n-k) 
= 861,326 
F 
F = 
= 
F 
At 0.01 (1%) significance F = 4.68 
At 0.05 (5%) significance F 2.99 
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3 
25 
APPENDIX 2 
Calculation of Index of Privatisation for Ancillary Services in New 
Zealand Hospital Boards 
For each of the years under considerat ion, hospital boards have 
been indexed on a scale from 0, where there is no contracting out anYWhere, 
to 160 in which case all ancillary services are contracted out at all 
board inst itutions. A I privatisation index' P (say) is developed in 
which the total number of services contracted out S (say) in any board is 
weighted by taking the ratio of bed numbers in the institutions I (say) 
which use contract services to the total bed numbers T (say) in the entire 
hospital board. With three services being the maximum number to be 
contracted out, (the fourth, laundry, is not contracted out and hence not 
considered) the final expression is multiplied by 100/3 to reduce the index 
to a value between 0 and 100. 
The level or index of privatisation for any given year can then be 
~alculated frofu the formula P = 100[S x Il/3T. Data on bed numbers comes 
from the annual publication Hospital Management Data, which was only 
operative from 1975 to 1988 while 1989 data, which is the most recent 
available, was supplied by the Department of Health Statistics. 
been possible to develop the index prior to 1975. 
In summary form Y = Index of Privatisation and is ven as: 
It has not 
100 x [Services Contracted] x [Beds in Hospitals with Contractors] 
3 x [Total No. of Beds in the Hospital Board] 
where X Total bed numbers in each of the 29 boards. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Adjustments to Hospital Board District Populations for Cross Boundary 
Flows of Travellers (after Barnett et a1 1980) 
By the term • travellers' is meant persons who, on census day, are being 
treated in boards other than the one in which they normally live (Barnett 
et a1 1980, 255). The original base board district population figures 
are amended to account for travellers according to the formula: 
where 
NT; = ai/pi)x (Pi/r) 
and 
NAi. :::: Adjusted population of hospital board i 
N.""i Original base population of hospital board i 
NTi Population from (t 0) which net travellers drawn (dispersed) for 
hospital board i. 
ti :::: Net travellers, hospital board i, on census day. 
pi Inpatient numbers, hospit a1 board i, on census day. 
Pi :::: Inpatient numbers, hospital board i, for whole year. 
r = Inpatient admission rate for whole of New Zea1<3nd. 
The direction of the sign in the equation is determined by whether there 
was a net inflow (or outflow) of travellers to (or from) each hospital 
board. A basic assumption of the formula is that census night is typical 
for all nights throughout the year. The data on net travellers and 
inpatient numbers is drawn from Bed Occupation Survey 1981 and Hospital 
Management Data 1981, both issued by the National Health Statistics Centre, 
Department of Health, Wellington. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Methodological Considerations in the Gathering of Data and Information 
on the Contracting Out of Public Hospital Ancillary Services. 
The methodological approach adopted in this thesis has been aimed at 
, 
testing empirically the validity of three major theoretical frameworks that 
purport to explain the development of privatisation policies; public 
choice, Weberian managerialism, and Marxian class conflict. The 
application of these theories to the case study required the collation of a 
very broad range of data and information. This requirement had a major 
affect on the methodology adopted in the empirical research since the 
informat ion and data required did not exist uniformly across either 
space or time. Consequently it was not possible to approach the research 
using rigorous data sampling methods and survey techniques. Instead the 
research methodology had to be sufficiently flexible and informal to c~)pe 
with the spatially and temporally variable extent to which the informat:l.on 
and data was available. The effect of this was that the methodological 
approach tended to develop as the research proceeded. 
In order to test the applicability of the three theoreti.;al 
frameworks, the critical issue was to explain why New Zealand hospFal 
boards resorted to private contracting for their ancillary services. Of 
particular interest was the issue of explaining the variations that 
existed between di fferent hospital boards in their rationale for 
contracting out ancillary services. 
Prior to seeking these explanations for geographically uneven 
privatisation it was, however, first necessary to determine precisely the 
extent to which the policy had been adopted across both space and time. 
This necessitated gaining a knowledge of the growth of privnte 
contracting within, as well as between, the different hospital boards. 
In the first instance this was achieved by entering into written 
correspondence with 
29 hospital boards. 
the Chief Executive or General Manager of each of the 
The main question they were asked, was whether their 
respective board had ever used private contractors for ancillary service 
provision. 
If they had four further quest ions were asked. First was wt:ich 
hospital (s) within the board used contractors, second was the name of I;he 
contracting companies concerned, third was which particular ancillary 
services (ie domestic cleaning, orderlies, dietary, laundry) had b(~en 
contracted out and, finally in which year did contracting out commence or 
cease. All 29 boards responded to the approach with 25 report ing the use 
of private contractors and all of these responding to the next four 
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questions. With this information it was possible to establish, in 
cartographic form, the spatial development of private contracting over 
time. It has also been possible through this initial written 
correspondence to determine which private contracting firms were 
responsible for providing the ancillary services. 
Having established the basis of the geographical development of 
private contracting, the next task was to seek explanations for the spatial 
patterns ascertained from this initial survey and to find out the reasons 
for private contracting. This necessitated personal visits to each of the 
25 hospital boards that had used contractors, whether currently or at 
any time in the past. While initial contact had been with Chief 
Executives or General Managers, in accordance with accepted business 
,<, 
practice, further contact was directed specifically to the manager directly 
concerned with currently contracted out services. 
In most cases the research enquiries were directed to the Suppltes 
Officer of the hospital boardE!' central administration as this person had 
overall responsiblity for contract ancillary services. Some very sm;'lll 
boards did not have a specialised Supplies Officer and so enquiries were 
then address to either the Chief or Deputy Chief Executive or the 
Accountant depending upon who had most experience with the contractors. In 
the large hospital boards of Auckland, Waikato and Wellington there Has 
some delegation of responsiblity for contracting out to the local hospHal 
level, the Hospital Manager or Chief Administration Officer of the 
institution concerned was also interviewed. Through this procedure it v,las 
possible to interview all hospital board managers who currently had 
responsibility for contract ancillary services. A total of thirty five 
hospital managers were interviewed during the course of the research. 
One of the major difficulties in gathering information on contracting 
out for earlier years, was that almost invariably the hospital manager 
concerned was no longer employed by the board, and upon enquiry could aot 
be traced. Of the 20 hospital boards that first started contracting out 
prior to 1965 it has only been possible to trace one manager, formerly of 
the Vincent Board, who had active involvement in contracting out in these 
early times. Even for contracting out in more recent times this ',:as 
sometimes a problem where there had just been a change of managellwnt 
staff. In cases where managers had left a board's employment all attempts 
to trace their whereabouts were unsuccessful. In compensation thl'!re 
were managers in mny boards who had a long history of employment in the 
same position and who were therefore exceedingly knowledgeable on the 
subject of contract service provision over time. Often this significantly 
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to compensated for the absence of certain previously employed manage~ent 
staff. 
Interviews with hospital managers could be supplemented in 16 boards 
by examination of written records on contracting out. These records 
assumed several di fferent forms. A prominent part consist ed of let t ers 
t hat had been exchanged bet ween hospi tal board managers, pri vat e 
contractors, trade union officials, and managers in other hospitals. 
Internal memoranda relating to contracting out that were exchanged between 
the managers of a hospital board also featured prominently amongst the 
records. The tender documents and conditions of contract supplied by 
boards to the contractors had also often been preserved, along with the 
tenders that the prospective contractors submitted to the boards. 
Another important source of recorded information was the reports 
submit ted by hospit al managers tot he el ect ed board membershi p. These 
reports were significant for the revealing way in which they recommended 
either the commencement, continuation, alteration or termination of a 
particular contract. Where the subject of contracting out had aroused 
media attention, as for example in the case of industrial disruption, 
extracts 
boards. 
from local newspapers were 
These extracts provided a 
also found in the records of many 
useful basis for establishing the 
existence of an industrial relations problem in a board and stimulaed 
further investigation in this area. The Otago Board was distinctive 
insofar as it possessed a very detailed collection of newspaper cuttings 
from various parts of the country and this proved to be very useful in 
ascertaining the number of industrial disputes concerning ancillary staff 
both in the Otago Board and others throughout the country. Advertising 
and promotional material from contracting companies featured prominently 
amongst the preserved material and provided a major source of information 
on the business activit ies of these companies. Finally, circular let ters 
from the Department of Health on the subject of contracting out had also 
been kept on file in most boards. 
An important point to emphasise with the hospital board records is 
the variation in consistency between the boards. This variation occurred 
both in the time span covered by the records and the amount of information 
they cont ained. In some boards no records at all were available although 
it was not always possible to determine whether this was due to their 
absence or to being withheld from view ostensibly to preserve 
confidentiality. For example Wanganui, Palmerston North, Dannevirke, 
Thames and Tauranga had no records available for inspection. For the most 
part however hospital boards were readily prepared to open their records 
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and certain boards were noteworthy for the comprehensive nature of the 
information detailed. The Wairarapa Board was part icularly useful for its 
records which extended back to the late 1940s. Canterbury Hospital Board 
records were also instructive in this respect while for information on the 
more contemporary developments in contracting out, Auckland, Northland, and 
Otago were especially useful. 
Unfortunately there was often little consistency between boards in 
what was preserved and sometimes the records were fragmentary with 
important time periods missing. This variability in documentation 
prevented more detailed research being undertaken particularly regarding 
the termination and commencent of many hospial contracts in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Nevertheless the records that were available proved to 
be an invaluable source of information both for ascertaining the different 
reasons for contracting out and for relating these reasons to the 
theoretical frameworks of the thesis. An attempt is made in table i to 
summarise the extent to which records and knowlegeable personnel were 
currently available in the hospital boards. 
In addi t ion tot he hospital boards, correspondence was also entered 
into with all eight regional branches of the Hotel and Hospital Workers' 
Union to obtain information on the ancillary workers' response to private 
contracting. Five of these branches were also visited, the Northern 
(Auckland), Wellington, Canterbury, Otago and Southland. All except 
Southland were visited on two or three separate occasions. The people 
interviewed were either the branch secretaries or the organising officials 
depending upon who was most knowledgable on contracting out. As the 
opportunity was also taken to interview these officials at national trade 
union conferences this eliminated the necessity of additional perso~al 
visits to some branch offices. Unfortunately written records kept by the 
trade union branches on contracting out were far more sparse than in the 
case of hospital boards. Most of the information had to be gained from 
oral interviews with both trade union officers and work site union 
delegates. 
The lack of written records required the reliance on the circulation 
of questionnaires, an example of which is shown in figure i. This was used 
to gain details on the geographical variat ions in labour force mil i tancy 
and was distributed to all branches of the Hotel and Hospital Worker's' 
Union. The usual limitations in this approach to data collection apply; 
some questionnaires were never returned, some were incomplete and sometimes 
the data supplied was inconsistent with information available from other 
sources. Perhaps the greatest source of inaccuracy came from the 
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TABLE i; The Availability of Information in New Zealand Hospital Boards on 
the Contracting Out of Ancillary Services 
Hospital Boards 
Auckland 
Canterbury 
Otago 
Waikato 
Wellington 
Hawke's Bay 
Northland 
Palmerston North 
------South Canterbury 
Southland 
Taranaki 
Tauranga 
Wanganui 
West Coast 
------
Ashbudon 
Bay of Plenty 
Dannevirke 
----
Maniototo 
------------~-----Marlbourgh 
South Otago 
Taumarunui 
Thames 
Vincent 
Wairarapa 
Waitaki 
Availabili ty of 
Documented Information 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Fair 
Poor 
Poor 
Excellent 
Poor 
Fair 
Poor 
Good 
Poor 
Poor 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
Poor 
Poor 
Poor 
Fair 
Fair 
Poor 
Fair 
Excellent 
Poor 
Extent of Knowledge 
Possessed by Management 
on Contracting Out 
Good 
Good 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
Poor 
Excellent 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Good 
Fair 
Good 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
Good 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
Excellent 
Good 
Waiapu, Cook, Central Hawke's Bay and Nelson are excluded from this table 
as there has been no history of contracting out ancillary services in these 
Boards 
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unavoidable necessity of relying on people's memories to recount certain 
events. Sometimes details of an event in one region had to be acquired 
from another region particularly where there had been a rapid turnover 
of personnel. 
Apart from the hospital boards and trade union branches, the two other 
sources of information were the private contractors and the cent~al 
government's Department of Health. For the former, the main limitation 
was that so many firms that once supplied hospital ancillary services had 
gone bankrupt, and little or no information was available on them. Indeed 
it was only from hospital board records that any details of these firms 
could be found. Even the largest contractor currently providing hospital 
services (United Health Services) claimed to have no writ ten records of 
their dealings with hospital boards and trade unions. Aside from what was 
found in hospital board records, the gathering of informat ion on company 
activity could only be ascertained from oral interviews with management 
personnel at both national and regional levels. 
Information from the head office of the Department of Health was 
sought on two accounts. The first was to obtain data on the annual 
financial allocations to the individual hospital boards, while the second 
was to gain details of the role the Department played in hospital boards' 
contracting out policies. 
For collating statistical information the only published source of 
data was the annually produced Hospi.tal Management Data by the National 
Health Statistics Centre of the Department of Health. A serious 
limitation of this publication was that it was only produced between the 
years 1975 and 1988 and so it only covered part of time span considered in 
the thesis. In addU ion to this there were also problems associated with 
the data itself part icularly as it related to the ancillary services. 
These difficulties have been detailed at appropriate places throughout the 
text, (see for example chapter five, page 114 and chapter eight page 206) 
but in brief they amount to the existence of a lack of conceptual clarity 
underpinning the terms for which data has been collated. For example the 
concept of housekeeping services was not clearly defined. Consequently, 
there tended to be a lack of consistency in the compiling of data both 
across space (ie between the hospital boards) and time. With there being 
no other source of published data available, this problem was unavoidable 
but possible discrepancies were minimised by making individual enquiries to 
various hospital boards seeking confirmation or reassesment of the data 
they submitted to the National Health Statistics Centre. 
In terms of field work for the research, most of the time taken Has 
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. devoted to visiting hospital boards. Contact with trade union offices, 
contractors, and the Department of Health was usually coordinated ahlng 
with visits to the hospital boards. The initial field work for the thesis 
was done at the offices of the local Canterbury Hospital Board during the 
months of September and October of 1988. The entire month of November 
1988 was spent visiting all North Island hospital boards where services 
had been contracted out. Only Waiapu, Cook and Cent ral Hawkes Bay were 
excluded as there had not been any contracting out in these Boards. For 
the same reason no visit was made to the Nelson Board in the South Island. 
The initial field work was completed during the first half of 1989 by 
visiting the remaining South Island boards. After completing this first 
survey of the hospital boards to gather all the available data and 
information, the remainder of the field work consisted of additional visits 
to the Northland, Auckland, Waikato, Wellington, Wairarapa, Canterbury, 
Ashburton and Otago Boards. While the first visits had been undertaken 
largely to ascertain why. servic::es were contracted out, the purpose of the 
subsequent visits was to determine how the privatisation process occurred . 
. This required gaining a knowledge of the lines of communication that 
existed between managers within the boards and the how policy decision WE!re 
made. Another reason for follow up field work during 1989 was to clarify 
issues arising from the incomplete nature of the written infomation and 
the often inconsistent statistical data available. Detailed field work on 
the management structure and the ancillary work force of the Auckland and 
Northland Hospital Boards, was conducted during January and February 1990. 
Often trade union offices were 
subsequent field work. 
also visited during the course of this 
In summary, and to emphasise the point made at the beginging of this 
section, the existence of data and information on contracting out has been 
exceedingly variable in both quality and quantity. The forgoing account 
has attempted to detail the extent to which data was available for this 
research. While in many respects the data has been suboptimal, there has 
often been a sufficient supply of writ ten document at ion from various 
sources to provide an understanding of the geographical development of 
contracting out. 
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